In Re: Andrena Diane Crockett ( 2023 )


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  •                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    IN RE:
    ANDRENA DIANE CROCKETT
    DEBTOR/APPELLANT
    Civ. Action No. 19-2944
    (EGS)
    Bankr. Case No. 19-101
    (Chapter 13)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Andrena Diane Crockett (“Ms. Crockett”) appeals the
    Bankruptcy Court’s Order Overruling Objection to Claim of
    Nationstar Mortgage LLC D/B/A Mr. Cooper (the “Order Overruling
    Objection to Claim”); Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
    Motion to Reconsider in Part, Sustaining Debtor’s Objection to
    Nationstar’s Proof of Claim in Part, and Otherwise Denying
    Debtor’s Motion to Reconsider (the “First Memorandum Decision”);
    and Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Nationstar’s Motion
    to Alter Order Regarding Debtor’s Motion to Reconsider (the
    “Second Memorandum Decision”). See Notice of Bankruptcy Appeal
    Record (“A.R.”), ECF No. 2 at 155 (Order Overruling Objection to
    Claim), 166-73 (First Memorandum Decision); Suppl. Notice of
    Bankruptcy Appeal Record (“Suppl. A.R.”), ECF No. 5 at 3-8. 1 Upon
    1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, this
    Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
    filed document.
    1
    consideration of the briefing, the applicable law, and the
    entire record, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Order
    Overruling Objection to Claim; AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s
    First Memorandum Decision; and AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s
    Second Memorandum Decision.
    I. Background
    Ms. Crockett is the owner of property located at 1249
    Carrollsburg Place, SW, Washington, D.C. 20024 (“Carrollsburg
    Place Property”). See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 50-51 (Deed of Trust).
    She is also the borrower on a May 11, 2007 loan in the original
    amount of $340,000.00 secured by a Deed of Trust on the
    Carrollsburg Place Property. See id. at 46-49 (Note). The Deed
    of Trust is currently assigned to Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a
    Mr. Cooper (“Nationstar”). See id. at 73 (Certificate of
    Transfer/Assignment), 79 (Corporate Assignment of Deed of
    Trust).
    On February 1, 2010, Ms. Crockett entered into a Loan
    Modification Agreement secured by the same property with a
    principal balance of $412,891.81. See id. at 81-86 (Loan
    Modification Agreement). She defaulted on the debt in June 2010.
    See id. at 31 (Proof of Claim).
    Nationstar thereafter initiated a judicial foreclosure
    against Ms. Crockett in the Superior Court of the District of
    Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”). Id. at 166 (First Memorandum
    2
    Decision). Ms. Crockett challenged Nationstar’s accounting, so
    the D.C. Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on January
    19, 2017. Id. In a proceeding on June 8, 2017, that court
    concluded that Ms. Crockett’s claims were not viable. Id. On
    October 25, 2017, the D.C. Superior Court dismissed Ms.
    Crockett’s counterclaims. Id. at 166-67. Ms. Crockett appealed
    this order to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
    (“D.C. Court of Appeals”). Id. at 167. That court affirmed the
    D.C. Superior Court’s judgment on June 26, 2019. Id.
    Meanwhile, on February 15, 2019, Ms. Crockett filed a
    voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
    Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia
    (“Bankruptcy Court”). See id. at 1. On April 5, 2019, Nationstar
    submitted its Proof of Claim, which shows Ms. Crockett owed
    $549,337.77 in total and $184,932.67 to cure the default as of
    the petition date. See id. at 26-90 (Proof of Claim).
    Ms. Crockett filed an Objection to Creditor, Nationstar
    Mortgage LLC, Proof of Claim (“Objection”), challenging
    Nationstar’s accounting in the Proof of Claim and alleging that
    Nationstar failed to file all the required documents. See id. at
    96-99 (Objection). The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the
    Objection on July 18, 2019. See id. at 156, 157 (audio
    recordings of hearing attached to PDF documents). In an oral
    decision, the Bankruptcy Court determined that Ms. Crockett did
    3
    not meet her burden to show that there was an error with
    Nationstar’s Proof of Claim. See id. at 155-57. The Bankruptcy
    Court entered its order—the Order Overruling Objection to Claim—
    on July 22, 2019. See id. at 155 (Order Overruling Objection to
    Claim).
    On August 5, 2019, Ms. Crockett filed a Motion to
    Reconsider [the Order] Overruling Debtor’s Objections to
    Creditor’s Proof-of-Claim (“Motion to Reconsider”). See id. at
    158-64 (Motion to Reconsider). There, she argued that: (1) the
    Bankruptcy Court impermissibly relied on a decision that the
    D.C. Court of Appeals entered after the automatic stay was in
    place; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court did not address all the
    issues she raised in her Objection briefing. See id. at 158-63.
