Howell v. State ( 2021 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KARIEEM J. HOWELL, §
§ No. 372, 2020
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 1802010652(N)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: September 29, 2021
Decided: December 14, 2021
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Karieem Howell.
Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.
TRAYNOR, Justice:
At the heart of the State’s prosecution of Karieem Howell for numerous drug
and weapons offenses stood the testimony of Brian Caldwell, a witness who had
agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in return for a favorable plea agreement. It
is permissible, of course, for the trier of fact in a criminal case to consider a witness’s
agreement to testify for the prosecution in exchange for favorable treatment in the
witness’s separate case when assessing the witness’s credibility. Yet during
Howell’s trial, the trial judge instructed Howell’s jurors, at the beginning of
Caldwell’s damning testimony, that they could not consider Caldwell’s agreement
with the prosecution in weighing his credibility.
That the court’s instruction was legally erroneous the State concedes. But,
because Howell’s lawyer did not object to the instruction, we may only review the
mistake for plain error—that is, error that so affected Howell’s substantial rights that
his failure to object is excused. The State contends that the strength of the evidence
independent of Caldwell’s testimony and the correct instructions regarding witness
credibility provided to the jury at the close of evidence suffice to erase any prejudice
that Howell might have suffered because of the erroneous instruction.
Our review of the trial record persuades us otherwise. Caldwell’s testimony
was pivotal evidence upon which the jury’s determination of key elements of the
crimes charged likely turned. Those issues include the quantity of marijuana Howell
2
possessed, his delivery of the marijuana to others, and his knowing possession of an
illegal firearm. Without Caldwell’s testimony, the prosecution’s case was
susceptible to doubt; with it—if the jury found it credible—the likelihood of
conviction increased dramatically. The trial court’s instruction, however, unduly
restricted the jury’s assessment of Caldwell’s credibility and undermined the fairness
of Howell’s trial. Therefore, we reverse his convictions and remand to the Superior
Court for a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND
Howell and his co-defendants—his brother Malique, mother Sharon, and
cousin Harrison Dorsey—were indicted on multiple charges of drug dealing and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF), single counts
of conspiracy and possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number, and two
misdemeanor drug charges. The indictment was the product of a joint investigation
by the Delaware State Police and the New Castle County Police Department, which
culminated on February 16, 2018 in the execution of search warrants at two New
Castle County residences: one at 12 Bradbury Drive in New Castle—Sharon’s
home—and the other at 23 Aldershot Drive in Newark, where Howell and Malique
lived.
3
A. The Bradbury Search
Detective Patrick McAndrew of the Delaware State Police, the investigation’s
chief officer, executed the search warrant at 12 Bradbury. He first went to the “back
bedroom”1 where he found an illegal sawed-off shotgun next to the bed and a
handgun on the nightstand. He also found and seized $2,406 in cash from a bureau
in the bedroom.
Detective McAndrew then went to the basement where he noticed “an area
that appeared to be designated as a bedroom.”2 On one of the bedroom’s walls hung
“curved letters . . . that said Reem,”3 which the detective understood to stand for
Karieem. About ten feet from the bedroom in an unfinished area sat a picnic table
that, to Detective McAndrew, “appeared to be a drug packaging and resale
location. . . .”4 On the table were a vacuum-sealer machine, multiple freezer bags,
many of which appeared to have marijuana residue either on or in them. Although
McAndrew described the residue—he referred to it as “shake”—as a “large quantity
of green marijuana pieces,”5 the amount of marijuana recovered in this search was
immeasurably small. Though virtually empty when he seized them, the freezer bags
(according to McAndrew, there were “upwards of 100” of them6) were capable of
1
State v. Howell, No. 1802010652(N), Trial Tr. at 54, Mar. 13, 2019.
2
Id. at 59.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 60.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 61.
4
holding “about a pound of marijuana.”7 McAndrew also found a large chest that
contained ammunition, an assault rifle magazine, a handgun holster, and “a large
quantity of small particles of marijuana.”8
B. The Aldershot Search
Detective Michael Macauley, also of the Delaware State Police, executed the
search warrant along with other officers at 23 Aldershot, a split-level house
approximately 50 yards from an elementary school, which Howell rented and where
he and Malique were then living. The Superior Court summarized the searching
officers’ haul at 23 Aldershot:
In the basement of that residence, police found 28 grams of marijuana
in a clear plastic bag, a cigar blunt, and $1,300 in cash, along with a 9
millimeter handgun. The handgun had an extended magazine and an
obliterated serial number. The part of the gun where the serial number
was removed visibly was discolored and “clearly . . . altered.” In the
basement bedroom, police found a digital scale, a grinder with
marijuana residue, $2,300 in cash, 57 grams of marijuana, and a box of
ammunition containing various brands of 9 millimeter ammunition.
Police found Malique’s passport in a drawer in that basement bedroom.
The basement bedroom closet also contained several vacuum sealer
bags that were empty but appeared to have been used previously.
In the upstairs bedroom of 23 Aldershot, police found a passport and
vehicle title belonging to Howell. In a hallway closet adjacent to that
bedroom, police located $24,000 in cash and a blue backpack
containing Howell’s driver’s license, social security card, and medical
cards, along with a box containing 9 millimeter, .40 caliber, .45 caliber,
and .223 caliber ammunition. A money counter also was found in that
closet. Outside 23 Aldershot, behind a shed in the backyard, the police
7
Id. at 64.
8
Id. at 60.
5
found four firearms, including two shotguns, a .223 caliber rifle, and a
.22 caliber rifle.9
C. Howell’s Arrest
Later that day, Detective McAndrew applied for, and the Justice of the Peace
granted, a warrant for Howell’s arrest. The affidavit of probable cause attached to
the warrant application focused exclusively on what was found at 23 Aldershot; it
did not mention the search at 12 Bradbury. Accordingly, the complaint10
accompanying the warrant consisted of seven charges, all alleged to have been
committed at 23 Aldershot. The charges ranged from drug dealing—specifically,
possession with intent to deliver 132 grams of marijuana—to possession of a firearm
with an obliterated serial number. Five days later, Howell turned himself in and was
arrested on this warrant.
D. Caldwell’s Arrest
Less than a week after the simultaneous searches of 12 Bradbury and 23
Aldershot and the day after Howell’s arrest, the police raided the home of Brian
Caldwell, seizing 340 grams (or 12 ounces) of marijuana, $11,400 in cash, and used
plastic vacuum-sealer bags with markings similar to those on the bags found at 12
9
Howell, 2020 WL 1492787, at *2 (footnotes omitted).
10
According to Justice of the Peace Court Criminal Rule 4, “[t]he complaint is a written statement
of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. . . .” By statute, “the complaint shall be
attached to the [arrest] warrant.” 11 Del. C. § 5906(d).
6
Bradbury. The police arrested Caldwell, a development that did not bode well for
Howell.
When the police interviewed Caldwell on the night of his arrest, he admitted
that he purchased marijuana—a pound to two pounds at a time—for resale. But
Caldwell did not say how frequently he purchased marijuana. And, although he told
the interviewing officer the nicknames of his supplier, the record does not disclose
that nickname.
Four months later, things changed. According to Howell’s counsel, “[i]n
June, Mr. Caldwell, with counsel, comes forward and wants to be a cooperating
witness, and he provides a second video statement, which is parallel[] in many
respects to that which was given in February, but is contradictory in other respects
that are material to his credibility.”11
As far as we can tell, neither Caldwell’s February 22 statement nor his June
statement are part of the record in this case.12 But it would appear that, at the very
least, when Caldwell spoke with the police officers in June, having expressed his
desire to cooperate, he fingered Howell as his supplier and tied him to the drug
dealing operation, evidence of which the police found during their search of the two
residences. We derive that conclusion from the fact that, when Howell was arrested
11
App. to Opening Br. at A21.
12
Three brief, marginally relevant snippets from the February statement were played for the jury
and introduced as Court Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.
7
in February, he was only charged with offenses tied to 23 Aldershot. But when the
State sought, and the grand jury returned, Howell’s indictment in July of 2018, it
included weapons charges related to the weapons seized at the Bradbury property.
And a month later, Howell was reindicted, this time under an indictment that
included drug dealing charges related to activity at both 12 Bradbury and 23
Aldershot. As will be seen, Caldwell’s trial testimony was instrumental in linking
Howell to the drug dealing enterprise, including the activity at 12 Bradbury.
E. Scheduling Issues
In early January 2019, Howell’s three co-defendants entered into plea
agreements, acknowledging varying levels of culpability in the drug dealing
operation that gave rise to Howell’s indictment. Howell’s mother, Sharon, pleaded
guilty to three felonies—drug dealing, conspiracy in the second degree, and
possession of a destructive weapon. His brother, Malique, pleaded guilty to two
felonies—possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and drug
dealing. And Harrison Dorsey entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor-level
conspiracy.
By contrast, Howell was determined to go to trial, which was scheduled to
begin on January 23, 2019. By that time, Howell’s indictment had been refined to
include drug dealing and weapons charges linked to both 12 Bradbury and 23
Aldershot. Specifically, Howell faced three drug dealing counts, seven PFDCF
8
counts, three counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, two counts of
possession of drug paraphernalia, single counts of conspiracy in the second degree,
possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, non-compliance with bond
conditions, possession of a destructive weapon, possession of marijuana.
