Valley Joist BD Holdings, LLC v. Ebsco Industries, Inc. ( 2021 )


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  •            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    VALLEY JOIST BD HOLDINGS, LLC, a              §
    Delaware limited liability company,           §
    §       No. 105, 2021
    Plaintiff Below,               §
    Appellant,                     §       Court Below – Superior Court
    §       of the State of Delaware
    v.                              §
    §       C.A. No. N20C-07-072
    EBSCO INDUSTRIES, INC.,                       §
    §
    Defendant Below,                §
    Appellee.
    Submitted: October 13, 2021
    Decided: December 20, 2021
    Before VAUGHN, TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
    Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.
    Joseph B. Cicero, Esquire, Aidan T. Hamilton, Esquire, CHIPMAN BROWN CICERO &
    COLE, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Jeffrey H. Zaiger, Esquire, Judd Lindenfeld, Esquire,
    ZAIGER LLC, Stamford, Connecticut; for Appellant Valley Joist BD Holdings, LLC.
    John P. DiTomo, Esquire, Sara Toscano, Esquire, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT, &
    TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee EBSCO Industries, Inc.
    1
    MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justice:
    This appeal arises from a dispute over a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) formed
    between Valley Joist BD Holdings, LLC (“VJ Holdings”) and EBSCO, Industries Inc.
    (“EBSCO”). In December 2017, EBSCO sold all of its stock in Valley Joist, Inc. to VJ
    Holdings. After closing, VJ Holdings discovered structural defects in one of the buildings
    acquired as part of the transaction. In July 2018, VJ Holdings sought indemnification from
    EBSCO through the procedure outlined in the SPA. Two years after receiving no response
    to the notice, VJ Holdings filed suit in the Superior Court for breach of contract and fraud in
    the inducement.
    The Superior Court granted EBSCO’s motion to dismiss the fraud claim for failure to
    plead sufficient facts to satisfy Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b). The court also dismissed the
    breach of contract claim as barred under the SPA’s one-year contractual statute of limitations.
    VJ Holdings filed a timely appeal raising two issues, both relating to the dismissed fraud
    claim: first, whether VJ Holdings pled sufficient facts to show pre-closing knowledge of
    fraud; and second, whether the Superior Court properly relied on a bootstrapping doctrine to
    dismiss the fraud claim.
    For the reasons provided below, the Superior Court’s March 10, 2021 order granting
    a motion to dismiss is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this
    opinion. The allegations in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
    non-moving party, lead to a reasonable inference that EBSCO knew of the structural defects
    2
    in the building at the time of closing the SPA, contrary to its representation in the SPA that
    the building was in good operating condition and repair. As for the bootstrapping argument,
    a review of the Superior Court’s opinion reveals that the court did not rely on a bootstrapping
    doctrine to dismiss the fraud claim.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    A.     The Parties
    Appellant VJ Holdings is a Delaware limited liability company that served as an
    acquisition vehicle for the private equity firm, Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC.1
    Appellee EBSCO is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in
    Birmingham, Alabama.2
    Valley Joist, Inc. is the entity VJ Holdings acquired through the SPA. After the
    purchase, Valley Joist Inc., was converted to a Delaware limited liability company and re-
    named Valley Joist, L.L.C. (“Valley Joist”).3 Valley Joist custom builds steel joist and deck
    product systems that are critical components of roofing and flooring systems.4 Valley Joist
    owns and operates two facilities for the design and manufacture of its joist and deck products
    known as Valley Joist West, located in Fernley, Nevada, and Valley Joist East, located in Fort
    Payne, Alabama.5 At the center of the dispute is Building #14 at the Valley Joist East facility,
    1
    Answering Br. 7.
    2
    App. to Opening Br. A000011 (hereinafter “A_”).
    3
    A000011-12.
    4
    A000012.
    5
    Id.
    3
    which serves as a large manufacturing building. Building #14 has three crane bays, and each
    crane bay has one overhead crane.6
    B.     Execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement
    On December 29, 2017, VJ Holdings and EBSCO entered into the SPA. VJ Holdings
    purchased Valley Joist, Inc. from EBSCO for $20 million.7 Section 3.4(a) of the SPA states
    that EBSCO represents and warrants that “the Assets of [Valley Joist] (including the Real
    Property and buildings, fixtures, mechanical and other systems and improvements thereon)
    are in good operating condition and repair, ordinary wear and tear excluded, and except for
    any ordinary, routine maintenance and repair required that in sum are consistent with past
    practices.”8 VJ Holdings represented and warranted that it was “provided adequate access
    to the personnel, premises, and properties, Assets, books and records, and other documents
    and data of the Company” and that it did not conduct any formal inspections of the structural
    integrity of any Valley Joist buildings.9
    C.     Problems with the Cranes at Building #14
    In early 2018, Valley Joist began experiencing problems with the overhead cranes in
    Building #14 at Valley Joist East. The cranes would become misaligned and frequently
    needed to be shut down for repair. This caused production to decline and resulted in
    6
    A000013.
