State of Delaware Dept of Finance v. AT&T Inc. ( 2021 )


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  •         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    STATE OF DELAWARE,                    §
    DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,                §    No. 303, 2020
    §
    Plaintiff Below,              §
    Appellant,                    §    Court Below: Court of Chancery
    §    of the State of Delaware
    v.                            §
    §    C.A. No. 2019-0985
    AT&T INC.,                            §
    §
    Defendant Below,              §
    Appellee.                     §
    Submitted: March 17, 2021
    Decided:   June 1, 2021
    Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
    Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
    Melanie K. Sharp, Esquire, Martin S. Lessner, Esquire (argued), Mary F. Dugan,
    Esquire, and Michael A. Laukaitis II, Esquire, YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT
    & TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant State
    of Delaware, Department of Finance.
    Brian M. Rostocki, Esquire and Benjamin P. Chapple, Esquire, REED SMITH LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware; Sara A. Lima, Esquire (argued), REED SMITH LLP,
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, AT&T Inc.
    SEITZ, Chief Justice:
    The Delaware Department of Finance served an administrative subpoena on
    AT&T Inc. to produce records relating to a financial audit. AT&T refused to
    produce all of the requested records.              The Department responded by filing a
    complaint in the Court of Chancery to enforce the subpoena. AT&T defended by
    claiming, among other things, that the subpoena exceeded the Department’s
    authority and was overbroad. The Court of Chancery held that, although the
    Department validly issued the subpoena, AT&T “met its burden to show that the
    scope of the subpoena is so expansive that enforcement would constitute an abuse”
    of the court’s process. 1 The court noted that it had offered the Department the
    opportunity to supplement the record to explain why the subpoena should be
    enforced as written, but the Department declined the invitation. And, according to
    the court, it could have modified the subpoena, or permitted the Department to serve
    a narrower subpoena, but the Department declined these alternatives. The court
    therefore quashed the subpoena in its entirety. The Department has appealed the
    court’s decision.
    For the reasons explained below, we affirm the Court of Chancery’s judgment.
    We recognize, however, as the Court of Chancery did, that the procedural and
    substantive aspects of administrative subpoena enforcement are issues of first
    impression in Delaware. We adopt the procedures and substance followed by the
    1
    State of Del., Dep’t of Fin. v. AT&T Inc., 
    239 A.3d 541
    , 547 (Del. Ch. 2020).
    2
    federal courts in administrative subpoena enforcement proceedings. When the
    Department files a complaint to enforce an administrative subpoena, it must support
    the complaint with an affidavit or verification that shows it has a legitimate purpose
    for its investigation, the information sought may be relevant to the purpose and is
    not already in the Department’s possession, and the Department has complied with
    any administrative requirements. The respondent then files a response, where it can
    contest the Department’s assertions. If the respondent goes a step further and claims
    that the subpoena has been issued for an improper purpose such that enforcement
    would be an abuse of the court’s process, then the burden is on the respondent to
    make a particularized showing in its response that the Department issued the
    subpoena in bad faith, such as for harassment or to pressure the respondent to settle
    a collateral dispute. After the respondent files a response, and the parties make any
    further submissions called for by the court, the Court of Chancery should then
    convene a prompt hearing and address in summary fashion the enforcement issues.
    An evidentiary hearing should take place only in those cases when the court, after
    according great deference to the Department’s administrative judgments, believes
    that the disputed issues can only be resolved after hearing from witnesses.
    Because we have announced new procedural and substantive standards
    governing administrative subpoenas, we will allow the Department to serve a new
    subpoena on AT&T that complies with the guidance in this opinion. If the dispute
    3
    cannot be resolved, the Department should file an amended complaint to enforce the
    new subpoena, which should be addressed by the Court of Chancery consistent with
    the procedures and substantive review announced in this opinion.
    I.
    Delaware’s unclaimed property law, also known as escheat, allows the State
    to claim abandoned property if, after the statutory dormancy period, no rightful
    owner appears (the “Escheat Law” or “Escheat Statute”).2 Unclaimed property laws
    are rooted in the principle that abandoned property should be collected by the State
    to benefit the citizenry rather than confer a potential windfall on the holder.3
    2
    12 Del. C. §§ 1130-1190. Escheat means the State assumes title to or custody of unclaimed
    property. Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1319 (1961).
    Escheat originated in the English feudal system where all land was considered derived from the
    Crown. Id. at 1320. If a tenant died without heirs, “the land escheated, or fell back[,]” and reverted
    up the feudal chain of possession. Id. Similarly, the common law concept of bona vacantia gave
    the Crown the power to claim title to abandoned personal property. Id. at 1326 (noting that bona
    vacantia differs from escheat in that bona vacantia “was predicated on the absence of any other
    owner rather than on [the Crown’s] status as ultimate owner”). In the United States, escheat and
    bona vacantia merged under the umbrella of escheat. See Delaware v. New York, 
    507 U.S. 490
    ,
    497 n.9 (1993) (explaining that the contemporary concept of escheat bears a closer resemblance to
    bona vacantia and encompasses both real and personal property). States, as sovereigns, may
    escheat real or personal property located in that state after the owner has “abandoned” the property
    as defined under the State’s escheat statute. Texas v. New Jersey, 
    379 U.S. 674
    , 677 (1965),
    supplemented by, 
    380 U.S. 518
     (1965). Modern escheat statutes also cover abandoned or
    unclaimed intangible personal property such as corporate dividends, bank accounts, and insurance
    policies. See, e.g., 12 Del. C. § 1130(18) (defining “property” as both tangible and intangible
    under Delaware’s escheat laws).
    3
    The State may use the funds obtained through the unclaimed property statute in its operating
    budget until the property is claimed. See State of Del., Dep’t of Fin. v. Univar, Inc., 
    2020 WL 2569703
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2020).
    4
    Under Delaware’s Escheat Law, there is an Escheator of the State, who is the
    Secretary of Finance or the Secretary’s delegate.4 The State Escheator can, subject
    to limitations, “contract with a person to conduct compliance reviews and
    examinations” of the State’s unclaimed property laws.5 It can examine records, take
    testimony, and issue subpoenas to assess compliance with the State’s unclaimed
    property laws.6 Specific to subpoenas, the statute provides that the State Escheator
    or its agent can:
    (3) Issue an administrative subpoena to require that [] records . . . be
    made available for examination and that [] testimony . . . be provided.
    (4) Bring an action in the Court of Chancery seeking enforcement of an
    administrative subpoena issued under paragraph (3) of this section,
    which the Court shall consider under procedures that will lead to an
    expeditious resolution of the action.7
    4
    12 Del. C. § 1102.
    5
    Id. at § 1178.
    6
    Id. at § 1171. The State Escheator can also coordinate an audit with other states to verify
    compliance with the State’s Escheat Law. Id. at § 1181. If the State Escheator works with other
