Gulf LNG Energy, LLC v. ENI USA Gas Marketing, LLC ( 2019 )


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  •    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    GULF LNG ENERGY, LLC and                )
    GULF LNG PIPELINE, LLC,                 )
    )
    Plaintiffs,                 )
    )
    v.                                )   C.A. No. 2019-0460-AGB
    )
    ENI USA GAS MARKETING LLC,              )
    )
    Defendant.                  )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: September 11, 2019
    Date Decided: December 30, 2019
    Bradley R. Aronstam, S. Michael Sirkin, and R. Garrett Rice, ROSS ARONSTAM
    & MORITZ LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Joseph S. Allerhand, Seth Goodchild, and
    Tania C. Matsuoka, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, New York, New York;
    Mark W. Friedman, William H. Taft V, Carl Micarelli, and Lisa Wang Lachowicz,
    DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Plaintiffs
    Gulf LNG Energy, LLC and Gulf LNG Pipeline, LLC.
    Joseph B. Cicero and Gregory E. Stuhlman, CHIPMAN BROWN CICERO &
    COLE, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Joseph J. LoBue and Helene Gogadze,
    SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, Washington, D.C.;
    Attorneys for Defendant Eni USA Gas Marketing LLC.
    BOUCHARD, C.
    In February 2019, this court entered an order and final judgment confirming
    an arbitration award in favor of Gulf LNG Energy, LLC and Gulf LNG Pipeline,
    LLC and against Eni USA Gas Marketing LLC for approximately $371.5 million.
    The judgment was the culmination of an arbitration proceeding that also resulted in
    the termination of a contract among the parties concerning Eni’s use of a liquefied
    natural gas terminal in Mississippi that the Gulf entities constructed and own. Entry
    of the judgment, however, did not end the parties’ legal entanglements.
    In September 2018, the Gulf entities sued Eni’s parent company in New York
    state court to enforce a payment guarantee. In June 2019, Eni began a second
    arbitration against the Gulf entities asserting two discrete claims for negligent
    misrepresentation and breach of contract. The filing of the second arbitration
    prompted this lawsuit, in which the Gulf entities seek entry of a permanent injunction
    to enjoin Eni from pursuing the second arbitration.
    Pending before the court is the Gulf entities’ motion for judgment on the
    pleadings.   The motion brings to center stage two different lines of authority
    concerning the arbitration of disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act—one that
    allows courts to intervene to prevent collateral attacks on arbitration awards; the
    other that enforces the contractual intent of parties on questions of arbitrability. For
    the reasons explained below, the court reaches different conclusions as to Eni’s two
    new claims in resolving the pending motion based on these two lines of authority.
    1
    First, the court finds that Eni’s negligent misrepresentation claim in the
    second arbitration constitutes an impermissible collateral attack that seeks to undo
    the damages award from the first arbitration. Accordingly, as to that claim, the court
    grants the Gulf entities’ motion and will enter a permanent injunction to enjoin Eni
    from pursuing the negligent misrepresentation claim in the second arbitration.
    Second, the court finds that Eni’s contract claim, which was pled but never
    decided in the first arbitration, does not amount to a collateral attack of the first
    arbitration award. Accordingly, as to that claim, the court denies the Gulf entities’
    motion and, in view of the broad arbitration clause in the parties’ contract, leaves it
    to the tribunal in the second arbitration to determine whether that claim is arbitrable
    and, if so, whether the claim would be precluded based on the first arbitration.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    The facts recited in this opinion come from the parties’ pleadings, documents
    incorporated therein, and the parties’ submissions.1 Unless otherwise noted, these
    facts are not in dispute.
    A.     The Parties
    Plaintiff Gulf LNG Energy, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, owns
    and operates the liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) terminal at the Pascagoula Facility
    1
    Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 1); Defendant’s Answer to Verified
    Complaint for Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 12).
    2
    in Mississippi.2 The purpose of the LNG terminal is to facilitate the import of LNG
    by ship into the United States.3 Plaintiff Gulf LNG Pipeline, LLC, a Delaware
    limited liability company, owns and operates a five-mile long pipeline that delivers
    and distributes natural gas from the Pascagoula Facility to downstream inland
    pipelines.4 This decision refers to Gulf LNG Energy, LLC and Gulf LNG Pipeline,
    LLC together as “Gulf” or the “Gulf entities.”
    Defendant Eni USA Gas Marketing LLC (“Eni”), a Delaware limited liability
    company, is in the business of marketing natural gas products and performing related
    services in the United States.5 Eni is an indirect subsidiary of Eni S.p.A., an Italian
    corporation in the oil and gas industry.6
    B.      The Terminal Use Agreement
    On December 8, 2007, Gulf and Eni entered into the Terminal Use Agreement
    (“TUA”), which provided that Gulf would construct the Pascagoula Facility.7 Eni
    planned to use the Pascagoula Facility to receive, store, regasify, and deliver LNG
    to downstream pipelines in the United States.8 Under the TUA, Eni agreed to pay
    2
    Answer ¶ 9.
    3
    Id.
    4
    Id. ¶ 10.
    5
    Id. ¶ 11.
    6
    Id.
    7
    Id. ¶ 15; Compl. Ex. C (“TUA”).
    8
    Compl. ¶ 15.
    3
    Gulf various fees for the use of the Pascagoula Facility, including monthly fees
    known as “Reservation Fees” and “Operating Fees.”9 The initial term of the TUA
    commenced on December 8, 2007 and runs for twenty years from the “Commercial
    Start Date.”10
    Gulf alleges it incurred substantial debt and spent over $1 billion to construct
    the Pascagoula Facility,11 which became operational on October 1, 2011.12 Apart
    from an initial import of LNG when the Facility first became operational, Eni did
    not use the Pascagoula Facility.13
    Five provisions in the TUA are relevant to the present dispute. In Article
    22.4(a), Gulf covenanted to “observe and comply with [Article 22.2(f)] in all
    respects.”14 In Article 22.2(f), the Gulf entities represented and warranted that their
    “Constitutive Documents” will limit their purpose to, among other things,
    constructing, operating, and maintaining the Pascagoula Facility.15
    9
    TUA Art. 11.1(b).
    10
    See id. at 1, Arts. 1.32, 1.178.
    11
    Compl. ¶ 16.
    12
    Answer ¶ 16.
    13
    Id.
    14
    TUA Art. 22.4(a).
    15
    Id. Art. 22.2(f).
    4
    Article 22.4(e) requires Gulf to receive “reasonable consideration” for any