    7
    Id.; A000068 at §2.2(a).
    8
    A000076.
    9
    A000014; A000091 at §4.7; Opening Br. Ex. A at 3.
    4
    incidental costs of $500,000.10 Valley Joist hired a structural engineer to inspect the building.
    In a report dated July 20, 2018, the engineer concluded that “Building #14 was not built with
    the appropriate structural support for the overhead cranes and that the weight of such cranes
    could not be supported by the structure.”11 After the structural engineer determined that the
    building was beyond repair to support the weight of the cranes, Valley Joist constructed a
    new building, which cost approximately $7.5 million.12
    On July 3, 2018, VJ Holdings sent a notice of direct claim for indemnification to
    EBSCO through the procedure outlined in Section 6.7 of the SPA.13 EBSCO did not respond
    and thus rejected the claim.14 Two years later, on July 8, 2020, VJ Holdings filed suit in the
    Superior Court, asserting claims for breach of contract and fraud in the inducement.15 VJ
    Holdings sought over $11 million in damages.16
    E.     The Superior Court Proceedings and Decision
    EBSCO filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 2020, arguing, among other things,
    that VJ Holdings failed to adequately plead that EBSCO possessed the requisite knowledge
    to state a fraud claim.17 EBSCO acknowledged that the complaint included four allegations
    10
    A000016.
    11
    A000017.
    12
    A000019.
    13
    Id.
    14
    A000020; see also Opening Br. Ex. A at 5.
    15
    Id.; A000021-25.
    16
    A000024; see also Opening Br. Ex. A at 17.
    17
    Opening Br. Ex. A at 5,17.
    5
    of pre-closing knowledge: (1) a May 2017 capital expenses spreadsheet detailing $550,000
    allocated for roof repairs ($450,000) and crane beams ($100,000);18 (2) a September 20,
    2017 email from a Valley Joist employee to an EBSCO employee stating that one crane will
    not move in a southern direction;19 (3) a November 8, 2018 email of a Valley Joist employee
    sending EBSCO employees a list of scheduled capital expenditures that EBSCO had
    disclosed to Valley Joist;20 and (4) a transition employee’s (Josh Brasher)21 statements to a
    senior Valley Joist employee (Keith Juedemann) that EBSCO knew of structural problems
    with Building #14’s cranes months prior to the sale.22 The complaint also alleges that in
    April or May 2018, Brasher showed Juedemann repair quotes EBSCO received before
    closing, which indicated “it would cost $3 to $4 million to repair the defective condition of
    Building #14.”23
    EBSCO argued that the first three allegations were vague and unrelated to the actual
    structural issue. EBSCO argued that the statements from the transition employee were
    insufficient because the quote mentioned in the complaint referred to a quote that Valley Joist
    received after closing. EBSCO attached to their motion to dismiss a repair quote dated
    18
    A000018.
    19
    Id.
    20
    Id.
    21
    The employee was identified in the SPA and these proceedings as Josh Brasher. A000128;
    A000219 at 9:21-22.
    22
    A000017.
    23
    A000017-18.
    6
    March 16, 2018 (almost three months after closing) from Garrison Steel Erectors, Inc.
    addressed to Jonathan Dooley of Valley Joist.24
    The court concluded that the complaint did not meet the heightened pleading
    requirements of Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b) and dismissed the fraud claim for failing to
    plead “EBSCO’s pre-closing knowledge with particularity.”25 The court dismissed the
    contract claim because it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations negotiated in
    the SPA.26 The court observed that VJ Holdings appeared to attempt to circumvent the
    shortened statute of limitations period by rebranding its contract claim as a fraud claim, but
    the court did not rely on the bootstrapping doctrine to dismiss the fraud claim.27 VJ Holdings
    filed a timely appeal challenging the Superior Court’s decision to dismiss the fraud claim.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court reviews questions of law and contractual interpretation de novo.28 The
    decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de
    novo.29 The complaint is viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” and
    24
    A000138-41.
