Peters v. DSCYF ( 2020 )


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  •             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    ANAIS PETERS,1             §
    §                      No. 342, 2019
    Respondent Below,     §
    Appellant,            §                      Court Below—Family Court
    §                      of the State of Delaware
    v.                    §
    §                      File No. 19-02-06TN
    DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR §                      Petition No. 19-04579
    CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR  §
    FAMILIES,                  §
    §
    Petitioner Below,     §
    Appellee.             §
    §
    IN THE INTEREST OF:        §
    HAYDEN PETERS              §
    Submitted: December 16, 2019
    Decided: February 14, 2020
    Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices.
    ORDER
    Upon consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court Rule
    26.1, her attorney’s motion to withdraw, the response of the Department of Services
    for Children, Youth and Their Families/Division of Family Services (“DSCYF”),
    and the response of the child’s attorney, it appears to the Court that:
    (1)    The respondent below-appellant, Anais Peters (“the Mother”), filed an
    appeal from the Family Court’s decision, dated July 8, 2019, terminating her parental
    1
    The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the appellants under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
    rights to her daughter (“the Child”).2 On appeal, the Mother’s counsel (“Counsel”)
    has filed an opening brief and motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26.1.
    Counsel represents that she has made a conscientious review of the record and the
    law and found no meritorious argument in support of the appeal. Counsel also makes
    several hypothetical arguments if she were required to make arguments. The Mother
    has submitted no points for the Court’s consideration. In response to Counsel’s
    submission, DSCYF and the Child’s attorney have moved to affirm the Family
    Court's termination of the Mother’s parental rights.
    (2)     The Child was born in 2017. On May 4, 2018, DSCYF sought, ex parte,
    emergency custody of the Child, alleging that the Mother was incarcerated for
    endangering the welfare of the Child after she threw the Child to the ground multiple
    times. DSCYF also alleged that there were concerns about the Mother’s mental
    health and both parents’ substance abuse. The Family Court granted emergency
    custody of the Child to DSCYF.
    (3)     At the preliminary protective hearing on May 9, 2018, the Family Court
    appointed counsel to represent the Mother. The Mother consented to a probable
    cause finding of dependency for the Child. The Child was placed in the care of the
    maternal grandmother.
    2
    The Family Court also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s father, who filed a separate
    appeal (No. 339, 2019). We only recite the facts in the record as they relate to the Mother’s appeal.
    2
    (4)   On June 6, 2018, the Family Court held an adjudicatory hearing. The
    Mother consented to the Family Court finding the Child dependent in light of the
    pending criminal charges against her. The Mother also agreed to accept services
    from DSCYF. The Family Court found that DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to
    prevent unnecessary removal of the Child and had provided reasonable notice to
    family members.
    (5)   On July 3, 2018, the Family Court held a dispositional hearing. The
    Mother’s case plan was admitted into evidence. As part of her case plan, the Mother
    was required to complete mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations and follow
    any recommendations for treatment, work with a family interventionst, and complete
    parenting classes. The Mother was already employed and had housing. DSCYF had
    removed the Child from the maternal grandmother’s care because she allowed the
    Mother to have unsupervised contact with the Child. As a result of the pending
    criminal charges against the Mother, there was a no-contact order between the
    Mother and the Child. The Child was doing well in foster care. The Family Court
    found that DSCYF was making reasonable efforts toward reunification.
    (6)   On September 25, 2018, the Family Court held a review hearing. The
    Mother had made some progress on her case plan by starting parenting classes and
    substance-abuse treatment. She continued, however, to test positive for PCP. She
    had not completed a mental health evaluation or seen a family interventionist. The
    3
    Mother’s criminal charges relating to the Child were still pending and the no-contact
    order remained in effect. The Child was doing well in foster care. The Family Court
    found that DSCYF was making reasonable efforts toward reunification.
    (7)    The Family Court held another review hearing on December 17, 2018.
    The Mother did not appear for the hearing, but her progress on her case plan included
    completion of a parenting class, receiving treatment for her drug addiction and
    mental health, and maintaining her housing and employment. Her urine screens
    continued to test positive for PCP. After modification of the no-contact order, the
    Mother had begun visitation with the Child. The Mother’s criminal charges—
    endangering the welfare of a child and second degree child abuse—remained
    pending. The Child continued to do well in foster care. The Family Court found
    that DSCYF had made reasonable efforts toward at reunification.
    (8)    On February 19, 2019, DSCYF filed a motion to change the goal to
    termination of parental rights. The Family Court held another review hearing on
    March 12, 2019. The Mother had completed her case plan, but continued to test
    positive for PCP and still faced criminal charges relating to the Child. She had
    cancelled several of her weekly visits with the Child. The Mother claimed for the
    first time that her use of Benadryl was causing false positive results for PCP in her
    urine screens. The Child continued to do well in foster care. The Family Court
    granted DSCYF’s motion to change the goal to termination of parental rights. The
    4
    Family Court scheduled a termination of parental rights hearing for June 21, 2019.
    (9)    At the June 21, 2019 hearing, the Family Court heard testimony from
    both parents, the DSCYF treatment worker and permanency worker, the parents’
    family interventionists, the Mother’s substance-abuse counselor, and the Child’s
    court appointed special advocate. The testimony reflected that the Mother missed
    or was late for many of her scheduled visits with the Child. The Mother stopped
    taking Benadryl for a while, still tested positive for PCP, and resumed taking
    Benadryl. The Mother testified that she had taken Benadryl every day since a doctor
    told her to take it in 2006 for a skin condition that was common for women in their
    30s. When asked why she kept taking Benadryl if it was causing false positive tests
    for PCP as she claimed, the Mother said she thought not taking Benadryl could
    negatively affect her health.