    transaction it engages in with an “Affiliate.”16 Article 18.1 provides Eni with the
    right to terminate the TUA early if Gulf violates, among other provisions, Articles
    22.4(a) or 22.4(e).17 Finally, as discussed further below, Article 20.1(a) of the TUA
    contains a broad arbitration clause.18
    C.     Eni Initiates the First Arbitration Against Gulf
    On March 2, 2016, Eni filed a notice of arbitration with the American
    Arbitration Association, International Centre for Dispute Resolution, asserting
    claims against Gulf (the “First Arbitration”).19 Eni’s arbitration notice contended
    that, since the parties entered into the TUA, the natural gas market in the United
    States “has experienced radical change” due, in particular, to “the unforeseen, vast
    new production and supply of shale gas in the United States [that] made import of
    LNG into the United States economically irrational and unsustainable.”20
    In the First Arbitration, Eni sought, among other relief, (i) a declaration that
    “the essential purpose of the TUA has been frustrated and that the TUA has
    16
    Id. Art. 22.4(e). “Affiliate” is defined to mean “a Person . . . that directly or indirectly
    controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, another Person.” Id. Art. 1.7.
    17
    Id. Art. 18.1.
    18
    See Part II.B.
    19
    Dkt. 38.
    20
    Id. ¶ 3.
    5
    terminated” because of a “fundamental and unforeseeable change in the United
    States natural gas/LNG market,”21 and (ii) a declaration that Eni could terminate the
    TUA at any time under Article 18.1 because the Gulf entities “have breached the
    warranties and covenants set forth in at least Articles 22.4(a) and 22.4(e)” of the
    TUA.22 With respect to its second requested declaration, Eni asserted that Gulf
    violated Article 22.4(a) because Gulf had filed an application to modify the pipeline
    to “accommodate the planned liquefaction and export activities” contrary to the
    representation in Article 22.4(a) that the “purpose and object” of the Gulf entities
    was limited “strictly to importation and regasification of LNG.”23
    On June 29, 2018, the arbitration tribunal (“the First Tribunal”) issued its Final
    Award.24 The First Tribunal held that “the principal purpose of the TUA has been
    substantially frustrated” and declared that the TUA was terminated as of
    March 1, 2016.25        The First Tribunal ordered Eni to pay the Gulf entities
    $462,199,000 as “just compensation . . . for the value that their partial performance
    of the TUA conferred upon Eni.”26 This amount represents the sum of (i) restitution
    21
    Id. ¶¶ 57, 59.
    22
    Id. ¶ 64.
    23
    Id. ¶¶ 48, 61.
    24
    Compl. Ex. B (“Final Award”).
    25
    Id. ¶ 346.
    26
    Id. ¶ 403.
    6
    for “Eni’s proportionate share of the decommissioning costs” ($418,649,000) and
    (ii) 5% of the remaining TUA contract value ($43,550,000) as “compensation for all
    additional benefits conferred on Eni pursuant to the acquisition of the TUA capacity
    as part of the Angola Project.”27 Gulf also was awarded interest since the hearing
    date on the restitution amount.28
    The First Tribunal did not decide whether Gulf breached the TUA.               It
    explained that the breach of contract claim was “academic and deserves no further
    consideration” because First Tribunal already had declared that the TUA’s purpose
    had been frustrated.29
    D.      Gulf Sues Eni S.p.A. in New York State Court
    On September 28, 2018, Gulf sued Eni S.p.A.—Eni’s parent company—in
    New York state court (the “New York Action”).30 The New York Action concerns
    a dispute over a payment guarantee (the “Guarantee Agreement”) between Gulf and
    Eni S.p.A.31 Specifically, Gulf contends that Eni S.p.A. owes it “as much as
    27
    Id. ¶¶ 401, 403. The “Angola Project” refers to Eni’s purchase of a 13.6% stake in
    Angola LNG Limited to “increase its gas business in Angola.” Id. ¶¶ 42, 45, 159. The
    terms of the deal included “i) a payment of $260 million, and ii) the acquisition by Eni of
    the residual regasification capacity at [the] Pascagoula Facility.”             Id. ¶ 42.
    “Decommissioning costs” are the costs associated with returning the LNG terminal at the
    Facility “to the condition it was prior to entering the contract.” Id. ¶ 351.
    28
    Id. ¶ 403.
    29
    Id. ¶ 347.
    30
    Compl. Ex. G.
    31
    Id. ¶ 1.
    7
    approximately $900,000,000 in guaranteed obligations” under the Guarantee
    Agreement for Reservation and Operating Fees concerning the Pascagoula Facility
    running from the date of the Final Award until the end of the TUA’s initial twenty
    year term.32 Gulf advances this claim even though the First Tribunal ruled that the
    TUA was terminated on the theory that Eni S.p.A “specifically waived, ‘to the extent
    permitted by law, any release, discharge, reduction or limitation of or with respect
    to any sums owing by [Eni] or any other liability of [Eni] to [Gulf].’”33
    On December 12, 2018, Eni S.p.A. filed its answer and three counterclaims in
    the New York Action.34 Eni S.p.A. asserts, among other things, that “the Guarantee
    Agreement has terminated due to [Gulf’s] numerous and widespread breaches of the
    TUA and related agreements”—in particular Article 22 of the TUA—and that Gulf’s
    “breaches have also caused [Eni] substantial injury for which Eni S.p.A. seeks
    damages and other relief.”35
    E.      The Court Enters Judgment on the Final Award
    On September 25, 2018, Gulf filed an action in this court to confirm the Final
    Award in the First Arbitration and enter judgment against Eni requiring it to pay
    32
    Id. ¶¶ 1, 37, 72.
    33
    Id. ¶ 69 (quoting Guarantee Agreement § 3.2).
    34
    Pls.’ Suppl. Br. Ex. 1 (Dkt. 33).
    35
    Id. at 2, 13, 22.
    8
    Gulf the amount of the Final Award that remained outstanding.36 On October 23,
    2018, Eni filed its answer and counterclaim.37 In its counterclaim, Eni asked the
    court to enter judgment in Eni’s “favor confirming the Final Award in its entirety.”38
    In November and December 2018, Gulf and Eni each filed motions for
    judgment on the pleadings to confirm the Final Award, although they disagreed on
    certain aspects of the language to be included in a final order and judgment.39 After
    filing their respective motions, the parties engaged in negotiations and narrowed
    their disputes. During a hearing held on February 1, 2019, the court resolved the
    parties’ remaining disagreements over the language of the final order and
    judgment,40 which it entered later that day (the “Judgment”).41 The Judgment recites
    that “both Gulf LNG and ENI USA agree that the Final Award should be confirmed
    in its entirety” and entered judgment “in favor of Gulf LNG and against ENI USA
    in the amount of $371,577,849,42 which Eni subsequently paid in full.43
    36
    C.A. No. 2018-0700-AGB (“Confirmation Action”), Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1, 48.
    37
    Confirmation Action, Dkt. 8.
    38
    Confirmation Action, Dkt. 8 at 39.
    39
    See Confirmation Action, Dkts. 14, 20.
    40