In anticipation of trial, on January 11, 2019, the State produced a transcript of
Brian Caldwell’s December 2018 interview, subject, however, to a protective order
that prohibited Howell’s counsel from disclosing Caldwell’s identity to anyone,
including Howell, without leave of court. This disclosure prompted Howell to
request a continuance of the January 23 trial so that his counsel could “investigate
sources and resources that could provide impeachment information”13 on the newly
disclosed witness. The Superior Court granted the request and rescheduled Howell’s
trial for March 12, 2019.
It also came to light in early February that the police had seized Caldwell’s
phone from which they had extracted data, presumably relevant to Howell’s case.
According to Howell’s counsel, however, the prosecutors assigned to Howell’s case
told him that “the police were unsuccessful in being able to open, or to complete, the
cell phone dump.”14
13
App. to Answering Br. at B17.
14
App. to Opening Br. at A22.
9
Then “sometime within . . . the three weeks”15 preceding Howell’s March 12
trial date, Howell’s counsel noticed in a police report that the police had in fact
“completed” the download of Caldwell’s cell phone—a fact that was apparently
unknown by the prosecutors in Howell’s case.16 From the sketchy record, it seems
that it was not that the police had not downloaded the contents of Caldwell’s phone
but that they had done so to a disk that was difficult to open. In any event, after
much discussion about how Howell’s counsel might gain access to the information
on Caldwell’s phone, one of the prosecutors produced a flash drive containing
Caldwell’s cell phone data at 5:30 p.m. on March 11, the day before Howell’s trial
was scheduled to begin.
According to Howell’s counsel, through all of this the prosecutors were
“extraordinarily agreeable, going far beyond what [was] required [] in providing
discovery and cooperation . . . .”17 Even so, on the morning of March 12, Howell’s
counsel advised the court that he needed more time to review the recently provided
flash drive, presenting a scheduling request in the alternative: either select the jury
that day but defer swearing the jurors and the start of trial until the next day, or
continue the trial. The trial judge selected the first of these options, and the jury was
selected on the morning of March 12. And based upon its understanding that the
15
Id. at A22.
16
Id.
17
Id. at A18.
10
trial would begin the following day, the State agreed to lift the protective order that
until then had prohibited counsel from disclosing Caldwell’s identity to Howell.
On the morning of March 13 and before the jury was sworn, Howell’s counsel
asked the court to continue the trial for two weeks. The crux of counsel’s request
was that, having now had the previous afternoon and evening to review the cell
phone data, counsel believed that he needed more time to put this newly discovered
information to effective use when it came time to cross-examine Caldwell. The State
objected, noting that it had provided the disk with Caldwell’s cell phone contents on
it—albeit a disk that Howell’s counsel was unable to open—two months earlier, and
counsel neglected to complain about the information’s inaccessibility until the week
before trial.18 The State also complained that it would be prejudiced by a
continuance because it had agreed to lift the order protecting Caldwell’s identity in
reliance upon the court’s assurance that the trial would only be delayed by one day.
The trial court agreed with the State and denied Howell’s request. According
to the court, not only had Howell failed to show substantial prejudice, but it had
acceded to Howell’s request for a one-day delay, which provided an adequate
opportunity for Howell’s counsel to review the materials in question. The trial judge
18
It is worth noting here that the record seems to indicate that the data was not truly inaccessible
but that certain software was required to gain access to it. At oral argument in this Court, Howell’s
counsel acknowledged that he made no independent effort to extract the data on the disk the State
produced to him. Oral Arg. 8:06–8:35, (Sept. 29, 2021).
11
also allowed that, should Caldwell be called by the prosecution that day, the trial
would be halted so that Howell’s counsel would have another evening to continue
his review of the materials. The trial judge also pointed out that the State had agreed
to lift the protective order on the premise that the trial would not be subject to further
continuances. Hence, the court found that another continuance would be prejudicial
to the State.
F. Howell’s Pretrial Motions
Immediately following jury selection, the trial court addressed three motions
and three requested jury instructions Howell had filed that morning. Only one of the
motions and one of the requested instructions are implicated in this appeal.
1. Howell’s D.R.E. 404(b) Motion
In an application fashioned “Motion for D.R.E. 404(b) Admissibility
Hearing,” Howell expressed concern about a recorded interview of an unidentified
confidential informant by the prosecutor and the chief investigating officer. Because
the recording was, according to Howell, “replete with multiple references [to] other
bad acts and/or criminal misconduct that represent[] uncharged offenses vis-á vis the
issues to be presented at trial,”19 Howell asked the court “to conduct a voir dire
19
State v. Karieem Howell, ID. 1802010652(N), Docket Item (“D.I.”) 47 at 1.
12
hearing to determine the admissibility of offered testimony sought to be introduced
via the State’s confidential informant. . . .”20
When the Superior Court took up the motion after jury selection but before
any witnesses were called, Howell’s counsel conceded that the court’s consideration
of the motion was premature and that the court would benefit from hearing from the
witnesses other than the informant before conducting the Rule 404(b) analysis. The
court agreed and deferred its ruling on the motion.
2. Howell’s Proposed “Cooperating Witness” Instruction
Among other instructions that Howell asked the court to give the jury in
relation to Caldwell’s anticipated testimony, one focused on the jury’s consideration
of Caldwell’s credibility in light of the terms of his cooperation. The instruction
read, in full, as follows
INSTRUCTION ON COOPERATING WITNESS TESTIMONY
Ladies and Gentlemen, you are about to hear testimony of a
witness who has entered into an agreement with the State to provide
testimony, in this trial, and which cooperation may be considered by
the State in making a final sentence recommendation to the sentencing
judge whenever this witness is sentenced.
The fact that this agreement has been made must not be
considered by you as implying that the credibility of this witness is
enhanced by it.
20
Id.
13
You will determine the credibility of this witness, as you do all
witnesses in this matter, subject to the instructions that I will give you
at the conclusion of the trial.21
The State did not oppose Howell’s request, and the court said that, subject to some
“wordsmith[ing],”22 it would give the instruction.
G. Howell’s Trial
To assess the impact of the trial court’s rulings on the fairness of Howell’s
trial, we cannot view those rulings in isolation. Instead, we must review them in the
context of the entire record. And because the rulings with which we are most
concerned involve the testimony of Brian Caldwell, we pay special attention to the
role that testimony played in the prosecution’s case.
Not counting the day when the jury was selected, Howell’s trial in the Superior
Court lasted four days. In his opening statement, Howell’s counsel conceded that
the evidence seized at 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot indicated that both properties
were used by a drug-dealing operation. Speaking of 12 Bradbury, Howell’s counsel
admitted that “[a]ll that stuff [that] was found in the basement [e.g., digital scale,
ammunition, vacuum sealed bags; marijuana remnants]. No doubt about it, it relates
to drug distribution.”23 And after running through the items found at 23 Aldershot
(cash, marijuana, vacuum bags, weapons), Howell’s counsel conceded that they
21
App. to Answering Br. at B21.
22
Trial Tr. at 56, Mar. 12, 2019.
23
Id. at 36.
14
pointed to drug dealing.24 The trial’s focus, then, was not on whether a drug dealing
operation was being conducted at 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot but, instead, on
when that happened, and whether Karieem Howell participated in it.
On the first day of trial, the State called the police officers responsible for the
searches at 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot and at Brian Caldwell’s residence.
Detective McAndrew first described the various items seized at 12 Bradbury and, as
noted before, opined that what he saw in the basement “appeared to be a drug
packaging and resale location. . . .”25 But he also offered testimony linking Howell
to 12 Bradbury beyond the letters spelling Howell’s nickname—R-E-E-M—posted
on the basement wall. Detective McAndrew also explained how he had recovered
and photographed an electric bill for 12 Bradbury Road in Karieem Howell’s name.
Moreover, during pre-search surveillance of 12 Bradbury, the police noted that
Howell had visited this residence “at least twice.”26
Detective McAndrew also served as the testimonial conduit for certain text
messages the police recovered after seizing Malique’s cellphone during the search
of 23 Aldershot. The messages take the form of text “conversations” between
Howell and his brother Malique. Although the language Howell and Malique used
was, for the most part, cryptic, one exchange on January 31—within the indictment
24
Id. at 40 (“Drug dealing. Okay. Let’s concede that.”).
25
Id. at 60.
26
Id. at 104.
15
date-range of January 17 to February 16—is relevant to the parties’ respective
theories of the case:
Karieem Howell: 1550 a jawn Ard.
Jeremy Lin bag should have 26 jeans in it.
Nasty and duly should have 37.27
Malique Howell: Crown roil
Karieem Howell: Yea just take the folded stacks outta there.
Call me after it’s all counted and Jeremy Lin is in
one bag and nasty is in the other and lmk what’s
left.28
Based on his experience, Detective McAndrew testified—without
objection—that “[i]n this context [jawn is] referring to drugs[] [though] sometimes
it refers to firearms.”29 The detective also inferred that “[‘]jeans[’] was an auto-
correct.” He observed further that “$1,550 is consistent with a pound of marijuana.”
Thus, crediting Detective McAndrew’s interpretation, one might conclude that this
exchange describes an anticipated sale of 26 pounds for $37,000, or slightly more
than $1,400 pound.
27
It was later revealed that “Nasty” and “Duly,” whose name is Abdula, were two of Howell’s
customers.
28
State’s Ex. 26.
29
Trial Tr. at 85, Mar. 13, 2019. “Jawn” is a catchall that has been described as “the Philadelphia
all-purpose noun.” Merriam Webster, Some Jawn About Jawn, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/words-at-play/jawn-meaning-origin (Last Accessed: Dec. 10, 2021). Although not
included in traditional dictionaries, “jawn” has been defined as “an all encompassing substitute for
any person, place, or thing” and as “Philadelphia slang for anything . . . literally anything.”
