Wilson v. Planet ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
Brett Jones, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. )
Case No: 23-mc-00026-ACR
)
Planet, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Petitioner Brett Jones, also known as “Eeon,” filed this miscellaneous action on
behalf of “Kristina, et al, and Eeon, et al,” against respondents both real and imaginary including
“Planet, et al, et al; Doe’s 1-20, et al [and] THE FEDERAL RESERVE, et al.” Dkt. 1 (Motion to
Enforce) at 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action sua sponte without
prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The nature of Jones’ claims is unclear and much of his filings are illegible. As best the
Court understands, Petitioner seeks “the enforcement of Presidential Administrative Order 2039
and the regulatory provisions of the Federal Reserve Act.” Id. at 1, 14. He alleges that
“tendering of the collateral security to the local Federal Reserve agent . . . constituted accord and
satisfaction in the form of a ‘bearer instrument,’” and asserts that such debt must be accepted and
considered satisfied since there was a proper tender of payment. Id. at 3. Even if there was an
outstanding debt, Petitioner argues, he should have the right to a verified statement of
accounting. Id. Petitioner asks this Court to convert “the promissory note to a negotiable
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instrument as valid and enforceable and impose penalties on the Federal Reserve and its agents
for non-compliance.” Id. at 14.
LEGAL STANDARD
A district court “may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without notice
where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not possibly prevail based on the facts alleged
in the complaint.” Jafari v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 277, 279 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 621 F. App'x
676 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir.
2012)) (internal quotations and brackets removed). “[A] pro se litigant’s complaint is held to a
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp.
237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Redwood v. Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931,
933 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). But this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing pro se
to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a
plaintiff may or may not want to assert.” Id. (citations omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) a complaint must contain, among other
things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other words, Rule 8(a) requires that the plaintiff “give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (holding that the complaint must contain enough “factual matter” to
suggest liability) (citation and alterations omitted). A plaintiff must assert enough facts to give
the defendant “fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the [defendant] the
opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977)
(citation omitted).
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ANALYSIS
Jones’ petition does not meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. His factual allegations are
unclear—as is both the legal theory ostensibly providing the basis for the petition and the
legitimacy of the named Respondents. Some of the respondents Jones identifies, e.g., “Planet”,
are not legitimate respondents. As to those respondents who are legitimate, he has not given
them “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
Moreover, it appears that this case was improperly filed as a miscellaneous case.
Miscellaneous cases include “(a) actions to perpetuate testimony as in Rule 27, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; (b) actions to enforce administrative subpoenas and summonses; (c)
proceedings ancillary to an action pending in another district; (d) supplementary proceedings
brought in aid of execution; (e) motions for return of property in criminal proceedings; and (f)
requests for judicial assistance.” Matter of Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance
Applications & Ords., 300 F. Supp. 3d 61, 69, n.4 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Local Civil Rules
(“LCvR”) 40.3(a)(1) n.1, 57.10(a)(1) n.3). Further, miscellaneous cases may “relate[] to a
bankruptcy case or proceeding,” id. (citing LCvR 403.3(c)(2)(iii)), may include a “motion or
application filed in connection with a grand jury subpoena or other matter occurring before a
grand jury,” id. (citing LCrR 6.1), and may include “[a]ny news organization or other interested
person, other than a party or a subpoenaed witness, who seeks relief relating to any aspect of the
proceedings in a criminal case.” Id. (citing LCrR 57.6). Assuming that Jones intended to address
a loan agreement or bank transaction, a miscellaneous action is not the proper judicial vehicle to
resolve this dispute.
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Finally, while Jones may appear pro se, he is not authorized to seek relief on behalf of
other litigants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“[P]arties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel.”); Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(rejecting pro se party’s attempt to represent other parties).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this court hereby DISMISSES this action sua sponte without
prejudice.
DATE: April 25, 2023 _ _
Ana C. Reyes
United States District Judge
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