    Confirmation Action, Dkt. 47 at 44-49.
    41
    Confirmation Action, Dkt. 45.
    42
    Confirmation Action, Dkt. 45 ¶ 3.
    43
    Answer ¶¶ 4-5.
    9
    F.     Eni Initiates the Second Arbitration Against Gulf
    On June 3, 2019, Eni filed a second notice of arbitration with the American
    Arbitration Association, International Centre for Dispute Resolution, asserting three
    claims against Gulf (the “Second Arbitration”)44.           The first two claims seek
    declaratory relief and damages based on Gulf’s alleged breach of “the TUA by
    engaging in LNG liquefaction- and export-related activities in direct contravention
    of the express terms of at least Articles 22.4(a) and 22.4(e) of the TUA.”45 The third
    claim, for negligent misrepresentation, seeks “declaratory and other relief, in the
    form of damages and/or restitution . . . as a result of Gulf’s wrongful conduct” before
    the First Tribunal.46 These claims are discussed in greater detail below.
    G.     Procedural History
    On June 17, 2019, Gulf filed this action under the Federal Arbitration Act
    (“FAA”) and 10 Del. C. §§ 5702 and 5703(b), seeking two forms or relief: (i) “a
    permanent injunction staying the Second Arbitration” (Count I) and (ii) “a
    declaratory judgment that Eni . . . is barred from maintaining or pursuing the Second
    Arbitration” (Count II).47 On July 9, 2019, Gulf filed a motion for judgment on the
    44
    Compl. Ex. F (“Second Arbitration Notice”).
    45
    Id. ¶¶ 66-67, 69-70.
    46
    Id. ¶ 76.
    47
    Compl. ¶¶ 12, 58, 61. Section 5702 of the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act provides,
    in relevant part, that “any application to the Court of Chancery to enjoin or stay an
    arbitration, obtain an order requiring arbitration, or to vacate or enforce an arbitrator’s
    10
    pleadings on Count I to enjoin Eni “from taking any further steps or actions in the
    Second Arbitration other than to request that the Second Arbitration be discontinued
    and dismissed at Eni’s cost.”48 Briefing and argument on this motion, including
    supplemental submissions, was completed on September 11, 2019.
    II.      ANALYSIS
    Under Court of Chancery Rule 12(c), the court may grant a motion for
    judgment on the pleadings “when no material issue of fact exists and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”49 To obtain a permanent injunction, the
    Gulf entities must (i) “succeed on the merits of their case,” (ii) “demonstrate that
    irreparable harm will result in the absence of an injunction,” and (iii) “prove that, on
    balance, the equities weigh in favor of issuing the injunction.”50
    The parties’ positions on the merits of Gulf’s request for a permanent
    injunction have shifted since Gulf filed this case. Ultimately, the parties each came
    to rely primarily on one of two different lines of authority concerning the arbitration
    award shall be decided by the Court of Chancery in conformity with the Federal Arbitration
    Act” unless the parties’ arbitration agreement specifically refers to, and expresses their
    intention to apply, the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act. 10 Del. C. § 5702(c). The
    arbitration provision in the TUA contains no such reference and reflects no such intention.
    See TUA Art. 20.
    48
    Pls.’ Mot. ¶ 34 (Dkt. 14).
    49
    Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 
    624 A.2d 1199
    ,
    1205 (Del. 1993).
    50
    Harden v. Christina Sch. Dist., 
    924 A.2d 247
    , 269 (Del. Ch. 2007).
    11
    of disputes under the FAA: (i) cases enforcing the policy against collateral attacks
    on arbitration awards and (ii) cases interpreting broad arbitration clauses as written
    on the question of “arbitrability,” i.e., “who decides” whether a particular issue is
    arbitrable. The court begins by reviewing the parties’ contentions concerning these
    lines of authority.
    A.     The Collateral Attack Doctrine
    Gulf argues that the court should enjoin the Second Arbitration because it is
    an impermissible collateral attack on the Judgment this court entered confirming the
    Final Award in the First Arbitration. In support of this argument, Gulf relies on a
    series of decisions where courts have (i) dismissed litigation claims 51 or (ii) entered
    injunctions against the procession of a second arbitration,52 which amounted to a
    collateral attack on an award entered in a prior arbitration. The rationale of these
    decisions is that the FAA affords limited review of and a tight deadline to challenge
    an arbitration award to ensure that finality is achieved promptly and efficiently.
    51
    See e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 
    1988 WL 60380
    , at *6 (Del. Ch.
    June 14, 1988) (damages claim that adversary “acted illegally in the arbitration, thereby
    tainting the arbitration award” an impermissible collateral attack); Pryor v. IAC/InterActive
    Corp., 
    2012 WL 2046827
    , at *6 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2012) (breach of contract claim premised
    on adversary providing disallowed evidence in a prior arbitration an impermissible
    collateral attack); Gulf Petro Trading Co., Inc. v. Nigerian Nat’l. Petroleum Corp., 
    512 F.3d 742
    , 749-50 (5th Cir. 2008) (common law and statutory claims premised on an
    arbitration panel’s misconduct in a previous arbitration an impermissible collateral attack).
    52
    Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Hornsby, 
    865 F.Supp. 447
    , 450-51 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Decker v.
    Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
    205 F.3d 906
    , 910 (6th Cir. 2000); Arrowood
    Indem. Co. v. Equitas Ins. Ltd., 
    2015 WL 4597543
    , at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015).
    12
    Under Section 10 of the FAA, a party may petition to vacate an arbitration
    award only in limited circumstances, i.e., where (i) “the award was procured by
    corruption, fraud, or undue means,” (ii) “there was evident partiality or corruption
    in the arbitrators,” (iii) “the arbitrators were guilty of . . . misbehavior by which the
    rights of any party have been prejudiced,” or (iv) “the arbitrators exceeded their
    powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
    upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”53 Under Section 11, a party
    similarly may petition to modify an arbitration award only in limited circumstances,
    i.e., where (i) “there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
    material mistake,” (ii) “the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
    them,” or (iii) “the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
    the controversy.”54 Section 12 of the FAA requires that “a motion to vacate, modify,
    or correct an award must be served . . . within three months after the award is filed
    or delivered.”55
    The court reviews next three decisions where courts have granted the relief
    Gulf seeks here—entry of an injunction against the procession of a second arbitration
    53
    
