Sells v. State ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM S. SELLS, III, §
§ No. 429, 2013
Defendant-Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below:
§
v. § Superior Court of the
§ State of Delaware, in and for
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Kent County
§
Plaintiff-Below, § Cr. I.D. No. 1108023648
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 10, 2014
Decided: January 27, 2015
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, RIDGELY, VALIHURA and
VAUGHN, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Andre Beauregard, Esquire (argued), Brown, Shiels & Beauregard, LLC, Dover,
Delaware, and Adam D. Windett, Esquire, Hopkins & Windett, LLC, Dover,
Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire (argued), Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for
Appellee.
VALIHURA, Justice:
Defendant-Below, Appellant William S. Sells, III (“Sells”) appeals from a
Superior Court judgment where the jury found Sells guilty of Robbery in the First
Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Possession
of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Wearing a Disguise During the Commission
of a Felony, six counts of Aggravated Menacing, and five counts of Reckless
Endangering in the Second Degree. Sells was sentenced as follows: as to Robbery
First Degree, twenty-five years at Level V incarceration pursuant to 11 Del. C.
§ 4214; as to Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, twenty-
five years at Level V incarceration pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214; as to Possession
of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, eight years at Level V incarceration pursuant
to 11 Del. C. § 4214; as to Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a
Felony, five years at Level V incarceration pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214; as to six
counts of Aggravated Menacing, five years at Level V incarceration pursuant to 11
Del. C. § 4214 on each count; and as to five counts of Reckless Endangering
Second Degree, one year at Level V incarceration pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214 on
each count. Thus, Sells was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate Level
V sentence of ninety-eight years. A timely notice of appeal was filed on August
16, 2013.
Sells raises two arguments on appeal. First, Sells argues that the Superior
Court erred when it denied his motion to sever his trial from his co-defendant’s,
1
Russell Grimes (“Grimes”). Sells contends that Grimes would have provided
exculpatory evidence if the trials had been severed. Second, Sells argues that the
Superior Court erred in finding one of his peremptory challenges of a white juror
violated the United States Constitution, and that it erred in upholding the State’s
Batson1 challenge. We agree with Sells’ as to his second claim and, therefore,
need not reach the first claim. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed as to
Sells’ conviction.2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
On August 26, 2011, a masked man entered the First National Bank of
Wyoming in Felton, Delaware (the “Bank”), displayed what appeared to be a
firearm, ordered the Bank manager to exit her office, and told the tellers to empty
the cash drawers. During the robbery, the man jumped over a counter in the Bank
and blood was later discovered on the ceiling above that counter.4 The man placed
the money from the cash drawers into a satchel and exited the Bank. These events
were recorded on the Bank’s security cameras. The money taken from the Bank
contained dye packs, a security device designed to stain money taken from the
1
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2
Grimes is pursuing a separate appeal to this Court; his claims will be addressed separately in
his appeal.
3
The facts are drawn from the record presented to the trial court below and the briefing on
appeal.
4
The testimony of a Senior Forensic DNA Analyst revealed that the samples taken from inside
the Bank were not consistent with either Grimes or Sells.
2
Bank, and “bait bills,” bills for which the bank had recorded and maintained serial
numbers in case of theft. Over $53,000 was taken from the Bank.
When the suspect exited the Bank, he entered a black SUV. An employee of
the Bank who ran outside during the robbery testified that she saw the SUV driving
away from the Bank and that the SUV was emitting “pink, red smoke” which
indicated to her that the dye pack had gone off. Officer Keith Shyers of the
Harrington Police Department (“Officer Shyers”) also observed the SUV, and
testified that he saw a black male “hanging out [of] the window” of the SUV and a
“red poof” that “looked like some kind of paint.”
Because the vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed and he thought
something was suspicious, Officer Shyers turned around and began following the
SUV. Officer Shyers then heard a call that went out over the radio dispatch for a
robbery that had just occurred at the Bank. Officer Shyers was the first officer to
begin pursuing the car and was the lead vehicle for much of the pursuit. A few
minutes into the pursuit, the SUV stopped at an intersection and the passenger got
out of the vehicle and began firing shots at the pursuing officers. Officer Shyers
testified that he was approximately 20 to 30 feet from the passenger and that the
passenger was a black male wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt.
The passenger then got back in the SUV and a high-speed pursuit ensued
involving officers from the Delaware State Police, Harrington Police Department,
3
and Felton Police Department. At various points during the pursuit, the passenger
popped up through the sunroof and fired shots at the officers. The left rear tire on
Officer Shyer’s vehicle was shot and he abandoned his vehicle and jumped in
another officer’s car to continue the pursuit.