Dictionary.com, What Does Jawn Mean, https://www.dictionary.com/e/slang/jawn/ (Last
Accessed: Dec. 10, 2021).
16
Next Detective Michael Macauley testified about the execution of the search
warrant at 23 Aldershot, a split-level home approximately 50 yards from an
elementary school where, at the time, Howell and Malique were living. Detective
Macauley described the items seized inside the residence as well as behind the shed
in the backyard. All told, the police seized approximately 110 grams (a little under
four ounces)30 of marijuana, over $26,000 in United States currency, numerous types
of ammunition, four long guns, and a handgun with an obliterated serial number.
Howell was not present when 23 Aldershot was searched, but Malique and Harrison
Dorsey were, and both were arrested.
The first day of trial testimony was rounded out by the testimony of Detective
Bradley Landis, who told the jury about his receipt of information from a
confidential source in early 2018 that Brian Caldwell was selling large amounts of
marijuana from his residence in Bear, Delaware. That tip led to a search of that
residence where, as mentioned, the police recovered three-quarters of a pound of
marijuana, $11,400 in cash, used plastic vacuum-sealer bags with markings similar
to those on the bags found at 12 Bradbury, and Caldwell’s cell phone. That seizure
led to Caldwell’s arrest and confession and eventually to his agreement to cooperate
with the State and testify against Howell. Caldwell’s testimony would come the
following day, but not until the jury first heard from Howell’s brother, Malique.
30
State’s Ex. 32.
17
Malique took the stand to begin the second day of trial testimony. During
direct examination, the prosecutor asked Malique to read various text messages—an
exercise of only marginal utility given the cryptic nature of the messages and
Malique’s general unhelpfulness in translating them. For example, when asked what
the elusive “jawn” meant in the context of the exchange quoted above—the one
about which Detective McAndrew said that “jawn” meant “drugs” and that “jeans”
was an auto-correct—Malique responded that he did not know. By contrast,
however, what the word “jeans” meant in the same exchange, was clear to Malique:
“things that people wear,”31 that is, clothing made of denim. And so Malique then
translated the ensuing references to “stacks,” not to stacks of money but stacks of
clothes. Thus, for Detective McAndrew, this brief text exchange described an
anticipated sale of marijuana at the price of $1,550 per pound, while for Malique it
had something to do with blue jeans.
The prosecution concluded its direct examination by playing two video-
recorded police interviews of Malique, both conducted on the day of his arrest,
February 16, 2018, following the search of 23 Aldershot. In the first interview,
Malique admitted to ownership of the Taurus handgun with the obliterated serial
number, knowledge of two of the long guns found near the shed, and regular
31
Trial Tr. at 24, Mar. 14, 2019.
18
consumption of marijuana. But he denied any wrongdoing beyond that. In the
second interview, Malique said nothing that would incriminate his brother.
Up to this point in the trial, the prosecution had introduced ample evidence on
the issue Howell had conceded in his opening statement—that someone was dealing
drugs from 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot. But there was scant evidence, save the
scarcely intelligible text communications, of the identity of the drug enterprise’s
participants and the timing of the enterprise’s activities. Enter Brian Caldwell.
The prosecution wasted no time on its way to the heart of the matter, as
evidenced by the following exchange within minutes of Caldwell’s taking of the
witness’s oath:
Q. Mr. Caldwell, do you understand why you are here today?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you arrested on or about February 22nd of 2018?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What were you charged with?
A. Possession of a firearm and selling marijuana.
Q. You were charged with drug dealing?
A. Yes.
Q. When you [were] arrested on February 22, 2018, did you
consider yourself to be a drug dealer?
A. Yes.
Q. What were you selling?
A. Marijuana.
19
Q. Where were you getting that marijuana from that you were
selling?
A. Karieem Howell.32
The prosecutors then turned to Caldwell’s cooperation agreement with the
State. Recall here that, two days before, the court had agreed to give a
“wordsmithed” version of Howell’s requested instruction, which advised the jury
that Caldwell’s cooperation did not “imply[]” that his credibility was “enhanced.”33
But after the cooperation agreement was marked as an exhibit, the trial judge turned
to the jury and instructed them:
Ladies and gentlemen, you are about to hear testimony of a witness who
has entered into an agreement with the State to provide testimony in
this trial. The agreement provides something to the effect that the State
will consider the witness’ cooperation when the State makes a final
sentencing recommendation to the judge who will ultimately sentence
this witness. You may not consider this agreement in weighing the
witness’ credibility.34
Apparently, and regrettably,35 no one noticed the substantive change in the requested
instruction, and, hence, no one objected.
When Caldwell’s testimony resumed, he explained that a couple months
earlier—around the time Malique Howell, Sharon Howell, and Harrison Dorsey
resolved their cases by way of plea agreements—he too had entered into a plea
32
App. to Answering Br. at B100.
33
See infra notes 18 and 19.
34
App. to Answering Br. at B101 (emphasis added).
35
We are confident that, had a timely objection been made, the trial judge would have clarified
this instruction.
20
agreement with the State. Under his agreement, Caldwell had pleaded guilty to Tier
I possession of marijuana, a Class F felony, and agreed to forfeiture of $11,400 and
the firearm seized from his house. Following this explanation, Caldwell made an
in-court identification of Howell.
These formalities out of the way, the prosecutor’s questioning of Caldwell
returned to the subject of his dealings with Howell. As of the date of his arrest in
February of 2018, Caldwell had been a purveyor of marijuana for approximately two
years. During that time, Caldwell would purchase his marijuana—typically “[a]
couple pounds”36—from Howell “[o]nce every week or two.”37 These transactions
occurred at both the Bradbury and Aldershot addresses, but primarily at 12
Bradbury. Occasionally, Howell’s mother would be involved, but Caldwell “usually
got the weed from [Howell].”38
According to Caldwell, he had obtained the marijuana for which he was
arrested on February 22, 2018, from Howell the night before the police raided the
Bradbury and Aldershot houses. On that evening, Howell, who had business
elsewhere, told Caldwell to pick up the marijuana on his own at the Bradbury
residence. Caldwell then texted Sharon, who was at the residence, to alert her of his
anticipated arrival time. During their investigation, the police retrieved this text
36
App. to Answering Br. at B109.
37
Id. at B126.
38
Id. at B109.
21
message exchange between Caldwell and Sharon Howell, which Caldwell read in
the presence of the jury. Upon his arrival, Caldwell went to the basement and into a
closet and helped himself to the agreed upon amount of marijuana. Though this
“self-service” might seem unusual, it was not without precedent—Caldwell had
done the same once before.
The prosecution then turned its attention, over Howell’s objection under
D.R.E. 404(b), to the longevity of Caldwell’s business relationship with Howell, as
evidenced by text exchanges between them. Two text messages, read by Caldwell
for the jury’s benefit, are illustrative of the others. On October 22, 2016, Howell
texted Caldwell: “Well what’s up I pay him for the plug go drive and do it and sell
him jawns 2900 all day not threw the mail and I’ll do 3000 for you what’s up.” 39
And on November 26: “Ard give me the 3000 next Tim if the cash isn’t there for 3
it’s not 3100 Idc if I gotta come back, Ard.”40 Caldwell explained that these
messages were discussing how much he was paying for a pound of marijuana.
The prosecution also deployed Caldwell to plug another critical hole in its
case—the weight of the marijuana. Keep in mind that the police recovered 110
grams or slightly less than four ounces of marijuana at 23 Aldershot and a negligible
amount at 12 Bradbury. But to make its case on the charge of drug dealing under
39
Id. at B120; State’s Ex. 51 at 12.
40
Id. at B120, State’s Ex. 51 at 6. Caldwell translated “Ard” to mean “alrighty.” B119.
22
Count X41 of the indictment, the State had to prove that Howell possessed with the
intent to deliver 4,000 grams or 8.8 pounds or more of marijuana. Once again,
Caldwell filled the gap.
On this topic, Caldwell testified that Howell had confided in him that two of
his other customers—individuals named “Nasty” and Abdula—would buy
“[a]nywhere from 15, 20, 25 pounds”42 of marijuana from Howell. The record is not
clear as to when these transactions took place. But Caldwell also testified that he
had seen as much as 140 pounds at Howell’s residence, and this time the testimony
was tethered to early February 2018, squarely within the indictment’s date range.43
Caldwell was also an essential witness on the obliterated-serial number
charge. That morning, the jury had watched and listened to the two recorded
interviews of Malique Howell. And during the first of those interviews, Malique
admitted that the gun with the obliterated serial number seized at 23 Aldershot
belonged to him. That, of course, did not preclude a finding that Howell also
41
Throughout this opinion, the indictment’s counts are numbered in accordance with the re-
indictment filed on January 7, 2019, which was the operative indictment as the trial began.
Because the trial court granted Howell’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts I-IV and
the State entered nolle prosequis as to certain other counts, the court renumbered the counts in its
jury instructions following the reception of evidence and counsel’s closing arguments.
42
App. to Answering Br. at B129.
43
To be sure, there are ambiguities surrounding when Caldwell claimed to have seen the 140
pounds. On the one hand, a question posed by Howell’s counsel and Caldwell’s responses seem
to peg the date to the night before Howell’s house was raided by the police. See App. to Answering
Br. at B166–67. On the other hand, Caldwell testified that he saw the 140 pounds at a time when
Howell was home, which is inconsistent with his earlier testimony that he had to retrieve the
marijuana himself that night because Howell was not home. See supra pp. 21–22.