    9 U.S.C. § 10
    (a).
    54
    
    9 U.S.C. § 11
    (a)-(c).
    55
    
    9 U.S.C. § 12
    .
    13
    under the collateral attack doctrine—in deference to the policies underlying the
    foregoing provisions of the FAA.
    In Prudential Securities Incorporated v. Hornsby, the district court enjoined
    Arthur Hornsby from pursuing a second arbitration against Prudential.56 In the first
    arbitration, the tribunal awarded Hornsby $290,000 in resolving his claims that a
    Prudential employee (Storaska) mismanaged his account and that Prudential failed
    to supervise Storaska adequately and fraudulently concealed his wrongdoing.57 Ten
    months later, Hornsby filed a second arbitration, alleging a conspiracy between
    Prudential and Storaska to “feign[] compliance with [Hornsby’s] document requests
    during the AAA arbitration while fraudulently concealing internal memoranda that
    confirmed Storaska’s improper sales practices and Prudential’s toleration of those
    practices.”58 Hornsby sought “compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $1
    million against Prudential” in the second arbitration.59
    The district court found that the second arbitration amounted to a collateral
    attack on the prior AAA arbitration because the claim in the second arbitration “is
    premised entirely on Prudential’s fraudulent concealment of documents from the
    56
    
    865 F.Supp. at 452-53
    .
    57
    
    Id. at 448
    .
    58
    
    Id. at 448-49
    .
    59
    
    Id. at 449
    .
    14
    original arbitration panel, misconduct in the proceeding itself.”60 The district court’s
    reasoning drew on the policies underlying the provisions of the FAA governing
    review of arbitration awards:
    The strictures of section 10 and section 12 [of the FAA] are designed
    to afford an arbitration award finality in a timely fashion, promoting
    arbitration as an expedient method of resolving disputes without resort
    to the courts.
    *****
    Because the policies behind section 10 would be eviscerated if it were
    only an optional way to modify an arbitration award, an attempt to
    modify an award by a route or mechanism other than section 10 must
    be enjoined. Like the collateral actions noted above, Hornsby’s attempt
    to arbitrate an “independent” fraud claim against Prudential is, in
    reality, an attempt to augment and modify the first arbitration award.61
    In Decker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
    Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s entry of an injunction to enjoin a second
    arbitration.62 In the first arbitration, an NASD arbitration panel awarded Emily
    Decker $40,000 in damages in resolving her claim that Merrill Lynch had
    mismanaged Decker’s securities investment.63 A few months later, Decker filed a
    complaint against Merrill Lynch in Michigan state court, which it removed to federal
    court, alleging that Merrill Lynch interfered with the arbitration when one of its
    60
    
    Id. at 451, 453
    .
    61
    
    Id. at 450, 451
    .
    62
    
    205 F.3d at 911-12
    .
    63
    
    Id. at 908
    .
    15
    subsidiaries hired the chairperson of the arbitration panel.64 Decker then filed a
    second arbitration with the NASD, asserting the same claims.65
    The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that Decker’s complaint and
    second arbitration amounted to a collateral attack, because Decker’s “ultimate
    objective in this damages suit is to rectify the alleged harm she suffered by receiving
    a smaller arbitration award than she would have received in the absence of the
    chairperson’s relationship with Merrill Lynch.”66 Invoking the policy considerations
    underlying the FAA, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
    complaint and enjoining of the second arbitration:
    The FAA provides the exclusive remedy for challenging acts that taint
    an arbitration award whether a party attempts to attack the award
    through judicial proceedings or through a separate second arbitration.
    It would be a violation of the FAA to allow Decker to arbitrate the very
    same claims that we have determined constitute an impermissible
    collateral attack when previously presented for adjudication by a court.
    Decker may not bypass the exclusive and comprehensive nature of the
    FAA by attempting to arbitrate her claims in a separate second
    arbitration proceeding.67
    In Arrowood Indemnity Company v. Equitas Insurance Limited, the district
    court enjoined certain “Underwriters” from pursuing a second arbitration against
    64
    