    On September 20, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court issued its
    First Memorandum Decision, reversing its Order Overruling
    Objection to Claim in part and reducing Nationstar’s claim by
    $1,289.18. See id. at 166-73 (First Memorandum Decision). Then,
    on October 7, 2019, Nationstar filed its Rule 9023 Motion
    seeking reconsideration of the Bankruptcy Court’s First
    Memorandum Decision. Id. at 175-77 (Rule 9023 Motion). The
    Bankruptcy Court reversed its First Memorandum Decision in the
    Second Memorandum Decision on December 11, 2019. See Suppl.
    A.R., ECF No. 5 at 3-8 (Second Memorandum Decision).
    4
    Ms. Crockett filed a Notice of Appeal on September 26,
    2019. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 6. This appeal is ripe for review.
    II. Standard of Review
    A. Appeals of Decisions by the Bankruptcy Court
    This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of decisions of
    the Bankruptcy Court. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1) (conferring
    jurisdiction on federal district courts “to hear appeals . . .
    from final judgments, orders, and decrees” of bankruptcy
    courts). On appeal from a bankruptcy court, a district court
    “may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment,
    order, or decree or remand with instructions for further
    proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.
    A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s findings of
    fact only for indication that they are clearly erroneous. Id.;
    see also In re Johnson, 
    236 B.R. 510
    , 518 (D.D.C. 1999). “A
    finding [of fact] is clearly erroneous when, although there is
    evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
    evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been committed.” In re Johnson, 
    236 B.R. at 518
    (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
    333 U.S. 364
    , 395
    (1948)). A bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions, however, are
    reviewed de novo. See In re WPG, Inc., 
    282 B.R. 66
    , 68 (D.D.C.
    2002) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 
    496 U.S. 384
    , 405
    (1990)). The party seeking to reverse the bankruptcy court’s
    5
    ruling bears the burden of proof and may not prevail by showing
    “simply that another conclusion could have been reached.” 
    Id.
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    B. Pro Se Litigants
    “[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in
    all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,
    No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 
    2006 WL 1877014
    , at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,
    2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972)). The
    pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally
    construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    , 94 (2007) (per
    curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even
    so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 
    658 F. Supp. 2d 135
    , 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 
    656 F. Supp. 237
    , 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply
    with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 
    656 F. Supp. at 239
    ;
    Roosevelt Land, 
    2006 WL 1877014
    , at *2.
    III. Analysis
    A. The Bankruptcy Court Addressed All the Issues Ms.
    Crockett Raised in Her Objection
    Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “committed an
    error of law and an abuse of discretion” because it did not
    address every issue she raised in her Objection and Prehearing
    6
    Brief. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 17. 2 She states that the
    Bankruptcy Court considered only one of the sixteen claims she
    presented in her Prehearing Brief regarding Nationstar’s
    inadequate accounting. 
    Id. at 18
    . She also provides four
    examples of how Nationstar “ignored its obligations under the
    Federal Consumer Protection and Bankruptcy Code by maintaining
    an accounting system that was incapable of properly making
    payments in a Chapter 13 case.” 
    Id. at 17
    ; see also 
    id. at 17-18
    (reviewing accounting inadequacies).
    Nationstar suggests that this Court may not consider this
    argument because “the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning for its
    ruling is . . . not part of this Court’s record on appeal.”
    Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 9. This is incorrect. As
    Nationstar acknowledges, see id.; the Bankruptcy Court rendered
    an oral decision at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing
    held on July 18, 2019 and then documented its order in the Order
    Overruling Objection to Claim, see A.R., ECF No. 2 at 155.
    However, as Ms. Crockett states in her reply brief, see
    Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 7; that evidentiary hearing—
    2 Ms. Crockett also argues that the Bankruptcy Court did not
    address issues she raised in her Motion to Reconsider in its
    Order Overruling Objection to Claim. See Appellant’s Br., ECF
    No. 8 at 17. This Court will not consider this part of her
    argument, as Ms. Crockett did not file the Motion to Reconsider
    the Order Overruling Objection to Claim until after the
    Bankruptcy Court issued its Order Overruling Objection to Claim.
    7
    along with the Bankruptcy Court’s oral decision—is, in fact,
    part of the record on appeal, see A.R., ECF No. 2 at 156 (audio
    recording of first part of July 18, 2019 hearing attached to PDF
    document), 157 (audio recording of second part of July 18, 2019
    hearing attached to PDF document). This Court therefore may
    consider the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning from its oral decision
    as it evaluates the Order Overruling Objection to Claim.
    Nationstar also defends the substance of the Bankruptcy
    Court’s Order Overruling Objection to Claim. Nationstar claims
    that the Bankruptcy Court made one of two possible conclusions:
    (1) that Ms. Crockett “did not meet her burden to negate the
    prima facie validity of the filed claim”; or (2) that Nationstar
    “proved the validity of the claim by a preponderance of the
    evidence.” Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 9. Nationstar does not
    cite any evidence from the record to support this argument. See
    generally 
    id. at 8-9
    .