23
possessed the gun; in fact, the indictment charged that both Howell and Malique
possessed it. Caldwell lent credence to this allegation when he testified that Howell
had asked him—it is not clear when—if he was interested in buying a “dirty
weapon.”44 Caldwell understood a “dirty weapon” to be a gun without a serial
number.45
On cross-examination, Caldwell acknowledged that, in June 2018 when he
agreed to cooperate with the police, he was “pissed off”46 at Howell. This anger was
a product of Caldwell’s belief that Howell somehow set him up to be arrested back
in February. In consequence, Caldwell provided another statement to the police
implicating Howell. Eventually, Caldwell’s cooperation was memorialized in a
written cooperation agreement.
Under the agreement, Caldwell agreed to “cooperate fully with [the Delaware
Department of Justice], specifically with regard to the matter of State of Delaware
v. Karieem Howell (Case ID #1902010652), Malique Howell (Case ID #
1802010526), and Sharon Howell (Case ID #1802010507).”47 The scope of
Caldwell’s agreement to cooperate included confirmation that his June 2018
statement to the police was accurate and a commitment to testify at Howell’s trial.
44
App. to Answering Br. at B129.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 146.
47
See D.I. 47 (stipulation) and D.I. 48 (cooperation agreement).
24
The agreement was explicitly linked to Caldwell’s plea agreement, under which a
weapons charge carrying a minimum-mandatory prison sentence was dropped and
the severity of Caldwell’s drug charge was reduced. In addition to those benefits,
the State agreed to recommend a prison sentence, suspended though for probation.
But should Caldwell withdraw from or violate any provision of the agreement, the
State would be released from its obligations under the cooperation and plea
agreement, including the sentencing recommendation. To ensure Caldwell’s
compliance, his sentencing was deferred until after Howell’s trial.
On the third and final day of trial testimony, Detective McAndrew was
recalled to the stand but his testimony was uneventful, at least as it relates to the
issues raised on appeal.
The State’s last witness in its case-in-chief was Detective Trevor Riccobon of
the New Castle County Police Department. Under a stipulation of the parties, the
court admitted Detective Riccobon’s testimony as expert testimony.48 The
prosecutor asked the detective to comment on various items of evidence and whether
that evidence was consistent with possession of marijuana for personal consumption
or, instead, was indicative of a drug-dealing operation. Among the evidence
48
The precise scope of Detective Riccobon’s expertise was never delineated. But when the
prosecutor, near the conclusion of his direct examination, asked the court to accept the detective’s
testimony as expert testimony, Howell’s counsel “agree[d] that he’s expert in . . . the drug areas
he’s spoken about.” Trial Tr. at 88, Mar. 15, 2019.
25
Detective Riccobon considered were: the absence of personal-use paraphernalia,
such as rolling papers, pipes and bongs; the text messages, the subject matter of
which he concluded were transactions involving multiple pounds of marijuana; the
number and size of vacuum seal bags found at 12 Bradbury; and the large amount of
cash found during the two searches. From all this, Detective Riccobon opined that
the police had uncovered something “beyond [the] personal use of marijuana. This
[was] drug dealing.”49
After the prosecution rested, Howell moved for judgment of acquittal on
Counts I through IV of the indictment (the PFDCF counts related to guns found near
the shed at 23 Aldershot) and Count IX (the obliterated-serial-number charge). The
court granted the motion as to Counts I through IV, noting that possession for
purposes of a PFDCF charge includes accessibility and “that the guns that were
behind the shed were [not] sufficiently close to either the house or the drugs to satisfy
the accessibility requirement.” But, the court observed, the possession element
under the obliterated-serial number count was much broader than under the PFDCF
statute and includes constructive possession and joint possession with another
person. There was evidence that Howell and his brother Malique were engaged in
drug dealing at 23 Aldershot and that the gun in question was found in the same
general area as drug dealing paraphernalia. On top of that, there was evidence that
49
Id. at 92.
26
Howell offered to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Hence,
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude that Howell had joint constructive possession with his brother of the
firearm with the obliterated serial number. Accordingly, the court denied the motion
as to Count 9.
At the outset of the defendant’s case, Howell recalled and briefly questioned
Detectives Landis and McAndrew. Detective Landis’s testimony was uneventful.
Detective McAndrew confirmed that Malique Howell’s fingerprints—and not
Howell’s—were on the digital scale and box found at 23 Aldershot.
The defense then called Loretta McCleary, Sharon’s sister and thus Howell’s
aunt. Ms. McCleary resided at 12 Bradbury since March of 2015. At that time,
Howell and Malique lived there too, Howell occupying the bedroom in the basement
and Malique the room next to Sharon’s upstairs. McLeary’s testimony concerning
who occupied the bedroom in the basement was confusing. She first testified that
she was “staying”50 in the basement from the summer of 2017 onward. She later
testified that she moved into the basement in January of 2018. She did state,
however, that Howell and his brother moved out of 12 Bradbury in November 2017.
Immediately before the move, according to McCleary, Malique occupied the
basement bedroom. Finally, McCleary acknowledged that she was living in the
50
Id. at 148.
27
basement bedroom in February 2018 when the police executed the search warrant at
12 Bradbury, but disclaimed all knowledge of the vacuum seal bags and digital scale,
which were ten feet from her bedroom.
Having been advised of his right not to testify, Howell nevertheless took the
stand in his own defense. Although Howell’s direct examination was lengthy—
according to the time stamps on the trial transcript it was approximately two hours
and forty minutes long—the preponderance of it did not respond directly to the
evidence admitted during the State’s case-in-chief. For instance, the first hour and
ten minutes consisted of Howell’s description of his pit bull-breeding business and
related activities. From there, he proceeded to describe his role as an entertainment
and night-club promoter with a sideline interest in plugging men’s clothing. To be
sure, this background provided the foundation for Howell’s explanation of portions
of the State’s evidence (e.g., the presence of large amounts of U.S. currency and the
meaning of the cryptic text messages), but it did little to rebut Brian Caldwell’s
testimony.
That said, for all its digressions, Howell’s testimony attempted to explain
away some of the evidence that the State claimed was incriminating. On the text-
message front, for example, he explained that his reference to “jeans” in the January
31 text message was to just that—blue jeans—which he was plugging for a friend
who was trying to start a clothing line. And a text message—“I need eight”—that
28
Detective Riccobon translated as a request for one-eighth of an ounce,51 according
to Howell, was actually referring to eight dog vaccination shots. Likewise, he said
that his veterinarian, who lived in a game-rich area of Pennsylvania, had the guns he
needed to hunt but not the ammunition. Presumably, the veterinarian’s request that
Howell bring him the required ammunition explained the presence of ammunition at
the two houses with which Howell was associated.
More to the point of the prosecution, however, Howell admitted that he was a
drug dealer in 2016 and 2017, selling marijuana by the pound. That ended though
in December of 2017—one month before Count X’s drug-dealing date range—when
he “got out of the game.”52 In that regard, Howell’s denial of drug dealing did not
address the January 17-February 16, 2018 date range and was limited to a single
date—February 16, 2018.53
Finally, Howell said that he did not know why his mother and brother, with
whom he claimed to be close, had pleaded guilty to drug dealing. Nor did he refute
Caldwell’s testimony that he had sold marijuana to Caldwell in February 2018 and
51
We note that Riccobon’s interpretation, found at page 64 of the March 15, 2019 trial transcript,
is puzzling in that this quantity is starkly out of line with the much larger quantities referred to in
the indictment and throughout Howell’s trial.
52
Trial Tr. at 238, Mar. 15, 2019.
53
Id.
Q. How about, your [sic] charged on February 16 with drug dealing—
A. No I was staying . . .
Q …2018?
A. No, I was staying to myself.
29
had told Caldwell that he sold marijuana to “Nasty” and “Duly” in large quantities—
15 to 25 pounds.
At the conclusion of Howell’s testimony, the defense rested.
The parties’ closing arguments ran along predictable lines. The prosecution
drew attention to Howell’s admission that he had been a drug dealer, the guilty pleas
of his family members, the evidence seized during the two residential searches, and
the cryptic text messages that, according to the State’s law-enforcement witnesses,
were indicative of illicit drug transactions. But what in our eyes is most relevant to
the resolution of Howell’s appeal is the extent to which the prosecution emphasized
that its most essential allegations were supported by Brian Caldwell’s testimony
By our count, in the approximately 40 pages of the transcription of the
prosecutor’s opening closing argument, Caldwell is mentioned by name 26 times on
12 of those pages. And these references were not in passing; they went directly to
the heart of the prosecution’s case, describing Caldwell’s recent purchase of
marijuana from Howell—with his mother’s assistance—from the residence at 12
Bradbury; Howell’s longstanding status as Caldwell’s marijuana supplier;
Caldwell’s first-hand knowledge of Howell’s storage and delivery of large amounts
of marijuana; and Howell’s offer to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial
number.
30
Not surprisingly, in his closing argument, Howell acknowledged the centrality
of Caldwell’s testimony to the prosecution. For instance, on whether Howell
possessed marijuana at 12 Bradbury with the intent to deliver it, Howell’s counsel
argued that “[the jury didn’t] have any evidence of that except Brian Caldwell. . . .”54
In like manner, when addressing the thinness of the proof of Howell’s possession of
4,000 grams of marijuana—an element of drug dealing under Count X—Howell’s
counsel “assumed they are relying upon none other than Brian Caldwell, the ever
trustworthy Brian Caldwell. . . .”55 And this refrain was repeated when Howell’s
counsel addressed the State’s proof of the obliterated-serial-number charge:
“[T]here is not an ounce of proof except Brian Caldwell says . . . once upon a time,
we don’t know when . . . . [T]hey’re going to say because Brian Caldwell said he
was offered one once and you can believe it happened if Brian Caldwell said so.”56
Following that, the prosecution doubled down on its reliance on Caldwell in
its rebuttal closing, devoting more than half of its rebuttal argument to Caldwell’s
testimony. In sum, if there was a witness who commanded the attention of counsel—
and presumably the jury—during closing arguments, it was not any of the
investigating officers, it was not Howell’s brother, and it was not Howell himself; it
was unquestionably Brian Caldwell.
