Watkins v. Cartwright ( 2018 )


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  •                                        COURT OF CHANCERY
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    MORGAN T. ZURN
    MASTER IN CHANCERY
    LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
    500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400
    WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734
    Final Report: April 16, 2018
    Date Submitted: April 13, 2018
    Ms. Robin Watkins                            via FSX and 1st Class Mail
    22 Marble House Drive
    Bear, DE 19701
    Lisa Keil Cartwright, Esq.
    Orlans PC
    1201 N. Orange Street
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Adria B. Martinelli, Esquire
    State of Delaware
    Department of Justice
    820 N. French Street, 6th Floor
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Re:        Watkins v. Cartwright, et al.
    C.A. No. 2018-0153-MTZ
    Dear Counsel and Litigant:
    In the context of a residential foreclosure that was litigated in Superior Court
    and concluded in a sheriff’s sale, the homeowner has petitioned this Court for a
    writ of mandamus directing the Superior Court judge to reverse his denial of the
    homeowner’s most recent motion. In this final report, I recommend the Court
    dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction.
    C.A. No. 2018-0153-MTZ
    April 16, 2018
    Page 2
    I.      Background1
    On February 15, 2016, M&T Bank filed a complaint in a scire facias sur
    mortgage action in the Superior Court against Robin Watkins (“Watkins”), alleging
    Watkins executed a mortgage secured by 22 Marble House Drive, Bear, Delaware,
    19701 (“the Property”), then failed to pay the monthly installments when due.2
    M&T Bank was represented by Atlantic Law Group, LLC, and specifically by Lisa
    K. Cartwright, Esquire (“Cartwright”). Watkins filed a pro se motion to dismiss
    that complaint on April 4, 2016, arguing M&T Bank lacked standing because it
    failed to allege it was the holder of the note or that it was entitled to enforce the
    note and the mortgage. 3 M&T Bank responded to the motion to dismiss on May
    16, 2016. Superior Court denied Watkins’ motion on August 25, 2016. Watkins
    answered the complaint, but then failed to appear at mediation.
    On April 26, 2017, M&T Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, to
    which Watkins responded on May 31, 2017, and June 8, 2017. On September 19,
    1
    The background is drawn from the allegations of the petition and the docket of the Superior
    Court case at issue, of which I take judicial notice. Del. R. Evid. 202(d)(1)(B). I also take
    judicial notice of the docket in Watkins v. Meridian Bank, No. N15C-09-145 CEB. In that case,
    Watkins sued the original mortgagee for the same mortgage at issue here, asserting the
    assignment and securitization of the mortgage should have satisfied her debt, and that the
    original mortgagee’s failure to do so constituted breach of contract and slander of title, and
    justified declaratory relief. Superior Court granted the mortgagee’s motion to dismiss on June 8,
    2016.
    2
    M&T Bank v. Watkins, No. N16L-02-093 CLS, Compl.
    3
    
    Id., Mot. to
    Dismiss.
    C.A. No. 2018-0153-MTZ
    April 16, 2018
    Page 3
    2017, Superior Court granted M&T’s motion for summary judgment, concluding
    Watkins failed to allege any recognized defense to a scire facias sur mortgage
    action, and M&T Bank presented sufficient evidence of nonpayment, that the loan
    sought to be foreclosed was ineligible for loss mitigation, that M&T Bank gave
    Watkins proper notice, and that Watkins failed to participate in mandatory
    mediation.4
    Accordingly, Superior Court issued a writ of levari facias to the New Castle
    County Sheriff on October 9, 2017. On December 6, 2017, Watkins filed a pro se
    “motion for right of subrogation” (“the Motion”) asserting she was a subrogee
    standing in the shoes of the creditor, and seeking return of the Property. 5 Superior
    Court denied the Motion on December 11, 2017, on the basis that Watkins “ha[d]
    not raised a proper issue that may be claimed in a scire facias sur mortgage
    foreclosure action.”6 The Property was sold by sheriff’s sale on December 12, 2017.
    On March 7, 2018, Watkins filed her pro se complaint in this action, which
    was followed by an amended complaint on March 8, 2018. Watkins asks this Court
    to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Superior Court to reverse its denial of
    Watkins’ Motion, alleging the Superior Court improperly denied her right to
    4
    