Corporal Scott Torgerson, an assistant shift supervisor for the Delaware
State Police (“Corporal Torgerson”), who was driving a fully-marked Crown
Victoria, took over as the lead vehicle in the pursuit. The passenger continued to
fire shots at the officers from the sunroof. The SUV drove around spike strips that
had been set in its path and Corporal Torgerson continued to pursue it. Shortly
thereafter, the driver lost control of the SUV and it came to rest in a ditch with its
back tires stuck. The driver and the passenger both exited the SUV and began
fleeing and Corporal Torgerson fired shots at them. The driver of the SUV was
shot in the leg by Corporal Torgerson and was later identified as Grimes. The
passenger of the vehicle escaped on foot.
The SUV was registered to Sophia Jones (“Jones”). Jones was Sells’
girlfriend. Jones and Sells shared an apartment and had a child together. Jones
testified that she did not know who was driving the SUV at the time of the bank
robbery because she had not seen the SUV in over a week, but that the last time
she had seen the SUV, Sells had been driving it. She testified that Sells had the
SUV because he was trying to sell it.
4
After the robbery, police officers searched the apartment that Jones and Sells
shared and asked her questions. Jones gave the officers Sells’ cell phone number
and told them that Sells’ best friend was named “Russell.” On August 28, 2011,
Jones contacted the police and inquired about getting her SUV back. The officers
asked Jones if Sells had contacted her, and she replied that he had called her,
inquired after his son, and asked whether the police had been to the apartment
because he had heard about the SUV being in an incident with Grimes.
On September 6, 2011, Sells was found barricaded in a room at the
Shamrock Motel. The SWAT team deployed tear gas grenades, smoke grenades,
stringball grenades,5 and stun grenades into the room through a small bathroom
window that opened to the outside in order to get Sells to exit the room, but those
efforts were unsuccessful. The officers used so many of the various types of
grenades that Sergeant Ennis testified that he had “no idea how [Sells] stayed” in
the room.6
When the standoff ended and Sells was taken into custody, United States
currency was collected from three separate locations of the motel room: in the
living room, in the bathroom, and outside the hotel underneath the bathroom
window. Many of the bills that were collected as evidence at the hotel were torn
5
Stringball grenades are were described by Sergeant Ennis as “a rubber softball [that] has small
little tiny rubber balls that are inside of it; when it explodes, the rubber balls fly around.”
6
The officers completely exhausted their supply of grenades and a helicopter had to deliver
additional grenades.
5
and burned. Some of the money that was collected in the living room area of the
motel room also appeared to be stained with a red dye. Sells’ defense counsel
elicited testimony on cross examination that the red stains on the currency could
have been caused by some of the explosives, which discharge red dye. A large red
stain also appeared on one of the walls of the motel room. Around 50 bills were
collected from the motel room ranging in denominations from $1 to $50. The total
value of the money collected was at most $769.7
Witnesses testified that Sells had used $475 of money with a red dye stain to
purchase cigarettes, and that 34 of those bills matched bait bills that were taken
from the Bank. One of Sells’ female companions also testified that Sells used
$3,500 in cash to purchase a car and that some of that money had red on it. That
money was never recovered.
On November 7, 2011, Sells was indicted on one count of Robbery First
Degree, one count of Conspiracy Second Degree, one count of Conspiracy First
Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a
Felony, two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, one count of
Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, six counts of Aggravated
Menacing, one count of Felony Theft, and five counts of Attempted Murder First
7
Detective Daddio testified that $31 was found outside the hotel room, the living area had $44
and one-half of a $50 bill. In the bathroom there was $418 recovered and an additional $226 in
partial bills.
6
Degree. On November 29, 2011, Sells entered a plea of not guilty and requested a
trial by jury. On April 10, 2013, Sells filed a motion to sever (the “First Motion to
Sever”) his trial from that of his co-defendant, Grimes. That motion, while not
included in the record before us, appears to have been based on a claim that Sells
and Grimes planned to present defenses that were antagonistic to one another. A
hearing was held on the motion on April 18, 2013, and Sells was given an
opportunity to file a supplemental memorandum of law on April 23, 2013. The
Court denied the First Motion to Sever on April 30, 2013, and scheduled trial to
begin on May 7, 2013. On May 1, 2013, Sells filed a new motion to sever (the
“Second Motion to Sever”).8
The Second Motion to Sever stated that Sells’ defense counsel met with
Grimes on April 30, 2013, and that Grimes made statements that could have
potentially exonerated Sells of any wrongdoing. Sells argued that he would be
extremely prejudiced by the absence of the exculpatory testimony that Grimes
would provide, and that Grimes would not testify at a joint trial due to the
likelihood that his criminal record would be introduced by the State, but that if the
trials were severed, Grimes would testify on Sells’ behalf. The Second Motion to
8
The Superior Court was displeased that the new motion to sever had been filed so close in
proximity to the start of the trial and at a time when the parties knew that the Superior Court
judges were at a judicial retreat.