    states, it can only exchange information or examine records “if the other state has confidentiality
    and security requirements substantially equivalent to those in the [Delaware Escheat Statute] or
    agrees in a record to be bound by this State’s confidentiality and security requirements.” Id. at
    § 1181(b). The State Escheator can also “retain a private attorney in this State or another state or
    foreign country to commence an action to recover property on behalf of the State Escheator and
    may agree to pay attorneys’ fees based in whole or in part on a fixed fee, hourly fee, or a percentage
    of the amount or value of property recovered in the action.” Id. at § 1182(e). The Escheat Statute
    also has general confidentiality requirements that must be followed when conducting an audit. Id.
    at § 1189.
    7
    Id. at § 1171. The Court of Chancery plays a role beyond hearing requests to enforce
    administrative subpoenas. In an appellate capacity, the court adjudicates underreporting disputes
    between the State Escheator and respondents over escheated property (12 Del. C. § 1179) and can
    “enforce the determination and secure payment or delivery of past due, unpaid, or undelivered
    property.” Id. at §§ 1179-80.
    5
    A.
    On January 12, 2012, the Department sent AT&T—a Delaware corporation—
    a notice of unclaimed property examination. 8 The Department designated third-
    party auditor Kelmar Associates LLC (“Kelmar”) as its agent for the examination.
    Over the next several years, Kelmar requested from AT&T documents related to the
    audit. AT&T apparently satisfied all the requests except the two that are the subject
    of this appeal. The parties refer to these requests as the “Rebates Request” and the
    “Disbursements Request.” On October 30, 2014, Kelmar sent the Rebates Request.
    It asked AT&T to identify and provide transaction details for all general ledger
    accounts used to track customer rebate accrual and expense activity during a
    particular period.9 The Rebates Request also asked AT&T to name all third-party
    administrators it had used to issue rebates and the duration of the vendors’
    relationships with AT&T.10
    On January 17, 2018, Kelmar notified AT&T of the Disbursements Request.
    The Disbursements Request sought information on all checks issued from twenty-
    seven accounts since June 1992.11 Kelmar asked AT&T to identify which business
    unit each check was issued on behalf of, the general ledger account where it was
    8
    Since 1999, AT&T filed consolidated unclaimed property reports on behalf of itself and its
    affiliates with the State Escheator. App. to Opening Br. at A0103; 12 Del. C. § 1142(a).
    9
    App. to Opening Br. at A0154-56.
    10
    Id. at A0156.
    11
    Id. at A0144-47.
    6
    recorded, the payee’s name and address, and whether the check was cashed, voided,
    stopped, still outstanding, or voided and reissued.12 Seven months later, Kelmar
    notified AT&T of an additional bank account it had added to the Disbursement
    Request.13
    While the examination of AT&T’s records was ongoing, the General
    Assembly      amended       Delaware’s   unclaimed    property    laws    (the   “2017
    Amendments”). 14 Three aspects of the 2017 Amendments are relevant to this
    appeal. First, the amendments authorized the State to issue administrative subpoenas
    to require production of records related to an unclaimed property examination. 15
    Second, the amendments extended the statute of limitations for most unclaimed
    property audits from three years to ten years.16 This decision will refer to the statute
    of limitations in place prior to the 2017 Amendments as the “Old Statute of
    Limitations” and the statute of limitations as amended in 2017 as the “New Statute
    of Limitations.” Finally, under the 2017 Amendments, the subject of a pending
    examination may “notify the [Department] of the person’s intent to expedite the
    completion of the pending examination . . . .”17 Doing so requires the Department
    12
    Id. at A0144-45.
    13
    Id. at A0148-52.
    14
    See 81 Del. Laws ch. 1 (2017).
    15
    12 Del. C. § 1171(3).
    16
    12 Del. C. §§ 1156(b), 1172(h).
    17
    Id. at § 1172(c)(1).
    7
    to serve “[a]ll requests for records, testimony, and information” no more than
    eighteen months from the date the expedited examination request was submitted.18
    AT&T was the subject of a pending examination when the General Assembly
    enacted the 2017 Amendments.               Thus, AT&T was entitled to an expedited
    examination under the revised law. AT&T submitted the required notice to the
    Department on December 11, 2017. Two months later, AT&T and Kelmar finalized
    a work plan for the expedited examination.19
    The parties disagree on what happened next. The Department argues that,
    after the parties executed the work plan, AT&T “refused to produce documents”
    relating to the Rebates and Disbursements Requests thereby “violating its own work
    plan with the State.”20 According to AT&T, “the records produced to date, which
    include[d] years of AT&T’s unclaimed property reports to Delaware, [were]
    sufficient to proceed with its audit to determine AT&T’s unclaimed property
    compliance.”21 Specifically, AT&T argues that it responded to the Disbursement
    Request with “payment data for every quarter-end month (four months per year) for
    approximately eight years[,]” which “amounted to over 10.5 million lines of
    information and reflected spend of over $16 billion.”22 AT&T further claims that it
    18
    Id. at § 1172(c)(3).
    19
    App. to Opening Br. at A0164-65.
    20
    Opening Br. at 9.
    21
    Answering Br. at 9.
    22
    Id. (citing App. to Opening Br. at A0106-07).
    8
    “provided schedules of data and detailed in writing how it maintain[ed] information
    that may be responsive to the [Rebates] [R]equest.”23
    In response to AT&T’s objections to the outstanding requests, the Department
    sent AT&T seven notices of deficiencies between July 2018 and October 2019. The
    Department cautioned that failure to comply with the work plan could result in
    termination of the expedited examination. On October 31, 2019, the Department
    terminated the expedited examination. The termination notice included a warning
    that the Department might issue an administrative subpoena for the records if AT&T
    did not produce the outstanding documents. AT&T did not respond. On November
    8, 2019, the Department issued an administrative subpoena demanding the
    production of documents responsive to the Rebates Request and the Disbursement
    Request.
    B.
    On December 6, 2019, AT&T filed an action in the United States District
    Court for the District of Delaware against three Delaware Department of Finance
    officials challenging the constitutionality of the Delaware Escheat Law. This action
    followed four days later. In the district court case, AT&T moved to stay the Court
    of Chancery litigation pending resolution of the federal action, and also moved to
    23
    Id. (citing App. to Opening Br. at A0107).
    9
    dismiss the case, or to quash or modify the subpoena. The district court stayed the
    federal case pending the outcome of the Court of Chancery action and this appeal.24
    On July 10, 2020, the Court of Chancery quashed the subpoena in its entirety.
    First, the Court of Chancery denied AT&T’s request to stay the action in favor of
    the federal action. It also denied AT&T’s motion to dismiss for failure to join
    indispensable parties. Those issues have not been raised on appeal. Next, the court
    concluded that the Department was authorized to issue the subpoena, and the
    subpoena satisfied the framework for enforcing administrative subpoenas set forth
    in the United States Supreme Court’s decision United States v. Powell.25 But as the
    court interpreted Powell, the court should not enforce an “unreasonable” subpoena
    if it would be an abuse of the court’s process.26 The court ultimately held that AT&T
    had established that the subpoena was so “expansive, both as to the time period it
    cover[ed] and the subject matter it embrace[d][,]”27 that “the Department issued an
    24
    AT&T Cap. Servs., Inc. et al. v. Geisenberger et al., C.A. No. 1:19-cv-02238-MN, D.I. 22 (filed
    July 28, 2020); Geisenberger et al., D.I. 26 (filed Jan. 12, 2021).
    25
    
