Brock v. Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ADRIA BROCK, §
§ No. 125, 2021
Respondent Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File No. 20-01-18TN
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR § Petition No. 20-02068
CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND THEIR §
FAMILIES §
§
Petitioner Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 1, 2021
Decided: February 10, 2022
Before VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Family Court. AFFIRMED.
Phillip Renzulli, Esquire, Law Office of Edward J. Fornias, Wilmington, Delaware,
for Appellants, Adria Brock.
Jonathon C. Harting, Esquire, State of Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellees, Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their
Families.
Renee D. Duval, Esquire, Office of the Child Advocate, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellees, Office of the Child Advocate.
VAUGHN, Justice:
Adria Brock1 (“the Mother”) appeals from a Family Court decision
terminating her parental rights over her daughter (“K.C.” or “the child”). In its
decision, the Family Court found that the Department of Services for Children,
Youth, and Their Families (“DSCYF”) established one of the statutory grounds for
terminating the Mother’s parental rights. The ground found to exist was that the
Mother’s parental rights over K.C.’s siblings were involuntarily terminated in a prior
proceeding. At the time of the termination hearing, this statutory ground was found
at 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(6) and provided for termination where “[t]he respondent’s
parental rights over a sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition [had] been
involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding.”2 The Family Court also found that
termination of the Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The Mother argues on appeal that Section 1103(a)(6) violates her right to due
process under the federal and state constitutions because it “creates an irrebuttable
presumption that reunification of a parent and child is not in the child’s best
interest.”3 Stated differently, as applied in this case, the Mother argues that the
statute violates the federal and state constitutions because “it creates a presumption
that she is unfit to parent any child presently solely because her parental rights [over]
1
“Adria Brock” is a pseudonym used for the Mother.
2
The General Assembly amended the Code on September 20, 2021, and this ground for
termination can now be found at 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(7). The provision now provides for
termination where “[t]he respondent’s parental rights over another child have been involuntarily
terminated.” For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to this ground as Section 1103(a)(6).
3
Opening Br. at 15.
2
older children were previously terminated in North Carolina.”4 The Mother also
claims that “[t]he statutory ‘best interest’ of the child factors set out under 13 Del.
C. § 722 do not sufficiently address a parent’s present ability to provide adequate
care for the child”;5 that “DSCYF did not present evidence or argument during the
trial to support a finding under 11 Del. C. § 1103(a)(6) that the Appellant was unfit
and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest”;6 and that
“[t]here is insufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard to
demonstrate that the parent is unfit under a best interest of the child analysis.”7 After
considering each of the Mother’s arguments, we have concluded that the Family
Court’s decision should be affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
K.C. was born prematurely on March 21, 2018. The identity of the child’s
father is unknown. Before K.C.’s birth, the Mother had three other children. In
2011, her parental rights to all three of those children were terminated involuntarily
while the Mother was living in North Carolina. At some point subsequent to the
termination of her parental rights of the three children in North Carolina, the Mother
was diagnosed with schizophrenia.
4
Id. at 16.
5
Id. at 17.
6
Id. at 22.
7
Id. at 25.
3
While the Mother was in Christiana Care Hospital giving birth to K.C., she
exhibited bizarre behavior, including being agitated that the child was not a boy.
DSCYF received a hotline report the day after the child’s birth expressing concerns
for the Mother’s mental health. The Mother was evaluated by the hospital’s
Psychiatry Department, and it was determined that she could not make informed
decisions at that time. Because of her premature birth, the child remained in the
hospital until May 9, 2018. During that time, the Mother was treated by the medical
personnel at Christiana Care for her diagnosis of schizophrenia. When it came time
for the child to be discharged, DSCYF determined that the Mother was incapable of
caring for a newborn because of her mental health. As a result, on May 9, 2018,
DSCYF filed an ex parte petition for custody in the Family Court. Emergency
temporary custody was awarded to DSCYF that day, and, because of the lack of a
suitable relative, the child was placed in foster care. The order awarding emergency
temporary custody to DSCYF noted that the Mother was “not stable due to mental
health issues.”8
A Preliminary Protective Hearing was held on May 16, 2018. The court found
that the child was dependent due to the Mother’s mental instability and her parental
rights termination in North Carolina. At an Adjudicatory Hearing held on June 29,
2018, the Mother stipulated that the child was dependent due to her mental health
8
Opening Br. Ex. C.