    25
    Opening Br. Ex. A at 17.
    26
    Id. Appellants do not appeal the dismissal of the contract claim.
    27
    A000221 at 11: 2-13; Opening Br. Ex. A at 16.
    28
    CompoSecure, L.L.C. v. CardUX, LLC, 
    206 A.3d 807
    , 816 (Del. 2018) (quoting Gatz Props., LLC
    v. Auriga Capital Corp., 
    59 A.3d 1206
    , 1212 (Del. 2012)).
    29
    See Clinton v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 
    977 A.2d 892
    , 895 (Del. 2009).
    7
    all well-pled allegations and the reasonable inferences flowing from those allegations are
    accepted as true.30
    III.   ANALYSIS
    On appeal, VJ Holdings contends that the Superior Court erred in granting EBSCO’s
    motion to dismiss the fraud in the inducement claim.31 VJ Holdings raises two arguments:
    (1) the Superior Court erred by holding that the complaint failed to plead EBSCO’s pre-
    closing knowledge sufficient to satisfy Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b);32 and (2) the trial
    court erred by relying on the “bootstrapping doctrine” to dismiss the fraud claim.33
    A.      The Fraud Claim Satisfies Rule 9(b)
    To state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a false representation made by
    the defendant; (2) the defendant knew or believed the representation was false or was
    recklessly indifferent to its truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or
    refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff acted or refrained from acting in justifiable reliance on
    the representation; and (5) damage resulted from such reliance.34 The pleading standards for
    fraud claims are heightened. Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b) provides that “[i]n all averments
    of fraud . . . , the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity.” The
    factual circumstances that must be stated with particularity refer to the time, place, and
    30
    
    Id. at 895
    .
    31
    Reply Br. at 1-2.
    32
    Id. at 3.
    33
    Id. at 17.
    34
    Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Hldg. Corp., 
    132 A.3d 35
    , 49 (Del. Ch. 2015).
    8
    contents of the false representations; the facts misrepresented; the identity of the person(s)
    making the misrepresentation; and what that person(s) gained from making the
    misrepresentation.35 Rule 9(b) provides that “knowledge and other condition of mind of a
    person may be averred generally.”36 “Although Rule 9(b) provides that ‘knowledge ... may
    be averred generally,’ where pleading a claim of fraud has at its core the charge that the
    defendant knew something, there must, at least, be sufficient well-pled facts from which it
    can reasonably be inferred that this ‘something’ was knowable and that the defendant was in
    a position to know it.”37
    The Superior Court held that VJ Holdings satisfied several pleading requirements.
    “VJ Holdings has pleaded that EBSCO made a fraudulent misrepresentation by stating that
    Valley Joist ‘Assets’ were in ‘good operating condition and repair.’”38 This alleged
    misrepresentation “was made in Section 3.4(a) of the SPA,” and it “was made on December
    29, 2017—the date the SPA closed.”39 Further, “VJ Holdings has alleged that EBSCO made
    the misrepresentation ‘with the specific intent to induce VJ Holdings to act on the purchase
    of Valley Joist and to refrain from inspecting the condition of the buildings and fixtures at
    Valley Joist East, including Building #14 and its cranes.”40 However, the court held that VJ
    35
    Browne v. Robb, 
    583 A.2d 949
    , 955 (Del. 1990); Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced
    Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 
    854 A.2d 121
    , 144 (Del. Ch. 2004).
    36
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 9(b).
    37
    Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 
    906 A.2d 168
    , 208 (Del. Ch. 2006).
    38
    Opening Br. Ex. A at 12.
    39
    
    Id.
    40
    Id. at 13.
    9
    Holdings failed to demonstrate facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that EBSCO
    knew the representations were false at the time they were made, thus failing to plead
    “EBSCO’s pre-closing knowledge with particularity.”41
    With respect to knowledge, the court reasoned that it could not consider a March 2018
    invoice as evidence of pre-closing knowledge of the defects with Building #14 because the
    invoice was dated after the closing of the SPA and provided no insight into what EBSCO
    knew at the time of closing.42 The court held that the remaining assertions were not specific
    enough to the structural problems.43 We disagree with the Superior Court’s analysis
    regarding the allegations of pre-closing knowledge.
    To plead knowledge for a fraud claim, a plaintiff must allege facts from which the
    court can reasonably infer that the misrepresentation was “knowable and the defendants were
    in a position to know it.”44 The complaint alleges that before “the expiration of the term of
    the Transition Employee’s service under the TSA, Valley Joist’s new management team was
    told by the Transition Employee that the problems with the Building #14 cranes were known
    to EBSCO months prior to its sale of the business.” 45 Paragraph 39 of the complaint adds:
    41
    Id. at 16.
