Quander v. District of Columbia ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DOUGLAS QUANDER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-cv-2539 (CJN)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendant.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 18, it is
ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. 5, is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this case.
This is a final, appealable order.
DATE: September 29, 2023
CARL J. NICHOLS
United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DOUGLAS QUANDER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-cv-2539 (CJN)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Douglas Quander alleges that, while he was detained at the District of Columbia
jail, Defendants violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they failed
to handcuff him prior to restraining him for disorderly conduct. See ECF No. 1at 3. He seeks
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move to dismiss on various grounds. See ECF Nos. 5,
10. For the reasons detailed below, the Court agrees and grants Defendants’ motions.
BACKGROUND
Quander was a pretrial detainee charged with various drug crimes in the Southern District
of Maryland and ordered detained pending trial. See Judgment, United States v. Quander, No. 18-
cr-334-GJH-1 (S.D. Md. Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 111. For reasons that his complaint does not
make clear, Quander was administratively segregated from other inmates at some point during his
pretrial detention. According to the complaint, on August 24, 2019, certain unknown corrections
officers, led by Defendant Andre Taylor, became aware that Quander “was smoking in the cell.”
ECF No. 1, at 2. Quander alleges that the officers pepper sprayed into his cell before entering it.
Id at 2-3. Quander apparently acknowledges that he “swung on four officers,” as a result of which
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he was restrained with “his head being smashed … into a toilet.” Id at 3. He allegedly suffered
substantial injuries from this restraint and other acts.
Plaintiff alleges that the District of Columbia, Corporal Andre Taylor, those unknown
officers, and Thomas Faust (Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections)
violated his constitutional rights, primarily by failing to handcuff him before entering his cell (an
alleged policy and practice of the Jail that he claims is unconstitutional). ECF No. 1, at 5.
Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on various grounds. See ECF No. 5, 10.
LEGAL STANDARDS
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assess whether a
complaint sufficiently alleges facts, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief. See Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible when it “allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint that merely asserts “labels and conclusions” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
Federal law supplies a private right of action for violations of constitutional or statutory
rights by persons acting under color of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section
1983, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that he was (1) deprived of a federally secured right by (2)
persons acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In the context
of civil suits against a prison or jail, inmates must satisfy additional conditions before filing a
section 1983 action. First, federal law requires inmates to exhaust all administrative remedies.
See Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002) (“The PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
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whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes.”). Plaintiff asserts, and
defendants do not refute, that he has administratively exhausted his claims with the D.C.
Department of Corrections. See ECF No. 1, at 4.
Second, prisons and related government officials can put forward qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). Courts may consider
qualified immunity at the pleading stage because it is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability.” Id quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). A defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the facts alleged by plaintiff do not demonstrate the violation
of a constitutional right or (2) the alleged constitutional right violated was not clearly established
at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
ANALYSIS
Starting with his Eighth Amendment claims, Quander was a pretrial detainee at the time of
the events here. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,
however, only applies to inmates found guilty in a court of law. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535 n.16 (1979) (“The Court of Appeals properly relied on the Due Process Clause rather than the
Eighth Amendment in considering the claims of pretrial detainees.”); see also Brogsdale v. Barry,
926 F.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1991). As for Quander’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, that
Amendment does not apply to the federal government or the District of Columbia. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).1 As to each Defendant, therefore, Quander has failed to state
either Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claims.
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The Fifth Amendment does apply to the District, but Quander’s complaint does not include a
Fifth Amendment claim.
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As for Quander’s Fourth Amendment claim, its gravamen is that he was unlawfully seized
when officers used “excessive force” against him. See ECF No. 1, at 3. The Fourth Amendment
does apply to these Defendants and prohibits them from committing unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the context of a prison, the reasonableness of a seizure is determined by “the scope of
the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and
the place in which it is conducted,” Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, keeping in mind that a “detention
facility is a unique place fraught with serious danger.” Id. Quander appears to contend that the
alleged seizure here was unreasonable because corrections officers failed to adhere to a “national
standard of care” by handcuffing him before entering his cell. Id. He claims instead that officers
“sprayed pepper spray from outside the cell” before entering it, id at 2-3; and then after he “swung
on” four of the officers, they restrained him with his “head being smashed according to two
witnesses into a toilet.” Id at 3.
With respect to the District, “municipalities are liable for their agents’ constitutional torts
only if the agents acted pursuant to municipal policy or custom.” Warren v. District of Columbia,
353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). But Quander has not plausibly alleged that the District has an official
policy of not handcuffing disruptive inmates before engaging them. Read in the light most
favorable to Quander, his complaint merely avers that the corrections officers did not handcuff
him in his particular case. Quander has failed to allege that policymakers in the District of
Columbia were the “moving force” behind his alleged constitutional violations, that they
knowingly ignored some practice related to handcuffing disruptive inmates, or that they were
deliberately indifferent to a risk of continuing constitutional violations. See Jones v. Horne, 634
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F.3d 588, 600-601 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the District of
Columbia is therefore dismissed.
As for Quander’s Fourth Amendment claim against Corporal Taylor and the unknown
corrections officers, those officers are entitled to qualified immunity. As an initial matter, drawing
every reasonable inference in his favor, Quander’s complaint likely fails to allege the violation of
a constitutional right. After all, a reasonable officer could infer from smoke coming out of solitary
confinement that an inmate has access to other illicit and dangerous materials. And Plaintiff’s
complaint admits that he “swung on four officers,” ECF No. 1, at 3 – an attack to which officers
may respond with a limited and targeted degree of force. The Fourth Amendment is not violated
by “every push or shove.” Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 795 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
But even if Quander had alleged a constitutional violation, he has not established that it is
clearly established that the Fourth Amendment requires a prisoner to be handcuffed in the
circumstances presented here. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“A Government
official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the
contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right.”). Plaintiff’s complaint and briefs fail entirely to point to (and
the Court is not aware of) any court cases, legislation, or prison policy clearly requiring inmates
to be handcuffed before officers enter their cells. Indeed, such a categorical rule would interfere
with the necessary professional judgment that corrections officers need to exercise to fulfill their
permissible, nonpunitive interest in “[e]nsuring security and order.” See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 561;
see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985) (noting that jails and prisons have
“legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners”).
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Lastly, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s remaining claims and conclude that they do not
state a plausible claim for relief. In particular, Plaintiff’s claims against Director Faust, Corporal
Taylor, and the unidentified corrections officers in their official capacities are duplicative of his
claims against the District of Columbia and are accordingly dismissed. See Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Plaintiff’s respondeat superior theory against the District also lacks
merit. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.”).
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions, ECF No. 5, 10, and
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1. An Order will issue contemporaneously with this
Opinion.
DATE: September 29, 2023
CARL J. NICHOLS
United States District Judge
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