    Id.
    65
    
    Id.
    66
    
    Id. at 910
    .
    67
    
    Id. at 911
    .
    16
    Arrowood.68 In the first arbitration, an arbitration panel accepted Arrowood’s
    interpretation of certain language in a contractual reinsurance program—i.e., a
    “Common Cause Coverage” provision that included a “First Advised Clause”—and
    issued an award requiring the Underwriters to pay Arrowood approximately $44.8
    million.69 Over a year later, the Underwriters filed a second arbitration demand (i)
    seeking access to certain Arrowood records concerning the interpretation of the
    Common Cause Coverage provision and (ii) asserting that Arrowood “engaged in
    intentional misconduct in the recent arbitration between the parties.”70
    The district court found that the second arbitration was “in direct
    contravention of the FAA” and “must be enjoined” because it sought “to recover all
    sums paid to Arrowood” in the first arbitration.71 The district court further explained
    that the Underwriters’ theory was that the first arbitration panel “erred in its
    interpretation of the Common Cause Provision due to Arrowood wrongfully, and
    ‘improperly,’ withholding relevant documents” during the first arbitration.72
    68
    
    2015 WL 4597543
    , at *8.
    69
    Id. at *1-2.
    70
    Id. at *3-4.
    71
    Id. at *6.
    72
    Id.
    17
    B.     Enforcement of Broad Arbitration Clauses
    In response to Gulf’s reliance on the collateral attack doctrine, Eni contends
    that the court “lacks jurisdiction to entertain the matters set forth in the complaint
    because the TUA delegates the threshold question of ‘arbitrability’ to the arbitration
    tribunal.”73 In other words, the policy underlying Eni’s opposition is that the court
    must enforce a broad arbitration clause that delegates to an arbitrator the authority
    to decide a disagreement about the scope of an arbitration provision.74
    The United States Supreme Court held long ago that the “question whether
    the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of
    arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and
    unmistakably provide otherwise.’”75 The test under Delaware law for determining
    when there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to have an
    arbitrator rather than the court decide questions of substantive arbitrability turns on
    whether the arbitration clause: (1) “generally provides for arbitration of all disputes;”
    73
    Def.’s Opp’n Br. 3 (Dkt. 17).
    74
    UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. Renmatix, Inc., 
    2017 WL 4461130
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2017)
    (“A disagreement about the scope of an arbitration provision—such as whether an
    arbitration provision governs a particular dispute—is known as an issue of ‘substantive
    arbitrability.’”) (citations omitted).
    75
    Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
    537 U.S. 79
    , 83 (2002) (quoting AT&T Techs.,
    Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 
    475 U.S. 643
    , 649 (1986)).
    18
    and (2) “incorporates a set of arbitration rules that empower[s] arbitrators to decide
    arbitrability.”76 New York law, which governs the TUA,77 is to the same effect.78
    In my opinion, the parties to the TUA evinced a “clear and unmistakable”
    agreement to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability. To start, the TUA expressly
    provides, with a limited exception not relevant here, that “all possible disputes” shall
    be resolved through arbitration:
    Any Dispute . . . shall be exclusively and definitively resolved through
    final and binding arbitration, it being the intention of the Parties that
    this is a broad form arbitration agreement designed to encompass all
    possible disputes.79
    The TUA goes on to define the term “Dispute” broadly to include “any dispute,
    controversy or claim . . . arising out of, relating to, or connected with this Agreement
    . . . as well as any dispute over arbitrability or jurisdiction,”80 and expressly provides
    76
    James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC, 
    906 A.2d 76
    , 80 (Del. 2006).
    77
    TUA Art. 19.
    78
    See Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 
    689 N.E.2d 884
    , 885, 888 (N.Y. 1997)
    (finding “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability where
    the arbitration clause provided that “[a]ny controversy . . . shall be settled by arbitration in
    accordance with the rules of the NASD Code” and the NASD Code provided that “[t]he
    arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions
    under this Code”) (internal quotations omitted).
    79
    TUA Art. 20.1(a).
    80
    
    Id.
     Art. 1.57 (emphasis added).
    19
    that “arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the International Arbitration
    Rules of the American Arbitration Association.”81
    Focusing on the broad language in the TUA’s arbitration clause, Eni argues
    that Gulf’s request for an injunction must be denied because the arbitrators in the
    Second Arbitration—and not this court—must decide the whether the Final Award
    entered in the First Arbitration has any preclusive effect on the claims asserted in the
    Second Arbitration. In making this argument, Eni emphasizes that the United States
    Supreme Court unanimously held earlier this year in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer
    and While Sales, Inc., that courts must respect the parties’ decision to delegate the
    arbitrability question to an arbitrator even if the argument for arbitration appears to
    be frivolous:
    We must interpret the [FAA] as written, and the [FAA] in turn requires
    that we interpret the contract as written. When the parties’ contract
    delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court may not
    override the contract. In those circumstances, a court possesses no
    power to decide the arbitrability issue. That is true even if the court
    thinks that the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a
    particular dispute is wholly groundless.82
    Schein is a consequential decision that emphatically reinforces that arbitration
    rights are a creature of contract, and thus that courts must enforce such contracts as
    81
    
    Id.
     Art. 20.1(b).
    82
    
    139 S.Ct. 524
    , 529 (2019).
    20
    written.83 But Schein does not address the collateral attack doctrine. Nor does
    Schein address the scenario present here where a second, related arbitration
    proceeding has been filed. The court discusses next two circuit court decisions on
    which Eni relies where the courts have enforced broad arbitration clauses and
    allowed an arbitrator to determine the arbitrability of the claims asserted in a second
    arbitration.
    In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Olick, the Third Circuit
    considered “the question of whether, under the [FAA], a district court has the
    authority, notwithstanding a valid arbitration clause, to enjoin a party from pursuing
    arbitration on res judicata grounds arising from both a prior arbitration and a prior
    judgment.”84 The prior judgment arose from a district court action captioned Carroll
    v. Hancock that involved alleged “violations of several federal and state statutes,
    along with various common law fraud theories, in connection with a series of limited
    partnership transactions.”85       The prior arbitration related to the same limited
    partnership transactions “that were the subject of the Carroll action.”86
    83
    One consequence of Schein is that it should end the additional “no non-frivolous
    argument about substantive arbitrability” inquiry this court has conducted under
    McLaughlin v. McCann, 
    942 A.2d 616
    , 626-27 (Del. Ch. 2008) “to guard against the
    frivolous invocation of an arbitration clause even when the Willie Gary test has been
    satisfied.” UPM-Kymmene, 
    2017 WL 4461130
    , at *4.
    84
    
