Brad D. Greenspan v. News Corporation ( 2016 )

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
SAM GLASSCOCK III STATE OF DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE
VICE CHANCELLOR 34 THE CIRCLE
GEORGETOWN, DELAWARE 19947
Date Submitted: January 11, 2016
Date Decided: January 22, 2016
Brad Greenspan Kathaleen St. J. McCormick, Esquire
2995 Woodside Road, Suite 400 Daniel M. Kirshenbaum, Esquire
Woodside, CA 94062 Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor
100 North King Street
Gregory V. Varallo, Esquire Wilmington, DE 19899
Kevin M. Gallagher, Esquire
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. A. Thompson Bayliss, Esquire
One Rodney Square Abrams & Bayliss LLP
920 North King Street 20 Montchanin Road, Suite 200
Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19807
Kevin M. Coen, Esquire Daniel B. Rath, Esquire
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LP Rebecca L. Butcher, Esquire
1201 North Market Street Tyler O’Connell, Esquire
Wilmington, DE 19801 Landis Rath & Cobb LLP
919 North Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Re: Brad D. Greenspan v. News Corporation, et al.,
Civil Action No. 9567-VCG
Dear Litigants:
Before me is the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reargument, filed on January 11, 2016
pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 59(f). The Defendants submitted unsolicited
letters and briefs between January 19 and January 21, 2016 in opposition to the
Plaintiff’s motion. In order to prevail on a motion for reargument, a movant must
show that “the Court has overlooked a decision or principle of law that would have
controlling effect or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts so the outcome
of the decision would be affected.”1 Based on the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff
has failed to meet that standard here.
The Plaintiff’s motion asks that I vacate my Letter Opinion of January 6, 2016
and grant the Plaintiff’s “preliminary injunctions and all other pleadings.” In my
Letter Opinion, I granted the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, finding that the
Plaintiff had waived the opportunity to oppose the motions.2
To the extent I comprehend his Motion for Reargument, the Plaintiff points to
two previously-filed Motions for Preliminary Injunction that he argues contain
evidence that was “designed and pled to be used to oppose Defendants Motion to
Dismiss.” Despite the Plaintiff’s characterization in his motion here, the Motions
for Preliminary Injunction were unresponsive to the issues raised in the Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss. The first Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed on June
19, 2015 and requested that I enjoin the Defendants from filing “Ex Parte
Applications” in Federal Court; from further violating “Del Statue 1701 including
harassing and discriminating against a whistleblower”; and requested “injunctive
relief and specific performance for indemnification.”3 The Plaintiff’s Second
1
Brown v. Wiltbank, 2012 WL 5503832, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 2012) (quoting Miles, Inc. v.
Cookson Am., Inc., 677 A.2d 505, 506 (Del. Ch.1995)).
2
See Greenspan v. News Corp., 2016 WL 74921 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2016).
3
As of the time of the Plaintiff’s first Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Plaintiff’s
advancement claims had been dismissed via Order of the Court on May 6, 2015 due, in part, to the
Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims for
2
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed on January 4, 2016,4 asked that I enjoin
Defendants from perpetrating a “malicious defamatory and libel scheme being
carried out in Delaware”; that I enjoin Defendants’ “continued false entries related
to [the] 2004 Proxy”; and again requested indemnification. I find that neither Motion
for Preliminary Injunction stated grounds in opposition to the Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss, and that the Motion for Reargument fails to otherwise state grounds for
“reargument” of my decision to grant the Defendants’ motions.
In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that, before granting the Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss, I improperly failed to dispose of the Motion of Joinder and the Motion
to Supplement Pleadings filed on March 24, 2015. 5 Those motions do not purport
to have any relation to the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss nor has the Plaintiff
asserted a relationship exists in his Motion for Reargument. Moreover, the Plaintiff
has failed to explain how my Letter Opinion has prejudiced the Plaintiff’s pursuit of
those motions. Consistent with my earlier bench ruling and letter to the parties on
December 14, 2015, all motions outstanding as of that date, including the two
motions referenced by the Plaintiff here, were dismissed without prejudice. The
advancement. Greenspan v. News Corp., C.A. No. 9567-VCG (May 6, 2015) (ORDER). To the
extent the Plaintiff seeks reargument of that order, his request is late as the deadline to file a motion
for reargument of my Order of May 6, 2015 has passed. See Ct. Ch. R. 59(f) (providing that a
motion for reargument must be filed within 5 days of the Court’s opinion).
4
I note that the Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed after the second and final
extended deadline given to the Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
5
Throughout this litigation, the Plaintiff was apprised of the option to amend his complaint
pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 15(aaa) but chose not to do so.
3
Plaintiff may proceed as he find appropriate in light of the dismissal of the moving
Defendants.
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently articulate the
legal basis for which I should reconsider my Letter Opinion granting the Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss. Despite the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reargument, I note that the
Plaintiff has made no apparent attempt to respond to the Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss, nor has he requested additional time to do so. The Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reargument is DENIED. To the extent the foregoing requires an Order to take
effect, IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sincerely,
/s/ Sam Glasscock III
Sam Glasscock III
4