Facer v. Governor of Delaware, John Carney ( 2022 )


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  •          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    JESSICA J. FACER,                     §
    §
    Petitioner Below,               §   No. 21, 2022
    Appellant,                      §
    §   Court Below—Superior Court
    v.                              §   of the State of Delaware
    §
    GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE,                 §   C.A. No. S21M-10-003
    JOHN CARNEY,                          §
    §
    Respondent Below,               §
    Appellee.
    Submitted: April 8, 2022
    Decided:   May 17, 2022
    Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,
    Justices.
    ORDER
    After consideration of the opening brief, the motion to affirm, and the record
    below, it appears to the Court that:
    (1)    The appellant, Jessica J. Facer, filed this appeal from the Superior
    Court’s dismissal of her petition for a writ of mandamus.        The Governor of
    Delaware, John C. Carney, Jr., has moved to affirm the judgment below on the
    ground that it is manifest on the face of Facer’s opening brief that her appeal is
    without merit. We agree and affirm.
    (2)    On October 7, 2021, Facer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in
    the Superior Court. She sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor to
    uphold the Delaware Constitution and the United States Constitution by ceasing all
    statewide Covid-19 mandates. Governor Carney filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
    that the petition was moot and did not satisfy the criteria for issuance of a writ of
    mandamus. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss. This
    appeal followed.
    (3)    In her opening brief, Facer argues that the contents of the Governor’s
    emergency mandates were unconstitutional. She also contends that this matter is not
    moot because another pandemic could occur in the future. As the Governor points
    out, the petition seeks relief from emergency orders that are no longer in effect.1 The
    Governor also emphasizes that the petition seeks to compel the performance of
    discretionary duties.
    (4)    “A writ of mandamus is a command that may be issued by the Superior
    Court to an inferior court, public official, or agency to compel the performance of a
    duty to which the petitioner has established a clear legal right.”2                  “For the
    performance of a duty to be clearly owed to a petitioner, it must be nondiscretionary
    or ministerial, meaning that it is ‘prescribed with such precision and certainty that
    1
    Facer acknowledged in her petition that the State of Emergency she challenged had ended on
    July 12, 2021. Facer v. Governor of Delaware, C.A. No. S21M-10-003, Petition for Writ of
    Mandamus ¶ 18 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2021). On March 1, 2022, the Governor lifted a subsequent
    State of Emergency and school mask mandate. See https://news.delaware.gov/2022/
    03/01/governor-carney-lifts-covid-19-state-of-emergency-2/; https://news.delaware.gov/2022/02/
    28/delaware-school-mask-requirement-to-end-at-600-p-m-on-tuesday-march-1/.
    2
    Clough v. State, 
    686 A.2d 158
    , 159 (Del. 1996).
    2
    nothing is left to discretion or judgment.’”3 A court may dismiss a petition for a writ
    of mandamus “where events after the petition’s filing moot the necessity of the
    writ.”4
    (5)     In light of the above legal principles, we conclude that the Superior
    Court did not err in dismissing Facer’s petition for a writ of mandamus. To the
    extent the petition challenged contents of emergency orders that are no longer in
    effect, the petition is moot. Facer speculates that there could be a future pandemic,
    but we decline to render an advisory opinion on a hypothetical scenario.5 To the
    extent the petition challenges the Public Health Emergency that remains in effect,
    Facer has not explained how the Governor failed to perform a nondiscretionary or
    ministerial duty owed to her. As the Superior Court correctly determined, the
    Governor’s exercise of emergency powers is a discretionary act.6
    3
    Brittingham v. Town of Georgetown, 
    113 A.3d 519
    , 524 (Del. 2015) (quoting Guy v. Greenhouse,
    
    1993 WL 557938
    , at *1 (Del. Dec. 30, 1993)).
    4
    
    Id. at 524-25
    .
    5
    Stroud v. Milliken Enters., Inc., 
    552 A.2d 476
    , 480 (Del. 1989) (“The law is well settled that our
    courts will not lend themselves ‘to decide cases which have become moot, or to render advisory
    opinions.’”) (quoting State v. Mancari, 
    223 A.2d 81
    , 82–83 (Del. 1966)).
    6
    Transcript of December 17, 2021 hearing at 13-15, attached as Exhibit B to Motion to Affirm.
    See also State ex rel. Bieroth v. Gianforte, 
    2021 WL 4760161
    , at *1 (Mont. Oct. 12, 2021)
    (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel governor to stop issuing executive
    orders that were discretionary in nature in response to COVID-19); Colvin v. Inslee, 
    467 P.3d 953
    ,
    963 (Wash. 2020) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel governor to release
    prison inmates due to COVID-19 emergency because governor’s exercise of emergency powers
    was discretionary).
    3
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
    GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
    BY THE COURT:
    /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
    Chief Justice
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21, 2022

Judges: Seitz C.J.

Filed Date: 5/17/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/18/2022