Navarro v. State ( 2019 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
EUDALDO NAVARRO, §
§ No. 141, 2019
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID Nos. 1709006495 (N) &
§ 1712003000 (N)
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: August 27, 2019
Decided: October 15, 2019
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, the
State’s response, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On June 13, 2018, after a two-day trial in Criminal ID No. 1709006495,
a Superior Court jury found the appellant, Eudaldo Navarro, guilty of menacing as
a lesser included offense of aggravated menacing and second degree unlawful
imprisonment as a lesser included offense of first degree unlawful imprisonment.
As discussed in more detail below, these convictions arose from Navarro’s actions
against his wife in September 2017.
(2) On August 6, 2018, Navarro pled guilty in Criminal ID No.
1712003000 to second degree attempted kidnapping, aggravated menacing, and
second degree conspiracy. These convictions arose from armed strangers, at
Navarro’s behest, forcing Navarro’s wife and children to leave their home to go to
Navarro in December 2017.
(3) The Superior Court sentenced Navarro in both criminal cases to a total
of twenty-three years and one month of Level V incarceration, suspended after six
years for decreasing levels of supervision. This is Navarro’s direct appeal.
(4) At the trial in Criminal ID No. 1709006495, Navarro’s wife testified
that she and Navarro were separated as of September 2017. Navarro was not a U.S.
citizen and was not legally in the U.S. On September 8, 2017, Navarro’s wife came
home to find Navarro there with their children. Navarro wanted to speak to her, but
she wanted to take their children to dance lessons. Navarro’s sister arrived and
picked up the children.
(5) Navarro eventually convinced his wife to go inside the house with him.
He then grabbed her arm, pushed her into a bedroom, locked the door, and threatened
her. He also took away her cell phone and car keys. He grabbed a kitchen knife and
threatened to kill her and himself. He would not let her leave the bedroom. He
repeatedly slashed a framed picture of Marilyn Monroe that she had in the bedroom.
(6) To escape from Navarro, his wife lied to him, telling him that she had
cancer and needed to go to the hospital. Navarro took her to the hospital in his GMC
Yukon truck. During an ultrasound procedure, she told hospital staff about
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Navarro’s threats. She declined their offers to call the police. She contacted the
police the next day after speaking with her family.
(7) After speaking with Navarro’s wife, the investigating police officer
tried to contact Navarro. He went to Navarro’s workplace where he found Navarro’s
truck, but not Navarro. A knife and picture of Marilyn Monroe were in the truck.
Navarro’s wife identified the knife as the one that Navarro had used to threaten her.
The police were unable to recover any fingerprints from the knife and did not submit
it for DNA testing.
(8) Navarro’s sister testified that both her brother and her sister-in-law
asked her to pick up the children on September 8, 2017. According to her, both of
them seemed happy when she picked up the children. Later that day her sister-in-
law called to say she was at the hospital because she was not feeling well and that
one of her relatives would pick up the children. The jury found Navarro guilty of
menacing as a lesser included offense of aggravated menacing and second degree
unlawful imprisonment as a lesser included offense of first degree unlawful
imprisonment. The jury found Navarro not guilty of terroristic threatening and
possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.
(9) As noted earlier, Navarro pled guilty to second degree attempted
kidnapping, aggravated menacing, and second degree conspiracy in Criminal ID No.
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1712003000, when Navarro instructed armed strangers to force Navarro’s wife and
children to leave their home to go to Navarro in December 2017.
(10) The Superior Court judge who presided over his trial, but not his guilty
plea, sentenced him in both cases on March 15, 2019. The Superior Court sentenced
Navarro as follows: (i) for second degree attempted kidnapping, fifteen years of
Level V incarceration, suspended after four years for decreasing levels of
supervision; (ii) for aggravated menacing, five years of Level V incarceration
suspended after one year for eighteen months of Level III probation; (iii) for second
degree conspiracy, two years of Level V incarceration, suspended for eighteen
months of Level II probation; (iv) for second degree unlawful imprisonment, one
year of Level V incarceration; and (v) for menacing, thirty days of Level V
incarceration suspended for one year of Level III probation.
(11) On appeal, Navarro’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”) filed a brief and a
motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based
upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably
appealable issues. Counsel informed Navarro of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and
provided Navarro with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying
brief.
(12) Counsel also informed Navarro of his right to identify any points he
wished this Court to consider on appeal. Navarro has raised points for this Court’s
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consideration. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and has moved to
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(13) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii)
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an
adversary presentation.1 Navarro’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as
follows: (i) he should not have been sentenced to jail time for misdemeanors when
he was sentenced to probation for more serious felonies; (ii) his sentences should not
have exceeded guidelines established by the Delaware Sentencing Accountability
Commission (“SENTAC”) because he accepted responsibility for the crimes and
apologized to the victims; (iii) his unfamiliarity with English and mental health were
issues throughout the proceedings; (iv) the prosecutor referred to comments his
daughter made at sentencing that do not appear in the police reports and acted
vengefully toward him after the trial; and (v) his counsel failed to make sufficient
arguments at his sentencing.