7
Sever included an Exhibit -- a statement signed by Sells’ defense counsel that
stated:
1. On Tuesday April 30, 2013, undersigned counsel met with
Russell Grimes . . . and obtained a detailed statement from Grimes.
Grimes advised that he was familiar with Defendant Sells and has
known Sells for several years.
2. Grimes stated that he was living in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina for seven months in 2011, contacted Sells in the summer of
2011, and arranged to purchase a black Ford Explorer from Sells. He
did not purchase the vehicle with the intent to use it in the robbery.
Nor did he discuss any criminal activity with Sells.
3. . . . Upon [Grimes’] arrival in Delaware, he contacted Sells and
arranged to meet to purchase the Ford Explorer. Grimes paid
$1,500.00 cash for the vehicle. . . .
4. Grimes stated that he believed the vehicle to be insured by
Sophia Jones, Sells’ girlfriend and an insurance card was in the car
indicating the same. He further stated that the transfer of the vehicle
was not completed properly and that he could not do so because of
warrants for his arrest in Delaware.
5. Grimes stated that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the
alleged robbery, that Sells was not with him, and that Sells was not
involved in the robbery of the First National Bank of Wyoming.
Grimes was unequivocal in his assertion that Sells could not have
been involved in the robbery. He described the suspect that
committed the robbery as a male of Spanish descent, six feet tall, thin
build, with a tear drop tattoo under his eye.
6. Grimes stated that he does not intend to testify at the scheduled
joint trial. However, should the trials be severed, Grimes advised that
he would be willing to testify on Sells’ behalf and he would testify that
Sells was not present for, did not plan, nor participate in the robbery
at the First National Bank of Wyoming. Grimes would testify that he
was in sole possession and control of the Ford Explorer he bought
from Sells and rebut evidence introduced by the State for the purpose
of implicating Sells.9
9
App. to Opening Br. at A13-14 (emphasis added).
8
The Superior Court was displeased with the tardiness of the motion to sever
and with the fact that the motion to sever did not include a sworn affidavit from
Grimes. Instead, it included only a signed statement from defense counsel
describing the conversation that they had with Grimes. In considering the Second
Motion to Sever at the pre-trial hearing, the Superior Court stated:
I’m looking at Butler,10 . . . [T]he unsigned by Mr. Grimes exhibit,
would certainly substantiate a bona fide need on the part of Mr. Sells
for the testimony. The substance of the testimony is decidedly
relevant. It is completely exculpatory in nature and effect. The fourth
requirement, of course, is that the codefendant will, in fact, testify if
the cases are severed. So that’s one issue. Then, if there is a showing
on the first four, then the Court’s to examine the significance of the
testimony, and I would say it’s clearly significant; assess the extent of
the prejudice caused by its absence, and although it’s not [one]
hundred percent, I would certainly say it’s substantial; pay close
attention to judicial administration, which would have to be ignored
completely; and give weight to the timeliness, which is, as has been
mentioned previously, atrocious.
The Superior Court then questioned Grimes, who was proceeding pro se, to
determine whether he would, in fact, testify on Sells’ behalf if the trials were
severed. Grimes initially appeared to be confused about what the Superior Court
was asking him. After the Superior Court explained the factors that it was required
to consider to determine whether to grant a motion to sever, the following colloquy
occurred between the Court and Grimes:
10
U.S. v. Butler, 611 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1980).
9
Court: So let’s get to the issue about whether the codefendant
will, in fact, testify consistent with the information that
he’s given. Does Mr. Grimes or his standby counsel
want to take any position on that?
Grimes: Yes. Good morning, your Honor.
Court: Good morning, Mr. Grimes.
Grimes: I didn’t tell anybody that I was testifying.
Court: What’s that?
Grimes: I didn’t say I was testifying to this, what’s on this paper.
