Harris v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation ( 2023 )


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  •                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    LAWRENCE LOGGINS,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    Civ. Action No. 21-1129
    NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER                 (EGS/MAU)
    CORPORATION,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    I.       Introduction
    Mr. Lawrence Loggins (“Mr. Loggins” or “Plaintiff”) brings
    this lawsuit against National Railroad Passenger Corporation
    (“Amtrak” or “Defendant”), alleging racial discrimination and
    hostile work environment claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    . See
    Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 26. 1
    Amtrak moved to dismiss Mr. Loggins’ Second Amended
    Complaint. See Def. National Railroad Passenger Corporation’s
    Mot. Dismiss Pl. Lawrence Loggins’ Second Am. Compl., or
    Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 27. The Court
    thereafter referred this case to a magistrate judge for full
    case management, see Minute Order (June 16, 2022); and the case
    1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
    Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of
    the filed documents.
    1
    was later directly assigned to Magistrate Judge Moxila A.
    Upadhyaya, see Docket Civ. Action No. 21-1129. On December 1,
    2022, Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya issued a Report and
    Recommendation (“R. & R.”) recommending that the Court grant
    Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for
    failure to state a claim or in the alternative that the Court
    transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
    District of Illinois. See R. & R., ECF No. 32.
    Pending before the Court is Mr. Loggins’ Objections to the
    R. & R., see Objs. Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings &
    Recommendations (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 33. Upon careful
    consideration of the R. & R.; the objections, opposition, and
    reply thereto; the applicable law; and the entire record herein,
    the Court hereby the Court hereby ADOPTS IN PART Magistrate
    Judge Upadhyaya’s R. & R., see ECF No. 32; and GRANTS Amtrak’s
    Motion to Transfer Venue, see ECF No. 27.
    II.   Background
    A.   Factual
    Mr. Loggins is a Black man who lives in Chicago and
    formerly worked as a conductor for Amtrak. See Second Am.
    Compl., ECF No. 26 at 1 & ¶ 10. During his employment, he
    admitted that he had sold cash fare tickets and failed to turn
    in the proceeds of those sales. 
    Id. ¶ 13
    . Amtrak removed him
    from service. 
    Id.
     Following an audit of his account, Amtrak
    2
    found that he had failed to transmit $4,331.25 for a two-year
    period but permitted him to return to his position if he made
    restitution and accepted discipline. 
    Id. ¶ 14
    . Mr. Loggins
    agreed to these terms and also waived the investigation. 
    Id. ¶ 15
    .
    Amtrak continued to audit Mr. Loggins despite his
    understanding that the waiver included “all outstanding
    deficiencies in his account.” 
    Id. ¶¶ 15-16
    . The audit revealed
    additional cash fares that he had failed to transmit. 
    Id. ¶ 16
    .
    Amtrak investigated and dismissed him from service. 
    Id. ¶ 17
    .
    Mr. Loggins appealed his dismissal to the Public Law Board.
    
    Id. ¶ 18
    . The Public Law Board directed Amtrak to rehire him but
    required him to make restitution for the remaining deficiency in
    his account. 
    Id. ¶ 18
    . Mr. Loggins does not allege whether he
    failed to turn in other funds or whether he paid any additional
    restitution to Amtrak. See generally 
    id. ¶¶ 1-26
    .
    In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Loggins alleges that
    “White employees engaged in similar misconduct but were not
    similarly disciplined.” 
    Id. ¶ 19
    . He points to one example for
    comparison: Mr. Lonnie Lavoie (“Mr. Lavoie”), a White man who
    worked as a conductor and revenue instructor in Chicago. 
    Id.
    According to Mr. Loggins, Mr. Lavoie failed to turn in $1,652.00
    of proceeds from cash fare sales but did not disclose this
    information to Amtrak. 
    Id. ¶¶ 20-21
    . Mr. Loggins also alleges
    3
    that Amtrak dismissed Mr. Lavoie but later rehired him and
    expunged his charges without requiring that he repay the
    company. 
    Id. ¶¶ 22-24
    .
    Mr. Loggins’ remaining allegations are conclusory and
    devoid of factual content, so the Court will not recount them
    here. See 
    id. ¶¶ 12, 25-31
    .
    B.   Procedural
    On April 13, 2022, Amtrak moved to dismiss Mr. Loggins’
    Second Amended Complaint or, alternatively, to transfer the case
    to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
    Illinois. See Def. National Railroad Passenger Corporation’s
    Mot. Dismiss Pl. Lawrence Loggins’ Second Am. Compl., or
    Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 27 at 1. Mr. Loggins
    filed a brief in opposition on April 27, 2022, see Pl.’s Mem. P.
    & A. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pl. Loggins’ Second Am. Compl.,
    or Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 28; and Amtrak
    filed its reply brief on May 4, 2022, see Def.’s Reply Supp.
    Mot. Dismiss Second Am. Compl., or Alternatively, Mot. Transfer
    Venue, ECF No. 29. On December 1, 2022, Magistrate Judge
    Upadhyaya issued her R. & R. recommending that the Court grant
    Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss or transfer the case to the U.S.
