Stedman v. Department of Homeland Security ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
RAYMOND STEDMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 22-2924 (BAH)
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Raymond Stedman filed the instant complaint in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia against the defendant Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which
removed the action to this Court before filing the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5. For the
reasons discussed below, this motion is granted.1
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that, over a 12- to 14-year period, “originat[ing] during the Bush
presidency,” his “home and property [have] been commandeered or overrun by the government
and other media entities.” Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1-2.2 He states that he “was the focal point of
an ‘open forum’ (spygate Obamagate) cyber riots and attacks, in direct contact with world
1
DHS’s first motion to dismiss, ECF No. 4, is dismissed as moot, leaving for consideration only DHS’s
corrected motion, ECF No. 5. In addition, DHS’s unopposed motion for an extension of time to file its reply, ECF
No. 8, is granted nunc pro tunc.
2
The page numbers cited are those applied by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing
(“CM/ECF”) system.
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leaders (Kim Jun Un [sic], Vlad Putin, Queen Elizabeth, the prince of Arabia), terrorist
organizations, and cults,” and to have had his “intellectual property . . . taken at will from the
privacy of [his] own home.” Id. Over this time period, plaintiff alleges, his “privacy and civil
rights were violated beyond belief.” Id. According to plaintiff, “bombers or army transport
planes fly[] directly over [his] house,” id. at 3, and on one occasion an “attack chopper with a red
light was 75 feet over [his] driveway,” id. at 3-4. “Besides the invasion of privacy, harassment,
criminal negligence, wreck less [sic] endangerment, and obstruction of justice,” plaintiff
allegedly suffers “injury to [his] brain and body caused by overwhelming signal, riots and ritual
like attacks by media and government entities as well as a victimized public and military and
intelligence agencies.” Id. at 4. To compensate for his injuries, plaintiff demands $45 million.
Id. at 1.
DHS moves to dismiss the complaint, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6), arguing that: (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See generally Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in
Support of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 9-12, ECF No. 5.3
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
“Article III of the Constitution prescribes that ‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited
subject-matter jurisdiction’ and ‘ha[ve] the power to decide only those cases over which
Congress grants jurisdiction.’” Bronner ex rel. Am. Stud. Ass’n v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 602
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 317
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For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, the Court proceeds as if service of process had been effected
and will not address DHS’s alternative argument that dismissal is warranted for insufficient service of process under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). See Def.’s Mem. at 12-13.
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(D.C. Cir. 2012)); see also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“‘Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute.’” (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994))).
Absent subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, the court must dismiss it. See Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506–07 (2006) (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)); FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim
at issue. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). When considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must determine jurisdictional questions by accepting as
true all uncontroverted material factual allegations contained in the complaint and “‘constru[ing]
the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff[s] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.’” Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 36 F.4th 278, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir.
2011)).
B. Rules 8 and 12(b)(6)
A plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he
is] entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Ideally, “[e]ach allegation [of a complaint is] simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). At the same time, to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
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is plausible on its face.’” VoteVets Action Fund v. McDonough, 992 F.3d 1097, 1104 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S.
744, 757–58 (2014). A facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not ‘“merely consistent
with’ a defendant’s liability” but that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556); see Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“Plausibility requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully[.]”).
In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the whole complaint must be considered, with
all factual allegations accepted as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see
also Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
The Court cannot, however, “assume the truth of legal conclusions, nor [does it] ‘accept
inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.’” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19(alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales,
477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (stating that conclusory
allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true”).
In applying these standards to pleadings filed by pro se litigants, the court must consider
the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.”
Johnson v. District of Columbia, 927 F.3d 539, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Whole
Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In addition, a pro se complaint must “‘be liberally construed’ and ‘held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Bowman v. Iddon, 848 F.3d
1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff is not excused
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from complying with applicable procedural rules and “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits
the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. District of
Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
678); see also Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s lawsuit must be dismissed on multiple grounds, since, as explained below,
whether plaintiff’s claims are broadly construed as torts or violations of his civil rights.
A. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims
“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, . .
. and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain
the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted); United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent, and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). “A
waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed,’”
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4
(1969)), and absent an express waiver, “sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and
its agencies from suit,” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
1. Tort Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act
Insofar as plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, DHS argues, Def.’s Mem. at 10-12, ECF No. 5,
they may proceed only under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80,
which permits a civil suit for “personal injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
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employment,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).4 The FTCA waives sovereign immunity “‘under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.’” Hornbeck Offshore
Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1)). Thus, the FTCA renders the United States subject to suit for certain – but not all –
tort claims. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Insofar as plaintiff brings negligence claims, see Pl.’s Response to Mot. of Dismissal
(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1, ECF No. 6; Pl.’s Response to Mot. of Dismissal (“Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n”) at 2,
ECF No. 10, such claims would proceed under the FTCA, which in relevant part provides:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have
first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his
claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and
sent by certified or registered mail.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, claimants may not sue the United States
“in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies,” and claimants’
“fail[ure] to heed that clear statutory command” warrants dismissal of their claims. McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); see Henderson v. Ratner, No. 10-5035, 2010 WL
2574175, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of FTCA claim where
“[a]ppellant failed to demonstrate that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit
in the district court”); Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 F. App’x 445, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per
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The United States of America is the only proper defendant to a suit under the FTCA. See, e.g., Hall v.
Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 496 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D.D.C. 2007). Even though this pro se plaintiff has not
named the United States as a party defendant, this pleading defect is overlooked and plaintiff’s claims are treated as
if he brought them against the United States directly.
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curiam) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of unexhausted FTCA claim “for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction”).
DHS notes that the complaint nowhere alleges that plaintiff presented to the agency the
requisite administrative claim, without which he may not pursue his tort claims in district court.
See Def.’s Mem. at 10-11; Def.’s Reply in Support of its Mot. to Dismiss (“Reply”) at 2-3, ECF
No. 11. Although plaintiff’s oppositions do not mention the FTCA, plaintiff produces a copy of
a Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (SF-95), explaining the basis of his claim as follows:
I was the target in ‘Q-anon’ pirated signal cult. For going on almost
twenty years now. While in contact with govt. employees, police
stations etc. Pre jan. 6 when the cyber riots turned to nation wide
riots and shootings. Even on the international level the un canny
[sic] similarity to what I said in the privacy of my own home kept
appearing. I’ve been recorded, taped monitored, redacted,
plagiarized, and repeated in courts. With no concern for my safety
and rights, or the situation at hand. Millions of victims, billions in
intellectual losses. Have resulted in targeting, hackings, attacks, to
me and other innocent people. My name is well known across the
world.
Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n, Ex. at 1, ECF No. 10-1. According to plaintiff, these events occurred on
November 22, 2022, at 12:25 a.m., see id., long after his complaint, had already been filed, on
April 28, 2022, ECF No. 1-2, and shortly after DHS had filed the pending motion to dismiss, on
November 16, 2022, alerting plaintiff to the defect under the FTCA. This belated effort to
present an administrative claim to DHS does not demonstrate compliance with the FTCA for
purposes of this lawsuit, as plaintiff fails to show both presentment of his claim to DHS and
denial of “his claim . . . [DHS] in writing and sent by certified or registered mail,” 28 U.S.C. §
2675(d), prior to filing this civil action in Superior Court on April 28, 2022. “The FTCA bars
claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative
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remedies,” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113,and thus plaintiff’s failure to exhaust warrants dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction.
b. Constitutional Tort Claims
Insofar as plaintiff’s tort claims arise from the violation of his civil rights, see, e.g., Pl.’s
Opp’n at 2; Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n at 2, sovereign immunity bars them. The “United States simply
has not rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.” Meyer, 510 U.S.
478; see Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[T]he United
States has not consented to be sued for monetary damages based on a constitutional
violation[.]”); Boling v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2017) (“First, the
law is well established that Congress has not waived the United States’ immunity with respect to
tort claims arising under the Constitution.”), aff’d, No. 17-5285, 2018 WL 6721354 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 19, 2018).
2. Remaining Tort Claims
DHS argues that plaintiff’s remaining claims, generally described by plaintiff as
“invasion of privacy, harassment, criminal negligence, wreck less [sic] endangerment, and
obstruction of justice,” Compl. at 3, “fall[] within the set of activities for which sovereign
immunity has not been waived,” Def.’s Mem. at 12. In other words, DHS argues that these
claims are intentional torts excepted from the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (providing that FTCA does not apply “[a]ny claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights”).
Given the vague and conclusory nature of the complaint, it is difficult to determine
whether or what intentional torts plaintiff intends to raise. That said, plaintiff’s allegations of
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having “walked into a[s] assassination style shooting,” Compl. at 3, having military aircraft fly
over his house, see id. at 3-4, and having suffered physical injury, see id. at 4, suggest assault and
battery claims. If plaintiff indeed brings assault and battery claims, they cannot proceed because
sovereign immunity bars them.
Plaintiff responds with a request that this Court “wa[i]ve sovereignty.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2;
see Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n at 1. According to plaintiff, his “circumstances are unprecedented and
seem to be the cause of international rioting and shootings,” such that “[l]iability, responsibility
and legislation would be great for victims and promote awareness of this situation.” Pl.’s Opp’n
at 2. This request is beyond the power of this Court to grant because only the United States
Congress has the authority to waive sovereign immunity. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 (“A waiver
of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory
text[.]”).
B. The Complaint Fails to State Claims Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
DHS argues that “this Court cannot entertain jurisdiction over the patently insubstantial
pleading before it,” as the “complaint makes claims that are wholly incredible, frivolous, and
incoherent.” Def.’s Mem. at 9. The Court concurs.
A federal court is “without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if
they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial,
[or] obviously frivolous.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Mindful, however, that a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be liberally
construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Brown v. District of Columbia, 514
F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the Court finds plaintiff’s allegations, to include his direct
contact with world leaders, Compl. at 3, and injuries to his “brain and body caused by
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overwhelming signal,” id. at 4, to be “patently insubstantial,” as they are “flimsier than doubtful
or questionable . . . [and] essentially fictitious,” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III. CONCLUSION
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tort claims and that the
complaint otherwise fails to state a viable legal claim. Accordingly, DHS’s motion to dismiss
will be granted. An Order consistent with this conclusion is issued separately.
DATE: April 27, 2023 /s/ Beryl A. Howell
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge
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