Anand v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ( 2023 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    NEIL ANAND,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    Civil Action No. 21-1635 (CKK)
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
    HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (May 23, 2023)
    This lawsuit arises from Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests made by pro se
    Plaintiffs Neil Anand and Lesly Pompy to Defendants United States Department of Health and
    Human Services (“HHS”)’ Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) and Drug Enforcement
    Administration (“DEA”). Plaintiffs Anand and Pompy are physicians who were indicted on
    multiple criminal counts, including health care fraud and the distribution of controlled substances.
    See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8. To aid in defense of their criminal prosecutions, Plaintiff Anand
    submitted FOIA requests to both HHS and DEA, and Plaintiff Pompy submitted a FOIA request
    just to DEA. After the agencies conducted their searches and made numerous withholdings,
    Plaintiffs then filed a Complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Defendants to
    produce certain records. See id. at 8, 11. Defendants HHS and DEA filed a [59] Motion for
    Summary Judgment against both Plaintiffs.
    On March 27, 2023, the Court ruled on Defendants’ [59] Motion for Summary Judgment in
    two opinions addressing Plaintiff Pompy and Anand separately. As is relevant here, the Court
    granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as against Plaintiff
    Anand. See Order, ECF No. 87; Mem. Op., ECF No. 88. The Court granted the Motion for all but
    1
    one component of Anand’s FOIA request. The Court denied summary judgment on Anand’s FOIA
    request to HHS OIG for “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning
    improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians” because OIG did not notify Anand that his
    request did not reasonably describe the records sought, as required by regulation or, alternatively,
    did not provide sufficient explanation as to why a search for this request would be burdensome.
    Mem. Op. ECF No. 88 at 2. The Court ordered HHS to file a Status Report indicating how they
    intend to proceed, such as, but not limited to, conducting a search or filing a renewed motion for
    summary judgment. Id. at 59. Following the order, HHS indicated that they planned “to file a
    renewed motion for summary judgment providing further detail as to why a search for this part of
    Plaintiff’s FOIA request would be unduly burdensome.” ECF No. 89 at 1. That [91] Second
    Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Anand is now pending before the Court.
    Upon review of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the
    Court will GRANT Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Anand.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The Court incorporates the background set forth in its Memorandum Opinion. See Mem.
    Op., ECF No. 88 at 2–5.
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    , to “pierce the veil of
    administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of Air
    1
    The Court’s consideration has focused on the following:
    • Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 91 (“Defs.’ Mot.”);
    • Plaintiff’s Response and Opposition to Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment,
    ECF No. 92 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”);
    • Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
    No. 93 (“Defs.’ Reply”).
    In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be
    of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
    2
    Force v. Rose, 
    425 U.S. 352
    , 361 (1976) (citation omitted). Congress remained sensitive to the
    need to achieve balance between these objectives and the potential that “legitimate governmental
    and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information.” Critical Mass
    Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
    975 F.2d 871
    , 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)
    (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    507 U.S. 984
     (1993). To that end, FOIA “requires federal agencies
    to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine exemptions for categories of
    material.” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 
    131 S. Ct. 1259
    , 1261–62 (2011). Ultimately, “disclosure, not
    secrecy, is the dominant objective of the act.” Rose, 
    425 U.S. at 361
    . For this reason, the
    “exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, and must be narrowly construed.” Milner, 131 S. Ct. at
    1262 (citations omitted).
    “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment.”
    Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 
    623 F. Supp. 2d 83
    , 87 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF) (citing
    Bigwood v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 
    484 F. Supp. 2d 68
    , 73 (D.D.C. 2007) (PLF)). “The agency
    is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are genuinely in dispute and the agency
    demonstrates that its search for responsive records was adequate, that any exemptions claimed
    actually apply, and that any reasonably segregable non-exempt parts of records have been disclosed
    after redaction of exempt information.” Prop. of the People, Inc. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 
    330 F. Supp. 3d 373
    , 380 (D.D.C. 2018) (RC) (citation omitted). The burden is on the agency to justify
    its response to the plaintiff’s request. 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(B). “An agency may sustain its
    burden by means of affidavits, but only if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than
    merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in
    the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., 
    515 F.3d 1224
    , 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “If an agency’s affidavit describes the justifications
    for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld
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    logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the
    record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis
    of the affidavit alone.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Defense, 
    628 F.3d 612
    , 619 (D.C. Cir.
