Lambert v. State , 2015 Del. LEXIS 83 ( 2015 )


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  • IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    BRADFORD P. LAMBERT, 111, §
    § No. 318, 2014
    Defendant Below, §
    Appellant, §
    ' § Court Below — Superior Court
    V. § of the State of Delaware
    § in and for New Castle County
    STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. 
    ID. No. 1311011377
    V §
    Plaintiff Below, §
    Appellee. §
    Submitted: February 11, 2015
    Decided: February 12, 2015
    Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
    Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.
    Thomas A. Foley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant Below,
    Appellee.
    Karen V. Sullivan, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
    Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff Below-Appellee.
    HOLLAND, Justice:
    The Defendant-Below/Appellant, Bradford P. Lambert, III (“Lambert”)
    appeals from a final judgment of the Superior Court. Following a jury trial,
    Lambert was found guilty of Driving a Vehicle While Under the Influence of
    Alcohol (“DUI”).1 Lambert raises .one claim in this direct appeal. Lambert
    contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress blood
    alcohol concentration (“BAC”) evidence because the Search Warrant Affidavit
    (“Affidavit”) failed to set forth facts sufficient to show probable cause. We have
    concluded that Lambert’s claim is without merit.
    ’Facts
    In November 2013, Delaware State Police Corporal Suzanne Lowman (“Cpl
    Lowman”) was called to the scene of a traffic accident where a motorcycle had
    rear—ended an automobile. At the scene, Cpl. Lowman observed a Trailblazer with
    rear-end damage and a motorcycle laying on its side. The Trailblazer’s driver
    informed Cpl. Lowman that Lambert, who at the time was being treated by
    paramedics, was the driver of the motorcycle.
    While Speaking with Lambert, Cpl. Lowman immediately detected a
    moderate odor of alcohol on Lambert’s breath. Cpl. Lowman also observed that
    Lambert’s eyes were bloodshot and watery. Lambert admitted that he ran into the
    rear end of the Trailblazer with his motorcycle.
    