    379 U.S. 48
    , 57-58 (1964); AT&T Inc., 239 A.3d at 547 (“This decision holds that the Escheat
    Law granted the State Escheator the authority to issue the subpoena, which the Department
    exercised.”).
    26
    AT&T Inc., 239 A.3d at 547. The Court of Chancery observed that “[d]ecisions considering the
    enforcement of administrative subpoenas also evaluate the dimension of reasonableness.” Id. at
    562 (citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 
    327 U.S. 186
    , 209 (1946)).
    27
    Id. at 575. The court found that a combination of factors supported its abuse of the court’s
    process conclusion: (1) the Department’s failure to provide a rationale for records requests that
    covered periods “sixteen years beyond the point at which the Old Statute of Limitations would
    [have] prevent[ed] the State Escheator from recovering unclaimed property,” (2) the Department’s
    requests for records where the last-known address may have been outside Delaware, in potential
    violation of the statute, and (3) the Department’s requests for records of all checks, regardless of
    the check’s disposition. Id.
    10
    overly broad and unreasonable subpoena such that to enforce it would abuse the
    court’s process.”28
    The Court of Chancery also found Kelmar’s involvement in the investigation
    troublesome. Relying on federal cases that have questioned Kelmar’s auditing
    practices in other states, the court noted that the breadth of the subpoena, coupled
    with the fact that Kelmar was compensated contingently and “works for other states
    in similar arrangements,” suggested that Kelmar might be furthering its own interests
    to support its business in other states.29 The court also found that “[t]he Department
    appear[ed] to have lent the State[]’s investigatory authority to Kelmar to use as it
    sees fit.”30 Thus, taken together, the court held that enforcing the subpoena would
    be an abuse of the court’s process.
    The Court of Chancery decided to quash, rather than modify, the subpoena.
    According to the court, quashing the subpoena was the only alternative because the
    parties did not provide the court with a sufficient basis to narrow the subpoena. The
    court rejected AT&T’s proposed limitations after finding that it would confine the
    Department’s authority beyond what is already permissible under the Escheat
    Statute. The court noted that it would have preferred to give “significant deference”
    28
    Id. at 563.
    29
    Id. at 576 (citing Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Frerichs, 
    2017 WL 4863318
    , at *4 (C.D. Ill.
    Sept. 5, 2017); Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Chiang, 
    2014 WL 6090559
    , at *1-2 (E.D. Cal.
    Nov. 13, 2014)).
    30
    
    Id.
    11
    to the Department in narrowing the subpoena, but the Department declined to
    propose any modifications.31
    The Department sought reargument on the grounds that the court “exceeded
    the appropriate scope of review for an abuse of the court’s process, misapprehended
    the factual record relating to [Kelmar’s] compensation, and incorrectly created a
    presumption that Kelmar . . . would improperly seek documents to use in
    examinations for other [s]tates.”32 The Court of Chancery denied the Department’s
    motion for reargument and dismissed the case without giving the Department leave
    to amend its complaint.
    C.
    On appeal, the Department argues that the Court of Chancery erred in several
    respects.      First, the Department contends that, once the court found that the
    Department met the elements of the Powell test, it should not have quashed the
    subpoena using the “abuse of the court’s process” standard. In other words, the court
    should have presumed good faith on the Department’s part and not jumped to the
    abuse of the court’s process review. Second, the Department argues that the Court
    of Chancery should not have singled out Kelmar’s involvement in the audit and its
    disputed contingency fee arrangement to find an abuse of the court’s process. Even
    31
    
    Id. at 577
    .
    32
    Opening Br. at 1.
    12
    if the State compensated Kelmar by contingency, according to the Department, the
    contingency arrangement was unrelated to the validity of the subpoena. Third, the
    Department contends that the court erred in applying the Old Statute of Limitations
    to assess the reasonableness of the subpoena. As they argue, the New Statute of
    Limitations in the 2017 version of the unclaimed property law should have been
    applied retroactively. And even if the Old Statute of Limitations applied, the
    Department claims, the Department’s information requests were not restricted to the
    statute of limitations period. Next, the Department argues that the Court of Chancery
    erred when it refused to accept the Department’s representation that it had narrowed
    the temporal scope of the subpoena with AT&T. And finally, the Department argues
    the court erred by entering a final judgment after granting AT&T’s motion to quash
    instead of allowing the Department to amend its complaint as a matter of right under
    Court of Chancery Rule 15(a).
    AT&T responds that the Court of Chancery’s factual findings—the
    overbreadth of the subpoena and Kelmar’s financial incentives—could be
    considered by the court when deciding whether the court’s process would be abused
    by enforcing the subpoena. What constitutes an abuse of the court’s process,
    according to AT&T, is within the court’s discretion. And regardless, AT&T argues,
    the court had the power to inquire further into the Department’s information requests
    but could not because the Department refused to cooperate. AT&T further asserts
    13
    that the court correctly applied the Old Statute of Limitations. The court was
    required to presume that the New Statute of Limitations had prospective effect only,
    and finding to the contrary would impact AT&T’s vested rights. And finally, AT&T
    argues that it had not agreed with the Department to narrow the subpoena and the
    court was not obligated to grant the Department’s request for further proceedings
    when the Department could simply issue a new subpoena.
    On appeal we defer to the Court of Chancery’s factual findings and will not
    set aside those findings “unless they are clearly erroneous or not the product of a
    logical and orderly deductive reasoning process”.33 Questions of law are subject to
    de novo review.34
    II.
    In United States v. Morton Salt,35 the United States Supreme Court held that
    a government agency charged with examining suspected wrongdoing has “a power
    of inquisition” akin to that of a grand jury “which does not depend on a case or
    controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that
    the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.”36 An
    administrative subpoena is not an “actual search or seizure” subject to the Fourth
    33
    Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 
    638 A.2d 1110
    , 1114 (Del. 1994).
    34
    Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., 
    106 A.3d 1035
    , 1043 (Del. 2014).
    35
    