I don’t even know what they talking about, somebody
sold me guns. They sold me --
Court: Don’t get into any facts. The question is whether you
will testify as you have described -- as has been
described in this exhibit. And if somebody wants to hand
him a copy of the exhibit, that’s fine.
Grimes: Where’s the exhibit, sir?
Court: I just finished saying if somebody wants to hand you a
copy of it.
Grimes: No, no, no. Nobody sold any guns. I didn’t have any
guns.
Court: I don’t know that it’s --
Grimes: I didn’t say nothing like that.
Defense counsel had not brought a copy of the Second Motion to Sever or
the attached exhibit to the courtroom, and no one had a copy that Grimes was able
to review. The record suggests that Grimes was provided with a copy of the First
Motion to Sever, and not the affidavit signed by defense counsel indicating
Grimes’ proffered testimony in a severed trial. Grimes further stated:
the only thing I would be willing to testify, the truck situation, me
buying the truck and me coming from North Carolina to get the truck,
that’s the only thing I’m testifying to, if I would testify. Anything
10
other than that, I have nothing to do with it. I don’t know what they
are talking about.
After the Court dealt with some other preliminary matters, Sells’ defense
counsel asked to be excused. When he returned, counsel explained that Grimes did
not have the correct affidavit in front of him, but now Grimes had signed an exhibit
to Sells’ Second Motion to Sever describing the exculpatory testimony that Grimes
would be willing to provide if the trials were severed.11 At this point, Grimes
indicated that he would be offering at trial the affirmative defense of duress. The
State indicated that Grimes would need to take the stand and testify during the trial
if he wished to argue that he was under duress. After speaking with his standby
counsel, Grimes then stated, “I understand now that I would have to testify, so if
that’s what it is, then that’s what it will be.” Sells’ Second Motion to Sever was
then denied because Grimes indicated that he would be testifying at trial.
The Superior Court proceeded to select a jury on May 6, 2013. A joint jury
trial commenced on May 6, 2013, and concluded on May 28, 2013. There were
11
The version of Exhibit A signed by Grimes is not included in the record provided to this Court.
Counsel for Sells explained that this document was provided to the trial court and no copies were
made because there was no paper in the copy machine. Later, counsel was unable to find this
signed document in the court file. On December 10, 2014, at oral argument, this Court asked
counsel to attempt to locate Grimes’ affidavit. Not receiving a response, this Court sent counsel
a letter on January 15, 2015, requesting an update on what efforts were made and what counsel
determined regarding the missing affidavit. On January 16, 2015, the State advised the Court
that the State never received a copy of the Second Motion to Sever or the Grimes affidavit. On
January 20, 2015, Sells’ counsel filed a response stating that during the course of this appeal,
they had made additional efforts to locate the missing signed affidavit but were unable to locate
it.
11
approximately sixty witnesses. On the eighth day of trial, after the State presented
its case-in-chief, Grimes advised the Superior Court that he did not intend to
testify. Neither Sells nor Grimes testified at their joint trial.12
Sells then renewed his motion to sever on May 20, 2013, (the “Third Motion
to Sever”) and the Superior Court denied the motion in a bench ruling that day.13
Sells never mentioned the Third Motion to Sever in his opening brief and did not
include the pages from the transcript where the Third Motion to Sever was made
and denied in the appendix to his opening brief.14
Sells raises two claims on appeal. First, he argues that that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his request for severance of the trials. Second, he
argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that Sells’ peremptory challenge to
Juror #8 was a reverse-Batson15 violation. Because we find merit in the second
claim and, accordingly, reverse, we need not reach Sells’ first claim.16
12
Thus, Grimes did not appear as a trial witness to present an affirmative defense of duress.
13
App. to State’s Answering Br. at B59 (“[Sells’ Defense Counsel]: I would renew defendant
Sells’ motion to sever in light of Mr. Grimes’ decision not to testify. There was a pretrial issue.
He signed -- there was an exhibit that he signed that he would be testifying on Mr. Sells’ behalf,
and now he’s elected not to testify. The Court: I don’t know that there is -- at any rate, fine.
Your motion is noted, and overruled.”).
14
See Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987) (“[T]he appellant [has] the burden of
producing ‘such portions of the trial transcript as are necessary to give this Court a fair and
accurate account of the context in which the claim of error occurred’ and the record ‘must
include a transcript of all evidence relevant to the challenged finding or conclusion.’” (citing
DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 9(e)(ii), 14(e))).