    Upon review of the record, this Court concludes that the
    Bankruptcy Court considered all issues Ms. Crockett raised in
    her Prehearing Brief in its Order Overruling Objection to Claim.
    See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 156-57. To successfully object to
    Nationstar’s Proof of Claim, Ms. Crockett needed to “produce
    evidence which, if believed, would refute at least one of the
    allegations that is essential to the claim’s legal sufficiency.”
    In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 
    954 F.2d 167
    , 173–74 (3d Cir.
    8
    1992). The Bankruptcy Court considered the following evidence
    from Ms. Crockett: the Objection, the Prehearing Brief, 12
    exhibits presented at the evidentiary hearing, and Ms.
    Crockett’s testimony at the hearing. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 156-
    57. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court
    determined that: (1) the D.C. Superior Court had already decided
    most of Ms. Crockett’s objections in Nationstar’s favor; (2) the
    remaining objection—concerning the fees Nationstar charged
    following the D.C. Superior Court’s decision—failed because the
    more recent fees were of the same character and of similar
    amounts as the fees that the D.C. Superior Court had already
    adjudicated; and (3) Ms. Crockett had not produced sufficient
    evidence to meet her burden of proof to show an error in the
    Proof of Claim. See 
    id. at 157
    . Accordingly, this Court
    concludes that the Bankruptcy Court appropriately considered
    every issue Ms. Crockett raised in her Objection.
    B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Rely on the Memorandum
    Opinion and Judgment by the D.C. Court of Appeals
    Ms. Crockett next argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred
    when it considered the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment issued by
    the D.C. Court of Appeals while the automatic stay was in place.
    See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 10-15.
    Pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. § 362
    , a bankruptcy filing
    “trigger[s] an automatic stay in” judicial foreclosure
    9
    proceedings. Maddox v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    374 F. Supp. 3d 146
    , 148 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing 
    11 U.S.C. § 362
    ); see also Giron
    v. Zeytuna, Inc., 
    597 F. Supp. 3d 29
    , 38 (D.D.C. 2022)
    (collecting cases). Here, Ms. Crockett filed her Chapter 13
    bankruptcy petition on February 15, 2019. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at
    1. This resulted in the judicial foreclosure proceedings
    initiated by Nationstar in D.C. Superior Court being
    automatically stayed that same day. At that time, the D.C.
    Superior Court had already concluded that Ms. Crockett’s claims
    were not viable and issued an order dismissing her
    counterclaims. See 
    id. at 167-68
    . The D.C. Court of Appeals did
    not issue its Memorandum Opinion and Judgment until after Ms.
    Crockett filed her bankruptcy petition. See 
    id. at 168
    (affirming decision of D.C. Superior Court on June 26, 2019).
    Nationstar argues that the Bankruptcy Court did not rely on
    the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment by the D.C. Court of Appeals
    to render its Memorandum Decision. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No.
    14 at 10-11. This Court agrees with this assessment. In the
    First Memorandum Decision, the Bankruptcy Court expressly
    considered and rejected Ms. Crockett’s argument that it had
    impermissibly relied on the decision by the D.C. Court of
    Appeals. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 169-70. The Bankruptcy Court
    stated that it “did not rely on the holding of the [D.C.] Court
    of Appeals decision” and that the D.C. Court of Appeals decision
    10
    “was not a deciding factor in this court’s overruling [Ms.
    Crockett]’s objections to Nationstar’s Proof of Claim.” 
    Id. at 170
    . The Bankruptcy Court further clarified that it considered
    the D.C. Court of Appeals decision only “to find what issues had
    been litigated and decided in the [D.C.] Superior Court.” 
    Id. at 169-70
    .
    Nevertheless, Ms. Crockett asserts that these statements
    “conflict[] with the many references” in the First Memorandum
    Decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals decision. Appellant’s
    Reply, ECF No. 16 at 9; see also Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at
    13-15 (listing references to the D.C. Court of Appeals decision
    in the First Memorandum Decision). This Court is persuaded,
    however, that each reference was appropriate. In its First
    Memorandum Decision, the Bankruptcy Court discussed the D.C.
    Court of Appeals decision twice: first in reviewing the
    procedural history of this case and the related litigation in
    the D.C. Courts; and second in discussing Ms. Crockett’s
    argument about the D.C. Court of Appeals decision. See A.R., ECF
    No. 2 at 167-70. These references are consistent with the
    Bankruptcy Court’s statement that it did not rely on the D.C.
    Court of Appeals decision.