    338 U.S. 632
     (1950).
    36
    
    Id. at 643-44
    .
    14
    Amendment’s probable cause requirement. 37 Rather, “[t]he gist of the [Fourth
    Amendment] protection [against administrative subpoenas] is in the requirement . .
    . that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.” 38 Agency investigatory
    powers are afforded great deference by the judiciary.39 When the legislature has
    given the agency the power to issue administrative subpoenas, judicial review of a
    complaint for enforcement is “strictly limited.”40
    In Morton Salt the Court held that a subpoena is enforceable if “the inquiry is
    within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite, and the
    37
    Powell, 379 U.S. at 57; see also Okla. Press, 
    327 U.S. at 195, 216
     (stating that investigative
    subpoenas need not be “limited . . . by forecasts of the probable result of the investigation”)
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blair v. United States, 
    250 U.S. 273
    , 282 (1919)).
    38
    Okla. Press, 
    327 U.S. at 208
    .
    39
    
    338 U.S. at 642
     (“Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it
    is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow that an administrative agency
    charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original
    inquiry.”). Without deference to administrative agencies, “[j]udicial supervision of agency
    decisions to investigate might hopelessly entangle the courts in areas that would prove to be
    unmanageable and would certainly throw great amounts of sand into the gears of the administrative
    process.” SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 
    648 F.2d 118
    , 127 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 
    596 F.2d 1231
    , 1235 n.1
    (5th Cir. 1979)).
    40
    FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 
    555 F.2d 862
    , 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc). The D.C. Circuit
    explained that “while the court’s function is ‘neither minor nor ministerial,’ the scope of issues
    which may be litigated in an enforcement proceeding must be narrow, because of the important
    governmental interest in the expeditious investigation of possible unlawful activity.” Texaco, Inc.,
    
    555 F.2d at 872
     (internal citation omitted) (quoting Okla. Press, 
    327 U.S. at
    217 n.57); accord
    Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 
    347 F.3d 57
    , 64 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[J]udicial review
    of administrative subpoenas is ‘strictly limited.’”) (quoting Texaco, Inc., 
    555 F.2d at 871-72
    ); In
    re McVane, 
    44 F.3d 1127
    , 1135 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The courts’ role in a proceeding to enforce an
    administrative subpoena is ‘extremely limited.’”) (quoting NLRB v. C.C.C. Assoc., Inc., 
    306 F.2d 534
    , 538 (2d Cir. 1962)); E.E.O.C. v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 
    939 F.2d 920
    , 922 (11th Cir. 1991) (“It
    is well-settled that the role of a district court in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena
    is sharply limited . . . .”).
    15
    information sought is reasonably relevant” to the authorized inquiry.41 An agency’s
    “determination of relevance should be accepted if not ‘obviously wrong.’”42
    In United States v. Powell, the United States Supreme Court refined the
    inquiry when courts are asked to enforce administrative subpoenas. There, a
    corporate taxpayer refused to comply with an IRS administrative summons. The
    company’s president argued that a three-year statute of limitations barred the IRS
    from seeking further assessments unless the agency could “indicate some grounds
    for its belief a fraud had been committed.”43 The district court granted the petition
    for enforcement. The Third Circuit reversed and found that the Internal Revenue
    Code barred the IRS from re-examining the taxpayer’s records unless it could make
    a showing of probable cause.
    The United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit decision. The
    Court held that “the Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable cause to
    obtain enforcement of his summons, either before or after the three-year statute of
    limitations on ordinary tax liabilities has expired.” 44 To hold otherwise “might
    seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks
    41
    Morton Salt, 
    338 U.S. at 652
    .
    42
    F.T.C. v. Carter, 
    636 F.2d 781
    , 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Texaco, Inc., 
    555 F.2d at
    877
    n.32).
    43
    Powell, 
    379 U.S. at 49
    .
    44
    
    Id. at 57
    .
    16
    warranted, forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject which
    he desires to investigate . . . .”45
    Summarizing the appropriate standard of judicial review, the Supreme Court
    in Powell held that an administrative subpoena is enforceable when the agency
    shows that (1) the investigation will be conducted for a legitimate purpose, (2) the
    inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, (3) the information sought is not already
    within the agency’s possession, and (4) the administrative steps required by the
    statute have been followed.46 If the government has met this preliminary showing,
    the burden shifts to the subpoena recipient to disprove one of the Powell factors or
    to demonstrate that enforcement would constitute an “abuse of the court’s
    process.”47
    After Powell, a subpoena issued within an agency’s statutory authority is
    “presumed to be reasonable.”48 “[T]he burden of demonstrating that [the] subpoena
    45
    
