Holmes v. Detective D'Elia ( 2015 )


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  • IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    MARVIN HOLMES,
    No. 23 6, 201 5
    Plaintiff Below,
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Court Below—Superior Court
    of the State of Delaware in and
    V. for New Castle County
    DETECTIVE GREGORY D ’ELIA, CA. No. N13 C-12-185
    Defendant Below,
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    OOOOOVJOOOOOOOOOOO'DOOOOOOOO'JOOOOOD
    Submitted: September 18, 2015
    Decided: December 8, 2015
    Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices.
    O R D E R
    This 8th day of December 2015, after careful consideration of the
    parties’ briefs on appeal and cross-appeal and the Superior Court record, it
    appears to the Court that:
    (1) The pro se appellant, Marvin Holmes (“Holmes”), is an inmate
    incarcerated in a Delaware correctional facility. The appellee, Detective
    Gregory D’Elia (“Det D’Elia”), is employed by the Newark Police
    Department and is represented by counsel.
    (2) Holmes has appealed the Superior Court’s Memorandum
    Opinion of April 20, 2015, dismissing his civil complaint against Det. D’Elia.1
    We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
    (3) It appears from the record that Det. D’Elia was assigned to
    investigate a report of an assault on November 13, 201 1 in Newark, Delaware.
    The alleged Victim identified Holmes as the person who strangled and
    attempted to sexually assault her.
    (4) Holmes was arrested on January 28, 2012 and was charged with
    second degree attempted rape and strangulation. The charges against Holmes
    were later dismissed.
    (5) On December 23, 2013, Holmes filed a civil complaint alleging
    that Det. D’Elia negligently investigated and identified him as the suspect in
    the November 13, 2011 attack. Holmes sought to recover monetary damages
    for the physical and mental distress he suffered as a result of being falsely
    accused of sexual assault and strangulation.
    (6) On February 12, 2014, Det. D’Elia moved to dismiss Holmes’
    complaint for insufficient process under Superior Court Civil Rule 4(f) and
    for failure to state a claim under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Det.
    1 Holmes v. D’Elia, 
    2015 WL 1889030
     (Del. Super. April 20, 2015).
    2
    D’Elia contended that he was statutorily immune from suit under the County
    and Municipal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter the “Tort Claims Act”).2
    (7)
    (8)
    Under 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) of the Tort Claims Act:
    [A government] employee may be personally liable
    for acts or omissions causing property damage,
    bodily injury or death in instances in which the
    governmental entity is immune under this section,
    but only for those acts which were not within the
    scope of employment or which were performed
    with wanton negligence or wilful and malicious
    intent.3
    By order dated March 17, 2014, the Superior Court ruled on Det.
    D’Elia’s motion to dismiss.4 The court denied to dismiss the complaint for
    insufficient process after finding that Holmes’ service of process was
    sufficient. The court ruled as follows:
    Holmes submitted a praecipe initiating service of
    process on Detective D’Elia at his place of work,
    the Newark Police Department, 220 Elkton Road,
    Newark, DE 19711. Per Deputy Sheriff Deane
    Cressman, service was made by leaving the relevant
    documents with Nate Graber in the Records
    Department at the Newark Police Department.
    Holmes states in his answering brief that the
    Newark Police Department does not give out a
    police officer’s home address to a person whom the
    officer has arrested. The Court finds that service
    2 The County and Municipal Tort Claims Act is codified at 10 Del. C. ch. 40, subch. II.
    310 Del. C. § 4011(c).
    4 Holmes v. D’Elia, 
    2014 WL 1083934
     (Del. Super. Mar. 17, 2014).
    3
    (9)
    failure to state a claim was not yet ripe for determination and ordered Holmes
    to respond to the merits of Det. D’Elia’s immunity defense within sixty days.6
    When Holmes submitted several letters in response to the immunity defense,
    the Superior Court permitted Det. D’Elia to file a reply in support of the
    motion to dismiss. Holmes filed a response to the reply on February 19, 2015.
    (10) By Memorandum Opinion dated April 20, 2015, the Superior
    Court dismissed Holmes’ complaint against Det. D’Elia on the basis that the
    detective was immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act.7
    was properly made under Rule 4(f)(1)(I), “by
    delivering copies thereof to an agent authorized by
    appointment or by law to receive service of
    process.”5
    The Superior Court ruled that dismissal of the complaint for
    Superior Court found that:
    5 
    Id.
    5 
    Id.
    The authority of D’Elia to arrest individuals is
    inherent in his job as a detective in the Newark
    Police Department and such an act is discretionary.
    Holmes contends that there was no physical
    evidence to justify the arrest and that D’Elia should
    have known that the accusations against Holmes
    were false. D’Elia’s investigation, which included
    a positive identification of Holmes as the attacker,
    and arrest of Holmes were within the scope of
    D’Elia’s employment. D’Elia’s actions were
    7 Holmes v. D ’Elia, 
    2015 WL 1889030
     (Del. Super. April 20, 2015).
    4
    The
    performed in good faith and without gross
    negligence.8
    This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
    (11) 5 i'fgzolmes has appealed the April 20, 2015 Memorandum Opinion
    dismissing his complaint. Det. D’Elia has filed a cross-appeal from the March
    17, 2014 order denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficient
    process.
    (12) When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for
    failure to state a claim, the Superior Court must determine whether the
    plaintiff “may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances
    susceptible of proof under the complaint.” The Supreme Court reviews a
    dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo to determine Whether the trial judge
    erred as a matter of law.10
    (13) In this case, upon de novo review, the Court finds that the
    Superior Court properly held, as a matter of law, that Holmes failed to state a
    claim upon which relief could be granted.11 Holmes failed to allege facts that,
    8 Id., at *2.
    9 Spence v. Funk, 
    396 A.2d 967
    , 968 (Del. 1978).
    10 Clinton v. Enterprise Rent—A—Car C0., 
    977 A.2d 892
    , 895 (Del. 2009).
    11 In its April 20 decision, the Superior Court wrote certain sentences that might be read in
    isolation as findings of fact. Read in full context, what the Superior Court was saying was
    that Holmes had pled no facts supporting a pleading stage inference that Det. D’Elia had
    any improper motive to target Holmes, as opposed to the detective carrying out his
    responsibility to investigate leads that might result in solving a serious alleged crime.
    5
    if taken to be true, would establish that Det. D’Elia’s investigation of Holmes
    was performed in the absence of good faith or with gross negligence or “with
    wanton negligence or wilful and malicious intent.”12
    (14) The Court concludes that the judgment of the Superior Court
    should be affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court’s Memorandum Opinion
    dated April 20, 2015. With the affirmance of the Superior Court’s final
    judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule
    12(b)(6), it is not necessary to address the claim, raised in the cross-appeal,
    that the Superior Court erred in an interim order when denying dismissal of
    the complaint on the alternative ground of insufficient process under Rule
    46113
    NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
    Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
    BY THE COURT:
    Justice 3 a
    12 10 Del. C. § 4011(0). Walls v Rees, 
    569 A.2d 1161
    , 1165 (Del. 1990).
    13 In re General Motors S’holder Litig., 
    897 A.2d 162
    , 167 (Del. 2006) (declining to reach
    the issues raised in a cross-appeal when the Court concluded that the trial court properly
    granted a motion to dismiss).
    6