4
and child welfare history. At the time of the hearing, the Mother was being treated
at Christiana Care and was in compliance with a medication plan. At that hearing,
the Mother’s DSCYF investigation worker noted that she had made a “complete
turnaround”9 since her case began.
DSCYF presented a case plan to the Mother on July 12, 2018, which was
entered into evidence during an August 8, 2018 Dispositional Hearing. The case
plan included the following elements: 1) Mental Health and Coping Skills; 2) Daily
Parenting Behavior Routines and Basic Needs; and 3) Management of Financial
Resources.
The Mother obtained housing with Shawn Wilson, who still resides with her
as a support person. Shawn lives with the Mother to make sure there are no safety
issues, such as forgetting to turn off the stove. At the time of the Dispositional
Hearing, the Mother was unemployed but was receiving Social Security Disability
Income and food stamps. She was also enrolled at Dawn Career Institute for Medical
Coding and Billing, which guarantees job placement after graduation. DSCYF
reported at the Dispositional Hearing that it had assigned Ms. Magana-Luna as a
Family Interventionist for the Mother. Ms. Magana-Luna supervised the Mother’s
weekly visits with the child and reported her observations back to DSCYF. Ms.
Magana-Luna conveyed to DSCYF that, during her visits, the Mother was attentive
9
Opening Br. Ex. E at 3.
5
to the child’s needs. The Mother was also continuing to see a psychologist, Dr.
Leland Orlov.
Review Hearings were held on November 15, 2018 and February 19, 2019.
Ms. Magana-Luna reported that although the Mother was consistent with her
visitation and was attentive to the child’s needs, she was concerned with the
Mother’s ability to properly care for and interact with the child. Ms. Magana-Luna
noted that the Mother had some difficulty in feeding the child and that she required
redirection and support to properly care for the child. Further, it was reported that
the Mother was using the oven to heat her home when the house’s heating unit was
out of service. Ms. Magana-Luna also informed the court that the Mother was
having difficulty with her finances. In the November hearing, the Mother’s Court
Appointed Special Advocate testified that the Mother had lived with an elderly
roommate who passed away in the Mother’s home in May 2018 and that the Mother
did not recognize the person was deceased until three days had passed.
The Mother only contested this testimony by stating that it was two days, not three.
On April 4, 2019, DSCYF filed a Motion to Change Goal, seeking to change
the goal from reunification to Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption (“TPR
and Adoption”). At a Permanency Hearing on June 25, 2019, Dr. Orlov was called
to give testimony as to whether the Mother would ever possess the cognitive
capability to care for child on her own. Dr. Orlov testified that he did not believe
6
the Mother is capable of independently parenting the child. He recommended the
Mother continue therapy for another year and then have another evaluation. Because
of this, the court stayed DSCYF’s Motion to Change Goal. Due to reassignment of
the case to another Family Court judge, a new Permanency Review hearing was held
over two days in October 2019. The court granted the Motion to Change Goal to
add TPR and Adoption as a concurrent goal because, although the Mother had been
compliant with her case plan, no mental health professional was able to state that the
Mother was capable of parenting on her own.
The Mother stopped seeing Dr. Orlov, and in May 2020, she began therapy
with Mr. McCollum, a mental health counselor. Mr. McCollum reported to DSCYF
that he believed the Mother had made a turn around and suggested they begin trial
reunification. Because of this progress, DSCYF did not proceed with the TPR
petition and instead began a trial reunification plan with the Mother, starting with
unsupervised day visits in August 2020. The Mother and Mr. McCollum identified
three support people to assist the Mother in these visits.
At a Permanency Hearing held on August 31, 2020, DSCYF testified that it
was concerned about the Mother’s boyfriend, Blake Scott. The concerns stemmed
from a meeting between a DSCYF treatment worker, Ms. Mayo, and Mr. Scott.
During the meeting, Mr. Scott was verbally aggressive towards Ms. Mayo. Ms.
Mayo also stated that Mr. Scott seemed to be in control of the Mother and would
7
often not allow her to speak and would answer for her. Ms. Mayo also voiced
concerns because Mr. Scott’s teenage daughter had alleged to DSCYF that Mr. Scott
had physically abused her. During the hearing, the Mother stated that she was no
longer with Mr. Scott. Ms. Mayo expressed her doubts that the Mother’s relationship
with Mr. Scott was actually over.
On September 9, 2020, DSCYF began another trial reunification, beginning
with one overnight visit per week. During the third week of this plan, Ms. Danzy,
one of the Mother’s supports, went to the Mother’s home to check on her and the
child. Ms. Danzy testified that Mr. Scott was at the home when she arrived.
