Matthew Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corporation ( 2018 )


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  •       IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    MATTHEW SCIABACUCCHI,                      )
    Individually and on Behalf of All Others   )
    Similarly Situated,                        )
    )
    Plaintiff,               )
    )
    v.                                  ) C.A. No. 11418-VCG
    )
    LIBERTY BROADBAND                          )
    CORPORATION, JOHN MALONE,                  )
    GREGORY MAFFEI, MICHAEL                    )
    HUSEBY, BALAN NAIR, ERIC                   )
    ZINTERHOFER, CRAIG JACOBSON,               )
    THOMAS RUTLEDGE, DAVID                     )
    MERRITT, LANCE CONN, and JOHN              )
    MARKLEY,                                   )
    )
    Defendants,              )
    )
    and                                        )
    )
    CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,                    )
    INC.,                                      )
    )
    Nominal Defendant.      )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: April 6, 2018
    Date Decided: July 26, 2018
    Kurt M. Heyman and Melissa N. Donimirski, of HEYMAN ENERIO GATTUSO
    & HIRZEL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Jason M. Leviton and
    Joel A. Fleming, of BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, Attorneys
    for Plaintiff.
    Martin S. Lessner, David C. McBride, James M. Yoch, Jr., and Paul J. Loughman,
    of YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
    OF COUNSEL: William Savitt, Anitha Reddy, and David Kirk, of WACHTELL,
    LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants
    Michael Huseby, Balan Nair, Eric Zinterhofer, Craig Jacobson, Thomas Rutledge,
    David Merritt, Lance Conn, John Markley, and Nominal Defendant Charter
    Communications, Inc.
    Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., Peter J. Walsh, Jr., Brian C. Ralston, Tyler J. Leavengood,
    Jaclyn C. Levy, and Aaron R. Sims, of POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Richard B. Harper, of BAKER BOTTS
    LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants Liberty Broadband
    Corporation, John Malone, and Gregory Maffei.
    GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
    The Plaintiff here is a stockholder in Charter Communications, Inc., a media
    company.     In 2015, Charter made two major acquisitions, of Bright House
    Networks and Time Warner Cable. Charter obtained stockholder approval of the
    transactions, but conditioned the acquisitions on stockholder approval of a related
    series of transactions, including an issuance of equity to Charter’s largest
    blockholder, Liberty Broadband. The stockholders voting for the acquisitions were
    told that those acquisitions would not close unless the issuance to Liberty was also
    approved. The equity issuance would help finance, in small part, the acquisitions.
    The transactions were approved; the Plaintiff here challenges, among other things,
    the transfer of equity to Liberty Broadband.
    The Defendants moved to dismiss, on the ground that the stockholder vote
    had cleansed any breaches of duty, citing Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings
    LLC.1 By Memorandum Opinion of May 31, 2017, I found that the vote was
    structured in such a way as to use approval of the lucrative acquisitions to coerce a
    vote for the issuance and a related transaction, negating any ratifying effect of the
    vote.2 The Defendants have also moved to dismiss on two additional grounds.
    They argue that the claims are solely derivative in nature, and that the Plaintiff has
    failed to demonstrate that the demand requirement of Court of Chancery Rule 23.1
    1
    
    125 A.3d 304
     (Del. 2015).
    2
    Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 
    2017 WL 2352152
    , at *20–24 (Del. Ch. May 31,
    2017).
    1
    should be excused. They also argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim under
    Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).
    The Plaintiff has attempted to plead both derivative and direct claims. I
    agree with the Defendants that the claims, in reality, are purely derivative.
    Therefore, the direct claims are dismissed. I also find, however, that the Plaintiff
    has adequately pled facts sufficient to excuse demand on the Charter board as
    futile, and that the Complaint adequately pleads a claim sufficient to invoke entire
    fairness. The Motion to Dismiss the derivative claims is denied, therefore. My
    reasoning follows.
    I. BACKGROUND3
    The allegations of the Complaint are recounted in great detail in my initial
    motion-to-dismiss opinion.4 I do not duplicate that effort here. Instead, I include
    only those facts necessary to understand the issues that remain following my initial
    decision.
    A. Parties
    Defendant Liberty Broadband Corporation is a Delaware corporation
    headquartered in Englewood, Colorado.5 Liberty Broadband was once a wholly
    owned subsidiary of non-party Liberty Media Corporation, but Liberty Broadband
    3
    The facts, drawn from the Complaint and other material I may consider on a motion to dismiss,
    are presumed true for purposes of evaluating the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
    4
    Liberty Broadband Corp., 
    2017 WL 2352152
    , at *4–13.
    5
    Compl. ¶ 12.
    2
    was spun-off in 2014, and now both Liberty Broadband and Liberty Media are
    separate, publicly traded companies.6 Defendant John Malone owns approximately
    47% of the voting power of both Liberty Media and Liberty Broadband.7 Malone
    also chairs the boards of directors of both companies.8 I refer to Malone and
    Liberty Broadband as the “Stockholder Defendants.”
    Nominal Defendant Charter Communications, Inc. is a Delaware corporation
    headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut.9     Charter is one of the largest cable
    providers in the United States.10      Liberty Broadband is Charter’s largest
    stockholder, holding approximately 26% of its stock.11
    Charter’s board of directors consists of ten members, four of whom were
    designated by Liberty Broadband.12 The directors are Defendants John Malone,
    W. Lance Conn, Michael Huseby, Craig Jacobson, Gregory Maffei, John Markley,
    Jr., David Merritt, Balan Nair, Thomas Rutledge, and Eric Zinterhofer (the
    “Director Defendants”).13     Liberty Broadband’s four designees are Malone,
    Huseby, Maffei, and Nair.14
    6
    
