Mills v. State ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
FLOYD MILLS, §
§ No. 177, 2015
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below – Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 1307023821
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: November 16, 2015
Decided: January 6, 2016
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
This 6th day of January 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and
the State’s response, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Shortly after midnight on July 29, 2013, a man described as wearing a
gray mask, green tee shirt, fatigue-style camouflage shorts, and black work gloves,
entered a Wilmington social club at 1220 North Claymont Street and held up the
club’s bartender and another man. The masked man fled the club with $250 in
cash from the register and several bottles of liquor. Later that morning, after an
investigation initiated by a witness’ tip about the robber’s whereabouts, the
appellant, Floyd Mills, was taken into custody as he was exiting the back door of a
Wilmington residence at 2510 Thatcher Street. Following two searches of the
Thatcher Street residence, one without a warrant and the other with a warrant,
Mills was arrested and charged with the robbery. Following his arrest, Mills made
incriminating statements to the police.
(2) In October 2013, Mills was indicted on charges of Robbery in the
First Degree, Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony,
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), and Wearing a
Disguise during the Commission of a Felony. In January 2014, Mills, through his
defense counsel, filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the searches
of 2510 Thatcher Street and Mills’ incriminating statements to the police. The
Superior Court denied the motion to suppress after a hearing. Mills’ trial was
scheduled for November 12, 2014.
(3) On November 7, 2014, Mills pled guilty to one count of Robbery in
the First Degree and one count of PFBPP. In exchange for the guilty plea, the
State dismissed the other charges in the indictment. Also, the State agreed not to
seek Mills’ sentencing as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) and to
seek sentencing under § 4214(a) only on PFBPP, the lesser of the two felony
offenses.1 For his part, Mills agreed not to oppose the motion seeking his
1
When imposing a sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b), the Superior Court must impose a life
sentence. When imposing a sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), the Superior Court has the
2
sentencing as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and his sentencing
thereunder for PFBPP.
(4) Prior to sentencing, Mills submitted a pro se letter asking the Superior
Court to withdraw the plea and to assign him new counsel. Mills stated that he was
dissatisfied with his defense counsel’s representation because counsel took
advantage of Mills’ learning disability and forced him into taking the plea. By
letter dated February 18, 2015, the Superior Court denied Mills’ request to
withdraw the plea and for the appointment of new counsel, and the matter
proceeded to sentencing. At sentencing on March 13, 2015, Mills again told the
Superior Court that he was “forced” into taking the plea, had been “taken
advantage of,” and wanted to withdraw the plea.2 The Superior Court again
rejected Mills’ contentions and imposed sentence.
(5) For PFBPP, Mills was declared a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. §
4214(a) and sentenced to fifteen years at Level V. For Robbery in the First
Degree, Mills was sentenced to ten years at Level V suspended after three years
discretion to impose up to a life sentence and must impose the statutory maximum applicable if
the operative conviction is a felony listed in 11 Del. C. § 4201(c), such as Robbery in the First
Degree and, in this case, PFBPP. The statutory maximum for Robbery in the First Degree is
twenty-five years. 11 Del. C. §§ 832, 4205(b)(2). The statutory maximum for PFBPP, a class C
felony in this case, is fifteen years. 11 Del. C. §§ 1448(c), 4205(b)(3) (2010 & Supp. 2015).
2
Hr’g Tr. at 9-10 (Mar. 13, 2015).
3
minimum mandatory for six months at Level III probation. This is Mills’ direct
appeal.
(6) On appeal, Mills’ defense counsel (“Defense Counsel”) has filed a no
merit brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).3 Defense
Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record,
there are no arguably appealable issues. Defense Counsel reports that Mills was
informed that he had a right to supplement the brief with written points for the
Court’s consideration. Mills has submitted as his written points a copy of the
motion to suppress filed in the Superior Court and a motion for appointment of
new counsel on appeal. The State has responded to Defense Counsel’s brief and
motion to withdraw, Mills’ submission, and has moved to affirm the Superior
Court’s judgment.
(7) When reviewing Defense Counsel’s motion to withdraw and brief
under Rule 26(c), the Court must be satisfied that Defense Counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.4
Additionally, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine
“whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an
3
See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 26(c) (governing criminal appeals without merit).
4
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S.
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
4
adversary presentation.”5 If the Court finds nonfrivolous issues for appeal, the
Court will grant Defense Counsel’s motion to withdraw and will appoint new
counsel to represent Mills on appeal.6
(8) The Court has carefully reviewed the Superior Court record on appeal
and has found “no nonfrivolous issue”7 with respect to Mills’ pro se motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. After considering the factors established in Scarborough
v. State to evaluate such a motion,8 the Superior Court found no good faith basis to
withdraw the plea in this case. Specifically, the Superior Court found that Mills’
motion to withdraw the plea made no assertion that there was a procedural defect
in taking the plea and no assertion of legal innocence. Also, the Superior Court
found that Mills admitted the offenses during the plea colloquy9 and represented in
open court that he was knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea. Finally, the
Superior Court found that Mills was adequately represented by Defense Counsel
and that withdrawing the plea would be problematic for the State (although
5
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. at 81-82.
6
Id. at 80.
7
Id.
8
See Scarborough v. State, 938 A.2d 644, 649 (Del. 2007) (listing factors to consider when
evaluating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea).
9
The Court notes that Mills entered a Robinson plea to Robbery in the First Degree. See
Robinson v. State, 291 A.2d 279 (Del. 1972) (permitting the acceptance of a guilty plea in the
absence of an admission of guilt).
5
perhaps not prejudicial) because the witnesses had been excused. The Court
concludes that the Superior Court’s findings are supported by the transcript of the
plea colloquy.
(9) Mills’ written submission on appeal does not contest the voluntariness
of the plea. To the extent the submission is intended to prompt this Court’s review
of the denial of the motion to suppress, the submission is unavailing. Mills’
voluntary guilty plea waived his right to challenge the suppression ruling on
appeal.10
(10) Having conducted “a full examination of all the proceedings” and
found “no nonfrivolous issue for appeal,”11 the Court concludes that the appeal is
“wholly without merit.”12 The Court is satisfied that Defense Counsel made a
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined
that Mills could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal.
10
Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003) (citing Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-
13 (Del. 1988)).
11
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988).
12
Supra note 3.
6
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is
GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to
withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice
7