    District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See R. &
    R., ECF No. 32 at 9.
    4
    On December 16, 2022, Mr. Loggins submitted Objections to
    the R. & R. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33. Amtrak filed an
    opposition brief on January 26, 2023. See Def. National Railroad
    Passenger Corporation’s Opp’n Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s R.
    & R. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 35. Mr. Loggins replied on
    January 27, 2023. See Pls.’ Rep[l]y Def. National Railroad
    Passenger Corporation’s Opp’n Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s
    Proposed Findings & Recommendations (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 37.
    The objections are now ripe and ready for adjudication.
    III. Legal Standard
    A.   Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party
    may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has
    entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(2).
    A district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
    disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or
    modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
    made by the magistrate judge.”). A district court “must
    determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
    that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
    “If, however, the party makes only conclusory or general
    objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the
    Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v.
    5
    Brown, 
    979 F. Supp. 2d 86
    , 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous
    standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great
    deference” and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire
    evidence the court is left with the definite and firm conviction
    that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia,
    No. CV 16-1920 (CKK), 
    2019 WL 4345712
    , at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,
    2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v.
    Mukasey, 
    608 F. Supp. 2d 50
    , 52 (D.D.C. 2009)).
    Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the
    proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made
    and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections
    which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the
    magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected to’ and are
    therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Astrue, No.
    08-2133, 
    2009 WL 3541001
    , at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009)). The
    Court reviews Mr. Loggins’ objections de novo.
    B.   Transfer Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1404
    (a)
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1404
    (a) authorizes a court to transfer an
    action to any other district where it might have been brought
    “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the
    interest of justice.” The purpose of § 1404(a) “is to prevent
    the waste of time, energy, and money, and to protect litigants,
    6
    witnesses, and the public from unnecessary inconvenience and
    expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 
    376 U.S. 612
    , 616 (1964).
    District courts accordingly have discretion under Section
    1404(a) to transfer a case based on an “individualized case-by-
    case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Berry v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Just., 
    49 F. Supp. 3d 71
    , 74 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing
    Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 
    487 U.S. 22
    , 29 (1988)); see
    also Beall v. Edwards Lifesciences LLC, 
    310 F. Supp. 3d 97
    , 102-
    103 (D.D.C. 2018); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey, 
    437 F. Supp. 2d 42
    , 45 (D.D.C. 2006). Section 1404(a) is meant to be a
    “judicial housekeeping measure” rather than a “forum-shopping
    instrument.” Van Dusen, 
    376 U.S. at 636
    .
    A defendant bears the “heavy burden of establishing that
    [the] [p]laintiff[’s] choice of forum is inappropriate” such
    that this Court should transfer this case out of this District
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1404
    (a). Jalloh v. Underwood, 
    300 F. Supp. 3d 151
    , 155-56 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Thayer/Patric of
    Educ. Funding L.L.C. v. Pryor Res., Inc., 
    196 F. Supp. 2d 21
    , 31
    (D.D.C. 2002)); Aracely, R. v. Nielsen, 
    319 F. Supp. 3d 110
    , 127
    (D.D.C. 2018); see also Garcia v. Acosta, 
    393 F. Supp. 3d 93
    ,
    108 (D.D.C. 2019); Accurso v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Case No.
    17-CV-02626 (APM), 
    2018 WL 4964501
    , at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 15,
    2018). To satisfy this burden, a defendant “must show that
    considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh
    7
    in favor of transfer.” Jalloh, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 155 (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    To justify a transfer, a defendant must make two showings.
    Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc., 
    403 F. Supp. 2d 68
    , 71 (D.D.C.
    2005). First, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff
    could have brought suit in the proposed transferee district. 
    Id. at 71-72
    . Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1391
    (b), a suit may be brought
    in a judicial district: (1) where “any defendant resides, if all
    defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
    located”; (2) where “a substantial part of the events or
    omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”; or (3) if there is
    no judicial district where the case may be brought as provided
    by the first two categories, where “any defendant is subject to
    the court’s personal jurisdiction.” Second, the defendant must
    demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interests
    of justice weigh in favor of a transfer. Devaughn, 
    403 F. Supp. 2d at 71
    ; Berry, 
    49 F. Supp. 3d at 75
    . “To determine whether
    ‘considerations of convenience and the interests of justice
    weigh in favor of a transfer,’ courts consider several private-
    interest factors, including: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of
    forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of
    the defendant; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether
    the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties;
    (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access
    8
    to sources of proof.” Beall, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 103. Courts also
    consider whether certain public-interest factors weigh in favor
    of transfer, including “(1) the transferee’s familiarity with
    the governing laws, (2) the relative congestion of each court,
    and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at
    home.” Id.
    III. Analysis
    Mr. Loggins objects to Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya’s
    recommendation that the Court transfer this case to the U.S.
    District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. For the
    reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R. & R. as to this
    issue.
    Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya determined that the convenience
    of the parties and the interests of justice weigh in favor of
    transfer. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 9. To reach this
    conclusion, she explained that the following factors support
    transfer: (1) Mr. Loggins resides in Chicago; (2) the alleged
    misconduct occurred in Chicago; (3) Mr. Lavoie—the proposed
    comparator—worked in Chicago; and (4) the Public Appeal Board is
    located in Chicago. See id. at 8. She further considered that
    the location of Amtrak’s headquarters in the District of
    Columbia did not weigh as heavily against transfer. See id. at
    8-9.
    9
    In his Objections to the R. & R., Mr. Loggins argues that
    his residence in Chicago is immaterial to the venue analysis
    because “[v]enue is his choice” and he chose to bring suit in
    the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. A
    plaintiff’s choice of forum “traditionally receives deference,”
    but diminished deference is accorded under several
    circumstances, including where, as here, the plaintiff resides
    in and the circumstances giving rise to the case occurred in the
    transferee forum. Payne v. Giant of Md., L.L.C., No. CIVA
    1:05CV00897 (GK), 
    2006 WL 1793303
    , at *3–4 (D.D.C. June 28,
    2006) (citations omitted). Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya thus
    appropriately considered factors other than Mr. Loggins’ choice
    of forum in recommending transfer of this case.
    However, Mr. Loggins fails to address those circumstances
    and contends that several other factors counsel in favor of the
    case remaining in the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF
    No. 33 at 10. Specifically, he argues that Amtrak often
    litigates in the District of Columbia and that this venue is the
    location of the company headquarters, lawyers, corporate
    officers, personnel records, and human resources and labor
    relations functions. See 
    id.
     Amtrak disputes most of these
    points. See Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 35 at 27. It explains that:
    its paper personnel records are located in Delaware; the
    relevant corporate officer works in Colorado; one of its
    10
    attorneys is based in Georgia; another attorney is barred in
    Illinois and admitted to practice in the transferee forum; and
    its attorneys regularly litigate matters in other federal
    district courts. 
    Id.
     Given all these circumstances, the Court
    agrees with Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya that only the location of
    Amtrak’s headquarters weighs in favor of this case remaining in
    the District of Columbia. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 8. Further,
    the Court declines to find that this factor is significant, as
    courts in this District regularly transfer cases against Amtrak
    to other more appropriate districts despite the location of
    Amtrak’s headquarters. See, e.g., Brown v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
    Corp. (“Amtrak”), No. 18-CV-02216 (APM), 
    2018 WL 11217191
    , at *1
    (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2018) (transferring case out of the District of
    Columbia where the plaintiff resided in the transferee forum and
    all the events occurred there); Wedge v. Potter, No. CIVA 06-
    0422 (EGS), 
    2006 WL 3191232
    , at *2-3 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2006)
    (transferring case out of the District of Columbia where all of
    events in the complaint, the relevant witnesses, and the
    documents were located in the transferee forum).
    Mr. Loggins also argues that a new factor weighs against
    transfer: “a change of venue will only disadvantage [his]
    counsel, whose costs and efforts to prosecute the case will be
    multiplied by a transfer to Chicago, and additional counsel will
    have to be retained because [his counsel] is not a member of the
    11
    bar of the state of Illinois.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. As
    Amtrak points out in its opposition briefing, see Def.’s Opp’n,
    ECF No. 35 at 27; Mr. Loggins cites no caselaw to support
    consideration of this factor. Because the Court is not aware of
    any authority suggesting that the convenience of a party’s
    attorney is a public or private interest factor to consider, cf.
    Beall, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (discussing convenience of the
    parties but not convenience of their attorneys); the Court will
    not consider this issue in reviewing Magistrate Judge
    Upadhyaya’s findings and recommendation.
    Finally, Mr. Loggins disputes that other factors weigh in
    favor of transfer. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. He argues
    that Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya “has no idea” where Mr. Lavoie
    currently works and that “the location of the Public Appeal
    Board is irrelevant” to this case. Id. He has misread the R. &
    R. and the caselaw. Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya correctly found
    that the relevant events in this case—including Mr. Lavoie’s
    alleged misconduct and the decision by the Public Appeal Board—
    occurred in Chicago. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 8. The caselaw
    makes clear that the location of events relevant to the
    complaint is a factor that the Court should consider in deciding
    a motion to transfer. See Brown, 
    2018 WL 11217191
    , at *1.
    Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R. & R. as to this issue
    and TRANSFERS this case to the U.S. District Court for the
    12
    Northern District of Illinois. 2
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART
    Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya’s R. & R., see ECF No. 32; and GRANTS
    Amtrak’s Motion to Transfer Venue, see ECF No. 27. An
    appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    SO ORDERED.
    Signed:    Emmet G. Sullivan
    United States District Judge
    May 3, 2023
    2 The Court declines to decide Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss, see
    ECF No. 27 and leaves the remaining issues to the transferee
    forum. Cf. Brown, 
    2018 WL 11217191
    , at *1-2.
    13