    2011) (citations omitted). “Uncontradicted, plausible affidavits showing reasonable specificity and
    a logical relation to the exemption are likely to prevail.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. Dep’t of
    State, 
    641 F.3d 504
    , 509 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
    III. DISCUSSION
    “An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt
    that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Valencia-Lucena v.
    U.S. Coast Guard, 
    180 F.3d 321
    , 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks
    omitted). However, as the Court explained in its previous [88] Memorandum Opinion, an agency is
    not required to conduct a search that would be unreasonably burdensome. Nation Mag.,
    Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 
    71 F.3d 885
    , 892 (D.C. Cir. 1995). An agency does
    “bear[] the burden to ‘provide [a] sufficient explanation as to why such a search would be
    unreasonably burdensome.’” Ayuda, Inc. v. FTC, 
    70 F. Supp. 3d 247
    , 275 (D.D.C. 2014) (RC)
    (quoting Nation Mag., 
    71 F.3d at 892
    ). This “substantial” showing, Tereshchuk v. Bureau of
    Prisons, 
    67 F. Supp. 3d 441
    , 455 (D.D.C. 2014) (RCL), should include “a detailed explanation by
    the agency regarding the time and expense of a proposed search in order to assess its
    reasonableness,” Wolf v. CIA, 
    569 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 9 (D.D.C. 2008) (RJL). “Summary judgment is
    warranted on the basis of agency affidavits when the affidavits describe the justifications for
    nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail… and are not controverted by [other] evidence in the
    record.” Miller v. Casey, 
    730 F.2d 773
    , 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Goland v. Central
    Intelligence Agency, 
    607 F.2d 339
    , 352–53 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding sufficiently detailed an
    affidavit stating the method of search and the number of files to be searched).
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    As HHS OIG did not provide a detailed explanation as to why the search would be
    unreasonably burdensome, in its first Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court previously deemed
    HHS OIG’s explanation to be conclusory and deficient. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 88, at 27.
    Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment now provides additional information,
    including the Supplemental Declaration of Robin Brooks, Director of the Freedom of Information
    Act Division of HHS OIG (hereinafter “Suppl. Brooks Decl.”). The Court finds that Defendants
    have carried their burden of demonstrating that conducting a search of Anand’s request for “all
    reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of
    opiates by specific physicians” would be unreasonably burdensome.
    Defendants begin by explaining the database that holds reports that may be responsive to
    this part of Anand’s FOIA request. OIG’s law enforcement database, which it uses to maintain all
    records of investigations, is a legacy system created in or around 2004 with limited search features.
    Defs.’ Mot. at 2 (citing Suppl. Brooks Decl. ¶ 10). The database is indexed by subject and, unless
    certain information was previously determined to be a complaint, cannot be sorted by submitter.
    Suppl. Brooks Decl. ¶ 9. OIG’s search for complaints submitted by ““Blue Cross Blue Shield,”
    “BCBS,” and “BC/BS” yielded no results. 
    Id.
     Therefore, given that there were no complaints, to
    locate “reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation,” as Anand requested, OIG could not
    search by submitter and would instead have to search all electronic case files in the database. 
    Id.
    Additionally, database search results cannot be narrowed by date nor filtered through Boolean
    searches. 
    Id.
     Finally, case files on the database contain documents embedded within other
    documents, some of which are not searchable electronically. Id. ¶ 11. OIG must therefore open
    each document to make sure there are no embedded documents and, if there are, look through some
    of them manually. Id. ¶ 11.
    In response to this part of Anand’s FOIA request, OIG ran seven searches related to terms
    5
    in Anand’s request, some of which yielded zero results. Id. ¶ 13. OIG identified 17,262 case
    results that hit on the term “Blue Cross Blue Shield,” 13,146 case results that hit on the term
    “BCBS,” and 2,320 case results that hit on the term “BC/BS.” Id. OIG cannot deduplicate results
    across these searches. Id. ¶ 15. OIG conducted a sample test to determine how long it would take
    to review all of these case results for responsive records. See id. ¶ 16. To do so, they selected a
    random sample of five case files from each of the three sets of search results to review, id. ¶¶ 17–
    22; reviewing these fifteen case files took approximately 26 hours and 57 minutes, id. ¶ 23.