    Id., Order, Sept.
    19, 2017.
    5
    
    Id., Mot. for
    Right of Subrogation.
    6
    
    Id., Order, Dec.
    11, 2017.
    C.A. No. 2018-0153-MTZ
    April 16, 2018
    Page 4
    subrogation. She maintains that M&T Bank lacked standing to foreclose on the
    Property. Ultimately, Watkins seeks to stop her eviction from the Property. She
    names as defendants Cartwright, allegedly as “substitute trustee” with M&T Bank,
    and the Honorable Calvin L. Scott, Jr., the Superior Court judge who denied the
    Motion.
    On April 12, 2018, Cartwright responded by letter, asserting the Superior
    Court foreclosure proceedings concluded with a sheriff’s sale and lacked any
    procedural irregularities or notice issues, and that Watkins failed to state a claim
    upon which relief may be granted. On April 13, 2018, Judge Scott moved to dismiss
    this action based on lack of jurisdiction, statutory immunity for claims based on
    performance of his official duties, and failure to state a claim. This is my final report.
    I.     Analysis
    The issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the Court, even in the
    absence of a motion. 7 This Court has no jurisdiction over a controversy for which
    there is a complete and adequate remedy at law before any other court of this State.8
    When it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action,
    the action must be dismissed. 9 “The Court of Chancery is not an appellate court with
    7
    Chavin v. H.H. Rosin & Co., 
    246 A.2d 921
    , 922 (Del. 1968).
    8
    Id.; 
    10 Del. C
    . § 342.
    9
    Ct. Ch. R. 12(h).
    C.A. No. 2018-0153-MTZ
    April 16, 2018
    Page 5
    respect to matters before Superior Court.” 10 “It is clearly empowered to hear and
    adjudicate actions to quiet title to real estate, but it is not a court to which an appeal
    from the actions of Superior Court will lie.” 11 Any attempt to vacate or challenge
    the validity of a sale conducted pursuant to the Rules of Superior Court must rest in
    Superior Court.12
    The remedy for attacking a judgment in the Superior Court or an
    execution out of that Court on the judgment lies in that Court. If there
    was any irregularity in the entry of the judgment or in the conduct of
    the Sheriff’s Sale the Superior Court has (or had) the power to grant a
    remedy. 13
    In this case, the remedy Watkins seeks is an order compelling the Superior
    Court to reverse its decision on her Motion, which presumably she believes would
    nullify the sheriff’s sale or otherwise restore the Property to her, and stop her
    eviction. Watkins could have sought relief from the Superior Court’s order under
    Rule 60, or attacked the sheriff’s sale by objecting to it or moving to set it aside
    under Superior Court Rule 69. Relief from a final Superior Court order is also
    available in the Delaware Supreme Court by direct appeal.14
    10
    City of Wilmington v. Wilmer, 
    1997 WL 124151
    , at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1997).
    11
    
    Id. 12 Id.
    13
    St. Georges Liquors, Inc. v. Int’l Underwriters Inc., 
    1986 WL 4870
    , at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15,
    1986) (granting a motion to dismiss a property owner’s attempt to set aside a Superior Court
    foreclosure and sheriff’s sale based on lack of jurisdiction).
    14
    Del. Const. art. 4, § 11(1)(a); 
    10 Del. C
    . § 148.
    C.A. No. 2018-0153-MTZ
    April 16, 2018
    Page 6
    I will not wade into whether Watkins is too late to pursue the remedies that
    are or were available in Superior Court and the Delaware Supreme Court. My
    analysis leads to the limited conclusion that this Court does not have subject matter
    jurisdiction because the remedy Watkins seeks is or was available in another court.15
    II.    Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, I recommend the Court dismiss this action
    because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. This is a final report pursuant to Court
    of Chancery Rule 144.
    Respectfully,
    /s/ Morgan T. Zurn
    Master in Chancery
    15
    See St. Georges Liquors, 
    1986 WL 4870
    at *3.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 2018-0153-MTZ

Judges: Zurn M.

Filed Date: 4/16/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/16/2018