Carello v. State ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    MICHAEL CARELLO                        §
    §     No. 301, 2016
    Defendant-Below,                 §
    Appellant,                       §     Court Below: Superior Court
    §     of the State of Delaware
    v.                               §
    §     Cr. 
    ID. No. 1511011583
    STATE OF DELAWARE,                     §
    §
    Plaintiff-Below,                 §
    Appellee.                        §
    Submitted: January 25, 2017
    Decided:   February 8, 2017
    Before HOLLAND, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.
    ORDER
    This 8th day of February, 2017, having considered the briefs and the record
    below, it appears to the Court that:
    (1)    Delaware State Police officers stopped Frank Prentice for failing to
    signal while making a left turn. When they approached Prentice’s car, they saw
    two hypodermic needles in the driver’s side door. Police arrested him and the
    passenger, Thomas McIlvane, for possession of drug paraphernalia. McIlvane told
    the police officers that he was on probation, and that he was staying at the Motel 6
    in Newark.     Because McIlvane was on probation, police decided to do an
    administrative search of his hotel room. When Detective Mark Hogate of the
    Delaware State Police arrived at the hotel to search the room, he discovered that
    the room was rented to Michael Carello, and decided to notify him of the search.
    (2)      Carello was standing by a car near the room, loading his trunk. As the
    officer approached Carello, he started reaching behind the small of his back,
    backed up behind the car, threw a gun in the trunk, and took off running. Detective
    Hogate arrested him, and saw the gun in plain view in his trunk. He also searched
    the car and found two digital scales in the center console, and marijuana in the
    floorboard of the front passenger seat. Police then searched the hotel room and
    found a gun in a cardboard box between the two beds.
    (3)      Carello moved to suppress all the evidence found as a result of the
    search. The Superior Court granted the motion as to all of the evidence except the
    gun found in the open trunk of the car. The Superior Court ruled that the gun in
    the trunk would not be suppressed because the officers were simply attempting to
    notify Carello that they were going to search his room. Thus, the encounter in the
    parking lot was consensual, and not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
    Carello was subsequently convicted of various weapons offenses in a stipulated
    bench trial.
    (4)      On appeal, Carello argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion
    by refusing to suppress the gun found in the trunk, arguing that its discovery
    resulted from an unconstitutional seizure. The Superior Court correctly held that
    2
    the encounter in the parking lot—though escalated by Carello—did not amount to
    a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
    the Superior Court.
    (5)    On November 18, 2015, Detective Hogate and several other Delaware
    State Police officer members of the Governor’s Task Force were conducting
    surveillance of a Motel 6 in Newark. Around 9:00 PM, they saw Prentice make a
    left turn out of the hotel parking lot without using his signal, and stopped his car.
    When one of the officers approached the car, he saw two hypodermic needles in
    plain view in the driver’s side door. They arrested Prentice and the passenger,
    McIlvane. McIlvane was on probation at the time.
    (6)    McIlvane told the officers that he was staying in a room in the Motel 6
    in Newark. When police searched him, they found a key card to the room. The
    officers then decided to do an administrative search of the hotel room. But when
    the officers went to the hotel, they found that the room was rented in Michael
    Carello’s name.
    (7)    Detective Hogate saw Carello in the hotel parking lot, loading the
    trunk of his car. He approached Carello to notify him that the officers were going
    to perform an administrative search of his hotel room. He did not suspect Carello
    had committed any crimes. Detective Hogate called out to Carello and said, “Hey,
    3
    Michael, I need to talk to you.”1 Carello looked at Detective Hogate and reached
    behind the small of his back with his left hand. The detective said “don’t do that,”
    and pointed his gun at Carello. Carello continued staring at the detective and
    walked back towards the open trunk of the vehicle. The detective saw him toss
    something in the trunk of his car, and heard a “metallic thud.” Carello then ran
    away. Detective Hogate chased after Carello and used his taser to stop him. He
    then arrested Carello.
    (8)     Detective Hogate saw a gun in the open trunk of the car. Police then
    conducted an inventory search of the car because “there was no one operating the
    vehicle on private property.”2 They found two digital scales in the center console
    of the car and two grams of marijuana under the front passenger floorboard. The
    police also searched the hotel room and found another gun in a cardboard box
    between the two hotel beds.
    (9)     A grand jury indicted Carello on charges of carrying a concealed
    deadly weapon, two counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited,
    possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, possession of marijuana, and
    resisting arrest. Carello moved to suppress all the evidence obtained as a result of
    the search. The court held that the search of the hotel room and the interior of the
    car violated Carello’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
    1
    App. to Opening Br. at 118.
    2
    
