Clark v. State ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DONALD CLARK, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 221, 2022
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1207014818 (K)
§
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 9, 2022
Decided: January 23, 2023
ORDER
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, it appears to the
Court that:
(1) The appellant, Donald Clark, filed this appeal from a Superior Court
order denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence. For the reasons
discussed below, we conclude that Clark’s sentence is not illegal.
(2) In May 2014, Clark pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a
firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”). The charges to which Clark pleaded
guilty arose from his possession of two firearms on July 17, 2012. The indictment
alleged that Clark was a person prohibited as a result of either, or both, of two prior
convictions for possession with intent to deliver a narcotic Schedule II controlled
substance. As part of the plea, Clark agreed that he qualified for sentencing as a
habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). On May 13, 2014, the Superior Court
declared Clark to be a habitual offender and sentenced him, for each of the two
PFBPP counts, to eight years of incarceration followed by probation.
(3) In the years since his conviction and sentencing, Clark has filed
numerous motions for correction or review of sentence, frequently making the same
argument: that his sentence is illegal because a prior conviction for possession of
cocaine with intent to deliver is not a violent offense that triggers an enhanced
penalty under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1). The Superior Court denied his latest motion
asserting that claim, and Clark has appealed to this Court.
(4) We review the denial of a motion for sentence correction for abuse of
discretion.1 We review questions of law de novo.2 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds
statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required
to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the
judgment of conviction did not authorize.3
(5) After careful consideration, we conclude that the Superior Court did not
err by denying the motion, because Clark’s sentence is not illegal. Clark challenges
1
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).
2
Id.3
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
2
the sentences imposed for two counts of PFBPP. On July 17, 2012,4 11 Del. C. §
1448(c) provided that possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited was a
Class D felony if (i) the deadly weapon at issue was a firearm and (ii) the person was
prohibited from possessing the firearm under paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(8) of
Section 1448.5 Clark pleaded guilty to possessing two firearms and he concedes,
consistent with the indictment, that he had a prior felony conviction for possession
with intent to deliver cocaine. At the time of Clark’s PFBPP offenses, Section
1448(a)(3) prohibited a person from possessing a deadly weapon if he had a prior
conviction for the unlawful use, possession, or sale of a narcotic.6 Thus, the PFBPP
offenses to which he pleaded guilty were Class D felonies under 11 Del. C. §
1448(c).7
4
The applicable versions of Sections 1448, 4201, and 4214 are those that were in effect on July
17, 2012, when Clark committed the PFBPP offenses that are at issue in this appeal. See Garnett
v. State, 2022 WL 1639226, at *2 (Del. May 23, 2022) (“This Court has held . . . that the version
of the habitual-offender statute that applies is the one in effect at the time that the defendant
committed the offense for which he is being sentenced.”); Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 543
(Del. 2017) (“Based upon the unambiguous language of Sections 1448(e) and 4201(c), we
conclude that the definition of ‘violent felony’ as that term is used in Section 1448(e) is controlled
by the version of Section 4201(c) in effect at the time Butcher committed Person Prohibited.”).
5
11 Del. C. § 1448(c) (effective June 30, 2012, to July 17, 2013).
6
Id. § 1448(a)(3).