According to Ms. Danzy, the Mother left with the child without first feeding the
child. The Mother and the child slept at Mr. Scott’s home that night. DSCYF stated
that this was against its express wishes, and that it had told the Mother on several
occasions not to have Mr. Scott around the child. Because of this event, DSCYF
reverted to supervised visits with the Mother. DSCYF was concerned that the
Mother was not capable of making rational decisions and referred her to Dr. Rachel
Brandenburg, a psychologist, for a forensic evaluation.
The Mother’s employment was also precarious during this time. After
graduating from her medical coding classes, the Mother took a job at Trans-World
Collections. However, on September 14, 2020, the Mother resigned from that
position due to being disciplined on the job. The Mother then took a job with
8
Walmart but was fired shortly thereafter. She then found a janitorial job at BJ’s
Wholesale Club but was also fired from that job. As of the TPR hearing, the Mother
had obtained a job as a security guard. However, as late as January 2021, the Mother
was continuing to have issues with overdrafts on her bank account.
The Family Court held a two-day TPR hearing on February 16, 2021, and
March 5, 2021. DSCYF alleged two statutory grounds for termination of parental
rights: failure to plan adequately for the child’s needs under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(4),
and the involuntary termination of K.C.’s older siblings under 13 Del. C. §
1103(a)(6). DSCYF acknowledged that the Mother was compliant with her case
planning. However, issues were raised regarding the Mother’s capability to parent
on her own. At the hearing, Dr. Brandenburg testified regarding her Forensic
Psychological Evaluation of the Mother. She testified that although the Mother’s
schizophrenia treatment had suppressed her more outward symptoms, such as
hallucinations or delusions, she still exhibited schizophrenic symptoms with regard
to her social cognition and ability to read social cues. Dr. Brandenburg referred to
the Mother leaving the dead body in her home for two (or three) days, her difficulty
interacting with the child, and her decision to have Mr. Scott around the child as
manifestations of those symptoms. When asked about the Mother’s social cognition
in the context of parenting, Dr. Brandenburg stated the following:
One of the things—you know, [the Mother], I think, can
probably take a test or quiz on parenting and answer all of
9
the questions correctly. I think she’d be able to learn. But
it’s her application of that learning that’s difficult and the
adapting to changes. A child is very different when
they’re three months old to when they’re three years old.
And those changes happen throughout. So . . . when
they’re done with baby food, how do we transition to solid
food? Those kinds of things would be really difficult for
her to problem solve on her own and that initiative to do.
Understanding when to call the doctor versus when to just
watch and see . . . that would be very difficult for her to
figure out.10
Dr. Brandenburg further testified that due to the Mother’s cognitive deficiencies, she
would be unable to discharge her duties as a parent without high risk to K.C.
The child has resided in the same foster home since May 2018. She refers to
her foster mother and father as “Ma-ma” and “Pop-Pop.” The child is healthy and
on track for her age, developmentally and cognitively.
On March 30, 2021, the Family Court entered an order terminating the
Mother’s and the Unknown Father’s parental rights. The court first found that there
was not clear and convincing evidence that the Mother had failed to plan under
Section 1103(a)(4), as she had been consistent in her case planning. The court did,
however, find that there was clear and convincing evidence that the Mother’s
parental rights had been terminated in the past, specifically the termination of her
parental rights in 2011 in North Carolina. Turning next to the best interests factors
set forth in 13 Del. C. § 7229(a), the court concluded that clear and convincing
10
App. to Answering Br. at B18-19.
10
evidence existed to find that the termination of the Mother’s and Unknown Father’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the decision of the Family Court to terminate parental rights,
this Court conducts a “review of the facts and law, as well as the inferences and
deductions made by the trial court.”11 “Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.”12
“To the extent that the issues on appeal implicate rulings of fact, we conduct a
limited review of the factual findings of the trial court to assure that they are
sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly wrong.” 13 “Moreover, this
Court will not substitute its own opinion for the inferences and deductions made by
the Trial Judge where those inferences are supported by the record and are the
product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”14 Our review is limited to an
abuse of discretion when the trial judge has correctly applied the appropriate law.15
DISCUSSION
Under Delaware law, a trial judge must conduct a two-step analysis when
deciding whether or not to terminate parental rights.16 First, the judge must
11
Powell v. Dep’t. of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 730 (Del. 2008).