54
Trial Tr. at 71, Mar. 18, 2019.
55
Id. at 72.
56
Id. at 77.
31
H. The Jury’s Verdict and the Court’s Sentence
Because the State entered nolle prosequis on the four possession-of-a-firearm-
by-a-person prohibited charges and, as mentioned, the court had entered judgment
of acquittal as to four of the PFDCF charges at the conclusion of the prosecution’s
case-in-chief, the jury retired to deliberate on six counts: two counts of drug dealing
(one for possessing with intent to deliver marijuana within a protected school zone
and the other for delivering or possession with intent to deliver 4,000 grams or more
of marijuana) and single counts of PFDCF, conspiracy in the second degree,
possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. The jury found Howell guilty of all but the PFDCF charge. After
considering and denying a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal over the
course of the next six months, the court sentenced Howell to 30 years of Level V
incarceration, suspended after five years for decreasing levels of supervision, and
Howell appealed.
I. Howell’s Claims on Appeal
Howell raises eight claims on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied his continuance request on the day after the jury
was selected abut before it had been sworn. Second, Howell claims that, because
the courtroom was configured in a way that partially obstructed his view of the jury,
32
“his constitutional rights to due process and/or right of presence during trial”57 were
violated. Howell’s third argument is that the trial court’s “cooperating witness”
instruction misstated the law and meets the plain-error standard. Fourth, Howell
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce
text messages containing evidence of prior uncharged misconduct in violation of
D.R.E. 404(b). Fifth, Howell argues that the trial court’s instruction relating to the
possession-of-a weapon-with-an-obliterated-serial-number charge was so flawed as
to constitute plain error. Howell’s sixth and seventh arguments challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence as to the obliterated-serial-number count and the weight
of marijuana necessary to support one of the drug dealing counts. Finally, and for
good measure, Howell raises a “cumulative error” claim.
II. ANALYSIS
Our analysis of Howell’s arguments, to the extent necessary, proceeds in the
order of their importance to our resolution of his appeal. Because we reverse and
remand for a new trial, consideration of Howell’s claim that the Superior Court’s
denial of his continuance request was reversible error is unnecessary. And given our
reversal and our rejection of all but one of Howell’s appellate claims, neither must
we consider his “cumulative error.” Yet because the resolution of the remaining
57
Opening Br. at 13.
33
argument will affect the scope and conduct of Howell’s new trial—should there be
one—we address them in turn.
A. The trial court’s “cooperating witness” instruction was plainly
erroneous
Howell contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, during
Brian Caldwell’s testimony, that it should not consider Caldwell’s cooperation
agreement with the State in weighing his credibility. He acknowledges that, because
he did not object to the instruction, this misstep is subject to review under our plain-
error standard. The State concedes that the instruction was erroneous, but argues
that, because the evidence against Howell independent of Caldwell’s testimony, was
strong and the court provided a correct—though general—witness-credibility
instruction before the jury deliberated, the error was not plain.
The parties are correct that an unpreserved claim that a jury instruction was
erroneous is subject to plain-error review. Not only must Howell show that the
instruction contained an incorrect statement of the law,58 he must also demonstrate,
that the error was “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the
fairness and integrity of the trial.”59
58
See White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 405 (Del. 2020) (quoting Miller v. State, 224 A. 2d 592, 596
(Del. 1966)).
59
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127,
146 (Del. 1982)).
34
The State rightly concedes that Howell has cleared the first hurdle of this test.
The court’s “cooperating witness” instruction was not a correct statement concerning
the potential relevance of the witness’s cooperation to the jury’s assessment of
Caldwell’s credibility.
In Wright v. State,60 this Court recognized that a jury may consider a witness’s
cooperation with law enforcement and “his repeated willingness to testify in order
to advance his own legal interests” when weighing the credibility of the witness’s
testimony.61 What is more, we characterized a witness’s prior agreement to
cooperate with the prosecution as “useful impeachment evidence for [the defendant]
at his trial.”62 Although Wright was decided in the context of a claim that the
prosecution had violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland,63 the
notion that a witness’s cooperation is relevant to the jury’s credibility assessment is
equally applicable here. And Wright is but one in a long line of cases in which we
have recognized that deals made between the prosecution and a witness are
relevant—and can be damaging—to the witness’s credibility.64
60
Wright v. State, 91 A. 3d 972, 989 (Del. 2014).
61
Id.62
Id.63
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady violation occurs when the state suppresses
evidence that is favorable—that is, exculpatory or impeaching—to the accused, causing prejudice
to the defendant.
64
See, e.g., VanArsdall v. State, 542 A.2d 3, 11–12 (Del. 1987) (denial of cross-examination about
prosecutor’s offer of a “deal” to witness in order to secure witness’s cooperation and testimony
was reversible error because, without it, “there was a greater probability that the jury believed [the
35
This is so much the case that federal courts are known to instruct juries to
apply a healthy dose of skepticism to the testimony of cooperating witnesses. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, has published a model criminal
instruction that touches upon this issue:
4.20 Credibility of Witnesses – Testimony of Informer
You have heard evidence that (name of witness) has an arrangement
with the government under which (he) (she) (gets paid) (receives)
(describe benefit) for providing information to the government.
(Name of witness)’s testimony was received in evidence and may be
considered by you. The government is permitted to present the
testimony of someone who (gets paid) (receives) (describe benefit) for
providing information to the government, but you should consider
the testimony of (names of witness) with great care and caution. In
evaluating (name of witness)’s testimony, you should consider this
factor along with the others I have called to your attention. You
may give the testimony such weight as you think it deserves. It is
for you to determine whether or not (name of witness)’s information
witness].” Additionally, revelation to jury that prosecutor made deal with witness “also may have
affected the jury’s view of the strength of the prosecution’s case as a whole.”); see also Johnson
v. State, 129 A.3d 882, 2015 WL 852889, at *1 (Del. Dec. 10, 2015) (TABLE) (noting that trial
counsel whose performance was challenged as ineffective, “adequately impeached [the witness]
on the plea agreement, which served to undermine [the witness’s] credibility. . . .); Downes v. State
676 A.2d 902, 1996 WL 145836, at *3 (Del. Mar. 13, 1996) (TABLE) (contrary to defendant’s
argument that submission of plea agreement and joint indictment to jury impermissibly bolstered
witness’s credibility, “[i]f anything, the presentation of these documents served to impeach [the
witness’s credibility in the eyes of the jury, not bolster it.”) Allen v. State, 878 A.2d 447, 451 (Del.
2005) (admission of co-defendant’s plea agreement into evidence is for the limited purpose of
allowing the jury to accurately assess co-defendant’s credibility as witness); and see Phillips v.
State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1165 (Del. 2017) (jury “could and should take into consideration” witness’s
plea agreement that contained certain benefits when determining the credibility of witness’s
testimony).
36
or testimony may have been influenced by (his) (her) arrangement
with the government.65
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court, in Hoffa v. United States,66 relied
in part on a similar instruction when it rejected the defendant’s claim that the
government’s use of the testimony of an informer, whose charges were dropped and
whose wife received four monthly installment payments of $300, violated the
defendant’s due process rights. The Supreme Court noted the following jury
instruction with approval:
You should carefully scrutinize the testimony given and the
circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter
in evidence which tends to indicate whether the witness is worthy of
belief. Consider each witness’ intelligence, his motives, state of mind,
his demeanor and manner while on the witness stand. Consider also
any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case . . . . All
evidence of a witness whose self-interest is shown from either benefits
received, detriments suffered, threats or promises made, or any attitude
of the witness which might tend to prompt testimony either favorable
or unfavorable to the accused should be considered with caution and
weighed with care.67
In this case, Howell did not request such a defense-friendly instruction;
instead, he merely asked the court to instruct the jury that Caldwell’s cooperation
does not necessarily enhance his credibility. But, as given, the court’s instruction
65
Third Cir. Comm. on Model Crim. Jury Instructions, Final Instructions: Consideration of
Particular Kinds of Evidence, Third Circuit Court of Appeals § 4.20 (2021),
https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/model-criminal-jury-table-contents-and-instructions. (Bold and
italics in original).
66
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
67
Id. at 312 n.14. By quoting this instruction and the Third Circuit’s model instruction, we do not
comment on their propriety.
37
effectively removed Caldwell’s status as a cooperating witness who had a selfish
reason for testifying in a manner favorable to the prosecution from the jury’s
assessment of his credibility altogether. And that was error.
We turn next to whether this error undermined the integrity and fairness of
Howell’s trial. The State says that it did not because, among other things, Howell
was “given broad latitude to probe Caldwell’s credibility”68 by cross-examining him
about his prior truthfulness, his favorable plea, and his agreement with the State.
The State suggests, moreover, that Howell was permitted to argue to the jury in
closing that Caldwell’s sentencing fate—still pending when he testified—hinged on
whether his testimony was satisfactory to the prosecution. All this is true, but it
misses the point. It does not address the trial court’s instruction, which prohibited
the jury from considering these very facts “in weighing [Caldwell’s] credibility.”69
Next, the State maintains that the erroneous instruction should not undermine
our confidence in the result of Howell’s trial because the evidence against Howell
that was not dependent on Caldwell’s testimony was strong. According to the State,
“[b]ecause Howell cannot establish that the result would have been different absent
the error, he is therefore not entitled to reversal.”70 To begin with, this misstates
Howell’s appellate burden. The State offers no authority—and we are aware of
68
Answering Br. at 26.