    Id.
    7
    
    Id.
    8
    Id. ¶ 13.
    9
    Id. ¶ 24.
    10
    Id.
    11
    Id. ¶ 2.
    12
    Id. ¶¶ 13–22, 34.
    13
    Id. ¶¶ 13–22.
    14
    Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 17, 20.
    3
    Plaintiff Matthew Sciabacucchi held Charter stock at the time of the
    challenged transactions, and he maintains his ownership interest today.15
    B. Factual Background
    1. Liberty Media Invests in Charter
    In May 2013, Liberty Media purchased a 27% stake in Charter.16 As part of
    its investment, Liberty Media entered into a stockholders agreement with Charter.17
    That agreement gave Liberty Media the right to designate four directors to the
    Charter board so long as its ownership interest remained at 20% or higher. 18 The
    agreement also imposed several restrictions on Liberty Media: it could not acquire
    over 35% of Charter’s voting stock before January 2016 (or more than 39.99%
    after January 2016), and it was prohibited from soliciting proxies or consents.19
    Liberty Media’s four board designees were, as just noted, Malone, Maffei, Nair,
    and Huseby.20 In September 2014, Liberty Media assigned all of its rights and
    obligations under the stockholders agreement to Liberty Broadband, one of the
    Defendants in this action.21
    Several years before Liberty Media’s investment, Charter had adopted
    provisions in its certificate of incorporation that restricted the company’s ability to
    15
    Id. ¶ 11.
    16
    Id. ¶ 32.
    17
    Id. ¶ 33.
    18
    Id. ¶ 34.
    19
    Id. ¶ 35.
    20
    Id. ¶ 33.
    21
    Id. ¶ 37.
    4
    enter into transactions with large stockholders.22 Specifically, the certificate of
    incorporation put restrictions on “Business Combinations” between Charter and an
    “Interested Stockholder.”23          An “Interested Stockholder” was defined as any
    person who held 10% or more of Charter’s voting stock, and “Business
    Combination” was defined to include transfers of Charter assets (and issuances of
    Charter securities) to an Interested Stockholder.24       Charter could not effect a
    Business Combination unless (i) a majority of the directors unaffiliated with the
    Interested Stockholder approved the transaction, and (ii) a majority of stockholders
    unaffiliated with the Interested Stockholder voted in favor of the transaction.25
    2. The Challenged Transactions
    a. The Original Bright House Transaction
    Soon after Liberty Media invested in Charter, Rutledge (Charter’s CEO) and
    Maffei met with executives of Time Warner Cable Inc. to discuss a potential
    acquisition of Time Warner.26 The discussions continued into late 2013 and early
    2014, but they broke down in February 2014.27 That month, Comcast Corporation
    and Time Warner announced that Comcast had agreed to acquire Time Warner for
    22
    Yoch Aff. Ex. A, Ex. 3.1, art. 8(a).
    23
    Id.
    24
    Id. art. 8(b)(i)(B), 8(b)(vi).
    25
    Id. art. 8(a), 8(b)(v).
    26
    Compl. ¶ 63.
    27
    Id. ¶ 64.
    5
    approximately $45 billion.28         Anticipating antitrust challenges to the merger,
    Comcast and Time Warner decided to divest a number of subscribers.29 As part of
    that divestment, Charter would enter into subscriber swaps with Comcast and Time
    Warner, in addition to purchasing a Comcast subsidiary.30 These transactions were
    contingent on the consummation of the Comcast-Time Warner merger.31
    Meanwhile, having failed to acquire Time Warner, Charter set its sights on
    Bright     House    Networks,        LLC,   a       large   cable   company   owned   by
    Advance/Newhouse Partnership.32 In June 2014, Advance/Newhouse sent Charter
    a high-level term sheet under which Advance/Newhouse would contribute Bright
    House to a partnership in exchange for, among other things, $1 billion in cash and
    common and preferred partnership units.33 One week later, Charter proposed
    revisions related to Advance/Newhouse’s influence over Charter, “particularly in
    conjunction with the existing share ownership and governance rights of Liberty
    Media Corporation.”34 Negotiations continued, and by October 2014, Charter and
    Advance/Newhouse had reached agreement on a term sheet setting forth the
    material terms of the transaction.35 The parties shared the term sheet with Liberty
    28
    Id. ¶ 65.
    29
    Id.
    30
    Id. ¶ 66.
    31
    Id.
    32
    Id. ¶ 68.
    33
    Yoch Aff. Ex. D, at 137.
    34
    Compl. ¶ 91 (emphasis omitted).
    35
    Yoch Aff. Ex. D, at 138.
    6
    Media, which proposed various changes, including that Advance/Newhouse “grant
    Liberty Media a proxy . . . to vote as many of [Advance/Newhouse’s] shares in
    Charter as would be required to increase Liberty Media’s total voting stake in
    Charter to 25.01%.”36        Liberty Media also proposed that Charter give it
    “preemptive rights to maintain its pro rata ownership stake in Charter after the
    closing of the combination with Bright House in connection with any issuance of
    equity securities of Charter after signing.”37
    On October 24, the six Charter directors not appointed by Liberty Media met
    to discuss the term sheet.38     The directors reviewed the potential conflicts of
    interest of Charter’s legal and financial advisors, as well as the directors present at
    the meeting.39      “The independent directors resolved to form a working group
    comprising Eric L. Zinterhofer, Chairman of Charter, John D. Markley Jr. and
    Lance Conn to meet as necessary to consider and negotiate the potential
    transaction.”40     Because LionTree Advisors LLC, one of Charter’s financial
    advisors, had “a substantial historic and ongoing relationship with Liberty,” “the
    independent directors of the Charter board of directors negotiated and considered
    the transactions with Liberty without the participation of LionTree.”41
    36
    Id.
    37
    Id. at 138–39.
    38
    Id. at 139.
    39
    Id.
    40
    Id.
    41
    Id.
    7
    Following several weeks of negotiations, on November 21, Charter and
    Liberty Broadband (which had recently completed its spin-off from Liberty Media)
    agreed to pursue the Bright House acquisition based on a revised term sheet that (i)
    gave Liberty Broadband the right to maintain a 25.01% voting interest in Charter,
    and (ii) provided for a thirteen-member board with three designees each for Liberty
    Broadband and Advance/Newhouse.42          The purpose of maintaining a 25.01%
    voting interest in Charter was to allow Liberty Broadband to escape regulation
    under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which does not apply to entities
    “primarily engaged . . . in a business or businesses other than that of investing,
    reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities.”43
    On March 30, 2015, the Charter board met to consider the proposed
    transactions.44     After discussing the benefits of the deal, the four directors
    designated by Liberty Broadband voted to approve the acquisition.45          Those
    directors (along with representatives of LionTree) then left the meeting.46 The
    remaining six directors proceeded to review the proposed transactions between
    Charter and Liberty Broadband.47 The remaining directors determined that the
    42
    Id.
    43
    15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1).
    44
    Yoch Aff. Ex. D, at 141.
    45
    Id.
    46
    Id.
    47
    Id.
    8
    contemplated transactions were fair to and in the best interests of Charter’s
    stockholders.48
    Charter announced the Bright House transaction the next day.49 Under the
    agreement, Charter would pay Advance/Newhouse $2 billion in cash, $5.9 billion
    in exchangeable common partnership units, and $2.5 billion in convertible
    preferred partnership units.50 The partnership units would be exchangeable into
    Charter common stock at $173 per share, which represented the sixty-day Charter
    volume-weighted average price.51 Under a new stockholders agreement between
    Charter, Liberty Broadband, and Advance/Newhouse, Advance/Newhouse would
    retain a 26.3% ownership stake in the resulting company, and Liberty Broadband
    would hold a 19.4% ownership stake.52 Advance/Newhouse also agreed to grant
    Liberty Broadband a voting proxy on up to 6% of its shares, giving Liberty
    Broadband voting power of at least 25.01% at closing. 53           Moreover, both
    Advance/Newhouse and Liberty Broadband would receive preemptive rights
    allowing them to maintain their pro rata ownership.54 Finally, Liberty Broadband
    agreed to purchase $700 million of newly issued Charter shares at $173 per share.55
    48
    Id.
    49
    Compl. ¶ 69.
    50
    Id.
    51
    Id.
    52
    Id. ¶ 70.
    53
    Id.
    54
    Id.
    55
    Id.
    9
    The Bright House acquisition was contingent on the consummation of the
    subscriber-divestment transactions Charter had entered into with Time Warner and
    Comcast.56 The divestment transactions, in turn, would not close unless Comcast
    merged with Time Warner.57 In April 2015, the Comcast/Time Warner merger
    was terminated following reports that the Federal Communications Commission
    would bring a lawsuit to block the deal.58 Thus, the divestment transactions and
    the Bright House deal became void.59
    b. The Time Warner Merger, and the New Bright House
    Transaction
    The same day Comcast and Time Warner called off the proposed merger,
    Charter and Time Warner began discussing a potential combination.60 Rutledge,
    Charter’s CEO, spoke with Maffei about Charter’s interest in a merger with Time
    Warner, and Maffei indicated his support for such a transaction.61 Maffei also said
    that Liberty Broadband was interested in pursuing “a significant additional
    investment in Charter, including by exchanging its [Time Warner] shares for
    Charter shares, . . . in light of Charter’s potential financing needs and Liberty
    Broadband’s desire to maintain its percentage equity interest in Charter.”62
    56
    Compl. ¶ 69.
    57
    Id. ¶ 66.
    58
    Id. ¶ 74.
    59
    Id.
    60
    Yoch Aff. Ex. D, at 143.
    61
    Id.
    62
    Id.
    10
    Charter’s board met on May 4, 2015, to discuss the potential acquisition of
    Time Warner.63 The board authorized Charter’s management to offer to acquire
    Time Warner for approximately $172.50 per Time Warner share based on
    Charter’s stock price as of May 4.64 The board also reaffirmed its willingness to
    “complete the Bright House transaction on substantially the same economic and
    governance terms as previously agreed.”65 About two weeks later, Charter and
    Time Warner management discussed the “terms on which Liberty Broadband was
    interested in making an additional investment in Charter shares to partially finance
