Church v. State ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MICHAEL L. CHURCH, §
§ No. 463, 2015
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below:
§ Superior Court of the
v. § State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1101004755
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: October 26, 2015
Decided: January 4, 2016
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
This 4th day of January 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm under Supreme Court Rule
25(a),1 and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Michael L. Church, has appealed the Superior
Court’s August 18, 2015 summary dismissal of his second motion for
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.2 The State has
moved to affirm the Superior Court judgment on the ground that it is
1
The appellant requested permission to file a response to the motion to affirm. The
motion is denied. Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), no response to a motion to affirm is
permitted unless requested by the Court. The Court finds no good cause to request a
response in this case.
2
State v. Church, 2015 WL 5120862 (Del. Super. Aug. 18, 2015).
manifest on the face of Church’s opening brief that the appeal is without
merit.
(2) It appears that Church was charged in a thirteen-count
indictment with having committed multiple sex offenses between August
and December 2010. On September 20, 2011, Church pled guilty to one
count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child and one count of Sexual
Abuse of a Child in the First Degree. In exchange for the guilty plea, the
State agreed to dismiss eight counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child in the First
Degree and three counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child in the Second Degree.
(3) Prior to sentencing, Church filed a motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. Church claimed that his defense counsel was ineffective and
that he felt “threaten[ed] and forced” into taking the plea. The Superior
Court denied the motion3 and later denied Church’s motion for
reconsideration.4 The Superior Court found that the guilty plea “was not the
product of threat or misconduct by defense counsel,” and that the plea was
“knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”5 The Superior Court determined that
Church pled guilty “because he is guilty and he did not want to risk the
consequences of the jury trial that would have begun immediately, had he
3
State v. Church, 2012 WL 1413978 (Del. Super. Feb. 15, 2012).
4
State v. Church, 2012 WL 1415763 (Del. Super. Mar. 2, 2012).
5
State v. Church, 2012 WL 1413978, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 15, 2012).
2
not pleaded guilty.”6 On March 9, 2012, the Superior Court sentenced
Church to a total of thirty-five years at Level V, suspended after twenty-two
years (seventeen years minimum mandatory), for Level IV work release and
probation. Church did not file a direct appeal.
(4) On March 6, 2013, Church filed a motion for postconviction
relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Church claimed that his
defense counsel’s failure to investigate the case, develop evidence, suppress
the charges and develop a trial strategy, rendered the guilty plea involuntary.
(5) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
context of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that his defense
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, the
defendant would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to
trial.7 In this case the Superior Court summarily dismissed Church’s second
postconviction motion after finding that Church’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel were without merit.8 The Superior Court found that:
[I]f the case had gone to trial on September 20,
2011, Defendant probably would have been found
guilty as charged or, at least, guilty of one
6
Id.
7
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-60 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
58-60 (1985)).
8
State v. Church, 2013 WL 3422490 (Del. Super. June 25, 2013).
3
unlawful sexual intercourse charge; Defendant
certainly would have not been acquitted. If
Defendant had not pleaded guilty, he would be
serving at least one life sentence, probably more,
rather than 22 years.9
Also, the Superior Court found that Church’s claims “concern[ed] things that
happened before he pleaded guilty and, because his guilty plea was knowing,
voluntary and intelligent, [Church] waived those claims when he pleaded
guilty.”10 Church did not file an appeal from the denial of his first motion
for postconviction relief.
(6) In September 2013, Church filed a motion for appointment of
counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion to appoint counsel.11 Nearly
one year later when Church filed a motion for reconsideration, the Superior
Court denied that motion as well.12
(7) Church filed an appeal from the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of counsel. The appeal was dismissed on the basis that the
denial of counsel was not appealable as a collateral order before the entry of
a final order.13
9
Id., at *2.
10
Id., at *1.
11
State v. Church, 2013 WL 5786176 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2013).
12
See docket at 43, State v. Church, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 1101004755 (Oct. 6, 2014).
13
Church v. State, 2015 WL 1243731 (Del. Mar. 17, 2015).
4
(8) Undaunted, on June 4, 2015, Church filed a second pro se
motion for postconviction relief and a supporting memorandum. Church’s
second postconviction motion repeated verbatim the claims raised in his first
postconviction motion, namely that the alleged ineffectiveness of his defense
counsel rendered the guilty plea involuntary. The Superior Court concluded
that the second postconviction motion “presented nothing new” and issued
an order on August 18, 2015, summarily dismissing the motion as
procedurally barred.14 This appeal followed.
(9) The Court has considered the parties’ positions on appeal and
has concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when
summarily dismissing Church’s second motion for postconviction relief as
procedurally barred. Summary dismissal was appropriate because the
motion was a successive postconviction motion filed in a guilty plea case.15
The motion was procedurally barred because it was untimely16 and raised
claims that were formerly adjudicated.17
14
State v. Church, 2015 WL 5120862 (Del. Super. Aug. 18, 2015).
15
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
16
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that a motion for post-conviction relief
must be filed within one year of the final judgment). In Church’s case, in the absence of
a direct appeal, the judgment became final thirty days after March 9, 2012, the date the
Superior Court imposed sentence. Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1). Church did not file
his second motion for post-conviction relief until June 4, 2015, well past the one-year
time bar.
17
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
5
(10) To overcome the procedural bars, Church was required to plead
either (i) the existence of new evidence creating a strong inference that he
was actually innocent; (ii) the existence of a new rule of constitutional law
made retroactive to cases on collateral review rendered his convictions
invalid; or (iii) a viable claim that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction
over his case.18 In this case, Church’s opening brief on appeal repeats the
grounds for relief presented in his first and second motions for
postconviction relief and supporting memorandum. Church cannot satisfy
any of the pleading requirements to overcome the procedural bars.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice
18
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2), (i)(5).
6