    151 F.3d 132
    , 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
    85
    
    Id. at 134
    .
    86
    
    Id.
    21
    Over one year after entry of the prior judgment and of an award in the prior
    arbitration, Olick filed a second arbitration asserting claims “sounding in fraud,
    misrepresentation, tortious interference with business relations, slander, libel, and
    RICO violations.”87 Hancock argued that Olick’s second arbitration claim “arose
    from the same factual circumstances as the previous arbitration . . . as well as the
    prior federal judgment, and therefore principles of res judicata barred Olick from
    raising a claim that could have been raised at either the prior arbitration proceeding
    or the Carroll litigation.”88
    Recognizing that the case presented “somewhat of a ‘hybrid’ situation in that
    Hancock’s objection to arbitrating Olick’s claims stems from both a prior arbitration
    and a prior judgment,” the Third Circuit differentiated between the two scenarios in
    its analysis.89       With respect to the prior federal judgment, the Third Circuit
    concluded, based on its precedents, “that the district court . . . should have first
    decided the preclusive effect of the prior federal judgment as it relates to Olick’s
    [second] demand for arbitration.”90 With respect to the prior arbitration, however,
    the Third Circuit concluded that “Hancock’s res judicata objection based on the prior
    87
    
    Id.
    88
    
    Id.
    89
    
    Id. at 137
    .
    90
    
    Id. at 138-39
    .
    22
    arbitration is an issue to be arbitrated and is not to be decided by the courts.”91 In
    reaching the latter conclusion, Circuit Judge Seitz, writing for the panel, explained
    the Court’s rationale as follows:
    The reasoning underlying this approach is that a provision regarding
    the finality of arbitration awards is a creature of contract and, like any
    other contractual provision that is the subject of dispute, it is within the
    province of arbitration unless it may be said “with positive assurance”
    that the parties sought to have the matter decided by a court.92
    In Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Second Circuit held
    that the arbitrators in a second arbitration “should also decide the claim-preclusive
    effect of a federal judgment confirming an arbitral award.”93 In the first arbitration,
    the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) asserted a variety of claims (fraud,
    securities fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
    contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) against
    Citigroup, alleging that it “had diluted the value of [ADIA’s] investment [in
    Citigroup] by issuing preferred shares to other investors.”94 The first arbitration
    panel returned an award in favor of Citigroup, which the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of New York later confirmed. While that confirmation
    proceeding was pending, ADIA filed a second arbitration “again asserting claims of
    91
    
    Id. at 140
    .
    92
    
    Id. at 139
    .
    93
    
    776 F.3d 126
    , 131 (2d Cir. 2015).
    94
    Id. at 127.
    23
    breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing.”95 Citigroup sought to enjoin the second arbitration “on the ground that
    ADIA’s new claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata,
    because they were or could have been raised in the first arbitration.”96
    The Second Circuit’s explained that its conclusion that the arbitrators should
    decide the claim-preclusive effect of the judgment confirming the first arbitral award
    was as a “simple intuitive step” that followed from two of the Second Circuit’s prior
    precedents.97 In those prior cases, the Second Circuit held “that arbitrators are to
    resolve the claim-preclusive effect of an arbitration award confirmed by a state court
    and the issue-preclusive effect of a federal judgment.”98 Additionally, the Second
    Circuit expressed the view that the arbitrators would be better positioned than the
    confirming court to consider the preclusive effect of an arbitration award based on
    their familiarity with the underlying merits:
    Indeed, in confirming the award, the district court did not review the
    merits of any of ADIA’s substantive claims or the context in which
    those claims arose. Instead, it considered only whether the arbitration
    panel’s evidentiary rulings and application of New York choice-of-law
    principles violated the FAA. Under these circumstances, a district court
    95
    Id.
    96
    Id. at 128.
    97
    Id. at 131.
    98
    Id. See also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 
    88 F.3d 129
     (2d Cir. 1996) (addressing preclusive effect of arbitration award confirmed by a
    state court); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum, 
    101 F.3d 813
     (2d Cir. 1996)
    (addressing preclusive effect of federal judgment).
    24
    unfamiliar with the underlying circumstances, transactions, and claims,
    is not the best interpreter of what was decided in the arbitration
    proceedings, the result of which it merely confirmed.99
    *****
    With the foregoing discussion of the legal principles upon which the parties
    primarily rely in mind, the court turns next to consider the elements of Gulf’s request
    for entry of a permanent injunction to enjoin Eni from pursuing the claims it has
    asserted in the Second Arbitration.
    C.     The Merits of Gulf’s Request for a Permanent Injunction
    Gulf contends that the two substantive claims Eni has asserted in the Second
    Arbitration—for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract—constitute
    impermissible collateral attacks on the First Arbitration.100 Synthesizing the six
    cases applying the collateral attack doctrine cited above, Gulf contends the relevant
    inquiry for determining if the claims in the Second Arbitration amount to an
    impermissible collateral attack is whether “the nature of the claims and relief sought
    in the Second Arbitration . . . (a) seek[] to rectify alleged harm suffered in the earlier
    arbitration, or (b) challeng[e] alleged misconduct occurring in that earlier proceeding
    which purportedly tainted the prior Award.”101
    99
    776 F.3d at 132-33 (citations omitted).
    100
    Gulf also asserted a claim for declaratory relief in the Second Arbitration, but that claim
    goes hand in hand with its contract claim. See Second Arbitration Notice ¶¶ 66-67, 69-70.
    101
    Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 2.
    25
    In response, Eni advances essentially three lines of argument.       First, it
    contends that Schein overruled all of the cases on which Gulf relies that have applied
    the collateral attack doctrine, each of which pre-dates Schein.102 Second, Eni
    discounts most of Gulf’s precedents because, according to Eni, they “do not address
    the arbitrability question.”103 Third, Eni argues as a factual matter that its claims in
    the Second Arbitration do not constitute a collateral attack on the Final Award.104
    The court addresses these issues, in turn, below.
    As to Eni’s first line of argument, Schein nowhere mentions the collateral
    attack doctrine. Schein does not even refer to any of the cases Gulf cites that have
    applied that doctrine. In the absence of any actual discussion or analysis of the
    collateral attack doctrine in Schein, this court declines to assume that the Supreme
    Court’s rejection of a “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability means that it
    intended to overrule this well-established doctrine. Apart from the fact that Schein
    does not even discuss the issue, the question of arbitrability that Schein does address
    focuses on the need to honor contractual intent whereas the collateral attack doctrine
    is premised on different considerations, namely the policies of finality and limited
    102
    Def.’s Suppl. Br. 4 (Dkt. 34).
    103
    Id. 6.
    104
    Id. 14.
    26
    review underlying the provisions of the FAA governing judicial review and
    confirmation of arbitration awards.105
    As to Eni’s second line of argument, it is not surprising that a decision
    applying the collateral attack doctrine would not separately consider the question of
    arbitrability. The point of the doctrine is that a court may intervene to dismiss
    litigation claims or to enjoin a second round of arbitration based on a prior arbitration
    in order to vindicate the policies of finality and limited review of arbitration awards
    embedded in the FAA notwithstanding the existence of a broad arbitration clause.
    As the Arrowood court put it:
    Although parties are generally free to seek arbitration under a broad
    arbitration clause, courts may intervene if the “ultimate objective . . . is
    to rectify the alleged harm” a party suffered from an unfavorable
    arbitration award “by attempting to arbitrate [its] claims in a separate
    second arbitration proceeding.” Such arbitral mulligans are forbidden
    by the FAA, which is the “exclusive remedy for challenging acts that
    taint an arbitration award[,] whether a party attempts to attack the award
    through judicial proceedings or through a second arbitration.”106
    This approach is consistent with then-Chancellor Strine’s decision in Pryor v.
    IAC/InterActiveCorp.,107 a case on which both parties rely. In that case, William
    Pryor sued IAC in the Court of Chancery for alleged misconduct in an arbitration
    105
    See Part II.A.
    106
    