    the cash portion of the consideration to be paid to [Time Warner] stockholders and
    the terms on which Liberty Broadband would consider exchanging [Time Warner]
    shares for Charter shares.”66 The next day, “the independent directors of Charter’s
    board of directors met to receive an update from Mr. Zinterhofer and Wachtell
    Lipton[, Charter’s legal advisors,] regarding the Liberty Broadband investment,
    including the ongoing discussions regarding the aggregate amount of the
    investment and the per share price.”67
    On May 26, 2015, Charter announced that it had reached an agreement to
    merge with Time Warner for a mix of stock and cash.68 The merger valued Time
    63
    Id. at 144.
    64
    Id.
    65
    Id.
    66
    Id. at 147.
    67
    Id.
    68
    Compl ¶ 75.
    11
    Warner at approximately $78.7 billion.69 Charter agreed to provide $100 in cash
    and shares equivalent to 0.5409 Charter shares for each outstanding Time Warner
    share in a newly created public parent company, New Charter.70                 Liberty
    Broadband and Liberty Interactive would receive all stock for their Time Warner
    shares.71 Charter also provided “an election option for each Time Warner Cable
    stockholder, other than Liberty Broadband . . . or Liberty Interactive . . . to receive
    $115.00 of cash and New Charter shares equivalent to 0.4562 shares” of Charter
    for each Time Warner share.72 Upon the closing of the merger, Liberty Broadband
    agreed to buy $4.3 billion of newly issued shares of New Charter at $176.95, the
    closing price of Charter as of May 20, 2015.73
    At the same time that Charter announced the Time Warner merger, it
    announced a new Bright House transaction with similar terms as the original
    Bright House transaction.74 Once again, pursuant to a new stockholders agreement
    between         Charter,   Liberty     Broadband,       and      Advance/Newhouse,
    Advance/Newhouse agreed to grant Liberty Broadband a voting proxy on up to 6%
    of its shares.75 Liberty Broadband also agreed to purchase $700 million of newly
    69
    Id.
    70
    Id.
    71
    Id.
    72
    Id.
    73
    Id. ¶¶ 79, 81.
    74
    Id. ¶ 77.
    75
    Id. ¶ 83.
    12
    issued Charter shares at the previously agreed-to price of $173 per share.76 Liberty
    Broadband received the right to “purchase from any issuance of equity in
    conjunction with capital raising efforts sufficient shares to maintain its investment
    in the Company,” and was carved out from any future stockholders rights plan
    Charter might adopt.77 The Time Warner merger and the Bright House transaction
    were conditioned on the Charter stockholders’ approving (i) the stock issuances to
    Liberty Broadband and (ii) the voting proxy agreement.78
    All of these transactions had been approved at a Charter board meeting held
    on May 23.79 At that meeting, the four directors designated by Liberty Broadband
    first unanimously approved the proposed transactions with Time Warner and
    Advance/Newhouse as fair and in the best interests of Charter’s stockholders.80
    They then left the meeting.81 The remaining six directors proceeded to review the
    negotiations over the agreements with Liberty Broadband and Bright House.82
    “After further consideration and consultation with their advisors,” the remaining
    directors unanimously approved the Time Warner merger and the transactions with
    Liberty Broadband and Bright House.83
    76
    Id. ¶ 79.
    77
    Id. ¶ 84.
    78
    Id. ¶ 99.
    79
    Yoch Aff. Ex. D, at 151–52.
    80
    Id. at 152.
    81
    Id.
    82
    Id.
    83
    Id.
    13
    On August 20, 2015, Charter filed a definitive proxy statement with the
    Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Time Warner merger
    and the agreements with Bright House and Advance/Newhouse.84 On September
    21, 2015, 90% of outstanding Charter shares approved the Time Warner merger.85
    Excluding shares beneficially owned by Liberty Broadband and its affiliates,
    approximately 86% of outstanding Charter shares, in a single vote, voted in favor
    of issuing stock to Liberty Broadband, allowing Liberty Broadband and Liberty
    Interactive to receive all stock for their Time Warner shares, and granting Liberty
    Broadband a voting proxy on up to 6% of Advance/Newhouse’s shares.86 The
    Time Warner merger and the Bright House transaction closed on May 18, 2016.
    Before the transactions just described, Charter, Time Warner, and Bright
    House     were    separate   entities.   Bright   House   was   wholly   owned   by
    Advance/Newhouse.        Liberty Broadband owned 26% of Charter.          After the
    transactions, Charter owned Bright House and had merged with Time Warner.
    Time Warner stockholders owned between 40% and 44% of Charter,
    Advance/Newhouse owned between 13% and 14%, and Liberty Broadband owned
    between 19% and 20%.          As a result of its voting proxy, however, Liberty
    84
    Yoch Aff. Ex. D.
    85
    Yoch Aff. Ex. F.
    86
    Id.
    14
    Broadband retained an additional voting interest of approximately 6%, keeping its
    total voting power about the same as it stood before the transactions.
    ***
    To recap, the Plaintiff does not challenge the Time Warner merger or the
    Bright House acquisition. Instead, he attacks four “side deals” Charter entered into
    with Liberty Broadband in connection with the Time Warner and Bright House
    transactions.87 First, the Plaintiff challenges Charter’s issuance of $700 million in
    stock to Liberty Broadband as part of the Bright House acquisition. According to
    the Plaintiff, that issuance was unfair because it was priced at $173 per share,
    which represented a discount to Charter’s market price at the time. 88 Second, the
    Plaintiff questions the fairness of Charter’s decision to issue Liberty Broadband
    $4.3 billion in stock valued at $176.95 per share, an issuance made in connection
    with the Time Warner merger. In the Plaintiff’s view, that transaction was unfair
    because, while $176.95 represented Charter’s market price at the time, that price
    failed to take account of financial projections suggesting that the company would
    be worth far more than $176.95 per share once the transactions closed.89
    Third, the Plaintiff challenges Charter’s decision to allow only Liberty
    Broadband to receive all stock for its Time Warner shares.               That decision
    87
    Compl. ¶ 99.
    88
    Id. ¶ 6.
    89
    Id. ¶ 7 & n.3.
    15
    purportedly gave Liberty Broadband “a tax benefit not available to public
    stockholders” and enabled it to “fully enjoy the future benefits and synergies of the
    [t]ransactions.”90 Fourth and finally, the Plaintiff attacks Liberty Broadband’s
    receipt of the 6% voting proxy, which allowed it to maintain its preexisting voting
    power.     As a result, Liberty Broadband was “the only shareholder to avoid
    significant dilution of its voting interest upon the consummation of the
    [t]ransactions.”91
    C. This Litigation
    One day after Charter filed the proxy, the Plaintiff filed his original
    complaint for breach of fiduciary duties, alleging that the proxy was materially
    misleading because it failed to disclose certain unlevered free cash flow projections
    and the text of the voting proxy agreement. The Plaintiff sought to enjoin the
    acquisitions based on these purported breaches. Charter supplemented the proxy
    on September 9, 2015, providing the requested projections and the text of the
    voting proxy agreement. The Plaintiff then withdrew his request for injunctive
    relief, acknowledging that “the additional disclosures . . . moot[ed] Plaintiff’s
    pending motions.”92
    90
    Id. ¶ 9.
    91
    Id. ¶ 8.
    92
    Sept. 10, 2015 Letter to the Court.
    16
    The Plaintiff amended his complaint on April 22, 2016. The Complaint
    contains four counts. Count I is brought as a direct claim; it alleges that the
    Director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by (i) approving the stock
    issuances to Liberty Broadband and the voting proxy agreement, and (ii) “failing to
    disclose all material facts necessary for shareholders to cast an informed vote on . .
    . whether to enter into the [t]ransactions and issue the shares contemplated
    thereunder.”93 The Plaintiff claims that the stock issuances and the voting proxy
    agreement “unfairly expropriate[d] and transfer[red] voting and economic power
    from Charter’s public shareholders to the Stockholder Defendants.”94 Like Count
    I, Count II is brought as a direct claim, and it alleges that the Stockholder
    Defendants, as Charter’s controlling stockholders, breached their fiduciary duties
    by causing the Charter board to approve the transactions challenged in Count I.95
    Counts III and IV mirror Counts I and II, except that they are brought derivatively
    rather than directly.96
    On July 22, 2016, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under
    Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1.          On May 31, 2017, I issued a
    Memorandum Opinion holding that (i) the Stockholder Defendants were not
    controlling stockholders, and (ii) any purported breaches of fiduciary duty were not
    93
    Compl. ¶¶ 157–60.
    94
    Id. ¶ 159.
    95
    Id. ¶¶ 161–64.
    96
    Id. ¶¶ 165–72.
    17
    cleansed by the stockholder vote, because the Complaint adequately alleged that
    the vote was structurally coerced.97        Specifically, I held that the contractual
    restrictions imposed on the Stockholder Defendants—for example, Liberty
    Broadband could not acquire over 35% of Charter’s stock, designate more than
    four out of ten directors, or solicit proxies or consents—defeated any inference that
    the Stockholder Defendants were controlling stockholders.98 I then held that the
    Complaint supported a reasonable inference that the stockholder vote in favor of
    the challenged transactions was coerced.99 The coercion stemmed from the way
    the transactions were presented to the stockholders. The Bright House acquisition
    and the Time Warner merger—neither of which the Plaintiff challenges—were
    contingent on stockholder approval of the challenged transactions, that is, the share
    issuances to Liberty Broadband and the voting proxy agreement. Thus, the Charter
    board allegedly “presented the stockholders with a simple choice: accept (disloyal)
    equity issuances to the [c]ompany’s largest stockholder, and an agreement granting
    that stockholder greater voting power, or lose two beneficial transactions.”100 That,
    in my view, prevented the stockholder vote from having ratifying effect at the
    pleading stage.101
    97
    Liberty Broadband Corp., 
    2017 WL 2352152
    , at *14–24.
    98
    