    Id. at 54
    .
    46
    
    Id. at 57-58
    .
    47
    
    Id. at 58
     (“The burden of showing an abuse of the court’s process is on the [party objecting to
    the subpoena] . . . .”); see also United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 
    437 U.S. 298
    , 316 (1978)
    (“[T]hose opposing enforcement of a summons do bear the burden to disprove the actual existence
    of a valid . . . purpose [for the investigation] by the [agency].”).
    48
    U.S. v. R. Enters., Inc., 
    498 U.S. 292
    , 300-01 (1991) (explaining that “the law presumes . . . that
    a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority[,]” and therefore, “a grand jury
    subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable”). This principle applies
    with equal force to administrative subpoenas. See Morton Salt, 
    338 U.S. at 642-43
     (analogizing
    the subpoena power to that of grand juries).
    17
    is unreasonable falls on the individual to whom it is directed.”49 When a subpoena
    is challenged as overbroad, its permissible scope is addressed by the second Powell
    factor. “[W]hether [the] evidence sought is relevant requires the [] court to evaluate
    the relationship between the particular materials sought and the particular matter
    under investigation—an analysis ‘variable in relation to the nature, purposes and
    scope of the inquiry.’”50 It must be “adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of
    49
    In re McVane, 
    44 F.3d at
    1135 (citing FTC v. Rockefeller, 
    549 F.2d 182
    , 190 (2d Cir. 1979));
    Texaco, Inc., 
    555 F.2d at 882
     (“The burden of showing that the request is unreasonable is on the
    subpoenaed party.”) (citing Powell, 
    379 U.S. at 58
    ; FTC v. Standard Am., Inc., 
    306 F.2d 231
    , 235
    (3d Cir. 1962)).
    50
    McLane Co., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 
    137 S. Ct. 1159
    , 1167-68 (2017) (quoting Okla. Press, 
    327 U.S. at 209
    ). Several Federal Courts of Appeals have applied this framework when reviewing
    subpoenas challenged as overbroad. See Doe v. United States, 
    253 F.3d 256
    , 266-71 (6th Cir.
    2001) (considering the scope of the materials requested and whether production of those materials
    would be an undue burden on the subpoena recipient under “the second element of [the court’s]
    test for determining the enforceability of an administrative subpoena [which] focuses on the
    relevance of the documents to the agency’s investigation” ); In re McVane, 
    44 F.3d at 1135
     (noting
    that “[t]he relevance of the sought-after information is measured against the general purposes of
    the agency’s investigation, ‘which necessarily presupposes an inquiry into the possible range of
    investigation under the statute’”) (quoting Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v.
    Resolution Trust Corp., 
    5 F.3d 1508
    , 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
    Corp., 
    788 F.2d 164
    , 169-71 (3d Cir. 1986) (evaluating a subpoena challenged as overly broad
    under a “relevancy standard”); United States v. Goldman, 
    637 F.2d 664
    , 666 (9th Cir. 1980)
    (affirming the district court’s denial of enforcement after finding that “the government had not met
    its light burden in establishing that the records [from two years prior to the agent’s examination]
    were relevant”); United States v. Freedom Church, 
    613 F.2d 316
    , 321-22 (1st Cir. 1979)
    (reviewing the summonee’s challenge to the scope of the IRS summons in terms of its relevancy
    to the investigation); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 
    584 F.2d 1018
    , 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The
    breadth of an investigation is for the investigators to determine. The breadth of a subpoena or of
    a search made in records may be excessive, but the test is relevance to the specific purpose, and
    the purpose is determined by the investigators.”) (quoting 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
    § 3.06, at 188-89 (1958)).
    18
    51
    the relevant inquiry.”            Ultimately, the question comes down to one of
    reasonableness.52
    Under Powell, the court can also consider whether enforcing the subpoena
    would constitute an abuse of the court’s process. This factor is different than the
    other Powell factors. It addresses whether the court is being asked to join the agency
    in an act of bad faith:
    It is the court’s process which is invoked to enforce the administrative
    summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an
    abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper
    purpose, such as to harass the [target of the investigation] or to put
    pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose
    reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.53
    If an agency satisfies the four Powell factors, however, it is strong evidence
    of an administrative agency’s good faith.54 The party opposing the subpoena then
    51
    See Okla. Press, 
    327 U.S. at 208-09
     (articulating this reasonableness standard, the United States
    Supreme Court stated that the subpoena must be “authorized by [the legislature],” “relevant to the
    inquiry[,]” and shall be “adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry”).
    52
    See Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 
    469 U.S. 310
    , 323 (1985) (observing that the court
    has never held “that the IRS must conduct its investigations in the least intrusive way possible[,]
    [i]nstead, the standard is one of relevance”); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 
    584 F.2d at 1028-31
    (holding that information subpoenaed may be obtained if reasonably relevant to an investigation
    within the authority of the agency); see also See v. City of Seattle, 
    387 U.S. 541
    , 544 (1967)
    (“[W]hen an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment
    requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in
    directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.”); Morton Salt, 
    338 U.S. at 652-53
     (finding that a government agency has not exceeded its investigatory power where “the
    inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information
    sought is reasonably relevant”).
    53
    Powell, 
    379 U.S. at 58
     (internal citation omitted).
    54
    United States v. Stuart, 
    489 U.S. 353
    , 360 (1989) (referring to the Powell factors as “the
    requirements of [agency] good faith”); LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 
    437 U.S. at 313, 318
     (listing the Powell
    factors as the “elements of a good-faith exercise” and later referring to the factors as “the Powell
    standards of good faith”).
    19
    bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of good faith.55 “This burden is a
    heavy one.”56 To carry it, a respondent must point to “specific facts or circumstances
    plausibly raising an inference of bad faith.”57
    Federal courts applying Powell’s abuse of process standard have avoided rigid
    definitions of “bad faith.” Instead, they have restricted bad faith to those cases when
    an agency acts for reasons unrelated to the merits of the investigation. Some
    examples include, when an agency serves a subpoena in support of a claim the
    agency “knows it cannot win,”58 “fraud or deceit on the part of the government,”59
    55
    Stuart, 
    489 U.S. at 360
     (finding that affidavits submitted by the IRS “plainly satisfied the
    requirements of good faith [that the court] set forth in Powell and ha[s] repeatedly reaffirmed”)
    (citing Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 
    469 U.S. at 321
    ); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 
    465 U.S. 805
    , 813 n.10 (1984)); see also United States v. McCarthy, 
    514 F.2d 368
    , 372 (3d Cir. 1975).
    56
    LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 
    437 U.S. at 316
    ; see also United States v. Markwood, 
    48 F.3d 969
    , 978 (6th
    Cir. 1995) (“LaSalle held that the party asserting the agency acted in bad faith bears a heavy burden
    of proof.”); United States v. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 
    769 F.2d 1440
    , 1444 (10th Cir. 1985)
    (“The burden then shifts to the taxpayers. The burden is a heavy one.”); SEC v. Knopfler, 
    658 F.2d 25
    , 26 (2d Cir. 1981) (“When the Commission has met the normal statutory prerequisites for
    enforcement, the opponent of a subpoena has a heavy burden if he seeks denial of enforcement on
    the ground that the subpoena is sought for an invalid purpose.”); N.L.R.B. v. Interstate Dress
    Carriers, Inc., 
    610 F.2d 99
    , 112 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[T]he burden on the party to whom the subpoena
    is addressed is not a meager one.”).
    57
    United States v. Clarke, 
    573 U.S. 248
    , 254 (2014) (holding that a taxpayer opposing an IRS
    summons on the grounds that it was issued for an improper purpose is entitled to examine IRS
    officials only if he alleges specific facts giving rise to an inference of agency bad faith); SEC v.
    Marin, 
    982 F.3d 1341
    , 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying Clarke’s holding to other Powell criteria);
    see also United States v. Garden State Nat’l Bank, 
    607 F.2d 61
    , 71 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Allegations
    supporting a ‘bad faith’ defense are . . . insufficient if conclusionary.”).
    58
    Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., 
    648 F.2d at 127
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    59
    Groder v. United States, 
    816 F.2d 139
    , 144 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Kaatz, 
    705 F.2d 1237
    , 1243 (10th Cir. 1983)).
    20
    or where an administrative agency uses its civil investigatory powers solely for
    criminal investigations (where it is not already authorized to do so).60
    III.
    We turn to three of the Department’s related arguments on appeal—whether
    the Court of Chancery erred when it found that enforcing the subpoena would be an
    abuse of the court’s process, even though the Department satisfied the Powell
    factors; whether Kelmar’s contingent fee arrangement was relevant to the subpoena
    enforcement issue; and whether the court should have accepted representations that
    the subpoena’s scope had been narrowed by the parties.
    We agree with the Department on several points when it comes to the court’s
    inquiry into an abuse of the court’s process. First, it is correct that the proper scope
    of the subpoena and the reasonableness of the requested information is addressed
    under the second Powell factor—whether the information requested is relevant to
    the purpose of the investigation being conducted by the Department. We also agree
    with the Department that once the Court of Chancery found that the Department had
    satisfied the Powell factors, AT&T bore a heavy burden to rebut the presumption
    that the Department was acting in good faith in pursuing its investigation. 61 Further,
    we agree with the Department that there is nothing inherently wrong with the State’s
    60
    LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 
    437 U.S. at 318-19
    .
    61
    
