Hawkins v. Family Court ( 2024 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE GREGORY L. HAWKINS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 23-1430 (MN) ) FAMILY COURT, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Gregory L. Hawkins, Georgetown, Delaware – Pro Se Plaintiff. May 17, 2024 Wilmington, Delaware Marg lcWetience On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff Gregory L. Hawkins filed this pro se action under 42 US.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants the Family Court of Sussex County and the State of Delaware. (D.I. 2). Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4). Plaintiff has filed a motion to seal. (D.I. 6). The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings claims under the Second, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments, and alleges that a Family Court Judge filed an illegal DFS investigation against him, and that decisions were made against him by judges and commissioners that were racially discriminatory, biased and prejudiced against him as a man. He indicates by name several judges and commissioners that were involved, without providing further detail. He seeks $5 million in damages. Il. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading 1s liberally construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d. 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Rather, a claim is deemed frivolous only where it relies on an “‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.’” Id. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 11. A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well- pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. III. DISCUSSION “Absent a state’s consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil rights suit in federal court that names the state as a defendant.” Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam)). The State of Delaware has not waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Jones v. Att’y Gen. of Delaware, 737 F. App’x 642, 643 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Accordingly, the claims against Delaware must be dismissed. State courts are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment, see Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that Pennsylvania’s First Judicial District is a state entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity), and state court judges are entitled to judicial immunity for judicial acts, see Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”) (quoting Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and amendment is futile. Plaintiff's motion to seal will be denied. There is a “strong presumption of openness [which] does not permit the routine closing of judicial records to the public” Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff has not met the “heavy burden” of showing that “disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury” to him, Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984), or that closure is “essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest,” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and deny Plaintiff’s motion to seal. An appropriate Order will be entered.