    Id.
     at *16–20.
    99
    
    Id.
     at *20–24.
    100
    Id. at *22.
    101
    Id. at *24.
    18
    Having found that the stockholder vote did not cleanse any purported
    breaches of fiduciary duty at the motion-to-dismiss stage, I then requested
    supplemental briefing on whether the Plaintiff’s claims are direct or derivative.102
    The parties provided that briefing, and I heard oral argument on the remaining
    issues on April 6, 2018. The Plaintiff concedes in supplemental briefing that
    Counts II and IV, which rest on the allegation that the Stockholder Defendants
    controlled Charter, must be dismissed in light of my holding that the Complaint
    fails to adequately allege those Defendants’ controller status.         Thus, this
    Memorandum Opinion considers only whether Counts I and III state viable claims
    for relief.
    II. ANALYSIS
    The Complaint alleges that the following four transactions “unfairly
    expropriate[d] and transfer[red] voting and economic power from Charter’s public
    shareholders to the Stockholder Defendants”: (i) Charter’s issuance of $700
    million in Charter shares to Liberty Broadband at $173 per share, (ii) Liberty
    Broadband’s receipt of a voting proxy from Advance/Newhouse to vote up to 6%
    of its shares, (iii) Charter’s issuance of $4.3 billion in Charter shares to Liberty
    Broadband at $176.95 per share, and (iv) Liberty Broadband’s receipt of all
    102
    Id.
    19
    Charter stock for its Time Warner shares.103 The threshold question is whether
    these allegedly unfair transactions give rise to purely derivative claims. I turn to
    that question now.
    A. The Plaintiff’s Claims Are Solely Derivative
    “To determine whether a claim is derivative or direct, this Court must
    consider ‘(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing
    stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery
    or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?’”104 To plead
    a direct claim, “[t]he stockholder must demonstrate that the duty breached was
    owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to
    the corporation.”105 By contrast, “[w]here all of a corporation’s stockholders are
    harmed and would recover pro rata in proportion with their ownership of the
    corporation’s stock solely because they are stockholders, then the claim is
    derivative in nature.”106 Tooley requires this Court to look beyond the labels used
    to describe the claim, evaluating instead the nature of the wrong alleged.107
    “In the typical corporate overpayment case, a claim against the corporation’s
    fiduciaries for redress is regarded as exclusively derivative, irrespective of whether
    103
    Compl. ¶ 159.
    104
    Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 
    65 A.3d 618
    , 655 (Del. Ch. 2013) (quoting Tooley v.
    Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 
    845 A.2d 1031
    , 1033 (Del. 2004)).
    105
    Tooley, 
    845 A.2d at 1039
    .
    106
    Feldman v. Cutaia, 
    951 A.2d 727
    , 733 (Del. 2008).
    107
    E.g., In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig., 
    906 A.2d 808
    , 817 (Del. Ch. 2005),
    aff’d, 
    906 A.2d 766
     (Del. 2006).
    20
    the currency or form of overpayment is cash or the corporation’s stock.”108 The
    reason is that, in the typical corporate overpayment case, “any dilution in value of
    the corporation’s stock is merely the unavoidable result (from an accounting
    standpoint) of the reduction in the value of the entire corporate entity, of which
    each share of equity represents an equal fraction.”109 In Gentile, however, the
    Supreme Court pointed to “at least one transactional paradigm—a species of
    corporate overpayment claim—that Delaware case law recognizes as being both
    derivative and direct in character.”110 Gentile held that a corporate overpayment
    claim may be both direct and derivative where:
    (1) a stockholder having majority or effective control causes the
    corporation to issue “excessive” shares of its stock in exchange for
    assets of the controlling stockholder that have a lesser value; and (2)
    the exchange causes an increase in the percentage of the outstanding
    shares owned by the controlling stockholder, and a corresponding
    decrease in the share percentage owned by the public (minority)
    shareholders.111
    Post-Gentile, Delaware courts have struggled to define the boundaries of
    dual-natured claims.112 In Feldman, this Court took a limited view of Gentile’s
    reach, finding it “clear” “that the Delaware Supreme Court intended to confine the
    scope of its rulings to only those situations where a controlling stockholder
    108
    Gentile v. Rossette, 
    906 A.2d 91
    , 99 (Del. 2006).
    109
    
    Id.
    110
    
    Id.
    111
    
    Id. at 100
    .
    112
    See Chester Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. New Residential Inv. Corp., 
    2016 WL 5865004
    , at *7
    (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 2016) (“There is some tension in recent cases about how far to extend
    Gentile.”), aff’d, 
    2018 WL 2146483
     (Del. May 10, 2018).
    21
    exists.”113 Feldman reasoned that “any other interpretation would swallow the
    general rule that equity dilution claims are solely derivative, and would cast great
    doubt on the continuing vitality of the Tooley framework.”114                Thus, under
    Feldman, a dual-natured claim arises only where “a controlling stockholder, with
    sufficient power to manipulate the corporate processes, engineers a dilutive
    transaction whereby that stockholder receives an exclusive benefit of increased
    equity ownership and voting power for inadequate consideration.”115
    Other decisions have taken a more expansive view of Gentile.                      In
    Carsanaro, this Court held that a dual-natured claim does not require the presence
    of a controlling stockholder on both sides of the transaction.116 According to
    Carsanaro, Gentile also applies to self-interested stock issuances effectuated by a
    board that lacks a disinterested and independent majority.117 In In re Nine Systems
    Corp. Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Noble agreed with Carsanaro’s
    approach, reasoning that it made little sense “to hold a controlling stockholder to a
    higher standard than the board of directors.”118           Vice Chancellor Noble also
    emphasized that Gentile “expressly recognized that it only addressed what was ‘at
    least one transactional paradigm’ that had the dual nature of causing direct and
    113
    Feldman v. Cutaia, 
    956 A.2d 644
    , 657 (Del. Ch. 2007), aff’d, 
    951 A.2d 727
    .
    114
    
    Id.
    115
    
    Id.
    116
    
    65 A.3d at 658
    .
    117
    
    Id.
    118
    
    2014 WL 4383127
    , at *28 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Fuchs v. Wren Holdings,
    LLC, 
    129 A.3d 882
     (Table) (Del. 2015).
    22
    derivative harm and permitting direct and derivative recovery.”119 Accordingly,
    any “[b]roader language in Gentile . . . about situations not involving a controlling
    stockholder would arguably have been dictum.”120
    The Supreme Court revisited Gentile in El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v.
    Brinckerhoff.121 El Paso involved a limited partner’s claim that the partnership had
    overpaid the controlling general partner for assets held by the general partner’s
    parent.122 The limited partner did not attempt to prove that the overpayment
    increased the general partner’s voting power at the expense of the unaffiliated
    unitholders.123 Instead, the injury stemmed solely from “the extraction of . . .
    economic value from the minority by a controlling stockholder.”124 Nevertheless,
    the limited partner argued that his challenge to the overpayment gave rise to a
    dual-natured claim under Gentile.125                The Supreme Court rejected the limited
    partner’s attempt to fit his claim into the Gentile framework.126
    The Supreme Court emphasized that Gentile involved “a controlling
    shareholder and transactions that resulted in an improper transfer of both economic
    value and voting power from the minority stockholders to the controlling
    119
    Id. at *27 (quoting Gentile, 
    906 A.2d at 99
    ).
    120
    
    Id.
    121
    
    152 A.3d 1248
     (Del. 2016).
    122
    
    Id.
     at 1252–53.
    123
    
    Id. at 1264
    .
    124
    
    Id.
    125
    
    Id.
    126
    
    Id.
    23
    stockholder.”127 Because the challenged transactions in El Paso did not dilute the
    unitholders’ voting rights, the limited partner’s claim failed to “satisfy the unique
    circumstances presented by the Gentile ‘species of corporate overpayment
    claim[s].’”128 The limited partner conceded that he had proved only expropriation
    of economic value, and not any dilution of voting rights.129 According to the
    limited partner, however, this distinction was “immaterial.”130 The Supreme Court
    disagreed.131 It expressly “decline[d] the invitation to further expand the universe
    of claims that can be asserted ‘dually’ to hold here that the extraction of solely
    economic value from the minority by a controlling stockholder constitutes direct
    injury.”132 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the limited partner’s overpayment
    claim was “exclusively derivative under Tooley.”133
    Chief Justice Strine wrote separately in El Paso to note that Gentile “is
    difficult to reconcile with traditional doctrine” on the direct/derivative
    distinction.134 As the Chief Justice pointed out, “[a]ll dilution claims involve, by
    definition, dilution.”135 Thus,
    127
    
    Id. at 1263
    .
    128
    
    Id. at 1264
     (emphasis added) (quoting Gentile, 
    906 A.2d at 99
    ).
    129
    
    Id.
    130
    
    Id.
    131
    
    Id.
    132
    
    Id.
    133
    Id. at 1265.
    134
    Id. at 1266 (Strine, C.J., concurring).
    135
    Id.
    24
    [t]o suggest that, in any situation where other investors have less
    voting power after a dilutive transaction, a direct claim also exists
    turns the most traditional type of derivative claim—an argument that
    the entity got too little value in exchange for shares—into one always
    able to be prosecuted directly.136
    The Chief Justice found this result to be problematic.137
    Following El Paso, this Court has had two occasions to consider whether
    Gentile applies in the absence of a controlling stockholder.      In Carr v. New
    Enterprise Associates, Inc., Chancellor Bouchard held that, “to invoke the dual
    dynamic recognized in Gentile, a controlling stockholder must exist before the
    challenged transaction.”138 Because there was no controller at the time of the
    challenged transaction, the complaint in Carr failed to plead facts giving rise to a
    dual-natured claim.139 The Chancellor confronted this issue again in Cirillo Family
    Trust v. Moezinia.140 There, the Court reached the same conclusion, holding that
    “the Gentile paradigm only applies when a stockholder already possessing
    majority or effective control causes the corporation to issue more shares to it for
    inadequate consideration.”141 As in Carr, the Gentile framework did not apply in
    136
    Id.
    137
    Id.
    138
    