    Id. at 316
    ; Garden State Nat’l Bank, 
    607 F.2d at 68
    .
    21
    designated representative, Kelmar, operating under a contingency fee arrangement
    and, when permitted, collaborating with other states on audits.62 And finally, the
    Department is correct that parties should be able to narrow the breadth of a subpoena
    by representations made to the court without having to serve an amended subpoena.
    We part company with the Department, however, when it comes to the court’s
    authority to have the Department address its questions about the breadth of the
    subpoena and Kelmar’s incentives. As recognized earlier, the Department enjoys a
    strong presumption of good faith. That strong presumption comes from satisfying
    the Powell factors. Yet even though the court’s role is extremely constrained when
    deciding whether enforcing and administrative subpoena would be an abuse of the
    court’s process, it still exists.            When the court has questions about the
    appropriateness of a subpoena, it is within the court’s discretion to inquire further,
    or to hold an evidentiary hearing to clear up disputed facts, before enforcing the
    subpoena.63
    62
    A contingency fee arrangement with the auditor benefits the State because the State need not
    pay for audit services unless funds are uncovered that should be returned to the State. The State
    also does not have the expense of a large staff of state employee auditors to conduct compliance
    audits. The Department is also permitted by statute to enter into a contingency fee arrangement
    with designees (12 Del. C. § 1182(e)), who can coordinate its audits with other states. Id.
    63
    Garden State Nat’l Bank, 
    607 F.2d at 71
     (holding that when the government’s “allegations are
    factually refuted by the [person opposing the subpoena], thus presenting a disputed factual issue,
    or where proper affirmative defenses, such as those alleging ‘bad faith’ . . . are factually
    supported[,] . . . the [person opposing the subpoena] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing”) (citing
    McCarthy, 
    514 F.2d at 368
    ); United States v. Salter, 
    432 F.2d 697
    , 700-01 (1st Cir. 1970) (setting
    a similar procedure for evidentiary hearings where the respondent has challenged enforcement of
    an administrative summons as an abuse of the court’s process); see also United States v. Church
    22
    Here, the Department put the court in a box. It took the position that after the
    pleadings closed and briefing completed, the court had to decide the matter on the
    record submitted and issue a final appealable order either enforcing or quashing the
    subpoena.64 In other words, the court’s only options were to enforce the subpoena
    as is, or not at all. Either way, enter a final order. That is not what the Powell test
    contemplates. Instead, in a case when the court has doubts about the good faith of
    an agency’s use of its subpoena power, the court can go beyond the written
    submissions and inquire further into whether the Department is using the
    administrative subpoena for purposes unrelated to the administrative investigation—
    for instance, to harass the respondent or further some other unrelated interest.
    The Court of Chancery found the subpoena was “expansive, both as to the
    time period it covers and the subject matter it embraces.”65 According to the court,
    “[t]he Department seems to be pursuing information about property that it knows it
    cannot recover” or was in search of records “with last-known addresses outside of
    Delaware” for property “almost certainly non-escheatable” which would sweep up
    “a vast amount of irrelevant data.”66 The court was also concerned that Kelmar
    of Scientology of Cal., 
    520 F.2d 818
    , 824-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing with approval the procedure
    set forth in McCarthy and Salter and applying it to the case at hand).
    64
    AT&T Inc., 239 A.3d at 557 (“[T]he Department maintained that in an action to enforce an
    administrative subpoena, the only pleading is a complaint, the standard response is a motion to
    quash, and that based on that record, this court must make a decision that would result in a ‘final
    appealable order’ regarding the administrative subpoena.”).
    65
    Id. at 575.
    66
    Id.
    23
    might be straying from its Delaware-based work into information that might help
    Kelmar recover unclaimed property for other states.67
    Boxed in by the Department’s black or white stance, the court was left in the
    unsatisfying position of having questions that the Department would not answer. As
    the court held:
    The Department might have good explanations on these points, but it
    eschewed the opportunity to provide them. The court is therefore left
    with the bare allegations of the complaint. Based on those allegations,
    the court is forced to conclude that enforcing the Subpoena as written
    would be an abuse of the court’s process.68
    In most cases the subpoena recipient will have a difficult time convincing the
    court to inquire further into an agency’s good faith once the agency satisfies the
    Powell test. But under the circumstances of this case, where the court had serious
    questions but the Department refused to provide answers, the Court of Chancery did
    not err in quashing the subpoena in its entirety.
    IV.
    We now address the Department’s argument that the Court of Chancery erred
    when it decided that the New Statute of Limitations did not apply retroactively and
    thus the Old Statute of Limitations applied to the Department’s 2019 subpoena. The
    67
    Id. at 576 (“The fact that Kelmar works for multiple states supplies a potential motivation for
    Kelmar’s insistence on obtaining records for all checks and rebates, regardless of whether or not
    the last-known address on AT&T’s records indicates that the property would have been
    escheatable to Delaware.”).
    68
    Id.
    24
    Court of Chancery used its statute of limitations analysis to review the
    reasonableness of the Department’s document requests. Finding that the Old Statute
    of Limitations applied, the court used its shorter time frame as a measuring stick to
    assess the reasonableness of the Department’s information demands.
    Before the 2017 Amendments, the last update to the statute of limitations was
    2002.69 Under that version of the Escheat Law, the statute of limitations was tied to
    the holder’s filing of an annual unclaimed property report. The State could not
    recover property until after it had issued a notice of deficiency for an annual report.70
    Generally, the State had three years from the holder’s annual report filing to issue a
    notice of deficiency, and six years if the omission exceeded 25% of the amount
    disclosed in the report.71 But if “no report [was] filed, or if a false or fraudulent
    report [was] filed with the intent to evade the obligation to pay over abandoned
    property,” then the State could issue a notice of deficiency at any time.72 Absent
    fraud, failure to issue a notice of deficiency within the statutory time period barred
    the State from suing to recover the unclaimed property.73
    69
    73 Del. Laws ch. 417 (2002).
    70
    Id. (“The State Escheator, as soon as practicable after receipt of any report required by this
    chapter, shall examine it to determine if it is correct.”) (emphasis added).
    71
    Id.
    72
    Id.
    73
    Id. (“No suit to enforce the payment of a deficiency in payment of abandoned or unclaimed
    property shall be brought . . . against a holder unless the notice of deficiency in payment is mailed
    to the holder within the three (3) year period provided in this subsection.”).
    25
    After the 2017 Amendments adopting the New Statute of Limitations, the
    State extended the limitations period to enforce unclaimed property laws to ten years
    after the duty arose to report the unclaimed property. 74 It also provided that the
    limitations period was tolled by delivery of a notice of examination or if the State
    Escheator “reasonably concludes that the holder has filed a report containing a
    fraudulent or willful misrepresentation.”75
    In its review of the reasonableness of the subpoena, the court noted first that
    “the statute of limitations [] does not operate as a bright-line rule that leads to a
