Smith v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    LYNETTE SMITH,                          §
    §
    Defendant Below,              §   No. 346, 2014
    Appellant,                    §
    §
    v.                            §   Court Below—Superior Court
    §   of the State of Delaware,
    STATE OF DELAWARE,                      §   in and for New Castle County
    §   Cr. ID No. 1206011052
    Plaintiff Below,              §
    Appellee.                     §
    Submitted: September 29, 2014
    Decided:   October 23, 2014
    Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.
    ORDER
    This 23rd day of October 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s
    opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to
    the Court that:
    (1)    The appellant, Lynette Smith, filed this appeal from the Superior
    Court’s sentence for her second violation of probation (“VOP”). The State of
    Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is
    manifest on the face of Smith’s opening brief that her appeal is without merit.1 We
    agree and affirm.
    1
    Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
    (2)   The record reflects that Smith was indicted for Theft and multiple
    counts of Unlawful Use of a Credit Card in November 2012. On March 26, 2013,
    Smith pled guilty to Theft. The Superior Court immediately sentenced Smith to
    three years of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III probation
    and six months of Level II probation. Smith was also required to pay restitution,
    undergo evaluation for substance abuse, and follow any recommendations for
    substance abuse treatment. Smith did not appeal.
    (3)   On January 8, 2014, an administrative warrant charging Smith with
    her first VOP was issued. The charges included failure to report to the probation
    officer as directed, positive drug tests for cocaine, and failure to comply with
    substance abuse treatment. On February 19, 2014, the Superior Court found Smith
    in violation of her probation. Smith was sentenced to three years of Level V
    incarceration, suspended for eighteen months of Level IV home confinement,
    suspended after sixth months for Level III probation. Smith did not appeal.
    (4)   On June 4, 2014, an administrative warrant charging Smith with her
    second VOP was issued.       The charges included use of cocaine and multiple
    unauthorized leaves from home confinement. Smith appeared before the Superior
    Court on June 18, 2014. The Superior Court found Smith in violation of her
    probation. Smith was sentenced to three years of Level V incarceration, suspended
    after successful completion of the Key program for two years of Level IV
    2
    supervision, suspended after successful completion of the Level IV Crest program
    for Level III Crest Aftercare. This appeal followed.
    (5)     In her opening brief, Smith claims: (i) she was denied the right to
    present witnesses on her behalf and otherwise defend herself at the VOP hearing;
    (ii) there were medical reasons for her failure to return home by curfew; (iii) her
    counsel was ineffective; (iv) she was sentenced based on her juvenile and adult
    criminal history without a pre-sentence investigation; (v) she was coerced into
    making a statement and the probation officer committed perjury; and (vi) the
    sentence was excessive and too harsh. We find no merit to these arguments.
    (6)     Smith did not seek to present any witnesses at the VOP hearing.
    Appellate review of Smith’s claim that she was denied the right to present
    witnesses is therefore waived absent plain error.2 There is no indication Smith
    sought the presence of the witnesses identified in her opening brief at the VOP
    hearing or to present testimony of those witnesses on her behalf. The record
    reflects that Smith was represented by counsel at the VOP hearing, spoke on her
    own behalf, and admitted to violating the terms of her probation. Under these
    circumstances, there is no merit to Smith’s claim that she was denied the right to
    present witnesses or to defend herself at the VOP hearing.
    2
    Supr. Ct. R. 8.
    3
    (7)    Smith appears to claim that several of her curfew violations should be
    excused because those violations occurred while she was recovering from knee
    surgery and unable to return to her home by curfew. Smith did not make this
    argument at her VOP hearing. At the VOP hearing, Smith admitted to using
    cocaine and leaving her apartment without authorization to take out the trash or
    babysit for a friend.
    (8)    In a VOP hearing, unlike a criminal trial, the State is only required to
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms of
    his/her probation.3 A preponderance of the evidence means “some competent
    evidence” to “reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has
    not been as good as required by the conditions of probation.”4 Regardless of
    Smith’s new explanations for her curfew violations, Smith’s admission at the VOP
    hearing to using cocaine constituted sufficient competent evidence to revoke her
    probation.5 As for Smith’s claim that her appointed counsel was ineffective, this
    Court will not consider that claim for the first time on this direct appeal.6
    3
    Kurzmann v. State, 
    903 A.2d 702
    , 716 (Del. 2006).
    4
    
    Id.
     (quoting Collins v. State, 
    897 A.2d 159
    , 160 (Del. 2006)).
    5
    Collins v. State, 
    897 A.2d at 160
    .
    6
    Barnes v. State, 
    2014 WL 60963
    , at *1 (Del. Jan. 7, 2014); Desmond v. State, 
    654 A.2d 821
    ,
    829 (Del. 1994).
    4
    (9)     Smith’s attacks on her sentence are also without merit. This Court’s
    appellate review of a sentence is extremely limited and generally ends upon a
    determination that the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the
    legislature.7 If the sentence is within statutory limits, the sentence will not be
    disturbed on appeal unless the defendant can establish that the sentencing judge
    relied on impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind.8
    (10) Smith complains that the Superior Court sentenced her based on her
    juvenile and adult criminal record, but the transcript of the VOP hearing reflects
    that the Superior Court was most concerned by her cocaine use. Smith also fails to
    identify any authority in support of her contention that the Superior Court was
    required to obtain a pre-sentence investigation before sentencing her for her second
    VOP. As far as the length of Smith’s sentence, the Superior Court could impose
    any period of incarceration up to and including the balance of the Level V time
    remaining on the February 19, 2014 sentence (three years).9 The Superior Court
    did not exceed that amount of time in imposing a Level V sentence of three years,
    which was suspended for decreasing levels of supervision after Smith’s successful
    completion of the Key program.
    7
    Kurzmann, 
    903 A.2d at 714
    .
    8
    Weston v. State, 
    832 A.2d 742
    , 746 (Del. 2003).
    9
    11 Del. C. § 4334(c); Pavulak v. State, 
    880 A.2d 1044
    , 1046 (Del. 2005).
    5
    (11) Finally, Smith fails to substantiate her conclusory statements that she
    was coerced into making a statement and that her probation officer committed
    perjury at the VOP hearing. In the absence of any evidence or argument in support
    of these conclusory statements, we conclude that Smith’s coercion and perjury
    claims are without merit.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
    GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
    BY THE COURT:
    /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely
    Justice
    6