    2018 WL 1472336
    , at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2018).
    139
    
    Id.
     at *9–10.
    140
    
    2018 WL 3388398
     (Del. Ch. July 11, 2018).
    141
    Id. at *16.
    25
    Moezinia because there was no controlling stockholder (or control group) at the
    corporation before the purportedly improper dilution.142
    Here, the Plaintiff alleges that Charter overpaid Liberty Broadband by
    issuing it stock for allegedly unfair consideration. Likewise, the Plaintiff pleads
    that Charter received inadequate consideration from Liberty Broadband in
    exchange for agreeing to grant it the 6% voting proxy. These allegations amount
    to a corporate overpayment claim—Charter purportedly transferred assets to
    Liberty Broadband for inadequate consideration. Thus, unless the facts alleged in
    the Complaint fit the Gentile paradigm, they give rise only to derivative claims. In
    my view, Gentile does not apply to the challenged transactions, and the Plaintiff’s
    claims are thus solely derivative.
    In my initial motion-to-dismiss decision, I held that the Complaint failed to
    adequately allege that John Malone and Liberty Broadband were Charter’s
    controlling stockholders.143 That, according to post-El Paso caselaw, is dispositive
    of the direct/derivative question.        Because Gentile is limited to transactions
    involving controlling stockholders, the absence of a controller here means that the
    Plaintiff’s claims are not dual-natured.
    142
    Id. In ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 
    2017 WL 3421142
    , at *26 n.206 (Del. Ch. July 21,
    2017), aff’d, 
    184 A.3d 1291
     (Table) (Del. 2018), Vice Chancellor Laster went further, writing
    that “[w]hether Gentile is still good law is debatable.”
    143
    Liberty Broadband Corp., 
    2017 WL 2352152
    , at *16–20.
    26
    Before El Paso, this Court was split on the question whether Gentile applied
    to transactions that did not involve controlling stockholders. El Paso clarified this
    uncertainty by limiting Gentile to “the unique circumstances presented” in that
    case.144 As the Plaintiff correctly points out, El Paso did not squarely address
    whether Gentile is limited to controller transactions. But the Supreme Court in El
    Paso was faced with a similar question: Should Gentile be limited to its facts—that
    is, a transaction that both diluted voting power and expropriated economic value—
    or should it be extended to a different set of transactions, namely, those that extract
    only economic value from the minority holders? The Supreme Court answered the
    question in the negative. It rejected the limited partner’s “invitation to further
    expand the universe of claims that can be asserted ‘dually.’”145
    In my view, the reasoning of El Paso, applied here, means that Gentile must
    be limited to its facts, which involved a dilutive stock issuance to a controlling
    stockholder. El Paso thus implicitly rejected the reasoning of decisions such as
    Carsanaro and Nine Systems, which had extended Gentile to any dilutive issuance
    approved by a conflicted board. Notably, the two post-El Paso decisions to have
    considered the question have concluded that Gentile does not apply absent a
    controlling stockholder.146 Because the Complaint here fails to adequately allege
    144
    El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., 
    152 A.3d at 1264
    .
    145
    
    Id.
    146
    Moezinia, 
    2018 WL 3388398
    , at *16; Carr, 
    2018 WL 1472336
    , at *9–10.
    27
    that the Stockholder Defendants controlled Charter, Gentile does not apply, and the
    Plaintiff’s claims are solely derivative.147
    B. Demand is Excused as to the Challenged Transactions
    Because the Plaintiff’s challenges to the allegedly unfair transactions give
    rise to purely derivative claims, the Complaint must comply with Court of
    Chancery Rule 23.1.148 The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint for
    failure to plead demand futility. The demand requirement is an extension of the
    fundamental principle that “directors, rather than shareholders, manage the
    business and affairs of the corporation.”149 Directors’ control over a corporation
    embraces the disposition of its assets, including its choses in action. Thus, under
    Rule 23.1, a derivative plaintiff must “allege with particularity the efforts, if any,
    made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
    comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action
    or for not making the effort.”150
    147
    In candor, limiting Gentile to controller situations, rather than expanding it to conflicted board
    non-controller dilution cases, or overruling it entirely, is, as a matter of doctrine, unsatisfying. I
    find that the Supreme Court’s treatment in El Paso controls here, however.
    148
    Because the Plaintiff’s claims are solely derivative rather than dual-natured, I need not decide
    whether the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 23.1 apply to dual-natured claims brought
    by stockholders whose ownership stake has not been eliminated by a merger. See, e.g., Calesa
    Assocs., L.P. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., 
    2016 WL 770251
    , at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016) (suggesting
    that “a dual-natured claim should be addressed under the particularized pleading standard of
    Rule 23.1”).
    149
    Aronson v. Lewis, 
    473 A.2d 805
    , 811 (Del. 1984) (citing 8 Del. C. § 141(a)), overruled on
    other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 
    746 A.2d 244
     (Del. 2000).
    150
    Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a).
    28
    Where, as here, the plaintiff has failed to make a presuit demand on the
    board, the Court must dismiss the complaint “unless it alleges particularized facts
    showing that demand would have been futile.”151 The plaintiff’s “pleadings must
    comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ substantially
    from the permissive notice pleadings governed solely by Chancery Rule 8(a).”152
    Under the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 23.1, conclusory “allegations
    of fact or law not supported by allegations of specific fact may not be taken as
    true.”153 Nonetheless, the plaintiff is “entitled to all reasonable factual inferences
    that logically flow from the particularized facts alleged.”154 In deciding a Rule
    23.1 motion, I am limited to “the well-pled allegations of the complaint, documents
    incorporated into the complaint by reference, and judicially noticed facts.”155
    This Court analyzes demand futility under the test set out in Rales v.
    Blasband.156 Rales requires a derivative plaintiff to allege particularized facts
    raising a reasonable doubt that, if a demand had been made, “the board of directors
    could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment
    151
    Ryan v. Gursahaney, 
    2015 WL 1915911
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2015), aff’d, 
    128 A.3d 991
    (Table) (Del. 2015).
    152
    Brehm, 
    746 A.2d at 254
    .
    153
    Grobow v. Perot, 
    539 A.2d 180
    , 187 (Del. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 
    746 A.2d 244
    .
    154
    Brehm, 
    746 A.2d at 255
    .
    155
    Breedy-Fryson v. Towne Estates Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 
    2010 WL 718619
    , at *9 (Del.
    Ch. Feb. 25, 2010).
    156
    
    634 A.2d 927
     (Del. 1993).
    29
    in responding to [it].”157 Aronson v. Lewis addresses the subset of cases, as here, in
    which the plaintiff is challenging an action taken by the current board.158 To
    establish demand futility under Aronson, the plaintiff must allege particularized
    facts creating a reasonable doubt that “the directors are disinterested and
    independent” or the “challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
    exercise of business judgment.”159 The tests articulated in Aronson and Rales are
    “complementary versions of the same inquiry.”160 That inquiry asks whether the
    board is capable of exercising its business judgment in considering a demand.161
    Here, the Plaintiff argues that demand is futile because at least half of
    Charter’s ten-person board lacks independence from Malone, who is indisputably
    interested in the challenged transactions. Delaware law is clear that directors are
    presumed to be independent for purposes of evaluating demand futility.162
    “Independence means that a director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of
    the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences.”163
    157
    
    Id. at 934
    .
    158
    See 
    id.
     at 933–34 (explaining that Aronson does not apply unless the plaintiff is challenging a
    business decision by the board of directors that would be considering the demand).
    159
    
    473 A.2d at 814
    .
    160
    In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
    2013 WL 2181514
    , at *16 (Del. Ch.
    May 21, 2013); see also David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, 
    2006 WL 391931
    ,
    at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006) (“This court has held in the past that the Rales test, in reality, folds
    the two-pronged Aronson test into one broader examination.”).
    161
    In re Duke Energy Corp. Derivative Litig., 
    2016 WL 4543788
    , at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31,
    2016).
    162
    See Beam v. Stewart, 
    845 A.2d 1040
    , 1055 (Del. 2004) (noting that in “the demand-excusal
    context, . . . the board is presumed to be independent”).
    163
    Aronson, 
    473 A.2d at 816
    .
    30
    A plaintiff may establish that a director lacks independence by alleging with
    particularity that the director “is sufficiently loyal to, beholden to, or otherwise
    influenced by an interested party to undermine the director’s ability to judge the
    matter on its merits.”164         Put differently, a director is not independent if
    particularized facts support a reasonable inference that she “would be more willing
    to risk . . . her reputation than risk the relationship with the interested [person].”165
    “Allegations of mere personal friendship or a mere outside business
    relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a
    director’s independence.”166        Nevertheless, “[s]ome professional or personal
    friendships, which may border on or even exceed familial loyalty and closeness,
    may raise a reasonable doubt whether a director can appropriately consider
    demand.”167 Likewise, “substantial past or current relationships . . . of a business .
    . . nature” may, if material to the director, give rise to a pleading-stage inference of
    beholdenness.168 In conducting the independence inquiry, I must “consider all the
    particularized facts pled by the plaintiff[] about the relationships between the
    director and the interested party in their totality and not in isolation from each
    164
    Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., 
    2017 WL 1437308
    , at *26 (Del. Ch. Apr.
    14, 2017).
    165
    Beam, 
    845 A.2d at 1050
    .
    166
    