    finding that a subpoena is unauthorized if the agency seeks records that are outside
    the limitations period.”76 Instead, when “an information request goes beyond the
    statute of limitations[,] [it] becomes part of the inquiry into whether it would
    represent an abuse of the court’s process to enforce a subpoena . . . .”77 The court
    found that neither the statute nor the legislative history showed that the General
    Assembly intended to apply the New Statute of Limitations retroactively. 78 Using
    74
    81 Del. Laws ch. 1 (2017); 12 Del. C. § 1156(b). Under the 2017 Amendments, the State is
    prohibited from “commenc[ing] an action or proceeding to enforce [the Escheat Statute] with
    respect to the reporting, payment, or delivery of property more than 10 years after the duty arose.”
    Id.
    75
    Id.
    76
    AT&T Inc., 239 F.3d at 569.
    77
    Id. at 570. We note that the overbreadth of an administrative subpoena should not reflexively
    be treated as a trigger to inquire into whether the court’s process is being abused. Overbreadth as
    part of a review for abuse of the court’s process should be reserved for those rare cases when the
    scope of the administrative subpoena as a whole is so overbroad that it strongly supports an
    argument of bad faith by the agency.
    78
    Id. at 568-69 (citing Del. S.B. 13 syn., 149th Gen. Assm. (2017)).
    26
    the Old Statute of Limitations, the court concluded that the Department’s subpoena
    requests appeared unreasonable because they far exceeded the scope of what was
    permissible under the version of the Escheat Law in effect at that time.
    On appeal, the Department advances three reasons why the Court of Chancery
    erred in applying the Old Statute of Limitations: (1) the New Statute of Limitations
    should be applied retroactively; (2) even if the Old Statute of Limitations applied, it
    should not be used to bar the State’s review of records outside the limitations period,
    and (3) AT&T elected to be bound by the New Statute of Limitations when it entered
    the expedited examination program.79
    For the first argument, the Department did not raise it before the Court of
    Chancery. In another case, the distinction might require serious consideration. In
    this appeal, however, it is waived.80 For the second argument, we agree with the
    Department that Powell rejected a “bright line bar on the State’s authority to conduct
    an investigation based on the running of the statute of limitations.”81 But the Court
    of Chancery recognized this point. As the court held when addressing AT&T’s
    argument that the statute of limitations precluded the Department from requesting
    information outside the statute: “[f]ramed in this bright-line fashion, this argument
    79
    Opening Br. at 28.
    80
    Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. AT&T raised the waiver issue in its answering brief. Answering Br. at 29.
    The Department did not respond to the argument in its reply brief.
    81
    Opening Br. at 30 (citing AT&T Inc., 239 F.3d at 569; Powell, 
    379 U.S. at 49
    ; EEOC v. Del.
    State Police, 
    618 F. Supp. 451
     (D. Del. 1985)).
    27
    does not provide grounds for quashing or modifying the Subpoena” and “AT&T’s
    bright-line argument that the statute of limitations bars the Department from
    investigating those years runs contrary to precedent.”82 The court concluded that
    “[t]he statute of limitations ... thus does not operate as a bright-line rule that leads to
    a finding that a subpoena is unauthorized if the agency seeks records that are outside
    the limitations period.”83 The court did not apply a “bright-line” rule. Instead, it
    acknowledged the Department’s ability to make information requests outside the
    limitations period, but assessed the reasonableness of the requests in relation to the
    ultimate investigatory purpose of the subpoena.
    Finally, the Department contends that the New Statute of Limitations applies
    because AT&T elected to be bound by the 2017 Amendments based on its decision
    to participate in the expedited examination. Stated differently, AT&T should not
    benefit from the expedited examination program authorized by the 2017
    Amendments without also being bound by the New Statute of Limitations, enacted
    under the same amendments.84 The Department’s position, however, is inconsistent
    with the position it took when the 2002 amendments to the Escheat Statute were
    adopted. As the Court of Chancery held:
    82
    AT&T Inc., 239 F.3d at 566, 569.
    83
    Id. at 569.
    84
    Opening Br. at 31 (citing Harper v. United States., 
    2019 WL 4229755
    , *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2,
    2019); Hampton v. Univ. of Md. at Baltimore, 
    674 A.2d 145
    , 150 (Md. Spec. App. 1996)).
    28
    Then, the State Escheator agreed that “no statute of limitations applie[d]
    for periods for which reports were filed prior to July 22, 2002,” and that
    the new statute of limitations applied for reports filed after the effective
    date.85
    The Court of Chancery did not err when it considered the reasonableness of the
    subpoena in light of what it found to be the applicable statute of limitations.
    V.
    We affirm the Court of Chancery’s judgment. We recognize, however, that
    the Court has announced new procedures and law governing enforcement of
    administrative subpoenas. Thus, although we affirm, the Department should have
    the opportunity to conform to the new procedures.86 The Department should serve
    a new subpoena on AT&T consistent with this opinion. If the parties are unable to
    agree on production of the information called for in the amended subpoena, the
    85
    AT&T Inc., 239 A.3d at 569 (citing Ethan D. Millar et al., Unclaimed Property, Tax Portfolio
    Series (BNA) no. 1600-3d § 1600.05(J)(1), Bloomberg Law (database updated June 2020)).
    86
    See United States v. Cortese, 
    614 F.2d 914
    , 918-19 (3d Cir. 1980) (remanding the case for further
    development of the record following the Third Circuit’s articulation of the proper standard for
    showing bad faith); White v. Panic, 783 A2.d 543, 555 & n.45 (Del. 2001) (“We have implicitly
    recognized a narrow exception to this policy where the Court affirms the judgment of the Court of
    Chancery but announces a new rule of law or clarifies pleading standards that apply to the
    plaintiff’s cause of action. In the interest of fairness, the Court directs the Court of Chancery in
    such cases to grant the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint in accordance with the newly
    announced rule or clarification.”); Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 
    700 A.2d 135
    , 147
    (Del. 1997) (“Because of the unique circumstances of this case, where we have been called upon
    to explicate pleading standards and the limited principles applicable to damages in a disclosure
    case, we remand for the sole purpose of allowing the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to replead
    in a manner consistent with this opinion.”).
    29
    Department should file an amended complaint and seek review by the Court of
    Chancery generally following the procedure set forth in United States v. McCarthy:87
    1. The Department files a complaint to enforce an administrative subpoena
    (in this case an amended complaint). It must support the complaint with
    an affidavit or verification that shows it has a legitimate purpose for its
    investigation, the information sought may be relevant to the purpose and
    is not already in the Department’s possession, and the Department has
    complied with any administrative requirements. The respondent then files
    a response and affidavits, where it supports any affirmative defenses and
    can contest the Department’s assertions.
    2. If the respondent goes a step further and claims that the subpoena has been
    issued for an improper purpose such that enforcement would be an abuse
    of the court’s process, the burden is on the respondent to make a
    particularized showing in its response and by affidavit that the Department
    issued the subpoena in bad faith, meaning for reasons unrelated to the
    merits of the investigation.
    3. After the respondent files a response and affidavits, the Court of Chancery
    can request further submissions to distill the issues for consideration. The
    court should convene a prompt hearing to address the enforcement issues
    87
    