    2015 WL 4597543
    , at *5 (quoting Decker, 
    205 F.3d at 910-11
    ).
    107
    
    2012 WL 2046827
    .
    27
    that valued Pryor’s shares in Shoebuy.com, Inc., a company that IAC acquired.108
    The arbitrator selected Houlihan Lokey as the valuation expert for the arbitration,
    and Houlihan Lokey issued an award adopting IAC’s proposed appraisal value.109
    After issuance of the arbitration award, Pryor filed suit in the Court of Chancery
    seeking to vacate the award and asserting claims for breach of contract and breach
    of fiduciary duty against IAC for introducing in the arbitration “certain market
    evidence in violation of the terms of the Stockholder’s Agreement” that governed
    the valuation of his shares.110
    In adjudicating IAC’s motion to dismiss, the court found (i) that “the
    substantive arbitrability of the fiduciary duty and contract claims [must] be
    determined by the arbitrator” and (ii) relying on Decker, that the “breach of contract
    claim fails for a separate reason because . . . it constitutes an impermissible collateral
    attack” on the arbitration award.111 Significantly, the court dismissed the fiduciary
    duty claim “without prejudice to allow Pryor to re-file in the event that the arbitrator
    108
    Id. at *1.
    109
    Id.
    110
    Id.
    111
    Id. at *6. In finding that the contract claim constituted an impermissible collateral
    attack, the court reasoned as follows: “Pryor’s objective in this breach of contact claim is
    to remedy ‘the alleged harm [he] suffered by receiving a smaller arbitration award than
    [he] would have received in the absence of the [submission of allegedly improper
    evidence].’ In order to obtain such relief, a plaintiff is limited to proceeding under the
    FAA.” Id.
    28
    concludes that the breach of fiduciary duty claim is not arbitrable,” but dismissed
    the contract claim “with prejudice because the flaw that this Count is an
    impermissible collateral attack on the [arbitration award] is not curable by
    proceeding before the arbitrator at this belated stage.”112             The court’s “with
    prejudice” dismissal of the contract claim accords with the ability of courts to
    intervene to dispose of collateral attack claims definitively notwithstanding the
    existence of a broad arbitration clause.
    Eni’s third line of argument gets to the core issue before the court, i.e., whether
    the negligent misrepresentation and contract claims it has asserted in the Second
    Arbitration amount to a collateral attack on the Final Award. In my opinion, for the
    reasons discussed next, the negligent misrepresentation claim does but the contract
    claim does not.
    1.   Negligent Misrepresentation Claim
    Eni’s claim for negligent misrepresentation, seeks “declaratory and other
    relief, in the form of damages and/or restitution . . . as a result of Gulf’s wrongful
    conduct” before the First Tribunal.113 The gravamen of this claim is that Gulf falsely
    represented to the First Tribunal “that it would no longer be able to recover
    Reservation and Operating fees from its other customer, ALSS or from any other
    112
    Id. at *7.
    113
    Second Arbitration Notice ¶ 76.
    29
    source, if Eni prevailed in the arbitration” in order “[t]o secure the award of equitable
    compensation for Decommissioning Costs of the Pascagoula Facility in the amount
    of approximately $418 million.”114 According to Eni, had Gulf not made this
    misrepresentation, “the compensation amount paid by Eni for decommissioning
    costs would have been greatly reduced, or reduced to zero” because the First
    Tribunal “excluded the amount of future Reservation and Operating Fee payments
    that Gulf would receive from ALSS in calculating the compensation for
    Decommissioning Costs [it] awarded to Gulf.”115
    The negligent misrepresentation claim is a collateral attack on the Final
    Award for two reasons. First, Eni’s ultimate objective in the Second Arbitration is
    to receive payment for decommissioning costs it was required to pay to satisfy the
    Final Award. In other words, Eni is seeking to claw back some or all of the damages
    that were awarded to Gulf in an arbitration proceeding that is supposed to be
    concluded. If Eni had its way, for all practical purposes, the finality of the Final
    Award would be undone and the monetary recovery Gulf obtained in the First
    Arbitration would be nullified. This is the epitome of a collateral attack.116
    114
    Id. ¶ 72.
    115
    Id. ¶ 75.
    116
    See Arrowood, 
    2015 WL 4597543
    , at *6 (second arbitration that sought “to recover all
    sums paid to Arrowood” in the first arbitration was a collateral attack). See also Prudential,
    
