Land v. State ( 2017 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MAURICE C. LAND, §
§ No. 5, 2016
Defendant Below- §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § ID No. 1408007675A
§
Plaintiff Below- §
Appellee. §
Submitted: November 16, 2016
Decided: January 10, 2017
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
On this 10th day of January 2017, it appears to the Court that:
1. Appellant, Maurice Land, appeals from a Superior Court jury verdict finding
him guilty of Robbery First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission
of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Conspiracy Second Degree, Theft, Tampering with Physical
Evidence, and Resisting Arrest. He makes one claim on appeal. He contends that his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the fourteen month delay
between his arrest and trial.
2. On August 8, 2014, Land was arrested in connection with an armed robbery
that occurred at a Dollar General in Georgetown. Two other men, Christopher Clay
and Booker Martin, were also arrested for their participation in the robbery. Land
was subsequently indicted on a number of charges stemming from the robbery on
November 17, 2014. He was not able to make bail.
3. Ordinarily, defendants indicted together should be tried together.1 The
Superior Court scheduled a joint trial for Land, Clay and Martin to be held on March
9, 2015. On December 29, 2014, the State complied with discovery requests. A case
review was originally scheduled for January 5, 2015. The matter was continued,
however, at the defendants’ request. On January 30, 2015, Clay filed a motion to
suppress evidence, and the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the motion for
February 17, 2015.
4. At the request of the State, the evidentiary hearing was continued because
the Deputy Attorney General assigned to the case had other matters scheduled for that
day. The hearing was rescheduled for April 1, 2015. As a result, the joint trial date
was rescheduled for April 27, 2015. Then on March 31, 2015, Martin’s counsel
requested a continuance because his wife had had a baby. The court rescheduled the
trial for June 8, 2015. In May 2015, Martin requested another continuance in order
to retain private counsel. The joint trial was rescheduled for July 27, 2015.
5. On June 4, 2015, Land filed a motion to dismiss asserting his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. On June 12, 2015, Land’s motion to dismiss was
1
Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1210 (Del. 1999).
2
denied.
6. The trial court held the evidentiary hearing for Clay’s suppression motion
on June 9, 2015. Land and his counsel took no part in the motion. The motion was
denied, but defense counsel for both Clay and Martin filed a “motion for
reconsideration” which was denied on July 16, 2015.
7. On July 14 and 15, 2015, both of Land’s co-defendants filed motions to
sever. On July 17, 2015, the court denied the motions to sever as to the co-
defendants, but severed some of the charges. In addition, counsel for the co-
defendants filed other motions with the court. Both Clay and Martin filed new
motions to suppress that were denied on July 24, 2015. Clay filed a motion to compel
additional discovery which was also denied on July 24, 2015.
8. Finally, during a conference on July 27, 2015, the day of trial, Land objected
to the State’s desired use of a surveillance video of the robbery. An evidentiary
hearing was scheduled for August 25, 2015 which resulted in a continuance of the
trial date to October 12, 2015. The court ruled that the video was admissible, and
trial began on October 12, 2015. Land was convicted and later sentenced to fifty
years of Level V incarceration for the Robbery charge and the PFDCF charge, with
varying degrees of probation for the remaining charges. This appeal followed.
9. Land claims that the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
3
trial because there was a fourteen month delay between his arrest and his trial. “This
Court reviews claims alleging an infringement of a constitutionally protected right de
novo.”2
10. In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court developed a
balancing test to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a
speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 The court
identified four factors that should be considered when determining whether a
defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment:
“the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his
right, and the prejudice to the defendant.”4 The factors are related and no one factor
is conclusive.5
11. A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is
accused of a crime through arrest or indictment whichever occurs first.”6 The length
of delay is a threshold factor.7 Unless the length of delay is determined to be
“presumptively prejudicial” the court does not assess the additional factors.8 This
2
Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007).
3
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (adopted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d
622, 623 (Del. 1973)).
4
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
5
Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
6
Id. at 273.
7
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
8
Id.4
Court has previously determined “that if the delay between arrest or indictment and
trial exceeds one year” the Court will then consider the additional three factors. 9 In
this case, the delay between Land’s arrest and trial date (August 9, 2014 to October
12, 2015) is greater than one year, and therefore an examination of the additional
Barker factors is appropriate.
12. We next consider the reasons for the delay. The United States Supreme
Court has found that different weight should be attributed for the various reasons
causing the delay.10 Deliberate attempts by the government to delay a trial should be
weighed heavily in favor of the defendant.11 In the same vein, a defendant who
prolongs the matter cannot solely blame the government for the resultant delay.12
13. Here, almost all of the delay was caused by defense motions, particularly
the suppression motion filed by Land’s co-defendant, Clay, as well as Land’s
objection to the State’s use of surveillance footage at trial. This Court has held that
delays caused by a co-defendant’s motions are “not chargeable to the prosecution.”13
We have also stated that delays caused by a co-defendant’s motions are not
9
Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613 *1, *7 (Del. Dec. 5, 2011).
10
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
11
Id.12
Cooper, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7.
13
Latson v. State, 146 A.2d 597, 600 (Del. 1958) (citing Garner v. State, 145 A.2d 68, 75 (Del.
1958)).
5
attributable to either the State or the defendant.14 This second factor does not weigh
in the Land’s favor.
14. The third Barker factor examines the defendant’s assertion of the right to
a speedy trial. Here, Land asserted his right in the form of a motion to dismiss for a
violation of his right to a speedy trial on June 4, 2015. This factor favors Land.
15. The final factor, prejudice to the defendant, “should be assessed in light
of the interests. . . the speedy trial right was designed to protect.”15 The United States
Supreme Court has identified three of these interests: “(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration, (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii)
to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”16
16. The first interest, to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration, weighs in
favor of Land because he was incarcerated during the delay.
17. With regard to the second interest under the prejudice prong, Land alleges
that the pre-trial incarceration caused a great deal of stress and apprehension. In his
opening brief, Land’s counsel states that Land “was under the constant stress and
apprehension of having his life forever altered by the possibility of a guilty verdict.”17
Based on Land’s record, which was disclosed by Land’s counsel, Land “has spent the
14
See Collier v. State, 1988 WL 113300, at *2 (Del. Sept. 23, 1988) (holding that the continuances
caused by a co-defendant were “not the fault of either party.”).
15
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
16
Id.17
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 16.
6
vast majority of his life incarcerated.”18 In 1974, Land was sentenced to a ten year
prison term at the age of sixteen.19 Next in 1979, Land was sentenced to a thirty-four
year prison term.20 However, mere assertions of stress and apprehension do not
equate to true prejudice to the defendant. This factor does not weigh in Land’s favor.
18. Land makes no claim that his defense was impaired in anyway due to the
delay in trial.21 Thus, as a whole, the fourth Barker factor does not weigh in Land’s
favor.
19. When all factors are considered, those carrying the greatest weight are that
substantially all of the delay was caused by pre-trial activities of Land and his co-
defendants, and Land was not prejudiced in the preparation of his defense.
Accordingly, Land’s speedy trial claim must be denied.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Justice
18
Id. at 8.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 15-16.
7