    Id.
    167
    Id.; see also Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 
    124 A.3d 1017
    , 1022 (Del. 2015) (“Close
    friendships [lasting fifty years] are likely considered precious by many people, and are rare.
    People drift apart for many reasons, and when a close relationship endures for that long, a
    pleading stage inference arises that it is important to the parties.”).
    168
    In re Primedia Inc. Derivative Litig., 
    910 A.2d 248
    , 261 n.45 (Del. Ch. 2006).
    31
    other.”169 “Evaluating a board’s ability to consider a demand impartially thus
    requires a ‘contextual inquiry.’”170
    In this case, the relevant board for demand-futility purposes consists of ten
    individuals: Malone, Conn, Huseby, Jacobson, Maffei, Markley, Merritt, Nair,
    Rutledge, and Zinterhofer. The Plaintiff does not challenge the independence of
    Conn, Markley, or Merritt. For their part, the Defendants concede that Malone and
    Maffei lack independence. Thus, to adequately allege demand futility, the Plaintiff
    must plead with particularity that at least three of the remaining five directors lack
    independence from Malone. In my view, the Plaintiff has cleared this hurdle.
    Demand is therefore excused.
    1. Nair
    Nair has been a Charter director since May 2013, when he became one of
    Liberty Media’s four designees.171 Nair serves as Executive Vice President and
    Chief Technology Officer of Liberty Global plc.172 Malone is the chairman and
    largest stockholder of Liberty Global, in which he holds a 25% stake.173 These
    allegations raise a reasonable doubt that Nair could impartially consider a demand
    to sue Malone.
    169
    Sanchez, 
    124 A.3d at 1019
    .
    170
    In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., 
    2016 WL 301245
    , at *34 (Del.
    Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (quoting Beam, 
    845 A.2d at 1049
    ), reconsideration granted in part, 
    2016 WL 727771
     (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2016).
    171
    Compl. ¶ 20.
    172
    
    Id.
    173
    Id. ¶ 13; Yoch Aff. Ex. B, at I-63.
    32
    Delaware law is clear that “when a director is employed by or receives
    compensation from other entities, and where the interested party who would be
    adversely affected by purs[u]ing litigation controls or has substantial influence
    over those entities, a reasonable doubt exists about that director’s ability to
    impartially consider a litigation demand.”174 To establish a lack of independence, a
    plaintiff need not allege that “the interested party can directly fire a director from
    his day job.”175 Instead, the question is whether “the director’s ability to act
    impartially on a matter important to the interested party can be doubted because
    that director may feel either subject to the interested party’s dominion or beholden
    to that interested party.”176 Delaware law has also recognized that, “[a]bsent some
    unusual fact—such as the possession of inherited wealth—the remuneration a
    person receives from her full-time job is typically of great consequence to her.”177
    Mizel v. Connelly178 illustrates these principles. There, this Court held that
    two senior executives could not be considered independent of the company’s CEO,
    who also held a 32.7% stake.179 The Court found it “doubtful” that these two
    executives could “consider the demand on its merits without also pondering
    174
    In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., 
    2016 WL 301245
    , at *36.
    175
    Sanchez, 
    124 A.3d at
    1023 n.25.
    176
    
    Id.
    177
    In re The Student Loan Corp. Derivative Litig., 
    2002 WL 75479
    , at *3 n.3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8,
    2002).
    178
    
    1999 WL 550369
     (Del. Ch. July 22, 1999).
    179
    Id. at *1, 3.
    33
    whether an affirmative vote would endanger their continued employment.”180
    Importantly, the Court noted that while “a 32.7% block may not be sufficient to
    constitute control for certain corporation law purposes,” “the pragmatic, realist
    approach dictated by Rales” demanded giving “great weight to the practical power
    wielded by a stockholder controlling such a block.”181 Other courts in this state
    have reached the same conclusion on similar facts.182
    Here, while the Complaint does not expressly allege that Nair’s positions as
    Executive Vice President and CTO of Liberty Global constitute his primary
    employment, that is certainly a reasonable inference.               Thus, I infer from the
    Complaint, Nair works full-time at a company in which Malone is a 25%
    stockholder. Significantly, Malone is also the chairman of that company’s board
    of directors. The Complaint does not allege that Malone controls Liberty Global,
    or that he holds a managerial position at the company. Nonetheless, Malone is the
    company’s largest stockholder and chairman, and that puts him “in a position to
    exert considerable influence over” Nair.183 Moreover, while the Complaint does
    not detail Nair’s compensation at Liberty Global, that does not negate a pleading-
    180
    Id. at *3.
    181
    Id. at *3 n.1.
    182
    See, e.g., Rales, 
    634 A.2d at 937
     (holding that a director who was also the CEO could not act
    independently of two brothers who held a 44% stake in the company); Steiner v. Meyerson, 
    1995 WL 441999
    , at *10 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (“The facts alleged appear to raise a reasonable
    doubt that Wipff, as president, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer, would be
    unaffected by [the CEO and significant blockholder’s] interest in the transactions that plaintiff
    attacks.”).
    183
    Rales, 
    634 A.2d at 937
    .
    34
    stage inference of materiality, because the compensation a person receives from
    her full-time employment is “typically of great consequence to her.”184 In short,
    the facts alleged in the Complaint suggest that Nair would be unable to objectively
    determine whether to initiate litigation against Malone.               Nair thus lacks
    independence for pleading-stage purposes.
    2. Rutledge
    Rutledge has served as Charter’s CEO since February 2012; he has also been
    a board member since that time.185 The Complaint alleges that Rutledge is a full-
    time Charter employee who depends on the company for his livelihood.186 In
    2014, Rutledge received $16 million in compensation from Charter.187 As noted
    above, Liberty Broadband controls 26% of the voting stock of Charter, and four of
    Charter’s ten directors are Liberty Broadband appointees. Malone, in turn, owns
    47% of Liberty Broadband. Notably, Rutledge gave an interview to the New York
    Times in which he “did not deny Malone’s influence, stating ‘[w]hen he talks, I
    listen. And he is a significant talker.’”188 These allegations are sufficient, to my
    mind, to cast doubt on Rutledge’s independence from Malone.
    184
    In re The Student Loan Corp. Derivative Litig., 
    2002 WL 75479
    , at *3 n.3. Indeed, such
    compensation is “usually the method by which bills get paid, health insurance is affordably
    procured, children’s educations are funded, and retirement savings are accumulated.” 
    Id.
    185
    Compl. ¶ 21.
    186
    
    Id.
    187
    Id. ¶ 61.
    188
    Id. ¶ 88 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
    35
    The considerations supporting demand futility with respect to Nair apply
    with even more significance to Rutledge.               While the Complaint does not
    adequately plead that Malone controls Charter, the facts alleged support a
    reasonable inference that he exercises substantial influence over the company
    through his ownership stake in Liberty Broadband. Indeed, Malone serves on the
    Charter board, and three other directors are designated by Liberty Broadband.
    Malone’s influence over Charter, and Rutledge specifically, is further evidenced by
    Rutledge’s admission that “[w]hen [Malone] talks, I listen. And he is a significant
    talker.”189 Rutledge is a highly compensated senior executive at Charter. Given
    that Rutledge presumably receives his primary income from his employment at
    Charter, “it is doubtful that [he] can consider the demand on its merits without also
    pondering whether an affirmative vote would endanger [his] continued
    employment.”190 Thus, like Nair, Rutledge cannot be considered independent from
    Malone at the pleading stage.
    3. Zinterhofer
    Zinterhofer has served on the Charter board since 2009, and he has been its
    chairman since December 2009.191 Zinterhofer formerly worked as a partner at
    189
    Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
    190
    Mizel, 
    1999 WL 550369
    , at *3.
    191
    Compl. ¶ 22.
    36
    Apollo Management, L.P. and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.192 Zinterhofer
    is also one of three founders of Searchlight Capital Partners, LLC, a private equity
    firm.193    In November 2012, a joint venture between Searchlight and Liberty
    Global bought a Puerto Rican cable company for approximately $585 million.194
    Searchlight owns 40% of the joint-venture entity; Liberty Global owns 60%.195
    Two years after this partnership, Liberty Global and Searchlight announced
    another joint venture to purchase a Puerto Rican cable company, this time for $272
    million.196 The combined business that resulted from this transaction was again a
    60/40 joint venture between Liberty Global and Searchlight, and it became the
    largest cable company in Puerto Rico.197 Thus, as the Complaint points out,
    “Zinterhofer is a current business partner with Liberty Global and Malone in
    corporate enterprises worth almost $1 billion.”198 As noted above, Malone owns
    25% of Liberty Global’s voting stock, and he chairs its board.
    It is true that “[a]llegations of . . . a mere outside business relationship,
    standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s
    192
    