    Id. at 116.
    4
    and seizures, and suppressed the evidence police obtained from those searches. As
    to the hotel room, the court held that Carello’s constitutional rights took
    precedence over the officers’ desire to conduct an administrative search of the
    probationer’s hotel room. Thus, the officers needed to obtain a search warrant.
    Further, the State stipulated that the marijuana police found in Carello’s car was
    not seized as the result of a proper inventory search. But, the Superior Court
    refused to suppress the gun in the car trunk, reasoning that Carello was not
    “seized” when the officer asked to talk to him. Rather, the court held that Carello
    escalated the situation through his own action.
    (10) On May 17, 2016, the Superior Court held a stipulated bench trial.
    Evidence and testimony from the suppression hearing was incorporated by
    reference into the bench trial. The Superior Court found Carello guilty of one
    count of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition
    by a person prohibited, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and resisting arrest.
    The court granted Carello’s request for immediate sentencing. The State moved to
    declare Carello an habitual offender, which the court granted. He was sentenced to
    a total of twenty-three years at Level V incarceration, followed by probation.
    Carello appealed.
    (11) On appeal, Carello claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion
    when it declined to suppress the gun police found in his trunk, arguing that it
    5
    resulted from an unconstitutional seizure. Specifically, he argues: (1) he was
    seized when the detective attempted to notify him of his intent to search his hotel
    room; (2) police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him; and (3) the gun should
    have been suppressed because it resulted from an illegal seizure. We review the
    Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress after an evidentiary hearing for
    abuse of discretion.3      “To the extent that we examine the trial judge’s legal
    conclusions, we review the trial judge’s determinations de novo for errors in
    formulating or applying legal precepts. To the extent the trial judge’s decision is
    based on factual findings, we review for whether the trial judge abused his or her
    discretion in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
    findings and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.”4
    (12) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
    I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by
    the government.5       The United States Supreme Court and this Court “have
    repeatedly held that not every encounter with the police is a seizure under the
    Fourth Amendment.”6 For example, “mere police questioning does not constitute a
    seizure. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual,
    3
    Culver v. State, 
    956 A.2d 5
    , 10 (Del. 2008).
    4
    Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 
    956 A.2d 1280
    , 1284-85 (Del. 2008).
    5
    Harris v. State, 
    806 A.2d 119
    , 124 (Del. 2002).
    
    6 Will. v
    . State, 
    962 A.2d 210
    , 214 (Del. 2008).
    6
    they may generally ask questions of that individual.”7               “During a consensual
    encounter, a person has no obligation to answer the officer’s inquiry and is free to
    go about his business. Only when the totality of the circumstances demonstrates
    that the police officer’s actions would cause a reasonable person to believe he was
    not free to ignore the police presence does a consensual encounter become a
    seizure.”8 In conducting this analysis, we focus on the police officer’s actions to
    determine objectively whether a person would feel he or she was not free to
    terminate the encounter.9
    (13) In Jones v. State, this Court adopted a six-factor test to determine
    whether a person has been seized under Delaware law:
    (1) whether the encounter occurred in a public or private place; (2)
    whether the suspect was informed that he was not under arrest and
    free to leave; (3) whether the suspect consented or refused to talk to
    the investigating officers; (4) whether the investigating officers
    removed the suspect to another area; (5) whether there was physical
    touching, display of weapons, or other threatening conduct; and (6)
    whether the suspect eventually departed the area without hindrance.10
    The Jones Court explained that the test is based on the totality of the
    circumstances, and that “no one factor is legally determinative, dispositive, or
    paramount.”11
    7
    
    Id. at 215
    (quoting Muehler v. Mena, 
    544 U.S. 93
    , 101 (2005)).
    8
    
    Williams, 962 A.2d at 215-16
    .
    
    9 Jones v
    . State, 
    745 A.2d 856
    , 869 (Del. 1999).
    
    10 Jones v
    . State, 
    28 A.3d 1046
    , 1052-53 (Del. 2011) (quoting United States v. Scheets, 
    188 F.3d 829
    , 836-37 (7th Cir. 1999)).
    11
    
    Jones, 28 A.3d at 1053
    (internal citations omitted).
    7
    (14) The question before us is whether Detective Hogate’s statement to
    Carello that he needed to talk to him would cause a reasonable person to believe he
    was not free to leave. The Superior Court ruled that the detective approached
    Carello only to inform him that he was going to do an administrative search of his
    hotel room. Because Carello was not seized by the detective, and the police did
    not provoke him to abandon the gun, the court found that the encounter was
    consensual. The Superior Court’s finding is well supported by the record. This is
    the type of “mere police questioning” that this Court has consistently found to pass
    constitutional muster.12
    (15) Further, applying the Jones factors to the facts of this appeal, we find
    that all of the factors weigh in favor of the Superior Court’s finding that Carello
    was not seized. First, the encounter occurred in a public parking lot. Second, the
    detective did not tell Carello he was under arrest or not free to leave. Third,
    Carello neither consented nor refused to speak. Instead, he hid from the officer
    and ran away. Fourth, the officers did not remove Carello from the area.13 Fifth,
    Detective Hogate did not initially show a weapon until Carello reached behind his
    12
    See Brown v. State, 
    35 A.3d 418
    , 
    2011 WL 5319900
    , at *1 (Del. 2011) (Table) (officers pulled
    up to defendant and asked his name and if they could talk to him); 
    Williams, 962 A.2d at 213
    (officer asked defendant’s name, birth date, and if he needed a ride); Ross v. State, 
    925 A.2d 489
    ,
    494 (Del. 2007) (“We hold that the presence of uniformed police officers following a walking
    pedestrian and requesting to speak with him, without doing anything more, does not constitute a
    seizure under Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.”).
    13
    The fact that Carello was taken away after he was arrested for being in possession of the gun is
    not relevant to our determination of whether the initial encounter was consensual.
    8
    back and hid behind the car. Finally, although Carello did not leave the area
    without a hindrance, it is because he escalated the situation. As the Superior Court
    held, Carello’s “actions raised the stakes considerably. By placing his hand behind
    his back in a manner common to, at least in an area where people are known to
    carry weapons, and then backing himself around into a position where he would
    have cover, [he] . . . changed . . . the situation dramatically.”14
    (16) Detective Hogate did no more than attempt to notify Carello that he
    was going to search his hotel room—the kind of consensual police encounter
    permitted by the constitution. Therefore, the Superior Court did not abuse its
    discretion by declining to suppress the gun. Because we have determined that
    police did not seize Carello, we do not reach his remaining contentions.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the
    Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
    BY THE COURT:
    /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
    Justice
    14
    Opening Br. Ex. B. at 29-30.
    9