12
George v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families (DSCYF/DFS), 150 A.3d 768,
2016 WL 6302525, at *4 (Del. Oct. 27, 2016) (TABLE).
13
Powell, 963 A.2d at 731.
14
Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983).
15
Powell, 963 A.2d at 731.
16
Id. at 731.
11
determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds for
termination enumerated in 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) has been met.17 If one of the
enumerated grounds for termination has been met, the trial judge next determines if
there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the
best interests of the child as defined under 13 Del. C. § 722.18 Under the best
interests standard, DSCYF must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of parental rights is essential to the child’s welfare.19
The Mother first contends that 11 Del. C. § 1103(a)(6) violates her federal and
state constitutional rights to due process because it creates an irrebuttable
presumption that she is an unfit parent solely because her parental rights in other
children were previously terminated and that reunification of her with her child is
not in the child’s best interests. She relies upon United States Supreme Court
decisions and decisions of this Court that have held that a parent’s parental rights
over a child are constitutionally protected.20
This same contention, however, was rejected by this Court in Sampson v.
Division of Family Services.21 In that case, as here, the Family Court terminated a
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Barr v. DSCYF, 974 A.2d 88 (Del. 2009); In the Matter of Derek W. Burns, a minor child, 519
A.2d 638 (Del. 1986).
20
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re Kelly Stevens, 652 A.2d 18 (Del. 1995); Orville v. Div. of Fam.
Servs., 759 A.2d 595 (Del. 2000).
21
868 A.2d 832 (Del. 2005).
12
parent’s parental rights where the statutory ground relied upon was the involuntary
termination of the parent’s parental rights over another child in a previous
proceeding. In Sampson, we framed Sampson’s contention as follows:
Sampson claims that 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(6) violates her
right to due process of law because the statute creates a
presumption that she is unfit to parent any child presently
or in the future, solely because her parental rights to her
older children were previously terminated.22
We rejected her contention and stated:
Sampson argues that by establishing that prior termination
as a basis for terminating her rights to a different child,
Section 1103(a)(6) violates procedural due process by
denying her the opportunity to show that despite the prior
termination, she is fit to continue as Samuel’s parent. The
short and dispositive answer is that that statute does not
deny her that opportunity.23
We explained this ruling as follows:
Sampson claims that that the “prior termination” provision
of Section 1103(a)(6) precludes a parent from
demonstrating his or her ability to care for a child, thereby
creating a risk that the parent will be deprived of her
parental rights on grounds that are contrary to fact. That
argument fails, because by requiring DFS to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s
best interests, the current Section 1103(a)(6) procedure
permits inquiry into a parent’s fitness to rear the particular
child whose custody is at issue.24
We continued:
Contrary to Sampson’s argument, Section 1103(a)(6) does
22
Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted).
23
Id. at 835.
24
Id. at 835-36.
13
not foreclose judicial inquiry into her fitness to care for
one child solely because her parental rights in her older
children had previously been involuntarily terminated. By
requiring DFS to prove that termination of parental rights
is in the child’s best interest, that statute protects against
an erroneous deprivation of parental rights.25
We will follow the precedent established by Sampson and for the reasons
given there we reject the Mother’s contention that Section 1103(a)(6) deprives her
of her constitutional rights to due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption
that she is an unfit mother and that reunification of her and her child is not in the
child’s best interests.
The Mother attempts to distinguish Sampson factually because in Sampson,
the parent failed to work cooperatively with DSCYF to be reunited with the child.
The Court noted that “Sampson’s parental rights were terminated not only because
her parental rights over her other children had been involuntarily terminated, but
also because, as a result of her failure to work cooperatively with DFS to be reunited
with [the child], it was also in [the child’s] best interest to have her parental rights
over him terminated.”26 In this case, by contrast, the Family Court found that
DSCYF failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Mother had failed
to plan for the child’s needs, stating that “[s]ince [the child] came into DSCYF
custody, Mother has cooperated with virtually all DSCYF’s requests and has
25
Id. at 836.
26
Id. at 836 (emphasis in original).
14
substantially completed her case plan.”27 This factual distinction is no avail to the
Mother. It has no bearing on her contention that Section 1103(a)(6)—a separate
ground for termination—creates an unconstitutional, irrebuttable presumption of
unfitness.
The Mother also challenges the use of the best interests factors set forth in 13
Del. C. § 722 in TPR determinations. She argues that these factors do not
sufficiently address a parent’s present ability to provide adequate care for the child.