7
See id. § 1448(c) (“Possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited is a class F felony,
unless said deadly weapon is a firearm . . . and the violation is 1 of paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(8)
of this section, in which case it is a class D felony.”); id. § 1448(a) (“Except as otherwise provided
herein, the following persons are prohibited from purchasing, owning, possessing or controlling a
deadly weapon . . . within the State: . . . (3) Any person who has been convicted for the unlawful
use, possession or sale of a narcotic, dangerous drug or central nervous system depressant or
stimulant as those terms were defined prior to the effective date of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act in June 1973 or of a narcotic drug or controlled substance as defined in Chapter
3
(6) In the plea agreement, Clark stipulated that he was eligible for habitual-
offender sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). In July 2012, 11 Del. C. § 4214(a)
permitted the Superior Court to impose a sentence up to life imprisonment for each
offense subject to sentencing under that section. If the PFBPP convictions for which
Clark was being sentenced were “Title 11 violent felon[ies], as defined in § 4201(c)
of this title,” then Section 4214(a) required the Superior Court to impose a
“minimum sentence which shall not be less than the statutory maximum penalty
provided elsewhere in this title for [Clark’s PFBPP convictions].”8 So if the PFBPP
convictions for which Clark was being sentenced as a habitual offender were violent
felonies under Section 11 Del. C. § 4201(c), he was subject to a minimum-mandatory
sentence of eight years, and up to life in prison, for each PFBPP offense.9 If they
were not violent felonies under Section 4201(c), he was subject to a sentence up to
life in prison but with no minimum mandatory. The Superior Court imposed a
sentence that corresponds to the minimum-mandatory sentence that would apply
under Section 4214(a) if Clark’s PFBPP offenses were violent felonies, but it is not
entirely clear from the record whether the court imposed the sentence as a matter of
47 of Title 16 . . . .”); 16 Del. C. § 4701(27) (effective Jan. 25, 2012, to Dec. 17, 2015) (defining
“narcotic drug” to include cocaine); id. § 4701(24) (effective through July 9, 2009) (same).
8
11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (effective June 1, 2012, to July 2, 2013).
9
See 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(4) (providing for a sentence of “up to 8 years” of incarceration for a
class D felony).
4
its discretion or because it understood the minimum-mandatory to apply.10 We
therefore consider whether Clark was subject to the minimum-mandatory sentence
under Section 4214(a). To reiterate, the answer turns on whether the PFBPP
offenses for which Clark was being sentenced were “Title 11 violent felon[ies], as
defined in § 4201(c) of this title.”11
(7) The list of violent felonies in the applicable version of Section 4201(c)
included “Section 1448(e) Possession of a Deadly Weapon by Persons Prohibited
(Firearm or Destructive Weapon Purchased, Owned, Possessed or Controlled by a
Violent Felon).”12 Section 1448(e) imposed an enhanced-sentencing scheme on
PFBPP offenses committed by individuals with prior convictions for violent
felonies.13 So Clark was subject to the minimum-mandatory sentence under Section
4214(a) if his PFBPP offense was subject to sentencing under Section 1448(e).14
10
It appears that the State did not submit to the Superior Court a written habitual-offender petition,
presumably relying instead on Clark’s stipulation that he was subject to sentencing under Section
4214(a). The record before the Court also does not include a transcript of Clark’s sentencing. But
the record does contain some indications that the parties and the court believed that the minimum-
mandatory provision of Section 4214(a) applied. The truth-in-sentencing form that was completed
at the time of Clark’s sentencing indicates that the minimum-mandatory sentence was eight years.
And the Superior Court’s order denying the first motion that Clark filed challenging his sentence
states that Clark “received the minimum sentence under the habitual statute.” State v. Clark, Cr.
I.D. No. 1207014818, Docket No. 52 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014).
11
11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (effective June 1, 2012, to July 2, 2013).
12
11 Del. C. § 4201(c) (effective June 1, 2012, to June 29, 2014).
13
11 Del. C. § 1448(e) (effective June 30, 2012, to July 17, 2013) (establishing minimum sentences
for PFBPP, depending upon history of violent felony convictions).
14
See Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 541 (Del. 2017) (“Section 4201(c) designates a Section
1448 conviction as a violent felony only if the defendant is subject to sentencing under Section
1448(e).”).
5
Section 1448(e)(1)a provided for a minimum-mandatory sentence of one year “if the
person has previously been convicted of a violent felony,”15 as defined in Section
4201(c).16 Section 4201(c) designated possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance as a violent felony.17 Thus, Clark’s prior conviction(s) for possession with
intent to deliver made him subject to sentencing under Section 1448(e) and,
therefore, also subject to the minimum-mandatory sentence under Section 4214(a).
The Superior Court imposed a sentence equal to the applicable minimum-mandatory
sentence. We therefore affirm the Superior Court’s denial of Clark’s motion to
correct an illegal sentence.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice
15
11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)a (effective June 20, 2012, to July 17, 2013).
16
See id. § 1448(e)(3) (“For the purposes of this subsection, ‘violent felony’ means any felony so
designated by § 4201(c) of this title . . . .”).
17
11 Del. C. § 4201(c) (effective June 1, 2012, to June 29, 2014).
6