Evans v. State ( 2015 )


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  •       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    AUGUSTUS H. EVANS, JR.,                 §
    §
    Defendant Below-                  §   Nos. 321/546, 2015
    Appellant,                        §
    §
    v.                                §   Court Below—Superior Court
    §   of the State of Delaware,
    STATE OF DELAWARE,                      §   in and for Sussex County
    §   Cr. ID 0609011528A
    Plaintiff Below-                  §
    Appellee.                         §
    Submitted: October 21, 2015
    Decided: December 1, 2015
    Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and SEITZ, Justices.
    ORDER
    This 1st day of December 2015, upon consideration of the parties’
    filings in these two appeals, it appears to the Court that:
    (1)    On June 22, 2015, the appellant, Augustus Evans, filed a notice
    of appeal in No. 321, 2015 from a Superior Court order dated May 15, 2015.
    The Superior Court’s order denied Evans’ request for permission to file
    multiple motions, including a motion seeking postconviction relief titled
    “Motion Under the Law of the Case Doctrine,” as well as a motion for
    recusal of the trial judge, a motion for an evidentiary hearing, and a motion
    for appointment of counsel. On October 5, 2015, the State of Delaware filed
    a motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is
    manifest on the face of Evans’ opening brief that appeal No. 321, 2015 is
    without merit.
    (2)   On October 8, 2015, Evans filed a second notice of appeal in
    No. 546, 2015 from a Superior Court order dated September 18, 2015. The
    Superior Court’s order denied Evans’ motion requesting permission to file a
    brief challenging a June 2014 amendment to Superior Court Criminal Rule
    61.   The Superior Court held that the 2014 amendment did not apply to
    Evans; therefore, he lacked standing to challenge it. The Superior Court also
    denied Evans’ motion because Evans had exhausted his right to seek
    postconviction relief under Rule 61.
    (3)   The Senior Court Clerk issued a notice to Evans to show cause
    why appeal No. 546, 2015 should not be dismissed for this Court’s lack of
    jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal in a criminal matter. Evans
    filed a response to the notice to show on October 21, 2015, contending that
    the Superior Court’s order is a final order. Evans’ response also requests
    that his two pending appeals be consolidated. After considering Evans’
    response and his motion to consolidate, we hereby discharge the notice to
    show cause in No. 546, 2015 and grant Evans’ request to consider these
    appeals in a consolidated manner.
    2
    (4)    The record reflects that Evans was convicted by a jury in July
    2007 of Assault in the Second Degree, two counts of Possession of a
    Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Aggravated Menacing, and
    Resisting Arrest. Evans waived his right to counsel and represented himself
    at trial. The Superior Court sentenced him as a habitual offender to a total
    period of seventy-nine years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after
    serving seventy-two years in prison for decreasing levels of supervision.
    This Court affirmed on direct appeal.1
    (5)    Since that time, Evans has filed five motions for postconviction
    relief under Rule 61. This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of
    Evans’ first four Rule 61 motions.2 In its denial of Evans’ fifth motion, the
    Superior Court informed Evans that it would not accept any future Rule 61
    motions unless Evans first sought and received the trial court’s permission to
    file. Evans voluntarily dismissed his appeal (No. 171, 2015) from that order.
    1
    Evans v. State, 
    2009 WL 367728
    (Del. Feb. 13, 2009).
    2
    See Evans v. State, 
    2015 WL 214057
    (Del. Jan. 14, 2015) (denying Evans’ fourth
    motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred, applying the June 2014
    amendments to Rule 61, and warning Evans that he risked an injunction against future
    meritless appeals); Evans v. State, 
    2014 WL 4104785
    (Del. Aug. 19, 2014) (denying
    Evans’ third motion for postconviction relief); Evans v. State, 
    2013 WL 5614265
    (Del.
    Oct. 10, 2013) (denying Evans’ second motion for postconviction relief); Evans v. State,
    
    2009 WL 3656085
    (Del. Nov. 4, 2009) (denying Evans’ first motion for postconviction
    relief).
    3
    (6)    Evans now appeals the Superior Court’s orders denying his
    requests for permission to file another Rule 61 motion. Although we reject
    the Superior Court’s conclusion in its September 18, 2015 order that the
    June 2014 amendments to Rule 61 would not apply to Evans’ sixth Rule 61
    motion if he were permitted to file one,3 we nonetheless affirm the Superior
    Court’s denial of Evans’ requests to file his sixth Rule 61 motion.
    (7)    Evans has unsuccessfully pursued postconviction relief under
    Rule 61 five different times. Evans refuses to accept the Superior Court’s
    rulings on his motions. As this Court held in affirming the Superior Court’s
    denial of his fourth postconviction motion, Evans is procedurally barred by
    Rule 61(d)(2) from filing another motion for postconviction relief unless he
    pleads with particularity a claim that (i) new evidence exists that creates a
    strong inference that he is actually innocent; or (ii) a new rule of
    constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review renders his
    convictions invalid.4      Evans’ motions in this case fail to satisfy the
    requirements of Rule 61(d)(2). Accordingly, we find no error of law or
    3
    See Evans v. State, 
    2015 WL 214057
    (Del. Jan. 14, 2015) (finding Evans’ fourth motion
    for postconviction relief to be procedurally barred by the June 2014 amendments to Rule
    61).
    4
    Evans v. State, 
    2015 WL 214057
    , *1 (Del. Jan. 14, 2015) (citing Del. Super. Ct. R.
    61(d)(2) (effective June 4, 2014)).
    4
    abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s denial of his requests to file his
    sixth Rule 61 motion.
    (8)     Moreover, we conclude that Evans’ untimely, repetitive, and
    frivolous filings constitute an abuse of the judicial process. Thus, the Clerk
    of this Court is directed to refuse any future filing from Evans related to
    these criminal convictions and sentences unless the filing is accompanied by
    the required filing fee or a completed motion to proceed in forma pauperis
    with a sworn affidavit containing the certifications required by 
    10 Del. C
    . §
    8803(e)5 and that motion is first granted by the Court.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
    Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
    BY THE COURT:
    /s/ Karen L. Valihura
    Justice
    5
    
    10 Del. C
    . § 8803(e) provides:
    When a court finds that a litigant has abused the judicial process by filing
    frivolous or malicious litigation, the court may enjoin that litigant from filing future
    claims without leave of court. When so enjoined, any future requests to file claims must
    be accompanied by an affidavit certifying that:
    (1) The claims sought to be litigated have never been raised or disposed of before
    in any court;
    (2) The facts alleged are true and correct;
    (3) The affiant has made a diligent and good faith effort to determine what relevant
    case law controls the legal issues raised;
    (4) The affiant has no reason to believe the claims are foreclosed by controlled law;
    and
    (5) The affiant understands that the affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 321-546, 2015

Judges: Valihura

Filed Date: 12/1/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/2/2015