    121 Del. C
    . §4177(a).
    Due to the injuries Lambert sustained in the collision, he was only semi-
    conscious and unable to complete any field sobriety tests. Cpl. Lowman requested
    a search warrant from the Justice of Peace Court in order to have a blood sample
    drawn.2 The blood draw revealed that Lambert’s BAC was .19, more than twice
    the legal limit.3 Because this was Lambert’s fourth DUI offense, Lambert was
    charged with Felony Driving Under the Influence4 as well as Inattentive Driving,5
    and Failure to Provide Proof of Insurance.6
    Motion T 0 Suppress
    In March 2014, Lambert filed a motion to suppress evidence of the blood
    draw results in the Superior Court. Lambert argued that the search warrant
    Affidavit submitted by Cpl. Lowman did not establish probable cause that Lambert
    was driving under the influence. At the suppression hearing, the trial court denied
    Lambert’s motion. The court stated:
    [A] collision between a motorcycle and a vehicle from
    the rear operated by a man with glassy, bloodshot eyes,
    and a moderate odor of alcohol - - emanating at the time
    that [] the officer had interaction with him on the
    backboard is sufficient to establish probable cause . . . .
    The burden on the State to establish probable cause is not
    insubstantial, but it’s not conviction level. It’s not
    beyond a reasonable doubt or even preponderance. And I
    find that there’s sufficient evidence in the warrant itself.
    2 Lambert also signed a consent form before Christiana Care drew his blood.
    3 
    21 Del. C
    . § 4177 (a)(5).
    4 
    21 Del. C
    . §4177(d)(4).
    5 
    21 Del. C
    . § 4176.
    6 
    21 Del. C
    . §2118(p).
    Based on this ruling, the parties agreed to a trial by stipulation, in which
    Lambert admitted he was guilty of DUI and that he was subject to sentencing as a
    fourth offense pursuant to 
    21 Del. C
    §4l77(d)(4). The State entered a nolle
    prosequi on the remaining charges. This appeal followed.
    Probable Cause Determination
    Search warrants require a “showing of probable cause.”7 “An affidavit
    submitted in support of a search warrant application must set forth facts, that,
    within the affidavit’s four corners, are sufficient for a neutral magistrate to
    ’98
    conclude that . . . [probable cause exists]. “[T]he magistrate must apply a
    ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to decide if ‘there is a fair probability that . . .
    evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”9 “In so doing, the
    magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the affidavit’s factual
    allegations.”10 A magistrate need not find proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even
    1
    that guilt is more likely than not to find probable cause.1 Instead, “[t]o establish
    probable cause, the police are only required to present facts which suggest, when
    7 Rivera v. State, 
    7 A.3d 961
    , 966 (Del. 2010) (citing Morgan v. State, 
    962 A.2d 248
    , 252 (Del.
    2008)).
    8 
    Id. 9 Id.
    at 966-67 (quoting Sisson v. State, 
    903 A.2d 288
    , 296 (Del. 2006)).
    ‘0 
    Rivera, 7 A.3d at 967
    .
    11 See State v. Maxwell, 
    624 A.2d 926
    , 928-30 (Del. 1993) (citing Locke v. United States, 3 L.
    Ed. 364 (1813)).
    those facts are Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, that there is a fair
    probability that the defendant has committed a crime.”12
    Affidavit
    In the Affidavit, Cpl. Lowman explains that she was dispatched to
    investigate an “injury acciden ” on Route 273.13 When she arrived, she saw a
    Trailblazer with damage to its rear and a motorcycle lying on its side.14 The driver
    of the Trailblazer identified Lambert as the driver of the motorcycle.15 When she
    spoke to Lambert, she “immediately” smelled a moderate odor of alcoholic
    beverages coming from [Lambert’s] breath.”16 At that time, Lambert was lying on
    a backboard and had blood around his nose and mouth.17 Cpl. Lowman observed
    that Lambert had bloodshot, watery eyes.18 In her Affidavit, Cpl. Lowman also
    noted that Lambert said, “[t]he car in front of me swerved and I hit this guy.”19
    The Superior Court concluded that “a collision between a motorcycle and a
    vehicle from the rear operated by a man with glassy, bloodshot eyes and a
    moderate odor of alcohol . . . is sufficient to establish probable cause to get a
    warrant.” Lambert contends that the Affidavit did not support a finding of
    12 
    Id. at 930
    (emphasis in original) (citing Jarvis v. State, 
    600 A.2d 38
    , 42-43 (Del. 1991)).
    BAflflz
    “Afifii
    “Afifl4
    “Afifli
    “Afifl3&6
    “Afifli
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    probable cause because the Affidavit did not state that he was confused,
    combative, or disoriented. Lambert further argues that the Affidavit was
    insufficient since it omitted whether Lambert actually caused the accident.
    Probable Cause Established
    In his appeal, as in the Superior Court, Lambert attempts to isolate and
    discount each fact in the Affidavit by hypothetically innocent explanations.
    However, this Court has found that “[t]he possibility that there may be a
    hypothetically innocent explanation for each of several facts revealed during the
    course of an investigation does not preclude a determination that probable cause
    exists . . . .20 The Superior Court properly rejected Lambert’s attempt to provide an
    innocent explanation for the crash, as follows:
    The defendant’s explanation, I believe, is one that may be
    relevant in a civil litigation matter, but I don’t believe the
    State is required to accept that characterization of the
    collision, but rather can look at the independent objective
    facts, which are that this motorcycle ran into the back of
    a vehicle while the perSon operating it appeared to the
    officer to be under the influence with a moderate odor of
    alcohol and bloodshot, glassy eyes.
    Lambert also argues that “the four corners of the Affidavit do not suggest
    that he was the motorist at fault for causing the accident” and that the magistrate
    “was not presented with any information that Mr. Lambert’s driving reflected
    2° 
    Maxwell, 624 A.2d at 930
    (citing 
    Jarvis, 600 A.2d at 41-42
    (probable cause existed although
    several actions were subject to innocent explanations».
    6
    impairment.” The Affidavit states that there was damage to the rear of the
    Trailblazer and that Lambert admitted hitting the Trailblazer. The only reasonable
    inference from those facts is that Lambert’s motorcycle struck the rear of the
    Trailblazer. Whether the Trailblazer or another car “swerved” does not change the
    fact that Lambert failed to avoid the collision. To conclude that there was probable
    cause to believe that Lambert was “under the influence,” the magistrate need only
    have found probable cause that “because of alcohol or drugs or a combination of
    both, [Lambert was] less able than [he] would ordinarily have been, either mentally
    or physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in
    the driving of [his] vehicle.”21
    When Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, the facts in the Affidavit
    and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom provided the magistrate with
    sufficient information to support a finding that there was probable cause to believe
    Lambert had operated his motorcycle while under the influence of alcohol.22
    First,
    Lambert collided with the rear-end of the Trailblazer. Second, Lambert had
    watery, bloodshot eyes. Third, Cpl. Lowman detected the odor of alcohol on
    Lambert’s breath. Accordingly, the Superior Court properly denied Lambert’s
    motion to suppress.
    21 
    21 Del. C
    . §4177(a); 
    21 Del. C
    . § 4177(c)(ll).
    22 See Bease v. State, 
    884 A.2d 495
    (Del. 2005).
    7
    Conclusion
    The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 318, 2014

Citation Numbers: 110 A.3d 1253, 2015 Del. LEXIS 83, 2015 WL 630902

Judges: Holland, Valihura, Vaughn

Filed Date: 2/12/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2024