    Defendants then concluded that “[g]iven the volume of records, at a rate of 52 weeks per year, 40
    work hours per week, it would take someone more than 28 years to finish reviewing these records.”
    Defs.’ Mot. at 3 (citing Suppl. Brooks Decl. ¶ 23). As Brooks’ explains, even if OIG’s entire FOIA
    staff worked solely on Anand’s request, it would take them over nine years. Brooks Decl. ¶ 23.
    The Court confirmed this calculation. Defendants then explain that employing someone full-time
    for that period of time to review case files for records potentially responsive to Anand’s FOIA
    request would cost more than $3.5 million in salary alone, without taking into account yearly pay
    increases and the cost of benefits. Id. ¶ 26. Defendants state that this “vastly understates the costs
    to the Department [of Health and Human Services].” Defs.’ Mot. at 3 (citing Suppl. Brooks Decl. ¶
    26).
    To reiterate from above, courts require an agency to provide a detailed explanation
    regarding the time and expense of searching for responsive records. Tereshchuk, 
    67 F. Supp. 3d at 455
    ; Wolf, 
    569 F. Supp. 2d at 9
    . The Court here is satisfied that Defendants have made the
    requisite substantial showing including approximations of time––28 years––and expense––in the
    millions of dollars––to search for records responsive to this part of Anand’s FOIA request. This
    estimated time far exceeds that which other courts have found to impose an undue burden. See,
    e.g., Wolf, 
    569 F. Supp. 2d at 9
     (approximately 3,675 hours); Ayuda, Inc., 
    70 F. Supp. 3d at
    275–76
    6
    (more than 8,000 hours); People for the Am. Way Found. v. Dep’t of Just., 
    451 F. Supp. 2d 6
    , 13
    (D.D.C. 2006) (JDB) (approximately 25,000 hours,2 to search 44,000 files manually); Long v.
    Immig. & Customs Enf’t, 
    149 F. Supp. 3d 39
     (D.D.C. 2015) (APM) (6.7 billion rows of data, which
    the affiant equated to an audiobook that would take approximately 9.5 years to read); Int’l Counsel
    Bureau v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    723 F. Supp. 2d 54
    , 59 (D.D.C.) (JDB) (“enlisting a full-time staff of
    twelve for a year to review hundreds of thousands of unsorted images would impose such an undue
    burden”). Likewise, the estimated expense exceeds that which other courts have found to impose
    an undue burden. See, e.g., Wolf, 
    569 F. Supp. 2d at 9
     (approximately $147,000).
    Plaintiff Anand has not presented anything to controvert Defendants’ showing. The Court
    will not belabor the various deficiencies of and irrelevant information included in Plaintiff’s
    briefing, but will briefly note that what Plaintiff has captioned as an “affidavit,” see Pl.’s Opp’n Ex.
    1, is unsworn and contains no affirmation that it was offered under penalty of perjury and,
    therefore, does not adhere to the requirements for an affidavit or any other sworn statement.
    Plaintiff’s failure to provide a proper affidavit bars him from disputing Defendants’ sworn affidavit
    by Robin Brooks. Oviedo v. Wash. Metro. Area Transp. Auth., 
    948 F.3d 386
    , 397 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
    This flaw was present in Plaintiffs’ briefing in response to Defendant’s first Motion for Summary
    Judgment, which Court discussed in detail in its prior opinion, see Mem. Op., ECF No. 88, at 16–
    18.
    Plaintiff also argues that Defendants should have narrowed Anand’s FOIA request to make
    it not burdensome. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 4. However, agencies “should read FOIA requests ‘as
    drafted, not as either agency officials or [the requester] might wish it was drafted.’” Nat’l Sec.
    Couns. v. CIA, 
    969 F.3d 406
    , 410 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Miller v. Casey, 
    730 F.2d 773
    , 777
    2
    This is the equivalent of almost 12 years at a 40-hour-per-week, 52-weeks-per-year rate.
    7
    (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (alteration in original). Agencies have no duty to narrow the scope of a FOIA
    request. See id. at 410.
    Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating
    that conducting a search of Anand’s request for “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield
    corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians” would be
    unreasonably burdensome.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Second Motion for
    Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Anand.
    An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    /s/
    COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
    United States District Judge
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