69
Id. at 25.
70
Id. at 27.
38
none—that requires a litigant claiming plain error to show that, but for the error, the
outcome of the trial would be different.71
But what is more to the point, the State’s claim that overwhelming
independent evidence pointed to Howell’s guilt cannot be squared with the record.
To be sure, the State presented a mountain of evidence from which the jury could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that someone associated with 12 Bradbury and
23 Aldershot was dealing drugs. Yet the same cannot be said of certain key elements
of the offenses with which Howell was charged.
First and foremost among those elements was the identity of the drug dealer.
It is undisputed that others, including two of Howell’s pleading codefendants—his
mother Sharon and brother Malique, neither of whom incriminated Howell— had
unfettered access to the areas in the two residences where the drugs, weapons, cash,
and other paraphernalia were found. And though the State might have argued that
the obscurely worded text messages were suggestive of drug activity on Howell’s
part, doubt lurked around the question of Howell’s involvement in the operation the
police uncovered. If credited, Caldwell’s testimony removed that doubt. Not only
did Caldwell describe Howell’s ongoing involvement in the drug-dealing operation,
71
In its answering brief, the States cites two cases in apparent support of its suggestion that
Howell’s inability to show that the result would have been different had not the erroneous
instruction been given precludes a finding of plain error, Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781 (Del. 2003)
and Allen v. State, 1990 WL 254350 (Del. Dec. 14, 1990). Although both of these cases deal with
the absence of plain error because of overwhelming evidence of guilt, neither supports the
application or adoption of the test the State has articulated.
39
but he also testified that Howell was involved in a recent delivery of marijuana to
him within the indictment’s date range—evidence otherwise missing from the
State’s case-in-chief.
Next there is the matter of the weight—4,000 grams (or 8.8 pounds) of
marijuana—Howell’s delivery or possession of which the State was required to
prove under Count X of the indictment. Without Caldwell’s testimony, the State
would have been reduced to asking the jury to infer that, because Howell possessed
vacuum-sealer bags capable of containing 4,000 grams of marijuana and an amount
of cash greater than the value of 4,000 grams, he must have possessed that amount
of marijuana at one time during the date range charged in the indictment. Not
impossible, but hardly ideal.
And finally, Caldwell provided a critical piece of evidence on the charge that
Howell possessed a weapon with an obliterated serial number. In light of Malique
Howell’s admission that the gun with the obliterated serial number belonged to him,
evidence, beyond its location in 23 Aldershot, linking Howell to that gun was critical
to the State’s allegation that Malique possessed the gun jointly with Howell. And
once again, Caldwell’s testimony provided the missing link.
In light of Caldwell’s central role in the prosecution’s case-in-chief as to these
key issues, we reject the State’s claim that the other evidence of Howell’s guilt was
40
so overwhelming that we should overlook the Superior Court’s undue restriction on
the jury’s consideration of Caldwell’s credibility.
Finally, the State contends that the erroneous “cooperating witness”
instruction does not amount to plain error when it is considered together with the
instructions the trial court read to the jury before its deliberations. Specifically, the
court told the jury:
You are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness. You decide
the weight to be given to each witness’s testimony. You should
consider each witness’s means of knowledge, strength of memory, and
opportunity for observation, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
the testimony, the consistency or inconsistency of the testimony, the
witness’s motivations, whether the testimony has been contradicted, the
witness’s bias, prejudice or interest, if any, the witness’s manner or
demeanor upon the witness stand, and all other facts and circumstances
shown by the evidence that affect the credibility of the testimony.72
No doubt, there are circumstances where a minor flaw in a jury instruction
that is not objected to in the trial court will not rise to the level of plain error, when
the instructions viewed in their entirety contain an accurate statement of the law.73
But the general rule is that “a jury should not have to reconcile two contrary
statements of the law.”74 And that is precisely what the jury was asked to do as it
considered the credibility of an important prosecution witness. As a general matter,
the jurors were told that they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witness
72
App. to Answering Br. at B260–61.
73
See Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A 3d. 1247, 1255–56 (Del. 2011).
74
Id. at 1256.
41
and, as such, were entitled to take into account “all facts and circumstances shown
by the evidence that affect the credibility of the testimony.”75 And one such fact or
circumstance would be “the witness’s motivations.”76 But when Caldwell was
sitting before the jury, the court specifically instructed the jurors to the contrary,
warning them that they were not to consider a very relevant circumstance—
Caldwell’s cooperation agreement—and how that might affect his credibility.
It is unreasonable, in our view, to expect a jury to reconcile these two
instructions or to determine which of the two is correct and which is erroneous. We
are not satisfied that the jury felt free to disregard the trial court’s specific instruction
concerning its determination of Caldwell’s credibility in favor of the more general
instruction regarding witness credibility. And, given Caldwell’s role in this case,
this compromised the fairness of Howell’s trial and necessitates a new trial.
B. Howell’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are without
merit
Howell contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
establish the elements of possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number
and the weight element (4,000 grams or more of marijuana) of the drug dealing
offense charged in Count III of the indictment. In other words, Howell claims that
the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal as to
75
App. to Answering Br. at B260–61.
76
Id. at 260.
42
these two alleged offenses. Despite our reversal on other grounds, we must yet
address this claim because of double-jeopardy considerations.77
We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal
de novo to determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements, beyond a
reasonable doubt.78 When we conduct this inquiry, we do not distinguish between
direct and circumstantial evidence.79
1. The obliterated-serial-number charge
The Superior Court neatly summarized the evidence supporting the jury’s
verdict on the obliterated-serial number count:
The firearm in question was found in the basement living area of
Howell’s residence. Although Malique and Howell testified that area
exclusively was Malique’s, the jury was free to weigh their credibility
and their motivations for that testimony. Even if the jury accepted that
testimony, other evidence the State presented was sufficient to support
the jury’s conclusion that Howell constructively possessed the firearm
and was aware that the serial number was removed or obliterated.
Howell’s backpack contained 9 millimeter ammunition, which was the
same caliber as the firearm at issue. No other 9 millimeter firearm was
found in the residence. The obliteration of the serial number on the
firearm was visible to the naked eye. Finally, Caldwell testified that
Howell previously offered to sell him a “dirty” weapon, which Caldwell
explained was a firearm without a serial number. That evidence and
77
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90–91 (1978) (“The successful appeal of a judgment of
conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, poses
no bar to further prosecution on the same charge.”) (internal citation omitted); Danks v. State, 229
A.2d 789, 792 (Del. 1967) (allowing retrial where reversal was "not . . . based on lack of evidence,
but . . . based upon error of law[.]")).
78
Cushner v. State, 214 A.3d 443, 446 (Del. 2019).
79
Robinson v. State, 953 A.2d 169, 173 (Del. 2008).
43
testimony was enough to allow the jury to find Howell guilty of Count
V.80
Howell asserts—in a conclusory fashion—that, because Malique Howell
admitted that he had purchased the gun in question and Caldwell did not identify the
date of Howell’s offer to sell the “dirty weapon,” no rational jury could conclude
that the gun offered for sale was the gun found in the basement of Howell’s primary
residence. We disagree. The jury was not bound to accept Malique’s testimony
regarding his purchase of the weapon and, in any event, ownership of the gun, while
relevant, is not dispositive. The evidence as outlined above was sufficient, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to support a finding that
Howell constructively possessed—perhaps jointly with Malique—the gun with an
obliterated serial number.
2. The weight of marijuana alleged in Count III
In finding that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that Howell possessed at least 4,000 grams—or approximately
8.8 pounds—of marijuana, the Superior Court acknowledged that the quantity of
marijuana seized at 12 Bradbury was insignificant. The court nevertheless
concluded that the evidence “as a whole”81 supported the jury’s finding as to weight.
Specifically, the court identified the following evidence as supporting the finding:
80
Howell, 2020 WL 1492787, at *6.
81
Id.44
• The $2,400 in cash found at 12 Bradbury
• Detective Riccobon’s testimony that marijuana sells for between
$1,500-$3,000 a pound
• Caldwell’s testimony that he regularly purchased two pounds of
marijuana from Howell
• Caldwell’s testimony that Howell had confided in him that he was
selling marijuana to Abdula and “Nasty” in quantities ranging from 15
to 25 pounds.
• The seizure at 12 Bradbury of approximately 100 vacuum-sealer bags,
an unidentified number of which contained marijuana residue and each
of which could hold up to one pound of marijuana.
• The text messages supporting Caldwell’s testimony “namely that
Malique and Howell were conspiring to deal drugs and that Malique
regularly was selling as little as a quarter pound of marijuana up to
multiple pounds.82
If this were the only evidence supporting the jury’s conclusion that Howell
possessed 4,000 grams of marijuana during the indictment’s date range, the trial
court’s denial of Howell’s motion for judgment of acquittal would stand on shaky
ground. The amount of cash found at 12 Bradbury was in the range of the price of
one pound or 453.6 grams of marijuana, far below the 4,000 gram threshold.
Caldwell’s purchases were at approximately one-quarter of the weight to be proved,
and his testimony about Abdula’s and “Nasty’s” purchases did not suggest that they
occurred within the indictment’s date range. And we find the notion that a quantity
of empty bags sufficient to hold a certain quantity of marijuana is evidence that the
bags once—and at the same time—held that quantity lacks persuasive force.