    42
    Id.
    43
    Id. at 15-16.
    44
    Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 
    891 A.2d 1032
    , 1050 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also
    Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI, 854 A.2d at 144 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“While knowledge may be averred
    generally, where pleading a claim of fraud that has at its core the charge that the defendant knew
    something, there must, at least, be sufficient well-pleaded facts from which it can reasonably be
    inferred that this ‘something’ was knowable and that the defendant was in a position to know it.”).
    45
    A000017.
    10
    In or around April or May 2018, the Transition Employee
    informed Keith Juedemann (a senior Valley Joist employee) that
    EBSCO knew about the inadequate structural support for the
    overhead cranes prior to the sale. The Transition Employee also
    showed Mr. Juedemann the quotes EBSCO received indicating
    that it would cost $3 to $4 million to repair the defective
    condition of Building #14.46
    Thus, the complaint alleges that before closing EBSCO knew of the structural issues with
    Building #14, in particular, and EBSCO knew that it would cost millions of dollars to repair
    Building #14.47 Valley Joist learned all this information from EBSCO’s own transition
    employee.
    The misrepresentation the Superior Court identified in the SPA is that “the Assets
    (including the Real Property and buildings, fixtures, mechanical and other systems and
    improvements thereon) were in good operating condition and repair, ordinary wear and tear
    excluded.”48 Statements from the EBSCO employee designated to lead the transition
    admitting EBSCO’s pre-closing knowledge of the structural issues, coupled with EBSCO’s
    pre-closing receipt of quotes to repair structural damage at Building #14 for $3-4 million,
    allege knowledge sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
    In determining that these allegations were insufficient, the court appears to have
    assumed that Paragraph 39 referred to one repair quote and that repair quote was the same
    46
    A000017-18.
    47
    Id.
    48
    Opening Br. Ex. A at 8; A000076 (emphasis added).
    11
    repair quote that Appellee attached to its motion to dismiss.49 That repair quote was dated
    three months after the closing and addressed to a Valley Joist employee.
    The court erred by relying on this repair quote. First, this repair quote was not
    attached to the complaint, and the court did not determine that it was incorporated by
    reference. Further, VJ Holdings argued that this quote was not one of the quotes referred to
    in Paragraph 39 of the complaint.50 As such, the court should not have considered the quote
    to resolve a motion to dismiss.51 Second, the complaint refers to multiple quotes, not just
    one; the complaint states that the quotes were provided to EBSCO, not Valley Joist; and the
    quotes provided a range of $3 to 4 million in repair costs, not just $3 million. Thus, the
    complaint appears to refer to different quotes, and it is unclear why this quote would undercut
    the allegations in the complaint.
    When the averments are taken as a whole, they satisfy the particularity requirement,
    allowing the complaint to survive dismissal and the action to proceed to
    discovery. Specifically, allegations that the EBSCO transition employee, Brasher, told
    Juedemann that EBSCO knew of the structural damage at Building #14 before closing and
    49
    See Opening Br. Ex. A at 15.
    50
    A000246.
    51
    “If, on a motion . . . to dismiss for failure of the pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can
    be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion
    shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
    shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
    56.” Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b).
    12
    received quotes before closing estimating that repairs would cost $3 to 4 million were
    sufficient to allege knowledge and defeat a motion to dismiss.
    B.      The Trial Court Did Not Dismiss the Fraud Claim Under the
    Bootstrapping Doctrine.
    VJ Holdings argues that the Superior Court erred by relying on the bootstrapping
    doctrine to dismiss its fraud claim. VJ Holdings leans heavily on the one sentence in the
    Superior Court’s opinion: “It appears VJ Holdings is attempting to circumvent the negotiated
    shortened statute of limitations period by re-casting its breach of contract claim as a fraud
    claim.”52 However, this observation was not the reason the court dismissed the fraud claim.
    As the court states in the very next sentence, “the [c]ourt finds that VJ Holdings . . . failed to
    plead EBSCO’s pre-closing knowledge with particularity. . . . Therefore, the fraud claim
    must be dismissed.”53 Thus, the bootstrapping doctrine had no bearing on the court’s
    determination about the vitality of the fraud claim.
    IV.      CONCLUSION
    For the reasons provided above, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED
    and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this ruling.
    52
    Opening Br. Ex. A at 16.
    53
    Id.
    13