1
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996).
5
(14) Our review of a sentence is limited to determining whether the sentence
is within the statutory limits defined by the General Assembly.2 If the sentence falls
within statutory limits, we consider only whether it is based on factual predicates
which are false, impermissible, or lack a minimal indicia of reliability, judicial
vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.3 All of Navarro’s sentences fall within
statutory limits.4
(15) To the extent Navarro suggests that he received probation for all of the
felonies he committed, he is incorrect. He received the greatest amount of Level V
time—fifteen years of Level V incarceration suspended after four years—for the
most serious felony he committed, second degree kidnapping (a class C felony). He
is also incorrect in stating that he only received probation for aggravated menacing;
he was actually sentenced to one year of Level V incarceration for aggravated
menacing. The Superior Court did sentence Navarro to probation for his least
serious felony (two years of Level V time suspended for eighteen months of Level
2
Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 714 (Del. 2006).
3
Id.4
Second degree kidnapping is a class C felony with a maximum statutory penalty of up to fifteen
years of Level V incarceration. 11 Del. C. § 783; 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(3). Aggravated menacing
is a class E felony with a maximum statutory penalty of up to five years of Level V incarceration.
11 Del. C. § 602(b); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(5). Second degree conspiracy in a class G felony subject
to a maximum statutory penalty of up to two years of Level V incarceration. 11 Del. C. § 512; 11
Del. C. § 4205(b)(7). Second degree unlawful imprisonment is a Class A misdemeanor with a
maximum statutory penalty of up to one year of Level V incarceration. 11 Del. C. § 781; 11 Del.
C. § 4206(a). Menacing is an unclassified misdemeanor subject to maximum statutory penalty of
thirty days of Level V incarceration. 11 Del. C. § 602(a); 11 Del. C. § 4206(c).
6
II probation for second degree conspiracy) and Level V time for two of his
misdemeanors (thirty days of Level V incarceration for menacing and one year of
Level V incarceration for second degree unlawful imprisonment), but those
sentences are within the statutory limits.
(16) The Superior Court did choose to impose sentences that exceeded the
SENTAC guidelines (although not as much as the State had requested), but Navarro
has no legal or constitutional right to appeal a sentence authorized by statute simply
because it does not conform to the sentencing guidelines established by SENTAC.5
In imposing the sentences, the Superior Court acknowledged Navarro’s acceptance
of responsibility in his guilty plea and his mental health issues, but also noted the
aggravating factors of the victim’s vulnerability and the prior abuse of the victim.
As to Navarro’s request for reduction of his sentence so that he can begin the
deportation process sooner, he did not raise this claim below so we will not address
it for the first time on appeal.6
(17) Navarro’s unfamiliarity with English and mental health issues were
addressed in the proceedings below. A translator was present for all of Navarro’s
appearances, including his trial, guilty plea, and sentencing, in the Superior Court.
5
Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992).
6
Supr. Ct. R. 8. The record reflects that Navarro did not wish to plead guilty to any crimes that
included minimum-mandatory time because such a plea would have a different impact on his
immigration status than a plea to crimes that did not include minimum-mandatory time. The
parties ultimately agreed on a plea to crimes that did not include minimum-mandatory time.
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The record reflects that Navarro was communicating with his counsel throughout
the trial. Navarro’s statements during his guilty plea colloquy and sentencing reflect
that he understood the proceedings.
(18) As to Navarro’s mental health, the Superior Court questioned him
during his plea colloquy about the medications he was taking for his anxiety and
depression. The Superior Court also inquired about his previous admissions to
mental hospitals. Navarro’s counsel stated that he believed Navarro understood
what he was doing and was competent to plead guilty. The record supports this
statement. Navarro has not asserted any cognizable claim based on his unfamiliarity
with English or his mental health.
(19) Navarro’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are without merit. Navarro
alleges that the prosecutor referred at sentencing to statements his daughter made
that do not appear in the police reports, but does not provide any factual support for
this allegation. The record reflects that Navarro’s daughter spoke to the police after
armed strangers, at Navarro’s behest, made her, her brother, and her mother leave
their home in December 2017 to go to Navarro. In arguing that the prosecutor’s
reference to his daughter asking one of the armed men why her father kept trying to
hurt the family led the Superior Court judge to conclude wrongly that there was a
previous history of abuse, Navarro ignores that the judge presided over his trial for
acts he committed against his wife in September 2017.
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(20) The record also does not support Navarro’s claim that the prosecutor
acted vengefully toward him after the trial. The prosecutor was not required to offer
Navarro a plea deal, but did so. The prosecutor also agreed that Navarro could plead
guilty to crimes that did not include minimum-mandatory time to address Navarro’s
concerns regarding the impact on his immigration status.
(21) We construe Navarro’s complaints regarding his counsel’s arguments
at sentencing as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This Court does not
consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal and does not do so
here.7
(22) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that
Navarro’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable
issue. We also are satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine
the record and the law and has properly determined that Navarro could not raise a
meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
7
Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994).
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