    (10) Although the Mother was employed, her pay had dropped from
    approximately $500 a week to less than $100 a week recently because she was
    working less hours. The Mother testified that she missed work for personal reasons
    that she was unwilling to disclose. There was also testimony regarding DSCYF’s
    unsuccessful efforts to find another relative placement for the Child.         The
    permanency worker testified that the Child was doing well in foster care and that
    there were adoptive resources readily available. The criminal charges were still
    pending against the Mother.
    5
    (11) On July 8, 2019, the Family Court issued a decision terminating the
    parental rights of Mother and the Father. As to the Mother, the Family Court found
    by clear and convincing evidence that she had failed to plan adequately for the
    Child’s needs under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). The Family Court also found that the
    Child had been in DFS care for more than six months, the Mother’s employment
    was questionable, she had failed to overcome her PCP addiction, she continued to
    have unresolved criminal charges relating to the Child, and her visitation with the
    Child was inconsistent. The Family Court next found, by clear and convincing
    evidence, that DFS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Finally, the
    Family Court considered the best-interest factors under 13 Del. C. § 722 and found,
    by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights was in the best
    interests of the Child.3 This appeal followed.
    (12) On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal
    determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.4 We will not disturb the
    3
    The best-interest factors include: (i) the wishes of the parents regarding the child’s custody and
    residential arrangements; (ii) the wishes of the child regarding her custodians and residential
    arrangements; (iii) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with her parents, grandparents,
    siblings, persons cohabitating in the relationship of husband and wife with a parent of the child,
    and any other residents of the household or persons who may significantly affect the child’s best
    interests; (iv) the child's adjustment to her home, school, and community; (v) the mental and
    physical health of all individuals involved; (vi) past and present compliance by both parents with
    their rights and responsibilities to the child under 13 Del. C. § 701; (vii) evidence of domestic
    violence; and (viii) the criminal history of any party or any resident of the household. 13 Del. C. §
    722.
    4
    Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 
    41 A.3d 367
    , 370 (Del. 2012).
    6
    Family Court’s rulings on appeal if the court’s findings of fact are supported by the
    record and its explanations, deductions, and inferences are the product of an orderly
    and logical reasoning process.5 We review legal rulings de novo.6 If the Family
    Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of review is limited to abuse of
    discretion.7 On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute our judgment for
    that of the trier of fact.8
    (13) The statutory procedure for terminating parental rights requires two
    separate inquires.9 First, the Family Court must determine whether the evidence
    presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination. 10 Second, the Family
    Court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests
    of the child.11     Both of these requirements must be established by clear and
    convincing evidence.12
    (14) Counsel states that she found no arguably appealable issues, but that if
    required to make arguments, she would argue that: (i) the Mother’s Benadryl use
    caused false positive results for PCP; and (ii) the Family Court gave insufficient
    weight to some best-interest factors (such as the Mother’s opposition to termination
    5
    In re Heller, 
    669 A.2d 25
    , 29 (Del. 1995).
    6
    
    Id.
    7
    CASA v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 
    834 A.2d 63
    , 66 (Del. 2003).
    8
    Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 
    402 A.2d 1202
    , 1204 (Del. 1979).
    9
    Shepherd v. Clemens, 
    752 A.2d 533
    , 536-37 (Del. 2000).
    10
    13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (listing the grounds for termination of parental rights).
    11
    13 Del. C. § 722(a).
    12
    Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 
    963 A.2d 724
    , 731 (Del. 2008).
    7
    of her parental rights and the severing effect that termination would have on the
    Child’s relationships with biological family members) while giving too much weight
    to other factors (such as the Mother PCP use, her recent changes in income, and the
    pending criminal charges). These hypothetical arguments are without merit.
    (15) Despite months of positive PCP results, the Mother did not raise her
    use of Benadryl as a possible reason for those results until February 2019. The
    Mother testified that she had taken Benadryl every day for a skin condition since
    2006 based on a doctor’s advice, but was unable to identify the skin condition. She
    briefly discontinued using Benadryl in 2019, but still tested positive for PCP. The
    Mother testified that she resumed taking Benadryl because she thought not taking it
    could affect her health, but she did not testify that her skin condition had returned or
    that she sought any medical advice about taking Benadryl again. As the trier of fact
    and the sole judge of witness credibility, it was for the Family Court judge to
    determine whether the Mother’s testimony was credible.13 The record supports the
    Family Court’s conclusion that the Mother’s testimony was not credible and that she
    was attempting to mask her continued PCP use by claiming that she had to take a
    medication (Benadryl) that supposedly caused false positive results for PCP.
    (16) As to the Family Court’s weighing of the best interest factors, the
    13
    See supra n.8.
    8
    Family Court may give different weight to different factors.14 Even with the
    Mother’s wishes and the Child’s ability to readjust to living with the Mother
    weighing against termination of termination of parental rights, the weight of the
    factors in favor of termination of parental rights (including the Mother’s continued
    PCP use, her unexplained reduction in income, and then-pending criminal charges
    that arose from her abuse of the Child) supported the Family Court’s finding, by
    clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the Mother’s parental rights was
    in the Child’s best interests.
    (17) After careful consideration of the parties' positions and the record on
    appeal, we conclude that the Mother's appeal is wholly without merit. We are also
    satisfied that the Mother's counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the
    record and the law and has properly determined that the Mother could not raise a
    meritorious claim in this appeal. We therefore affirm the Family Court's termination
    of parental rights.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
    Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
    BY THE COURT:
    /s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
    Justice
    14
    Bower v. Dep't of Servs. for Child, Youth & Their Families, 
    2016 WL 3382353
    , at *4 (Del. June
    9, 2016) (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 
    691 A.2d 619
    , 623 (Del. 1997)).
    9