    Id.
    193
    Id. ¶¶ 22, 55.
    194
    Id. ¶ 55.
    195
    Id.
    196
    Id. ¶ 56.
    197
    Id.
    198
    Id. ¶ 57.
    37
    independence.”199 But it does not follow that a business relationship between a
    director and an interested party can never undermine the presumption of director
    independence.200 A pleading-stage inference of beholdenness may arise where the
    plaintiff pleads with particularity that a director’s business relationship with an
    interested party is material to the director.201 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
    recently recognized “the importance of . . . mutually beneficial ongoing business
    relationship[s].”202      Indeed, “it is reasonable to expect that [such] . . .
    relationship[s] might have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely
    toward each other.”203
    In this case, Zinterhofer (through Searchlight) and Malone (through Liberty
    Global) are engaged in joint ventures worth almost $1 billion. One of those joint
    ventures involves running the largest cable company in Puerto Rico.                            It is
    199
    Beam, 
    845 A.2d at 1050
    ; see also Orman v. Cullman, 
    794 A.2d 5
    , 27 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“The
    naked assertion of a previous business relationship is not enough to overcome the presumption of
    a director’s independence.”).
    200
    See, e.g., Caspian Select Credit Master Fund Ltd. v. Gohl, 
    2015 WL 5718592
    , at *7 (Del. Ch.
    Sept. 28, 2015) (“As explained, Campion and Davis operate in the same line of business as
    Wayzata Partners, which has nominated them to numerous boards of directors. Both have
    engaged in various business dealings with Wayzata Partners, and expect future business
    relations. Wayzata Partners manages investment funds that acquire controlling interests in
    distressed companies. One can reasonably infer that Campion and Davis expect to be considered
    for directorships in companies the Wayzata funds acquire in the future. Even if the actual extent
    of their relationships with Wayzata Partners is not altogether clear at this point in the litigation,
    the existence of these interests and relationships is enough to defeat a motion to dismiss.”
    (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    201
    See Khanna v. McMinn, 
    2006 WL 1388744
    , at *17 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2006) (“Ultimately, the
    inquiry into independence turns in this instance on whether Covad’s business relationship with
    BEA Systems was material to BEA or to Crandall himself as a director of BEA.”).
    202
    Sandys v. Pincus, 
    152 A.3d 124
    , 134 (Del. 2016).
    203
    
    Id.
    38
    reasonable to infer that, if Zinterhofer voted to authorize a derivative suit against
    Malone, the relationship between Searchlight and Liberty Global might be in
    jeopardy. After all, “[c]ausing a lawsuit to be brought against another person is no
    small matter, and is the sort of thing that might plausibly endanger a
    relationship.”204   True, the Complaint does not (i) compare the value of
    Searchlight’s interest in the joint ventures to the overall value of its investment
    portfolio, (ii) allege the size of Zinterhofer’s interest in Searchlight, or (iii) plead
    facts regarding Zinterhofer’s net worth or compensation.          And the Complaint
    mentions that Zinterhofer was once a partner at Apollo and Morgan Stanley,
    perhaps suggesting that he is a wealthy man. But at the pleading stage, it is
    reasonable to infer that joint ventures of this size are important to their principals,
    even if those principals have a high net worth. It is equally reasonable to infer that
    joint ventures totaling almost $1 billion are material to the firms involved, even
    absent details regarding the size of those firms’ investment portfolios. Thus, while
    more information would perhaps have made the pleadings stronger, for purposes of
    the current Motion the Complaint adequately alleges that the possibility of
    endangering the Liberty Global/Searchlight joint ventures would weigh heavily on
    204
    
    Id.
    39
    Zinterhofer in evaluating a demand to sue Malone. In my view, that suffices to
    impugn Zinterhofer’s independence at the pleading stage.205
    ***
    Because Malone, Maffei, Nair, Rutledge, and Zinterhofer lack independence
    for pleading-stage purposes, at least half of the ten Charter directors who would be
    asked to consider a demand are conflicted. Thus, demand is excused, and I need
    not consider the Plaintiff’s allegations that Huseby and Jacobson lack
    independence for purposes of my analysis under Rule 23.1.
    C. The Complaint Pleads a Viable Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
    Charter’s board did not change in composition between the approval of the
    challenged transactions and the filing of the Complaint. Accordingly, for the same
    reasons discussed in connection with the demand-futility analysis, the Charter
    board lacked an independent and disinterested majority at the time of the
    challenged transactions. “If a board is evenly divided between compromised and
    non-compromised directors, then the plaintiff has succeeded in rebutting the
    205
    Park Employees’ & Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago v.
    Smith, 
    2017 WL 1382597
     (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2017), is not to the contrary. There, the plaintiff
    alleged that a director was beholden to an investment bank because he was the cofounder and
    managing partner of a firm that held a minority interest in a corporation that had received advice
    and underwriting services from the investment bank. 
    Id.
     at *8–9. This Court held that these
    allegations were insufficient to impugn the director’s independence. Id. at *9. Notably, unlike
    the Plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Smith did not plead any facts regarding the size of the business
    relationship between the director and the investment bank. Id. at *8–9.
    40
    business judgment rule.”206 Once a plaintiff has rebutted the business judgment
    rule, “the court will review the board’s decision for entire fairness,”207 which
    typically precludes dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).208
    Ordinarily, then, my finding of demand futility would be the end of the
    analysis.   As this Court has recognized, “[t]he standard for pleading demand
    futility under Rule 23.1 is more stringent than the standard under Rule 12(b)(6),
    and a complaint that survives a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 23.1 will also
    survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, assuming that it otherwise . . . state[s] a
    cognizable claim.”209 Under the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard, a complaint will
    not be dismissed “unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
    reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.”210
    Nevertheless, the Defendants argue that even if demand is excused, the
    Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim for breach of
    fiduciary duty. They point out that, in accordance with Charter’s certificate of
    incorporation, the challenged transactions were not approved by the full Charter
    board. Instead, they were approved by the six directors not designated by Liberty
    206
    Frederick Hsu Living Trust, 
    2017 WL 1437308
    , at *26.
    207
    