82
Id.45
Despite these reservations, our review of the entire record and, in particular,
one piece of evidence not mentioned by the trial court, convinces us that, when the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-
finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Howell possessed 4,0000 or more
grams of marijuana within the indictment’s date range. Specifically, Brian Caldwell
testified, in response to questions asked by Howell’s counsel, that he had seen “well
over a hundred pounds”83 of marijuana at 12 Bradbury when he was at the residence
in early February 2018. To be sure and as we previously noted, Caldwell’s testimony
on this point is beset by an apparent inconsistency.84 But for present purposes we
view this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and, when we do
that and consider it with the other evidence, Howell’s argument that the weight
evidence was insufficient collapses.85 We therefore conclude that the trial court did
not err when it denied Howell’s motion for judgment of acquittal on this ground.
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
Caldwell’s testimony about his prior drug transactions with Howell
and Howell’s offer to sell him an illegal firearm
As mentioned, on the first day of trial, Howell filed a “Motion for D.R.E.
404(b) Admissibility Hearing,” asking the Superior Court “to conduct a voir dire
83
App. to Answering Br. at B166.
84
See supra note 40.
85
See Torres v. State, 979 A.2d 1087, 1097 (Del. 2009) (Cocaine buyer’s testimony that he
received 500 grams of cocaine from defendant, when taken in the light most favorable to the State,
was alone sufficient to establish that the cocaine weighed in excess of 100 grams).
46
Hearing to determine the admissibility of offered testimony sought to be introduced
via the State’s confidential informant . . . .”86 The motion referred to a recording of
some unidentified event “conducted by the Prosecutor . . . and the Chief
Investigating Officer.”87 It alleged that “[t]he recording is replete with multiple
references of other bad acts and/or criminal misconduct that represents uncharged
offenses vis-á-vis the issues to be presented at trial.”88 Instead of identifying the
prior uncharged misconduct and the stating the reasons for its inadmissibility, the
motion contended that, “to determine the admissibility of such evidence, the Court
is required to perform a Getz/DeShields analysis with regard to all items of evidence
sought to be introduced through this witness.”89 At the same time, Howell filed a
Motion in Limine to Prevent Unfairly Prejudicial Information Presented [sic] to the
Jury,” in which he identified five categories of “potentially inflammatory and
unfairly unprejudicial information.90 That the prosecution might seek to place before
the jury:
(1) that Howell was the victim of a home invasion that resulted in a
theft of more than $200,000 in United States currency;
(2) that Howell’s neighbor was a suspect in the home invasion;
(3) that Howell would deliver 20 pounds every week of marijuana to
one individual and 15 to 25 pounds per week to another individual;
86
D.I. 47 at 1.
87
Id.88
Id.89
Id.90
D.I. 45.
47
(4) that Howell might have attempted to intimidate Caldwell during a
chance meeting at an Ocean City, Maryland resort; and
(5) that Howell’s mother’s boyfriend belonged to a “motorcycle gang
reported to be responsible for many acts of violence.”91
As with his Rule 404(b) motion, this motion asked the court to conduct a voir
dire hearing before Caldwell testified and to require the State to offer a[n]
‘evidentiary preview’ of the question and answers that will be presented to
[Caldwell] during the course of the direct examination.”92 Presumably, this would
permit Howell to interpose an objection if he thought that any of the questions were
out of bounds.
When the court took up these motions after jury selection, the State identified
two additional subjects not identified in Howell’s motions that would likely be
touched upon during Caldwell’s testimony—that for at least a year before Howell’s
arrest, he was regularly selling marijuana to Caldwell for redistribution and that
Howell had offered to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The
court then asked Howell’s counsel to speak in support of his motion. Counsel
suggested that the court defer consideration of his motions until after hearing from
the other witnesses but before Caldwell’s testimony, and the court agreed.
Two days later, immediately before Caldwell took the stand, the court
addressed Howell’s motions. The prosecutor clarified that he intended to address
91
Id. at 3.
92
Id.
48
four topics with Caldwell that might implicate D.R.E. 404(b)’s restrictions on the
admissibility of prior uncharged misconduct: (1) the home invasion: (2) Caldwell’s
knowledge of Howell’s sales of large quantities of marijuana to two other
individuals; (3) Howell’s course of drug dealing; including regular sales of
marijuana to Caldwell during the year preceding his arrest; and (4) Howell’s offer
to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial number. As things turned out,
the State did not ask Caldwell about the home invasion, and Howell withdrew his
objection to Caldwell’s testimony about Howell’s large marijuana sales to others.93
Thus, we need only concern ourselves with the Superior Court’s decision to permit
evidence of Howell’s past sales of marijuana to Caldwell and his offer to sell
Caldwell a gun with an obliterated serial number.
We review a trial court’s admission of evidence under D.R.E. 404(b) for abuse
of discretion.94 D.R.E. 404(b) prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence
of uncharged misconduct to prove the defendant’s character in order to show that,
on the occasion giving rise to the charges before the court, the defendant acted in
93
See App. to Answering Br. at B84:
The Court: So to be clear, you’re not objecting to the complaining witness
testifying as to his personal knowledge that this defendant sold quantities of
marijuana to individuals names Abdulla and Nasty?
Counsel: That is correct. There is logic to that.
See also id. at B95:
Counsel: . . . I did not object to the informant indicating that he was present when
there was a sale of 20 pounds or whatever to Abdula and to Nick Nasty.
94
Campbell v. State, 974 A.2d 156, 160 (Del. 2009).
49
accordance with that character. In other words, the State may not introduce evidence
of the defendant’s prior bad acts to show that the defendant has the propensity to
commit—and, in fact, did commit—the act with which he stands charged. Such
evidence, however, “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, a
lack of accident.
In Getz v. State, this Court fixed guidelines for the admissibility of evidence
under D.R.E. 404(b)
(1) The evidence of other crimes must be material to an issue or
ultimate fact in dispute in the case. If the State elects to present such
evidence in its case-in-chief it must demonstrate the existence, or
reasonable anticipation, of such a material issue.
(2) The evidence of other crimes must be introduced for a
purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not
inconsistent with the basic prohibition against evidence of bad
character or criminal disposition.
(3) The other crimes must be proved by evidence which is “plain,
clear and conclusive.”
(4) The other crimes must not be too remote in time from the
charged offense.
(5) The Court must balance the probative value of such evidence
against its unfairly prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403.
(6) Because such evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the
jury should be instructed concerning the purpose for its admission as
required by D.R.E. 105.95
95
Getz v. State, 538 A. 726, 734 (Del. 1988) (citation and footnote omitted).
50
A decade after Getz, in DeShields v. State,96 this Court shed additional light
on how a trial court should approach a Rule 404(b) analysis. Noting that D.R.E.
404(b) is identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court
quoted one scholar’s observation that
[f]rom the language of the [Federal] Rule, as well as its legislative
history, it is clear that the federal drafters created an open system in
which a trial judge neither mechanically excludes, nor routinely
accepts, other crimes evidence: rather, she . . . determines admissibility
on the basis of such factors as probative value, potential prejudice, and
the availability of alternative forms of evidence.97
That same scholar pointed to another treatise that set forth nine factors that a court
should apply when conducting the Rule 403 balancing test under the fifth step of the
Getz Analysis. Now frequently referred to as the “DeShields factors,” they are:
(1) the extent to which the point to be proved is disputed;
(2) the adequacy of proof of the prior conduct;
(3) the probative force of the evidence;
(4) the proponent’s need for the evidence;
(5) the availability of less prejudicial proof;
(6) the inflammatory or prejudicial effect of the evidence;
(7) the similarity of the prior wrong to the charged offense;
(8) the effectiveness of limiting instructions; and
(9) the extent to which prior act evidence would prolong the
proceedings.98
96
DeShields v. State, 706 A.2d 502 (Del. 1998).
97
Id. at 506 (quoting Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence, §5.14, at 169 (3d
ed. 1996)).
98
Id. at 506–07 (quoting Lilly, supra; citing C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §4.21
at 268–71 (1995)).
51
1. Howell’s past sales of marijuana to Caldwell
Howell’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of evidence of Howell’s
marijuana sales to Caldwell during the year and a half preceding his arrest is, in a
word, odd. First of all, Howell conceded that Caldwell’s testimony that Howell was
supplying other individuals—Abdula and Nasty—with large quantities of marijuana
during the same time period was admissible under D.R.E. 404(b). What is more,
Howell himself testified that he was selling marijuana by the pound in 2016 and did
not get “out of the game”99 until December 2017. Thus, it is difficult to see how the
challenged evidence was unfairly prejudicial to Howell.
Be that as it may, we have reviewed the Superior Court’s explanation of its
reasons for admitting the evidence and find no abuse of discretion there. The court
found that the testimony and the related text messages were material to show “a
common[] plan or scheme, knowledge and intent.”100 We agree that, at a minimum,
Howell’s intent to deliver the marijuana seized on February 16 was, as an element
of the crimes charged under Counts VIII and X of the indictment, material. The
court next determined that the prior sales were not too remote, and we agree; the
evidence showed a continuous course of conduct leading up to the charged offenses.
In addition, the court’s determination that the proof of the prior drug sales was plain,
99
Trial Tr. at 238, Mar. 15, 2019.
100
Trial Tr. at 82, Mar. 14, 2019.
52
clear, and conclusive is supported by the fact that it came in through the testimony
of a witness—Caldwell—with firsthand personal knowledge. And Howell did not
contest the propriety of the court’s limiting jury instruction concerning the purpose
for admitting this evidence as Getz requires.