15
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Traditionally, a Batson challenge has been used by
defendants objecting to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to remove from the venire
members of the defendant’s racial group. When this objection is used by the State in response to
12
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Erred in Seating Juror #8
1. Standard of Review
Sells’ second claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that his
peremptory challenge of a juror violated Batson v. Kentucky,17 and erred in
ordering the juror to be seated. Sells claims that the State failed to make a prima
facia case that his peremptory challenge constituted racial discrimination. We
agree.
In objecting to a peremptory challenge, the moving party bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case that the use of the peremptory strike constitutes
the defendant’s use of peremptory strikes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is known
as a “reverse Batson challenge.”
16
While we do not reach the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Sells’ motions to sever, we note that the trial court properly weighed the various factors to be
considered and initially appeared inclined to grant the severance motion until the State inquired
about whether Grimes would be raising an affirmative defense. In first applying the Butler
factors, the Court found that Grimes’ proffer had the potential to completely exonerate Sells.
Thus, the fourth factor -- whether Grimes would in fact testify if the cases were severed -- was
the lynchpin for determining whether the trial court should grant the Second Motion to Sever. If
the trial court believed that severance should have been granted based upon Grimes’ signed
affidavit, it should have granted the motion at the outset. Instead, the State entered the colloquy
and persuaded the Court that since Grimes was intending to offer an affirmative defense, he
would therefore need to take the stand in the joint trial. It was only after this development that
the trial court concluded that a severance was unnecessary. When, on the eighth day of trial,
Grimes decided that he was not going to testify, Sells promptly renewed his motion to sever. At
that point, given the trial court’s prior conclusion that Grimes’ proffered testimony could
potentially exonerate Sells, and that Grimes had stated in an affidavit that he was prepared to so
testify in a severed trial, the trial court should have set forth its reasons rather than summarily
deny the renewed motion.
17
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13
racial discrimination.18 The burden then shifts to the proponent of the strike to
present a race-neutral explanation.19 If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the
trial court must decide whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has proved
purposeful discrimination by the proponent of the strike.20 As to the first step of
the Batson analysis, we review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of
discretion, but we review legal conclusions de novo.21
2. Analysis
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution recognize a defendant’s “fundamental right
to trial by an impartial jury.”22 A peremptory strike safeguards that fundamental
right.23 Juror impartiality must be maintained not only in the interest of fairness to
those accused, but also to assure the integrity of the judicial process.24 However, a
peremptory strike may not be used by the State or the defendant in violation of the
18
Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230, 1238 (Del. 2000).
19
Id. (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)).
20
Barrow, 749 A.2d at 1238 (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767).
21
See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (“[A] defendant satisfies the requirements
of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an
inference that discrimination has occurred.”); Jones v. State, 938 A.2d 626, 632 (Del. 2007)
(considering whether the evidence supported the conclusion that the State established a prima
facie case of a Batson violation); Outten v. State, 650 A.2d 1291, 1299 (Del. 1994) (deferring to
the trial court’s findings that the defendants did not establish a prima facie case).
22
Knox v. State, 29 A3d 217, 223-24 (Del. 2011).
23
Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 588 (Del. 2013).
24
Id.
14
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.25 In Batson v.
Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step process to
analyze claims that a party utilized peremptory strikes in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.26 First, the opponent of the strike must make a prima facie case
of discrimination “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an
inference of discriminatory purpose.”27 Second, once the opponent makes a prima
facie case, then the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a neutral,
non-discriminatory explanation “related to the particular case to be tried.”28 Third,
if a neutral, non-discriminatory explanation is tendered, the trial court must
determine if the opponent of the strike has established purposeful discrimination by
the proponent.29
In this case, the State made a Batson challenge during jury selection because
it claimed that the defendant had stricken three white jurors. As a preliminary
matter, the factual premise of the State’s challenge was not correct. Sells exercised
one of his peremptory challenges to strike a black juror and two peremptory
25
See Burton v. State, 925 A.2d 503 (Del. 2007) (applying the Batson three-step process to an
objection made by the State to the defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge).
26
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
27
Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted).
28
Id. at 98.
29
Id.
15
challenges to strike two white jurors.30 Moreover, Sells argues that his strikes of
two white jurors and one black juror were consistent with the racial demographics
of Kent County.31 Accordingly, he argues that there was an insufficient factual
basis for the State’s challenge. Sells’ counsel objected on the record during the
trial that the State had failed to establish a pattern of racial discrimination.
