Wright v. Ross ( 2023 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    CHRISTOPHER L. WRIGHT,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                         Case No. 20-cv-306 (CRC)
    GINA RAIMONDO, Secretary,
    U.S. Department of Commerce,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff Christopher Wright, a veteran employee of the Office of Sustainable Fisheries
    within the United States Department of Commerce, filed this suit pro se against the Secretary of
    Commerce in her official capacity. In what is left of Wright’s complaint after the Court granted
    summary judgment to the Secretary on a host of claims that Wright had failed to exhaust or raise
    within the statute of limitations, see Mem. Op., June 10, 2020 (ECF No. 10), Wright alleges that
    he experienced discriminatory and retaliatory conduct, and was subjected to a hostile work
    environment, at the hands of his superiors through a series of events in 2018. He brings claims
    under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
    Following discovery, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on December 22, 2022.
    In light of Wright’s pro se status and consistent with D.C. Circuit precedent, on December 30,
    2022, the Court issued a “Fox/Neal” Order advising Wright that “on a motion for summary
    judgment, ‘any factual assertions in the movant’s affidavits will be accepted as being true unless
    [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the
    assertion.’” See Order at 1, Dec. 22, 2022 (ECF No. 33) (cleaned up). The Court further
    directed Wright to this Court’s Local Civil Rule 7(b) on conceded motions, cautioning him that
    failure to respond to the Secretary’s motion could risk dismissal of his case and entry of
    judgment for the Secretary. Id. at 2.
    Wright had not responded to the Secretary’s motion by February 8, 2023, well after the
    deadline for doing so. The Court therefore issued that day an Order to Show Cause why the
    motion should not be granted, giving Wright until February 22, 2023 to respond. Min. Order to
    Show Cause, Feb. 8, 2023. He has not done so. In fact, Wright has not communicated with the
    Court in almost six months, since the parties filed a joint status report on September 1, 2022
    concerning the timing of Wright’s deposition. Joint Status Report, Sept. 1, 2022 (ECF No. 27).
    In Winston & Strawn v. McLean, the D.C. Circuit held that a district court may not,
    consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), rely on this Court’s Local Rule 7(b) to
    enter summary judgment against a nonmoving party who fails to respond to his opponent’s
    motion in a timely fashion. 
    843 F.3d 503
     (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Circuit explained that while an
    untimely opposition could result in treating the movant’s asserted facts as undisputed, the court
    may not “grant judgment ‘as conceded’ simply because a nonmoving party fails to respond.” 
    Id. at 507
    . Rather, the district court “must always engage in the analysis required by Rule 56 before
    acting on a motion for summary judgment.” 
    Id. at 506
    .
    The plaintiff in Winston & Strawn missed the opposition deadline by only two days.
    Given Wright’s extended silence here, it likely would be within the Court’s discretion to dismiss
    the case outright for failure of prosecution, wholly apart from Rule 7(b). In an abundance of
    caution, however, the Court will nevertheless treat the Secretary’s Statement of Undisputed Facts
    as uncontested, and briefly assess the merits of the Secretary’s entitlement to summary judgment
    based on those facts.
    2
    In short, Wright’s claims are based on a series of alleged transgressions that took place in
    2018. They consist of being excluded from office leadership meetings, being hassled about his
    travel reimbursements, receiving tough counseling emails from his supervisor, having duties
    added to his job responsibilities, and being told that he needs to figure out ways to better handle
    his workload. Compl. ¶¶ 25–33; 
    id.
     Ex. 3; Def.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 3. The government
    insists that none of these perceived slights constitute an adverse action for purposes of Title VII
    or the other statutes at issue. Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.”) at 1, 5–6, 8–10, 14. The Court is not so
    sure after the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Chambers v. District of Columbia, which relaxed
    the standard for actionable adverse actions in Title VII discrimination cases. See 
    35 F.4th 870
    (D.C. Cir. 2022). In any case, the government also argues, supported by its Statement of
    Undisputed Facts, that Wright’s supervisors had legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-
    retaliatory reasons to take each of the actions about which Wright complains. Mot. at 16–22.
    The Court agrees. The Secretary is also correct that the series of workplace-related actions that
    Wright describes do not come close to the level of severe and pervasive conduct necessary to
    make out a Title VII hostile work environment claim. See Durant v. District of Columbia Gov’t,
    
    875 F.3d 685
    , 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
    The Court will, accordingly, grant summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. A
    separate Order follows.
    CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
    United States District Judge
    Date: April 21, 2023
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2020-0306

Judges: Judge Christopher R. Cooper

Filed Date: 4/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2023