She elaborates on this argument by contending that the Section 722(a) factors do not
specifically address parental unfitness and do not contain a specific provision under
which a parent can present evidence that his or her circumstances have changed and
the parent is currently fit. The U.S. Supreme Court cases of Stanley v. Illinois and
Santosky v. Kramer, she contends, hold that due process requires that a court find
that a parent is unfit before terminating the parent’s parental rights, and the Section
722(a) factors do not require a finding of unfitness.
We think that the Mother misunderstands the best interests analysis. The
Section 722(a) factors are not to be applied in a narrow, inflexible manner. They
call for a broad, flexible inquiry to be made in determining what is in the best
interests of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights. Section 722(a)
provides that in making a best interests determination, the Family Court shall
27
Opening Br. Ex. T at 9.
15
“consider all relevant factors including” the eight factors enumerated therein.28
In Stanley, the court held that a presumption under Illinois law that an unwed
father was presumed to be unfit to raise his children violated the Equal Protection
Clause, and that the Due Process Clause entitled the father to a hearing on his fitness
as a parent.29 The holding in Santosky is that the burden of proof in a termination of
parental rights proceeding be “by at least clear and convincing evidence.”30 While
those cases speak of fitness, as well as neglect, they do so in the context of the
holdings of the cases and do not set forth any specific constitutional rule regarding
the term “fitness.” We do not see any constitutional infirmity in the requirement of
Section 1103(a) that termination of parental rights be in the child’s best interests or
in the use of Section 722(a) to make that determination. The best interests factors in
Section 722(a) give the trial court ample discretion to consider the parent’s fitness
in determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.
28
The eight enumerated factors are: (1) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his or her
custody and residence arrangements; (2) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian or
custodians and residential arrangements; (3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his or her parents, grandparents, siblings, persons cohabiting in the relationship of husband and
wife with the parent of the child; (4) The child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and
community; (5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (6) Past and present
compliance by both parents with their rights and responsibilities to their child under Section 701
of Title 13; (7) Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in Chapter 7A of this title; and (8)
The criminal history of any party or any other resident of the household including whether the
criminal history contains pleas of guilty or no contest or a conviction of a criminal offense.
29
405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
30
455 U.S. 745 (1982) (“We hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
demands more than [a fair preponderance of the evidence standard]. Before a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the
State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”).
16
The next argument made by the Mother that we consider is an argument that
DSCYF “focused the majority if not the entirety of the proceedings on the parent’s
failure to case plan under Section 1103(a)(5), and failed to provide any evidence or
even argument, with any specificity, to support a finding that the Appellant was unfit
to care for the child and that termination was in the child’s best interests under a
Section 1103(a)(6) analysis.”31 This argument seems to suggest that DSCYF must
organize its evidence relevant to a best interests determination as a connection to the
statutory factor it relies upon, and that since here DSCYF offered two statutory
factors, it was necessary for it to offer two separate best interests analyses, one for
each statutory factor. This argument misconceives the requirements of Section
1103. Under Section 1103, the inquiry is a two-step analysis. The trial judge first
determines whether there is clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory
grounds for termination is proven. If so, the trial judge next considers whether
termination is in the child’s best interests. They are separate steps in the process,
and all of the evidence relevant to the child’s best interests on the question of
termination of the Mother’s parental rights could be considered on that issue once
the trial judge found that the Mother’s parental rights over the child’s siblings had
been involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding.
The Mother’s final contention is that there was insufficient evidence to
31
Opening Br. at 22-23.
17
establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child’s best interests to
terminate the Mother’s parental rights. However, the Family Court considered
ample evidence that supported a finding that the Mother was unfit and termination
of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. In so finding, the court found
that Section 722(a) best interests factors (3), (4), (5), (6), and (8) weighed in favor
of termination of parental rights, (1) and (7) weighed against, and factor (2) was
neutral.
In this case, the Mother was observed by medical personnel at Christiana Care
Hospital to be unable to make informed decisions on her own and was not stable.
They did not believe that the Mother was capable of caring for K.C. Although there
was some improvement in her condition at times, when the termination of parental
rights hearing was held three years later, Dr. Brandenburg was of the opinion that
the Mother was unable to discharge her duties as a parent without high risk to the
child. It does not appear that any of the mental health professionals who had contact
with the Mother were willing to express the view that she was capable of caring for
the child without supervision. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s
conclusions that by clear and convincing evidence it was in the child’s best interests
that the Mother’s parental rights be terminated.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Family Court is affirmed.
18