    865 F.Supp. at 451
     (second arbitration that attempted “to augment and modify the first
    arbitration award” was a collateral attack); Decker, 
    205 F.3d at 910
     (second arbitration
    30
    Second, and related to the first point, the essence of Eni’s negligent
    misrepresentation claim is that Gulf procured damages in the First Arbitration by
    engaging in misconduct that tainted the Final Award. Yet Eni made no effort to seek
    to vacate the Final Award on this ground and has no right to bring a collateral attack
    now to “challenge the very wrongs affecting the award for which review is provided
    under section 10 of the Arbitration Act.”117
    Eni devotes substantial attention in its opposition papers explaining why its
    contract claim does not constitute a collateral attack, a conclusion with which the
    court agrees, but it makes virtually no effort to do so with respect to its negligent
    misrepresentation claim.118 Indeed, Eni’s defense on this point boils down to the
    conclusory assertion that “Eni does not assert [the negligent misrepresentation]
    claim in order to undo or alter the prior Award.”119 This contention exalts form over
    substance. Eni did pay Gulf the sum it was ordered to pay in the Judgment and, as
    brought to “rectify . . . receiving a smaller arbitration award” than desired in first arbitration
    was a collateral attack).
    117
    Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 
    691 F.2d 1205
    , 1213 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Very simply,
    Corey did not avail himself of the review provisions of section 10 of the Arbitration Act
    and may not transform what would ordinarily constitute an impermissible collateral attack
    into a proper independent direct action by changing defendants and altering the relief
    sought.”); see also Phillips Petroleum, 
    1988 WL 60380
    , at *6 (damages claim premised
    upon one party “act[ing] illegally in the arbitration, thereby tainting the arbitration award”
    an impermissible collateral attack).
    118
    See Def.’s Suppl. Br. 14-22.
    119
    Id. 20.
    31
    technical matter, it does not seek to alter the words of the Judgment. As a substantive
    matter, however, Eni’s misrepresentation claim is a transparent tactic to claw back
    the damages it paid Gulf under the Judgment for the purpose of reducing and
    potentially nullifying the substance of the damages award that Gulf obtained as a
    result of the First Arbitration.
    2.     Contract Claim
    In the Second Arbitration, Eni seeks declaratory relief and damages and/or
    restitution on the theory that “Gulf breached the TUA by engaging in liquefaction-
    and export-related activities in direct contravention of the express terms of at least
    Articles 22.4(a) and 22.4(e) of the TUA.”120 In the First Arbitration, Eni sought a
    declaration that Gulf “breached the warranties and covenants set forth in at least
    Articles 22.4(a) and 22.4(e) and that Eni [] thereby may properly terminate the TUA
    pursuant to Article 18.1.”121 Importantly, the First Tribunal never ruled on these
    issues, which it found to be academic in view of its ruling that the TUA had been
    terminated for frustration of purpose:
    Considering the Tribunal’s finding on the frustration of TUA’s purpose,
    the question as to whether [the Gulf entities] have breached the
    warranties and covenants, including those set forth at Articles 22.4(a)
    and 22(e) of the TUA, has become academic and deserves no further
    consideration.122
    120
    Second Arbitration Notice ¶ 66-67, 69-70.
    121
    Dkt. 38 ¶ 64.
    122
    Final Award ¶ 347.
    32
    The contract claim in the Second Arbitration does not constitute a collateral
    attack on the Final Award under Gulf’s own formulation of the operative test.
    Specifically, given that the First Tribunal never reached the merits of the claim for
    breaches of Articles 22.4(a) and 22.4(e) of the TUA and never granted any relief
    based on that claim, it cannot be said that Eni’s contract claim in the Second
    Arbitration seeks to rectify “harm” allegedly suffered in the First Arbitration. Nor
    can it be said—and Gulf does not contend otherwise—that Eni is challenging alleged
    misconduct in the First Arbitration relating to the contract claim as having somehow
    tainted the Final Award.
    Given the court’s conclusion that the contract claim in the Second Arbitration
    is not a collateral attack, and the broad language of the arbitration provision in the
    TUA that evinces the parties’ agreement to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability, it is up
    to the tribunal in the Second Arbitration to determine whether the contract claim is
    arbitrable and, if so, whether that claim would be precluded based on the First
    Arbitration. This conclusion accords with the decisions in Schein, Olick, and
    Citigroup discussed above.123
    *****
    123
    See Part. II.B.
    33
    For the reasons explained above, the court concludes that Gulf has established
    that Eni’s misrepresentation claim in the Second Arbitration constitutes an
    impermissible collateral attack on the Final Award but that Gulf has failed to make
    this showing with respect to its contract claim in the Second Arbitration.
    D.     The Remaining Elements for a Permanent Injunction
    It is well-established under Delaware law that requiring a party to “devote
    unnecessary time and resources to contest” an issue that the court has determined to
    be “not arbitrable” amounts to irreparable harm. 124         Accordingly, absent an
    injunction, Gulf would suffer irreparable harm if it were required to arbitrate the
    misrepresentation claim in the Second Arbitration.
    Finally, the balance of the equities weighs in Gulf’s favor to obtain a
    permanent injunction with respect to the negligent misrepresentation claim. Without
    an injunction, Gulf will be deprived of the finality to which it is entitled concerning
    the damages award it obtained as a result of the First Arbitration. On the other side
    of the ledger, Eni has made no argument that the equities weigh in its favor, and the
    court is hard-pressed to conceive of a basis for such an argument insofar as the
    negligent misrepresentation claim is concerned.
    124
    Bd. of Educ. of Sussex Cty. Vocational-Tech. Sch. Dist. v. Sussex Tech. Educ. Ass’n,
    
    1998 WL 157373
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1998); see also Delaware Pub. Emps. v. New
    Castle Cty., 
    1994 WL 515291
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1994).
    34
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Gulf’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
    granted with respect to the negligent misrepresentation claim that Eni has asserted
    in the Second Arbitration but otherwise is denied. The parties are directed to confer
    and to submit an implementing order consistent with this decision within five
    business days.
    35