As this Court recently explained in McCoy v. State, “[a] State’s Batson
objection to the defendant’s exercise of a peremptory challenge is known as a
reverse Batson claim.”32 In McCoy, we set forth the following test to be applied in
analyzing a reverse Batson claim:
When the State makes a reverse Batson challenge to a peremptory
strike a three-step inquiry is required. First, the trial judge must
determine whether the State has made a prima facie showing that the
defendant exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race.
Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to
present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question.
Although the defendant must present a comprehensible reason, “[t]he
second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is
persuasive, or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inherently
discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the trial judge must then determine
whether the State has carried its burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. This final step involves evaluating “the
30
Sells’ fourth peremptory challenge was exercised to remove a white female juror. This strike
occurred after the State raised its Batson challenge. Sells offered two reasons for exercising this
peremptory challenge: that the prospective juror was a cashier and was employed by law
enforcement. The trial court held that the latter ground was a valid race-neutral reason for the
strike.
31
He notes that according to the most recent census data, Kent County is 68.8% white and
24.97% African American. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates Program,
available at http://www.census.gov/poptest/index.html.
32
McCoy v. State, 2015 WL 292575, at *14 (Del. Jan 20, 2015).
16
persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the [defendant], but
“the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike,” which is
usually the State in a reverse Batson challenge.33
Thus, a reverse Batson claim arises upon the prosecution arguing that a minority
defendant is engaging in racial discrimination because he is striking white jurors.
In responding to the State’s reverse Batson challenge, the Superior Court
stated:
As counsel for Mr. Sells know [sic] and as Mr. Grimes may well not,
while these strikes are peremptory and can be made for any reason or
no reason, basically, they cannot be exercised on the basis of race. I
think I will not change anyone seated to this point, but I would simply
say to counsel for Defendant Sells and to Mr. Grimes that from this
point forward, because of the pattern that has emerged, that any
excusal of a Caucasian juror will have to be for an express reason
other than race.34
The Superior Court stated that it was not requiring the defendants to provide
reasons for jurors that had already been excused, but that going forward, a stated
reason would be necessary.
Grimes then attempted to use a peremptory strike on Juror #8, a white male.
The following exchange occurred:
Court: Mr. Grimes, this is your strike. What is your nonracially-
based reason?
33
Id. at *17-18 (internal citations omitted).
34
App. to Opening Br. at A21-22 (emphasis added).
17
Grimes: The nonracially-based reason is because he’s employed
by Kent County Levy Court. I guess he’s employed by
law enforcement through them.
Court: Levy Court is not law enforcement.
Grimes: Well, I don’t know.
Court: Well, I do, and it’s not.
Grimes: I don’t know if that’s the reason he’s saying he’s
employed by law enforcement or not. I’m saying he’s
employed by the court, and it says he’s employed by law
enforcement.
Court: He’s not employed by this court.
Grimes: Okay. I understand what you’re saying, your Honor. I’m
going by what it says on the jury profile, and on the jury
profile, it says specifically that he’s employed by law
enforcement. So when I see “law enforcement,” and this
is a case involving law enforcement, the neutral racial
bias -- I mean the base reason --
Court: I understand.
Grimes: -- is that he’s employed by law enforcement, whether it’s
the court or not. I just see that he’s employed by law
enforcement, and this is a case involving law
enforcement.
State: But so is Juror 11 . . . who happens to be a black male,
yet this defendant has only struck whites. Your Honor,
and just for the record, While [Juror #8] does indicate
he’s employed in Kent County Levy Court, his
occupation is a mechanic.
The Court allowed Juror #8 to remain seated. Sells then exercised a peremptory
challenge with respect to the same juror for the same reasons.35 The following
exchange occurred between the Court and Sells’ counsel:
35
App. to Opening Br. at A30 (“Your Honor, the reason for the strike is according to the
information we have from the court, he was employed or he is employed by law enforcement.”).
18
Court: Okay. You heard everything that was said two minutes
ago, and you heard my ruling on that. You have nothing
to add to that; is that correct?
Counsel: Except, your Honor, that now it’s our motion to strike.
Court: No, no. It’s no different, yours or Mr. Grimes.
Counsel: Well, there is a difference.
Court: Mr. Grimes made the same motion and it was denied.
He’s seated. Now unless you have something new to
add, then I’m going to be really concerned about why
we’re going through this exercise at all.
Counsel: I’m establishing a record, in that, we believe he’s
employed by law enforcement.
Court: Okay. Fine. He’s going to be seated.