Howell’s biggest complaint seems to be that, because the trial court did not
make an explicit reference to the DeShields factors, its balancing of the probative
value and prejudicial effect of the 404(b) evidence was deficient. We disagree.
Although the court’s finding that “the highly probative nature of the course of
conduct evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” 101 could
be seen as conclusory, we are mindful that the court anchored its analysis in case
law addressing similar facts.102 And, as mentioned, Howell confirmed himself that
he was a drug dealer during the time covered by Caldwell’s testimony and the text
messages. This evidence might have been cumulative—an objection Howell did not
make—but, in light of Howell’s admission, the danger of unfair prejudice was
negligible.
101
Id. at 83–84.
102
See Andreavich v. State, 189 A. 3d 692, 2018 WL 3045599 (Del. June 19, 2018) (TABLE);
Torres v. State, 979 A.2d 1087 (Del. 2009); State v. Hynson, 608 A.2d 730, 1992 WL 53419 (Del.
Feb. 24, 1992) (TABLE).
53
2. Howell’s offer to sell Caldwell a “dirty” weapon
The Superior Court considered and rejected Howell’s challenge to the
admissibility of Caldwell’s testimony concerning Howell’s offer—at an
indeterminate time—to sell Caldwell a “dirty weapon,”103 which Caldwell took to
mean “[a] gun without a serial number.”104 According to the court, the testimony
was “circumstantial evidence that the defendant constructively possessed the firearm
with an obliterated serial number that was recovered from his home. It seems to be
introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) that is the defendant’s
knowledge and intent to possess that particular firearm.”105
In his briefing in this Court, Howell makes only a passing reference to this
ruling and has not presented any argument in opposition to it. We therefore find that
Howell has abandoned this argument.
D. Any flaw in the trial court’s obliterated serial-number instruction
was harmless
For the first time on appeal, Howell argues that the Superior Court’s jury
instruction relating to the possession-of-a weapon-with-an-obliterated serial-number
charge was deficient. Because Howell did not object to the instruction in the
103
App. to Answering Br. at B129.
104
Id.105
Trial Tr. at 85, Mar. 14, 2019. Given that the evidence was introduced to show that Howell
constructively possessed the firearm that is the subject of one of the charges for which he was on
trial, D.R.E. 404(b) is not applicable. Put another way, evidence that tends to show that Howell
possessed the very weapon for which he was charged is not “evidence of a crime, wrong or other
act” within the meaning of Rule 404(b).
54
proceedings below, we review this claim under our plain-error standard as
previously described.
To find Howell guilty, the jury was required to find that Howell knowingly
possessed a firearm “with the knowledge that the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial
number has been removed, obliterated or altered in a manner that has disguised or
concealed the identity or origin of the firearm.”106 Howell does not contest that
Count V of the indictment, which was reproduced as part of the written jury
instructions provided to the jury, adequately tracked this statutory language. And so
did the written jury instructions, which told the jury, in pertinent part, that
[i]n order to find the Defendant guilty of Possession of a Weapon With
a Removed, Obliterated or Altered Serial Number, you must find the
State proved [the] following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The Defendant possessed a firearm;
2. The serial number of the firearm had been removed or
obliterated in a manner that disguised or concealed the identity
or origin of the weapon; and
3. The Defendant acted knowingly.
“Knowingly” means the Defendant knew or was aware he
possessed a firearm and knew or was aware the serial number of
the firearm had been removed to hide the identity or origin of the
firearm.107
Presumably, this written instruction was part of the instructions to which
Howell assented when the court conferred with counsel about the instructions
106
11 Del. C.§ 1459(a) (emphasis added).
107
Jury Instructions, D.I. 55 at 27–28 (Mar. 18, 2019).
55
immediately before closing arguments.108 Yet when the court read the instructions
following closing arguments, it omitted the definition of “knowingly” and merely
reminded the jury that, “’[p]ossession,’ ‘firearm,’ and ‘knowingly’ previously have
been defined for you.”109 All previous definitions of “knowingly,” however, were
related to the possessory elements of other offenses—that is, that the defendant knew
or was aware that he possessed marijuana or a firearm; none would, in and of
themselves, inform the jury that it was required to find that Howell knew of the serial
number’s obliteration or alteration. And this, according to Howell, was “plainly
erroneous.” We disagree.
For starters, other than to assert that the jury’s acquittal of Howell under Count
V’s PFDCF charge was inconsistent with its guilty verdict on the obliterated-serial
number charge and thus evidence of jury confusion, he does not explain how the
seemingly incomplete—as distinguished from incorrect—instruction amounts to
plain error. Moreover, Howell’s “inconsistent verdict” argument is incorrect. As
the Superior Court correctly noted when it denied Howell’s motion for judgment of
acquittal, the standard of proof of the possession element of the obliterated-serial
number charge is different and more expansive than it is under the PFDCF statute.
Under the former, constructive possession can suffice, while under the latter,
108
Trial Tr. at 2–12, Mar. 18, 2019.
109
App. to Answering Br. at B256–256a.
56
availability and accessibility during the commission of the felony is required.110 For
this reason, Howell’s claim that the instruction was plainly erroneous because the
jury’s verdict was internally inconsistent fails.
The manner in which the Superior Court instructed the jury is not plain error
for other reasons. As the State correctly observes, jury instructions need not be
perfect111 and will pass muster if they are not misleading and allow the jury to
“intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.”112 Of course, jury instructions
may not misstate the law. But that is not what happened here.
Apparently, the court attempted to condense the instructions by eliminating
redundant definitions. Unfortunately, this well-intended endeavor caused the court
to give an instruction that was less than ideal. But we are satisfied that the
instruction, when considered together with the instructions in their entirety, though
arguably incomplete, did not jeopardize the fairness and integrity of Howell’s trial.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the trial court accurately set forth the
elements of the obliterated-serial number charge, including the element of
knowledge of the serial number’s obliteration, when it reviewed the charges with the
jury. And the written jury instructions, which were given to the jury and available
to it during deliberations, did not suffer from the same omission as did the
110
See Maddrey v. State, 975 A.2d 772, 775 (Del. 2009).
111
Whalen v. State, 492 A2d 552, 559 (Del. 1985).
112
Anderson v. State, 2016 WL 618840, at *4 (Del. Feb. 15, 2016).
57
instructions as read in open court.113 We are therefore confident that the jury was
able to apply the law to the facts as it found them.
E. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to move
Howell’s trial to another courtroom
Immediately after the court denied Howell’s continuance request and after the
jurors had taken their seats in anticipation of opening statements, Howell’s counsel
raised a concern about the courtroom’s configuration. In particular, counsel claimed
that, because of the placement of a large lectern, six of the twelve jurors would be
unable to observe Howell as he sat at counsel table during the trial. When the court
asked what Howell’s counsel would have the court do, he responded: “I would like
to have a courtroom where [Howell] can be seen.”114 Jurors, according to Howell’s
counsel, should have an unobstructed view of the defendant to gauge his reaction as
other witnesses testify. The court denied Howell’s request that his trial be moved to
another courtroom.
Although Howell did not couch his request below to move to another
courtroom in constitutional terms, he now claims that the trial court’s refusal “to
afford [Howell] an unobstructed view of the jury [was] a violation of his
113
The trial judge encouraged the jury to consult the written instructions should they have
questions. Trial Tr. at 122, Mar. 18, 2019, (“Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to read to you the
jury instructions that will apply to you during your deliberations. The good news is you’ll have
copies of these jury instructions in the deliberation room with you. So you don’t need to memorize
what I’m about to say, but please listen carefully. It will give you a sense of the instructions
overall, and then if you need [to] refer back to something, you will know where to look.”)
114
App. to Opening Br. at A48.
58
constitutional rights to due process and/or right of presence at trial.”115 This, of
course, is not the claim that Howell made in the trial court; there, it was the jury’s
view of Howell that was his only concern. And that claim runs afoul of the principle
that a defendant’s courtroom demeanor, save when he is testifying, is not evidence
and is therefore irrelevant.116
In addition to this flaw in Howell’s argument, none of the cases he cites
supports his contention that, because all jurors did not have an unobstructed view of
him while seated at counsel table, he was not “present” for his trial. In all of them,
the defendant was totally absent from all or a critical portion of his trial. 117 Here,
Howell was physically present at every stage of his trial and was visible to all jurors
when he testified. We therefore conclude that neither his right to be present at his
trial or his due process rights were violated.
115
Opening Br. at 13.
116
See Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 572 (Del. 1981) (“[T]he courtroom demeanor of a defendant
who has not testified is irrelevant. His demeanor has not been entered into evidence and, therefore,
comment is beyond the scope of legitimate summary.”); see also Norwood v. State, 991 A.2d 18,
2010 WL 703107, at *2–*3 (Del. Mar. 1, 2010) (TABLE) (finding no plain error where court did
not rearrange courtroom to permit juror to view defendant in his seat.”)
117
Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993) (defendant tried in absentia); Bustamente v.
Eyman, 456 F. 2d 269 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant, who had been taken from courthouse to county
jail when case was submitted to jury, was not returned and therefore not present when court
reconvened for rereading of jury instructions); Bradshaw v. State 806 A.2d 131 (Del. 2002)
(defendant absent from courtroom for trial court’s reading of Allen charge).
59
III. CONCLUSION
Because we have determined that the Superior Court’s erroneous “cooperative
witness” instruction was so clearly prejudicial to Howell’s substantial rights as to
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of his trial, we reverse his convictions and
remand this matter for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
60