Mennen v. Wilmington Trust Company ( 2017 )


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  • IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    KATHRYN MENNEN, SARAH
    MENNEN, AL_EXANDRA MENNEN,
    SHA_WN MENNEN, and JOHN
    l\/TENNEN,
    Plaintiffs,
    v. C.A. No. 8432-VCL
    WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY,
    a Delaware cor oration GEORGE
    JE_FP MENNE , and FiDUCIARY
    TRUST INTERNATIONAL OF
    DELAWARE, m its eapacit as the
    cor orate trustee of the TR ST
    ES ABLISHED BY GEORGE S.
    MENNEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF
    GEORGE JEFF MENNEN u/a/d/
    1 1/25/1970, a Delaware trust,
    Defendants.
    REPORT PURSUANT TO
    DELAWARE SUPREME COURT RULE 19(c)
    WHEREAS:
    A. On March 22, 2013, plaintiffs Kathryn Mennen, Sarah Mennen,
    Alexandra Mennen, ShaWn Mennen, and John Mennen filed a complaint in the
    Delaware Court of Chaneery naming as defendants Wilmington Trust Company,
    George Jeff Mennen (“Jeff Mennen”), and the Trust established by George S.
    Mennen for the benefit of George Jeff Mennen and his issue by agreement dated
    Novernber 25, 1970 (the “J eff Mennen Trust”).
    B. On July 25, 2013, OWen Roberts, then the individual trustee of the
    Jeff Mennen Trust, Was substituted as a defendant in place of the Jeff Mennen
    Trust.
    C. On November l, 2013, Roberts moved for summary judgment on the
    claims against the J eff Mennen Trust.
    D. On January l7, 2014, the Honorable Abigail M. LeGroW of the
    Superior Court of the State of Delaware, then serving as a Master in Chancery,
    issued a draft report Which recommended that this court grant Roberts’ motion for
    summary judgment
    E. Trial took place before then-Master LeGroW on February 12-14, 2014.
    F. On December 8, 2014, then-Master LeGrow issued a draft report on
    the merits.
    G. On April 24, 2015, after considering the plaintiffs’ exceptions to her
    drafts, then-Master LeGroW issued (i) a final report on the motion for summary
    judgment and (ii) a final report on the merits. The Delaware Supreme Court has
    referred to the final report on the motion for summary judgment as the “Spendthrift
    Ruling.”
    H. On April 27, 2015, then-Master LeGroW issued a revised final report
    on the merits (the “Merits Report”).
    I. On June 10, 2015, this court entered an order holding that the
    plaintiffs’ exceptions to the Spendthrift Ruling Were untimely and adopting the
    Spendthrift Ruling as a decision of this court. The Delaware Supreme Court has
    referred to this order as the “Stril2016 WL 5933966
    , at*l (Del. Oct. ll, 2016). Pursuant to
    Supreme Court Rule 19(0), the Delavvare Supreme Court retained jurisdiction to
    consider the implications of this court’s report. The Delaware Supreme Court
    “impose[d] no specific time period for the Court of Chancery to act, recognizing
    that this matter involves issues important to the parties, is no longer expedited, and
    that briefing before the Court of Chancery should occur before its ruling, and
    trusting the Court of Chancery to address the case With its usual concern for
    promptness.” ]a’. at *5.
    M. On remand, the parties briefed the plaintiffs’ exceptions to the
    Spendthrift Ruling, and oral argument Was held on February 7, 2017.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
    1. The Spendthrift Ruling is subject to de novo review. DiGiacobbe v.
    Sestak, 
    743 A.2d 180
    , 184 (Del. 1999).
    2. This court has considered carefully the exceptions raised by the
    plaintiffs in their briefs and during argument The court also has considered
    carefully the analysis set forth in the Spendthrift Ruling.
    3. The Spendthrift Ruling deals thoroughly With the issues. lt addresses
    at least two questions of first impression for Delaware, one of Which carries With it
    potential implications for the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction under the
    Constitution of 1897, and another Which appears to be an issue of first impression
    not only for Delaware but nationwide l Would like to think that l could improve on
    then-Master LeGroW’s decision, but l know that I cannot.
    4. “Believing the Master to have dealt With the issues in a proper manner
    and having articulated the reasons for her decision Well, there is no need for me to
    repeat her analysis.” In re Era’mcm, 
    2011 WL 2191680
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. May 26,
    2011) (Strine, V.C.). l therefore “adopt her analysis as Written.” 
    Id. See Tinley
    v.
    Pleasanton, 
    2002 WL 272347
    , 791 A.Zd 751 (Del. 2002) (ORDER) (“The Court
    has determined that the judgment of the Court of Chancery should be affirmed on
    the basis of, and for the reasons set forth in, the Master’s Well-reasoned report
    dated May 16, 2001, as adopted by the Court of Chancery on September 13,
    2001.”).
    ‘--'_-Yice Chane lor J.Travi Laster
    Dat"ed: Februal 7, 2017
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 8432-VCL

Judges: Laster, V.C.

Filed Date: 2/27/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/27/2017