Sells now argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding a pattern of
racial discrimination in the exercise of his three peremptory strikes, and that Juror
#8’s response to the jury questionnaire indicating that he was a member of law
enforcement was a valid race-neutral basis to permit his removal by the defense.
In this case, the State had the burden of establishing a prima facie case that
the non-moving party (Sells) intentionally used his peremptory challenges to
discriminate against a cognizable group. The trial court found a pattern of racial
discrimination after Sells struck two Caucasian jurors and one African American
juror. As we stated in McCoy, “[a]lthough there are no fixed rules, we
acknowledge that ‘a pattern of strikes against jurors of a particular race could be
19
prima facie evidence of racial discrimination.’”36 But here, the State engaged in no
analysis to support its claim that a pattern of racial discrimination existed -- other
than aggregating Grimes’ and Sells’ peremptory challenges and stating that a
pattern existed because the defendants, collectively, used five of six strikes on
white jurors.37 “It is the opponent of the strike’s burden to set forth ‘facts and
other relevant circumstances’ to support an inference of discrimination.”38 We do
not believe that the State established a prima facie case of discrimination based
upon Sells’ attempt to strike two white jurors.
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Batson, “[w]e have
confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to
36
McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at *19-20 (quoting State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Iowa
2012)).
37
See App. to Opening Br. at A21-23:
State: Your Honor, the State is making a Batson change [sic]. Both
defendants have -- three jurors that they have each stricken have all
been white.
Court: As counsel for Mr. Sells know [sic] and as Mr. Grimes may well
not, while these strikes are peremptory and can be made for any
reason or no reason, basically, they cannot be exercised on the
basis of race.
I think I will not change anyone seated to this point, but I would
simply say to counsel for Defendant Sells and to Mr. Grimes that
from this point forward, because of the pattern that has emerged,
that any excusal of a Caucasian juror will have to be for an express
reason other than race.
...
We’re talking five for six at this juncture. All that’s necessary is a
stated reason.
38
McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at *20 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986)).
20
decide if the circumstances concerning the . . . use of peremptory challenges
creates a prima facie case of discrimination against . . . jurors.”39 A trial court is
within its discretion to determine that there is a prima facie case of discrimination
so long as there is sufficient evidence to permit the trial judge to draw an inference
that discrimination has occurred.40 While the first step of the Batson analysis was
not intended to be an onerous one,41 we are confident that there is insufficient
evidence here to permit the trial court to draw an inference that discrimination has
occurred. The State presented no evidence as to what the overall racial
composition of the venire was, for example. The fact that Sells struck only two
white jurors is an insufficient evidentiary basis for the trial court to draw an
inference that a “pattern” of racial discrimination has occurred.
39
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
40
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 (2005). In Johnson v. California, a number of
prospective jurors were removed for cause until forty-three eligible jurors remained, three of
whom were black. The petitioner was a black male convicted of second degree murder and
assault on a nineteen-month old Caucasian child. The prosecutor used three of his twelve
peremptory challenges to remove the three prospective black jurors. The resulting jury,
including alternates, were all white. Upon the petitioner’s challenge, the trial court found that
petitioner had failed to make a prima facie case. The United States Supreme Court made clear
that a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out by offering a wide variety of evidence
“so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives rise to an inference of a discriminatory purpose.”
Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that it “did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a
defendant would have to persuade the judge -- on the basis of all the facts, some of which are
impossible for the defendant to know with certainty -- that the challenge was more likely than
not the product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies Batson’s first step
requirements by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred.” Id.
41
Id.
21
Moreover, the trial court erred in aggregating the peremptory strikes of
Grimes and Sells. Superior Court Criminal Rule 24(b) provides that “[i]n
noncapital cases, the State shall be entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the
defendant or defendants shall be entitled to a total of 6 peremptory challenges.”42
Rule 24(b)(2) further provides that “[i]f there is more than one defendant, the court
may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be
exercised separately or jointly.”43 Here, Sells and Grimes were exercising their
peremptory challenges separately.44 In McCoy, this Court reiterated that “‘[o]ne of
the primary safeguards for impaneling a fair and impartial jury is a defendant’s
right to challenge prospective jurors, either peremptorily or for cause.’”45 The
importance of peremptory strikes is highlighted by our recognition that “a new trial
is required when a juror is erroneously allowed to remain on the jury despite the
defendant’s valid peremptory challenge to that juror’s presence.”46 We explained
our rationale as follows:
42
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
43
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2).
