Ringgold v. State ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAY M. RINGGOLD, §
§ No. 163, 2014
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in and
v. § for New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, § Cr. ID No. 1006015765
Appellee. §
Submitted: July 25, 2014
Decided: October 17, 2014
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 17th day of October 2014, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Jay M. Ringgold, has appealed the Superior
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”). After careful consideration of the
parties’ briefs on appeal and the Superior Court record, the Court has
concluded that the denial of postconviction relief should be affirmed.
(2) The record reflects that, in June 2010, as part of a narcotics
investigation that relied in part on information obtained from a confidential
informant, police executed a search warrant at 2913 N. Washington Street in
Wilmington, Delaware. Police seized a 9 mm semi-automatic handgun and
holster from a storage box in the basement of the residence. Also in the
storage box were identifying documents belonging to Ringgold.
(3) Ringgold was indicted on one count of Possession of a Deadly
Weapon by a Person Prohibited (hereinafter “PDWBPP”) and was convicted
of that offense at a bench trial on March 9, 2011. At sentencing on June 3,
2011, the Superior Court declared Ringgold a habitual offender and
sentenced him to eight years, minimum mandatory, at Level V. On direct
appeal, we affirmed the conviction and sentence under Supreme Court Rule
26(c) (“Rule 26(c)”).1
(4) On direct appeal, Ringgold raised several points in response to
his appellate counsel’s Rule 26(c) submission, including that he was denied
the right to a speedy trial, the State withheld exculpatory evidence, and he
was convicted on the basis of insufficient evidence. We rejected those
points as without merit.2
(5) Ringgold also claimed that the evidence seized during the
search should have been suppressed (hereinafter “suppression claim”), and
that he was denied the right to confront the confidential informant
(hereinafter “confrontation claim”). We declined to consider those claims,
1
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 26(c) (governing criminal appeals without merit).
2
Ringgold v. State, 2012 WL 983199 (Del. Mar. 20, 2012).
2
however, after determining that they were intertwined with an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim (hereinafter “ineffective counsel claim”)
that was not reviewable on direct appeal.3
(6) On July 30, 2012, Ringgold filed a pro se motion for
postconviction relief and amendments to that motion (collectively “the
postconviction motion”). Ringgold also filed a motion for appointment of
counsel. The postconviction motion raised the claims that were raised but
not considered on Ringgold’s direct appeal, namely, the ineffective counsel
claim, the suppression claim, and the confrontation claim, as well as other
grounds for relief, including that Ringgold was coerced into waiving a jury
trial (hereinafter “coercion claim”), was denied the right to plead guilty
(hereinafter “guilty plea claim”), was sentenced illegally, and related
ineffective counsel claims.
(7) At the direction of a Superior Court Commissioner, the State
filed a response to the postconviction motion, and Ringgold’s trial counsel
filed an affidavit in response to the claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. After receipt of those submissions, the Commissioner appointed
counsel to assist Ringgold (hereinafter “Counsel”) and directed Counsel to
file a supplement or an amendment to the postconviction motion. Later,
3
Id., at *2.
3
when Counsel requested an extension of time to fully investigate and
determine if there was any merit to the postconviction motion, the
Commissioner granted the extension and directed that Counsel file an
amended postconviction motion or, in the alternative, a motion to withdraw
under Rule 61(e)(2).4
(8) On November 1, 2013, Counsel filed a Rule 61(e)(2) motion to
withdraw and supporting memorandum, representing that he had carefully
reviewed the record and determined that the postconviction motion was
without merit, and that the record did not suggest any other grounds for
relief.5 In response to Counsel’s motion to withdraw and memorandum,
Ringgold expressed dismay at the “unfortunate turn of events” and requested
an evidentiary hearing.
(9) On February 10, 2014, the Commissioner issued a report
denying the request for an evidentiary hearing and recommending that the
motion to withdraw should be granted and the postconviction motion should
be denied.6 The Commissioner further represented that, after making her
own conscientious examination of the record and the law for any other
claims that could arguably support a postconviction motion, she had
4
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2).
5
Id.
6
State v. Ringgold, 2014 WL 605849 (Del. Super. Comm’r Feb. 10, 2014).
4
concluded that the record did not support any other claim for relief.7 By
order dated March 17, 2014, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s
report and recommendation, granted Counsel’s motion to withdraw, and
denied the postconviction motion.8 This appeal followed.
(10) Typically, the Superior Court and this Court address the
procedural requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of a
postconviction motion.9 In this case, the Superior Court determined that
Ringgold’s claims of insufficient evidence, speedy trial, and exculpatory
evidence, were raised and rejected on direct appeal and should be
procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4).10 On
appeal, we agree with the Superior Court and further determine that
reconsideration of the formerly adjudicated claims is not warranted in the
interest of justice.11 Having carefully considered the parties’ positions on
appeal, we further conclude that the suppression claim, the confrontation
claim, the coercion claim, the guilty plea claim, and the related ineffective
7
Id.
8
State v. Ringgold, 2014 WL 1087160 (Del. Super. Mar. 17, 2014).
9
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
10
See Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(i)(4) (barring a formerly adjudicated claim).
11
Id. (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be considered “in the interest of
justice”). “[A] defendant is not entitled to have a court re-examine an issue that has been
previously resolved “simply because the claim is refined or restated.’” Skinner v. State,
607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del.1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del.1990)).
5
counsel claims, are without merit for the reasons provided in the
Commissioner’s report as adopted by the Superior Court.12
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice
12
See State v. Ringgold, 2014 WL 1087160 (Del. Super. Mar. 17, 2014), adopting 2014
WL 605849 (Del. Super. Comm’r Feb. 10, 2014). We did not consider Ringgold’s illegal
sentence claim, which was not addressed in his briefs on appeal. Murphy v. State, 632
A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993) (holding that “[t]he failure to raise a legal issue in the text
of the opening brief generally constitutes a waiver of that claim on appeal.”).
6