    514 F.2d 368
    , 372-73 (3d Cir. 1975).
    30
    in summary fashion. An evidentiary hearing should take place only in
    those cases when the court, after according the great deference to the
    Department’s administrative judgments, believes that the disputed issues
    can only be resolved after hearing from witnesses.
    31
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 303, 2020

Judges: Seitz C.J.

Filed Date: 6/1/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/1/2021

Authorities (40)

federal-trade-commission-v-texaco-inc-federal-trade-commission-v , 555 F.2d 862 ( 1977 )

the-university-of-medicine-and-dentistry-of-new-jersey-the-cooper-health , 347 F.3d 57 ( 2003 )

united-states-of-america-and-joseph-a-dollard-special-agent-internal , 614 F.2d 914 ( 1980 )

united-states-of-america-and-robert-h-cluberton-internal-revenue-agent , 520 F.2d 818 ( 1975 )

united-states-of-america-and-robert-h-mccorry-special-agent-of-the , 607 F.2d 61 ( 1979 )

Blair v. United States , 39 S. Ct. 468 ( 1919 )

national-labor-relations-board-v-c-c-c-associates-inc-john-e , 306 F.2d 534 ( 1962 )

federal-trade-commission-v-standard-american-inc-standard-american , 306 F.2d 231 ( 1962 )

united-states-of-america-and-robert-gray-special-agent-internal-revenue , 432 F.2d 697 ( 1970 )

in-re-mcvane-m-patricia-mcvane-jeffrey-s-hoffman-michael-g-economous , 44 F.3d 1127 ( 1995 )

united-states-of-america-and-boyd-w-hemphill-special-agent-of-the , 514 F.2d 368 ( 1975 )

United States v. LaSalle National Bank , 98 S. Ct. 2357 ( 1978 )

United States v. Morton Salt Co. , 70 S. Ct. 357 ( 1950 )

United States v. Stuart , 109 S. Ct. 1183 ( 1989 )

Klaassen v. Allegro Development Corp. , 2014 Del. LEXIS 119 ( 2014 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-98273-in-the-matter-of-an-application-to-enforce , 658 F.2d 25 ( 1981 )

United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation , 788 F.2d 164 ( 1986 )

Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. ... , 5 F.3d 1508 ( 1993 )

Texas v. New Jersey , 85 S. Ct. 626 ( 1965 )

Delaware v. New York , 113 S. Ct. 1550 ( 1993 )

View All Authorities »