    Ms. Crockett also suggests that the Bankruptcy Court must
    have relied on the D.C. Court of Appeals decision because it
    “did not state what were the deciding factors in rendering the
    11
    decision.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 14. She further argues
    that the Bankruptcy Court did not consider the Proof of Claim or
    the evidence she submitted. See 
    id. at 14-15
    . This Court is
    unpersuaded by these claims. In the First Memorandum Decision,
    the Bankruptcy Court explained the deciding factor in its
    decision: that Ms. Crockett “had not met her burden to show that
    there was an error with Nationstar’s Proof of Claim, because
    [her] evidence was unclear and confusing.” A.R., ECF No. 2 at
    168. Accordingly, because the Bankruptcy Court did not rely on
    the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment by the D.C. Court of
    Appeals, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not
    impermissibly rely on any decision issued while the automatic
    stay was in place. 3
    C. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
    Denying Ms. Crockett’s Motion to Reconsider Without
    Requiring Nationstar To Explain the Proof of Claim
    Ms. Crockett contends that the Bankruptcy Court abused its
    discretion because it denied her Motion to Reconsider without
    requiring Nationstar “to explain the issues confusing to the
    [c]ourt.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 16. This argument
    misunderstands the procedural posture of the case, the burden on
    3 Ms. Crockett also makes several arguments regarding actions
    taken by the D.C. Superior Court and D.C. Court of Appeals in
    the judicial foreclosure proceedings. See generally Appellant’s
    Br., ECF No. 8 at 10-12, 15. Because this appeal concerns only
    Bankr. Case No. 19-101, this Court will not reach those
    arguments.
    12
    the parties, and the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion. As
    Nationstar explains in its opposition briefing, see Appellee’s
    Br., ECF No. 14 at 8-9; the Proof of Claim constitutes prima
    facie evidence of the validity of the amount of Nationstar’s
    claim, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f); and the objecting party—
    Ms. Crockett here—bore the burden of “produc[ing] evidence
    sufficient to negate the prima facie validity of the filed
    claim,”—that is, “evidence equal in force to the prima facie
    case,” In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d at 173.
    Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court considered Ms. Crockett’s
    Objection, her Prehearing Brief, the exhibits and testimony she
    presented at the evidentiary hearing, and her Motion to
    Reconsider, and it concluded that her evidence—not Nationstar’s
    Proof of Claim—“was unclear and confusing.” A.R., ECF No. 2 at
    168.
    Ms. Crockett also argues that this Court “should use ‘the
    least sophisticated consumer’ standard in assessing these
    claims.” Id. (citing Wallace v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 
    683 F.3d 323
    , 326 (6th Cir. 2012); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar,
    
    503 F.3d 504
    , 509-10 (6th Cir. 2007)). This standard applies to
    actions concerning the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, see
    Wallace, 
    683 F.3d at 326
    ; and is therefore inapplicable here.
    13
    D. Nationstar Did Not Deceive the Bankruptcy Court to Reach
    the Second Memorandum Decision
    Finally, Ms. Crockett asserts that the Bankruptcy Court
    “was deceived into committing an error of law and an abuse of
    discretion when Nationstar filed its” Rule 9023 Motion and
    supporting exhibits. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 18. She
    contends that Nationstar’s submission of new evidence from 2013
    “rais[es] the question whether [it] has other information,
    previously withheld” and makes the Proof of Claim inaccurate.
    
    Id.
     4
    This Court is not persuaded that the Bankruptcy Court erred
    or abused its discretion. Ms. Crockett cites no authority—and
    this Court is unaware of any—that prevents Nationstar from
    supplementing its Proof of Claim in a Rule 9023 motion. See
    generally 
    id.
     Ms. Crockett also fails to present any evidence
    showing that Nationstar deliberately withheld information to
    deceive the Bankruptcy Court. See generally 
    id.
     Moreover, as
    Nationstar discusses in its opposition briefing, see Appellee’s
    Br., ECF No. 14 at 12; the Bankruptcy Court reasonably found
    that Nationstar “set[] forth evidence demonstrating that the
    $1,289.18 item disallowed by the [First Memorandum Decision]
    ought to be allowed instead, and set[] forth an adequate basis
    4 Ms. Crockett also refers to errors in the “Alternation
    Foreclosure Agreement” but does not explain their relevance to
    this argument. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 18.
    14
    under Rule 59(e) for altering the [First Memorandum Decision].”
    Suppl. A.R., ECF No. 5 at 6. This Court therefore AFFIRMS the
    Second Memorandum Decision issued by the Bankruptcy Court.
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the
    Bankruptcy Court’s Order Overruling Objection to Claim; AFFIRMS
    the Bankruptcy Court’s First Memorandum Decision; and AFFIRMS
    the Bankruptcy Court’s Second Memorandum Decision. An
    appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    SO ORDERED.
    Signed:    Emmet G. Sullivan
    United States District Judge
    July 20, 2023
    15