United States v. Trump ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
Criminal Action No. 23-257 (TSC)
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth below and during the hearing in this case on October 16, 2023,
the government’s Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice These
Proceedings, ECF No. 57, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Under binding Supreme Court precedent, this court “must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect [its] processes from prejudicial outside interferences.” Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). The First Amendment does not override that obligation.
“Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential
requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice. But it must not be allowed to divert
the trial from the very purpose of a court system to adjudicate controversies, both criminal and
civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures.” Id. at 350–
51 (cleaned up); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 n.18 (1984) (“Although
litigants do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door, those rights may
be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on several occasions this
Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to
ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant.”) (quotation omitted). Here, alternative measures
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such as careful voir dire, jury sequestration, and cautionary jury instructions are sufficient to
remedy only some of the potential prejudices that the government’s motion seeks to address.
In order to safeguard the integrity of these proceedings, it is necessary to impose certain
restrictions on public statements by interested parties. Undisputed testimony cited by the
government demonstrates that when Defendant has publicly attacked individuals, including on
matters related to this case, those individuals are consequently threatened and harassed. See ECF
No. 57 at 3–5. Since his indictment, and even after the government filed the instant motion,
Defendant has continued to make similar statements attacking individuals involved in the judicial
process, including potential witnesses, prosecutors, and court staff. See id. at 6–12. Defendant
has made those statements to national audiences using language communicating not merely that
he believes the process to be illegitimate, but also that particular individuals involved in it are
liars, or “thugs,” or deserve death. Id.; ECF No. 64 at 9–10. The court finds that such statements
pose a significant and immediate risk that (1) witnesses will be intimidated or otherwise unduly
influenced by the prospect of being themselves targeted for harassment or threats; and (2)
attorneys, public servants, and other court staff will themselves become targets for threats and
harassment. And that risk is largely irreversible in the age of the Internet; once an individual is
publicly targeted, even revoking the offending statement may not abate the subsequent threats,
harassment, or other intimidating effects during the pretrial as well as trial stages of this case.
The defense’s position that no limits may be placed on Defendant’s speech because he is
engaged in a political campaign is untenable, and the cases it cites do not so hold. The Circuit
Courts in both United States v. Brown and United States v. Ford recognized that First
Amendment rights must yield to the imperative of a fair trial. 218 F.3d 415, 424 (2000); 830
F.2d 596, 599 (1987). Unlike the district courts in those cases, however, this court has found that
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even amidst his political campaign, Defendant’s statements pose sufficiently grave threats to the
integrity of these proceedings that cannot be addressed by alternative means, and it has tailored
its order to meet the force of those threats. Brown, 218 F.3d at 428–30; Ford, 830 F.2d at 600.
Thus, limited restrictions on extrajudicial statements are justified here. The bottom line is that
equal justice under law requires the equal treatment of criminal defendants; Defendant’s
presidential candidacy cannot excuse statements that would otherwise intolerably jeopardize
these proceedings.
Accordingly, and pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 57.7(c), it is hereby ORDERED that:
All interested parties in this matter, including the parties and their counsel, are
prohibited from making any public statements, or directing others to make any
public statements, that target (1) the Special Counsel prosecuting this case or his
staff; (2) defense counsel or their staff; (3) any of this court’s staff or other
supporting personnel; or (4) any reasonably foreseeable witness or the substance of
their testimony.
This Order shall not be construed to prohibit Defendant from making statements criticizing the
government generally, including the current administration or the Department of Justice;
statements asserting that Defendant is innocent of the charges against him, or that his prosecution
is politically motivated; or statements criticizing the campaign platforms or policies of
Defendant’s current political rivals, such as former Vice President Pence.
In addition, the sealed version of the government’s Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial
Statements Do Not Prejudice These Proceedings, ECF No. 56, is DENIED as moot.
Date: October 17, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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