44
The record presented to this Court does not show how many peremptory strikes each
defendant was given. Our review of the record suggests that Grimes attempted to exercise his
fourth peremptory challenge and Sells’ attempted to exercise his fifth peremptory challenge to
remove Juror #8.
45
McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at *31 (quoting Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 587 (Del. 2013);
Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 482 (Del. 2003)).
46
McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at *32.
22
In Riley v. State, this Court held that “peremptory challenges, when
appropriately executed, are an essential tool for eliminating potential
jury bias and must be available to any party, within constitutional
limits.” The improper denial of a peremptory challenge forces the
defendant to be judged by a jury that includes a juror that is
objectionable to him. When this occurs, and the defendant properly
objected to seating the juror by attempting to exercise his Rule 24(c)
right to use a peremptory challenge, and that objection is overruled by
an erroneous finding of a reverse Batson violation, prejudice must be
presumed.47
Each defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury. Because there is no basis in
the record before us to attribute any motives Grimes may have had in exercising
his strikes to Sells, it was error to conclude that Sells was engaging in a pattern of
racial discrimination in striking two white jurors and one black juror.
Further, because African Americans like Sells48 are members of a minority
group in Kent County, the pattern of peremptory strikes against only Caucasian
members of the venire may provide less of an inference of discrimination. If a
super-majority of the venire is Caucasian, a pattern of striking white jurors is less
telling evidence that race was a factor, because the mathematical odds would be
that most potential jurors questioned for the parties to strike would be Caucasian.
Thus, trial courts should be cautious about inhibiting the use of peremptory strikes
47
Id. (quoting Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1012 (Del. 1985) (emphasis added)) (citing DEL.
CONST. art. I § 4; DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 24(c); State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 225 (Iowa
2012)).
48
Sells notes in his brief that he is of “mixed race, both Caucasian and African-American.”
Thus, Sells contends that regardless of whether he was removing an African American juror or a
Caucasian juror, he was removing a juror of his race. This argument, however, was not
presented to the trial court.
23
by a defendant except after careful application of Batson. Because here there was
an insufficient basis for the trial court’s conclusion that there was a “pattern” of
discrimination, prejudice must be presumed and a new trial is required.
After finding that a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination had
been established, the trial court proceeded to the second step of the Batson
analysis. It then found that Sells had not articulated a “non-discriminatory” reason
for attempting to remove Juror #8 since Sells’ proffered reason turned out to be
erroneous.49
Sells argues that the challenge to Juror #8 was based on a valid race-neutral
reason because Juror #8 was employed by “law enforcement.” We have held that
to rebut the prima facia case, “the [proponent of the strike] must provide a ‘clear
and reasonably specific’ explanation of ‘legitimate reasons’ for his use of the
challenges that are ‘related to the particular case.’”50
As the Superior Court explained, Juror #8 was actually employed by the
Levy Court as a mechanic.51 The court noted that Juror #8 was a mechanic; but the
form the juror submitted also indicated that he was a member of law enforcement.
49
The third step in the analysis -- whether the opponent of the strike has made a record that
would support a finding of pretext -- was not reached.
50
Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1224 (Del. 1996) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98
n.20 (1986)); see also Jones v. State, 938 A.2d 626, 632 (Del. 2007).
51
See App. to Opening Br. at A28-30 (“[State]: Your Honor, and just for the record, while
[Juror #8] does indicate that he’s employed in Kent County Levy Court, his occupation is a
mechanic.”).
24
Regardless of this discrepancy, because the State never established a prima facie
case for a reverse-Batson violation, it was error for the trial court to shift the
burden to Sells to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for exercising
his peremptory challenge. As a result, Juror #8 was improperly seated and
participated in the trial.52 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Superior
Court for a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the forgoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby
REVERSED and REMANDED.
52
As it turns out, Juror #8 was removed after jury deliberations had begun because he had an ex
parte conversation with a State witness prior to the commencement of deliberations. Sells and
Grimes consented to the removal of Juror #8. The trial proceeded with a jury of eleven. In
Claudio v. State, we acknowledged that with the consent of the parties, the unanimous verdict of
eleven jurors could be accepted by the court. Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1304 (Del. 1991).
While, as a result of an on-the-record colloquy, Sells appears to have waived any challenges
arising from Juror #8’s ex parte conversation with a State’s witness, Sells did not waive his
Batson challenge, and the subsequent removal of Juror #8 does not “cure” the improper seating
of Juror #8.
25