    Id.
    208
    See, e.g., Orman, 
    794 A.2d at
    21 n.36 (noting that a finding that entire fairness applies
    “normally will preclude dismissal of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss”). The
    Defendants do not argue that, even if entire fairness applies, the Complaint should be dismissed
    because it fails to adequately allege that the challenged transactions were unfair.
    209
    Feuer v. Redstone, 
    2018 WL 1870074
    , at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018) (citation omitted).
    210
    Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 
    27 A.3d 531
    , 535 (Del.
    2011).
    41
    Broadband: Markley, Merritt, Conn, Jacobson, Zinterhofer, and Rutledge. Thus,
    the Defendants argue, the Complaint cannot rebut the business judgment rule
    unless it successfully attacks the independence of at least three of these six
    directors. If that is correct, the demand-futility analysis and the Rule 12(b)(6)
    analysis could produce different results. Suppose, for example, that Jacobson,
    Markley, Merritt, and Conn were deemed independent, but Malone, Maffei, Nair,
    Rutledge, and Zinterhofer were found to lack independence.                        In that case, a
    majority of the six directors who approved the challenged transactions would be
    disinterested and independent.211 Of course, demand would be excused because
    the full board lacked an independent majority; but because the relevant decision-
    making body contained an unconflicted majority, the business judgment rule, in the
    Defendants’ view at least, would apply.212
    211
    Under 8 Del. C. § 141(b), “[a] majority of the total number of directors shall constitute a
    quorum for the transaction of business unless the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws
    require a greater number.” Charter’s certificate does not require a greater number, and thus the
    six directors not appointed by Liberty Broadband constituted a quorum.
    212
    See In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
    953 A.2d 963
    , 995 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[T]he
    directors implicated by the substantive allegations of the amended consolidated complaint are not
    necessarily the same as must be considered with regard to excusal of demand. Rather, the Court
    focuses on the directors actually alleged to be implicated in the challenged act (or failure to
    act).”); 1 David A. Drexler et al., Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 15.05[1] (2017)
    (“Although useful as a rule of thumb, it may be something of an over-generalization to state that
    corporate self-interest is automatically created unless a majority of the corporation’s directors is
    individually disinterested. Consider the following example: Assume six of a ten-director board
    have an interest in a particular transaction. If all directors are present at the meeting where the
    transaction is approved, it is an interested corporate transaction, since the affirmative votes of at
    least two interested directors are required for action. However, if only a quorum of six, including
    the four disinterested directors, is present and the transaction is approved with the affirmative
    votes of the four disinterested directors, the transaction arguably may be disinterested. . . . It may
    42
    The Plaintiff offers three responses to this argument. First, he argues that
    the Complaint successfully challenges the independence of Jacobson, Zinterhofer,
    and Rutledge.       Thus, three of the six directors who approved the challenged
    transactions were conflicted. Second, according to the Plaintiff, the Defendants are
    actually arguing that the six directors not designated by Liberty Broadband
    functioned as a special committee whose approval secured business judgment rule
    review for the transactions at issue. The problem, says the Plaintiff, is that the
    Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing the six directors in fact
    acted as a properly empowered special committee.
    Third, the Plaintiff stresses that the Liberty Broadband designees did
    approve the acquisitions of Bright House and Time Warner, which were
    inextricably linked to the challenged transactions. The Plaintiff’s syllogism runs as
    follows.     The acquisitions were contingent on stockholder approval of the
    challenged transactions, and I have already held that this transaction structure
    caused the stockholder vote to be structurally coerced.                    Specifically, if the
    stockholders voted down the challenged transactions, they would lose the
    thus be possible to narrow significantly the scope of interested transactions by mechanical means
    such as limiting the participation of interested directors in board meetings where the transaction
    in which they are interested is considered or delegating decision-making power over such
    decisions to committees of disinterested directors only.”); 1 Stephen A. Radin, The Business
    Judgment Rule 819 (6th ed. 2009) (“[E]ven where a majority of a corporation’s directors are
    interested, the business judgment rule still may govern if the challenged conduct or transaction is
    approved by a majority of the corporation’s disinterested directors or a committee of
    disinterested directors.”).
    43
    acquisitions, which both parties agree were beneficial to Charter. The six directors
    who approved the challenged transactions were presumably in a similar position: If
    they declined to recommend the allegedly unfair deals with Liberty Broadband,
    Charter would lose out on the opportunity to acquire Time Warner and Bright
    House. Thus, the Liberty Broadband designees’ approval of the acquisitions led to
    the challenged transactions being presented to both the remaining directors and the
    stockholders in a structurally coercive manner. Because all ten Charter directors
    played a role in securing the approval of the challenged transactions, it is the full
    board whose independence counts for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.
    I need not reach the Plaintiff’s first and second arguments, because his third
    argument persuades me that the independence of all ten Charter directors must be
    considered under the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.         The four Liberty Broadband
    designees did not vote on the challenged transactions. But they approved the
    acquisitions of Time Warner and Bright House, and the structure whereby those
    deals would not close unless the challenged transactions received stockholder
    approval.   Thus, by signing off on the structurally coercive terms of the
    acquisitions, the Liberty Broadband designees helped “‘strong-arm[]’ the
    stockholders into voting for the [challenged] transaction[s] ‘for reasons outside of
    44
    the economic merit’ of the decision.”213               They placed the six “independent”
    directors in the same “take it or leave it” circumstances. I find, therefore, that to
    rebut the business judgment rule, the Plaintiff need only plead that at least half of
    Charter’s ten directors lacked independence from Malone.214 Because the Plaintiff
    has alleged with particularity that at least five Charter directors are beholden to
    Malone, entire fairness applies, and the Complaint states a claim for breach of
    fiduciary duty.215
    D. The Disclosure Claim
    Finally, the Plaintiff purports to assert a disclosure claim based on allegedly
    misleading statements in the proxy.             According to the Plaintiff, the proxy is
    materially misleading because it describes Zinterhofer as “independent” without
    disclosing Searchlight’s bias-producing business relationship with Liberty
    213
    Liberty Broadband Corp., 
    2017 WL 2352152
    , at *21 (quoting Gradient OC Master, Ltd. v.
    NBC Universal, Inc., 
    930 A.2d 104
    , 119 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2007)).
    214
    Cf. Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 
    921 A.2d 732
    , 753 (Del. 2007) (“Generally speaking, a
    director who does not attend or participate in the board’s deliberations or approval of a proposal
    will not be held liable. This is not an invariable rule and the result may differ where the absent
    director plays a role in the negotiation, structuring, or approval of the proposal.” (footnote
    omitted)).
    215
    I do not reach the question whether the business judgment rule would apply if the Liberty
    Broadband designees had not approved the acquisitions. Moreover, to the extent the Defendants
    continue to maintain that entire fairness does not apply to the voting proxy agreement, I reject
    that argument. Charter approved the stock issuance to Advance/Newhouse; that issuance
    transferred voting power to Advance/Newhouse; and Advance/Newhouse agreed to transfer
    some of its newly acquired voting power to Liberty Broadband. These transactions were
    approved by both the six Charter directors not designated by Liberty Broadband and a majority
    of the stockholders. Because at least half of Charter’s directors suffered from disabling conflicts,
    the voting proxy—like the other challenged transactions—is subject to entire fairness review.
    45
    Global.216 The Complaint appears to suggest that the stockholders would not have
    approved the allegedly unfair transactions with Liberty Broadband if they had
    known of Zinterhofer’s conflicts. In other words, Charter would not have overpaid
    Liberty Broadband if the proxy had not been materially misleading. In my view,
    the Plaintiff’s disclosure claim must be dismissed.
    I have already held that the Complaint states a derivative claim based on
    alleged corporate overpayments. Any recovery for that claim would flow to the
    company, and not to the stockholders individually.217 Nevertheless, the Plaintiff’s
    disclosure claim is brought directly, and, just like the derivative claim, it seeks
    recovery for damage done to Charter by the overpayments to Liberty Broadband.
    The Supreme Court confronted a similar situation in In re J.P. Morgan Chase &
    Co. Shareholder Litigation.218 There, the plaintiffs brought a derivative corporate
    overpayment claim and a direct disclosure claim.219 The disclosure claim rested on
    the allegation that inaccuracies in the proxy statement caused stockholders to
    approve the overpayment.220 The Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s dismissal
    of the disclosure claim to the extent it sought compensatory damages for the
    216
    Compl. ¶ 142.
    217
    See, e.g., Tooley, 
    845 A.2d at 1036
     (“Because a derivative suit is being brought on behalf of
    the corporation, the recovery, if any, must go to the corporation.”).
    218
    
    906 A.2d 766
     (Del. 2006).
    219
    Id. at 768.
    220
    Id.
    46
    overpayment.221 Specifically, the Court held that “‘compensatory damages . . .
    from the [proxy] disclosure violation’ are disallowed when those damages would
    be ‘identical to the damages that would flow to [the company] as a consequence of
    . . . [the] underlying derivative [] claim.’”222      As the Court pointed out, the
    plaintiffs’ damages theory implied that “the directors of an acquiring corporation
    would be liable to pay both the corporation and its shareholders the same
    compensatory damages for the same injury.”223 “That simply cannot be,” said the
    Court.224
    J.P. Morgan compels the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s disclosure claim. Just
    like in J.P. Morgan, the Plaintiff in this case seeks compensatory damages for both
    his derivative corporate overpayment claim and his direct disclosure claim. And
    just like in J.P. Morgan, the damages sought for the direct and derivative claims
    are identical. The derivative claim alleges that Charter suffered injury when it
    gave Liberty Broadband corporate assets for too little value. Likewise, the direct
    claim alleges that inaccuracies in the proxy statement caused the stockholders to
    approve the very same transactions, which gave away Charter assets for too little
    value.     As the J.P. Morgan Court recognized, permitting the stockholders to
    221
    Id. at 773–74.
    222
    Lenois v. Lawal, 
    2017 WL 5289611
    , at *20 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2017) (quoting In re J.P.
    Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig., 906 A.2d at 772).
    223
    In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig., 906 A.2d at 773.
    224
    Id.
    47
    recover individually in these circumstances would violate “the fundamental
    principle governing entitlement to compensatory damages, which is that the
    damages must be logically and reasonably related to the harm or injury for which
    compensation is being awarded.”225             Thus, because the Plaintiff seeks only
    compensatory damages for his direct disclosure claim, that claim must be
    dismissed.226
    ***
    To sum up, Counts II and IV, which rest on the premise that the Stockholder
    Defendants control Charter, are dismissed. Count I, which is brought as a direct
    claim, is dismissed because (i) the challenged transactions give rise to purely
    derivative claims, and (ii) the direct disclosure claim fails. Count III survives
    because the Complaint adequately alleges demand futility and pleads a viable
    derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on the challenged transactions.
    225
    Id.
    226
    At oral argument, the Plaintiff’s counsel expressly disclaimed any intention of seeking
    nominal damages. See Apr. 6, 2018 Oral Arg. Tr. 49:16–17 (“MR. HEYMAN: We’re not
    pursuing nominal damages.”). And while the Complaint generally seeks “equitable relief,”
    Compl. at 67, a plaintiff cannot avoid the holding of J.P. Morgan by tacking on a makeweight
    request for equitable remedies in her complaint, cf. Lenois, 
    2017 WL 5289611
    , at *20 (“Plaintiff
    contends that, because he has requested rescissory instead of compensatory damages, J.P.
    Morgan does not apply. Plaintiff misses the point. . . . Were rescission reasonable and
    appropriate, I would undo the Transactions and put the Company back together into its previous
    state. That remedy seems quite obviously to belong to the Company. Rescissory damages, then,
    would flow to the same party, namely the Company.” (footnote omitted)).
    48
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted
    in part and denied in part. The parties should submit an appropriate form of order.
    49