Stewart v. Federal Express Corporation ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PASSION STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 21-2478 (CKK)
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(July 5, 2023)
Plaintiff Passion Stewart (“Stewart”), proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendant Federal
Express Corporation (“FedEx”) negligently handled packages delivered to her address in
Washington, DC. On August 3, 2022, this Court granted FedEx’s [8] Motion to Dismiss and
dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s [6] Amended Complaint, noting that Plaintiff’s complaint
failed for a lack of definiteness pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). However, the
Court afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to file a second amended complaint because it appeared
possible that Plaintiff had standing to proceed. In Plaintiff’s [16] Second Amended Complaint,
she provides specific tracking numbers for the allegedly mishandled packages. Because Plaintiff
has now provided adequate notice to Defendant as to the basis of her claims, and upon
considering of the pleadings, 1 the relevant legal authority, and the entire record, the Court shall
DENY Defendant’s [17] Motion to Dismiss.
1
This Memorandum Opinion focuses on the following documents:
• Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1-2 (“Compl.”);
• Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 6 (“Am. Compl.”);
• Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, ECF 8-3 (“Mot.”);
• Plaintiff’s Opposition, ECF No. 11 (“Opp’n”);
• Memorandum Opinion and Order, ECF 13 (“Op. and Order”);
• Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, ECF 16 (“2d Am. Compl.”);
• Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss, ECF 17 (“2d Mot.”);
• Plaintiff’s Second Opposition, ECF 19 (“2d Opp’n”);
I. BACKGROUND
On August 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed her first complaint in the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia alleging that Stewart had submitted “multiple claims with Fedex due to their
carriers leaving [her] packages in open spaces which results in the packages being stolen.” No.
1-2 at 2. Plaintiff stated that she and her neighbors had given FedEx specific instructions as to
delivery but that FedEx had improperly delivered her packages, resulting in a pecuniary loss of
$100,000. Id. Shortly after Defendant removed the case, Plaintiff filed a second “Complaint,”
which the Court construed as an amended complaint. Am. Compl. at 1. On August 3, 2022, the
Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting FedEx’s Motion to Dismiss and
dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Op. and Order at 7. Although
Plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim, it nevertheless provided Defendant insufficient notice of
which packages underlaid her claim. Because this error was relatively minor, and in light of
Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to file a second amended
complaint on or before September 7, 2022. Id. at 7.
However, Plaintiff failed to file a second amended complaint prior to the deadline, and on
September 21, 2022, this Court entered an [14] Order dismissing the case. On November 17,
2022, Plaintiff made a [15] Motion for Leave to File, as the Court’s Order had not been
forwarded to Plaintiff’s new address until October 30, 2022. On November 18, 2022, this Court
issued an [15] Order granting that motion.
Plaintiff’s [16] Second Amended Complaint includes copies of email correspondence
between Plaintiff and Defendant, which list tracking numbers for purportedly mishandled
• Defendant’s Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, ECF 20 (“Reply”).
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would
not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
packages. See 2d Am. Compl. at 2-4. Plaintiff also alleges that despite moving to a new
building with a concierge package box, FedEx delivery drivers continue to mishandle her
packages by placing them on the floor instead of in the secure box. Id. at 1, 8. In Defendant’s
[17] Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead facts to
establish that she is entitled to relief. As such, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and, despite the
Court having already settled the issue in Plaintiff’s favor, 12(b)(6). See 2d. Mot. to Dismiss at 1,
5.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a
complaint on the grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “‘a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In
evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all reasonable factual
inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations. See In re United Mine Workers of Am.
Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994) (TFH).
B. Rule 8(a)
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C.
Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being
asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer, mount an adequate defense, and determine
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C.
1977) (JJS). It also assists the Court in determining whether it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
III. DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s pro se complaint must be “‘liberally construed’” and
held to “‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Williams v. Bank
of N.Y. Mellon, 169 F. Supp. 3d 119, 123-24 (D.D.C. 2016) (RBW) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “Construing a document liberally means, at a minimum, that a plaintiff
need not use ‘magic words’ or legal jargon.” Walker v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 3d
1224, 1230 (N.D. Okla. 2017). Where, after drawing all factual inferences in the pro se
plaintiff’s favor, some legitimate claim for relief lies, the court may not grant a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. See Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(“Even if [a plaintiff] might lose on the merits, . . . the district court should [] permit[] [a] claim,
drafted pro se and based on legitimate factual allegations[] to proceed.”); Williams, 169 F. Supp.
3d at 124. Further, when determining the sufficiency of a pro se plaintiff’s claim, the Court may
“consider supplemental material filed by a pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise claims
being urged.” See Wade v. U.S. Secret Serv., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting
Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
Although Plaintiff’s first amended complaint advanced an Interstate Commerce Act
claim, it failed for a lack of definiteness pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) because
it did not specify which packages were purportedly mishandled, who sent the packages to
Plaintiff, whether there was a receipt or bill of lading associated with the packages, or Plaintiff’s
relationship to the sender of the packages. Op. and Order at 6. In her second amended complaint,
however, Plaintiff notes with more specificity the packages Defendant purportedly mishandled,
attaching copies of emails between herself and Defendant that list package tracking numbers.
See 2d Am. Compl. at 2-4. Critically, Plaintiff alleges that she was the intended recipient of
these particular packages, and that Defendant’s handling of those packages caused her economic
loss. E.g., id. at 3 (“FedEx le[ft] my package with [a particular] tracking number . . . at the front
door [contrary to delivery instructions] and [it] was stolen”). Plaintiff also alleges that despite
moving to a new building with a concierge package box, FedEx delivery drivers continue to
mishandle her packages by placing them on the floor instead of in the secure box, contrary to
instructions and notice that such a delivery method would result in injury (i.e., theft) to the
goods. Id. at 1, 8.
As was the case with Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the Court construes her second
amended complaint to advance an Interstate Commerce Act claim. A prima facie case under the
Interstate Commerce Act requires a showing of injury to goods, collected by the carrier in good
condition, that caused identifiable, economic loss to the consignee of the goods. See
Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013).
Because the second amended complaint meets these requirements, despite not including the
specific words “Carmack Amendment” or “Interstate Commerce Act,” Plaintiff has sufficiently
stated a claim.
Further, Plaintiff has cured the lack of definiteness in her first amended complaint by
including specific tracking numbers of allegedly mishandled packages. Compl. at 1, 8. The
tracking numbers provide Defendant with the necessary details to ascertain who delivered the
packages in question, their contents, and other information relevant to Plaintiff’s claim under the
Interstate Commerce Act. As such, the operative complaint gives FedEx sufficiently “fair notice
of the basis for [Plaintiff’s] claims.” See Charles v. United States, Civ. A. No. 21-0864, 2022
WL 1045293, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
514 (2002)).
To be clear, Plaintiff has cleared a fairly low bar. She has identified particular packages
of which she was the beneficial owner and recipient. She has further alleged that Defendant
negligently handled those particular packages, resulting in pecuniary loss. No more is required
to state a claim for the Interstate Commerce Act. See Harrah v. Minn. Min. and Mfg. Co., 809 F.
Supp. 313, 318 (D.N.J. 1992). It may be the case that, after discovery, it becomes clear that
Defendant does not hold the rights to recover for negligent handling of the packages at issue.
Yet Defendant now has sufficient notice to investigate, through discovery, whether Plaintiff is
correct that she has standing to advance the Interstate Commerce Act claim before the Court.
#
#
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s [17] Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. An
appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Dated: July 5, 2023
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge