Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. ( 2017 )


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  •    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    ___________________________________________
    )
    SHAREHOLDER REPRESENTATIVE                  )
    SERVICES LLC, in its capacity as the        )
    Stockholders’ Agent for the former          )
    securityholders of Calistoga                )
    Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,                      )
    )
    Plaintiff,
    )
    v.                                   ) C.A. No. 10537-CB
    )
    GILEAD SCIENCES, INC. and GILEAD            )
    BIOPHARMACEUTICS IRELAND                    )
    CORPORATION,                                )
    )
    Defendants.                     )
    ___________________________________________ )
    )
    GILEAD SCIENCES, INC. and GILEAD
    )
    BIOPHARMACEUTICS IRELAND
    )
    UC,
    )
    Counterclaimants,               )
    )
    v.                                   )
    )
    SHAREHOLDER REPRESENTATIVE                  )
    SERVICES LLC, in its capacity as the        )
    Stockholders’ Agent for the former          )
    securityholders of Calistoga                )
    Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,                      )
    )
    Counterclaim-Defendant.
    )
    __________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: January 10, 2017
    Date Decided: March 15, 2017
    Bradley D. Sorrels, Shannon E. German, and Jessica A. Montellese, WILSON
    SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware; David S. Steuer,
    Steven D. Guggenheim, and Evan L. Seite, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
    ROSATI, P.C., Palo Alto, California; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
    Brian C. Ralston and Aaron R. Sims, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware; Jason Sheasby, Gary N. Frischling, and Harry A. Mittleman,
    IRELL & MANELLA LLP, Los Angeles, California; Lisa S. Glasser, IRELL &
    MANELLA LLP, Newport Beach, California; Attorneys for Defendants.
    BOUCHARD, C.
    This post-trial decision holds that Gilead Sciences, Inc. is not required to pay
    a $50 million milestone payment under the terms of a merger agreement pursuant to
    which Gilead acquired Calistoga Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 2011. The core of the
    dispute boils down to the meaning of essentially one word—“indication”—as used
    in an 84-page merger agreement.
    As part of the merger consideration, Gilead agreed to make three payments to
    the former securityholders of Calistoga if its main compound at the time—CAL-
    101—achieved certain milestones. In August 2014, Gilead paid $175 million in
    satisfaction of the first two milestones after receiving certain regulatory approvals
    for CAL-101 from the United States Food and Drug Administration.
    In September 2014, the European Commission approved CAL-101, in
    combination with another drug, as a first-line treatment for patients with chronic
    lymphocytic leukemia in the presence of genetic abnormality known as 17p deletion
    or TP53 mutation who are unsuitable for chemo-immunotherapy. The question
    before the Court is whether that approval satisfies the third milestone, one of the
    triggers for which is “the receipt of Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 in the United
    States or the European Union, whichever occurs first, as a first-line drug treatment
    (i.e., a treatment for patients that have not previously undergone systemic drug
    therapy therefor) for a Hematologic Cancer Indication.”
    1
    The parties agree that the term “indication” has multiple meanings in the
    oncology industry that are context specific. Plaintiff Shareholder Representative
    Services LLC contends that, as used in the merger agreement, “indication” means
    “the approved use of a drug in a population of patients with a particular disease” and
    thus that the milestone at issue can be triggered by a regulatory approval of CAL-
    101 as a first-line therapy for a subpopulation of people suffering from a disease,
    such as CLL patients with 17p deletion or TP53 mutation. Gilead, by contrast,
    contends that “indication” means “disease” and thus that the milestone at issue can
    be triggered only by a disease-level regulatory approval of CAL-101.
    For the reasons explained below, after finding that the word “indication” is
    ambiguous when construed within the four corners of the merger agreement, I find
    that the overwhelming weight of extrinsic evidence supports the conclusion that the
    shared intention of the parties at the time of contracting was that the word
    “indication” means “disease” and that the milestone at issue could only be triggered
    by a disease-level regulatory approval.        Finally, I find that the European
    Commission’s approval of CAL-101 was not a disease-level approval and thus that
    the milestone in question is not due.
    I.    Background
    The facts recited in this opinion are my findings based on the testimony and
    documentary evidence of record from a four-day trial held in September 2016 during
    2
    which four fact and two expert witnesses testified. Plaintiff’s expert was Dr. Susan
    G. Arbuck, a consultant who provides strategic research and development services
    for drug development. Gilead’s expert was Dr. Claire Dearden, the Clinical Director
    of the Haemato-Oncology Department and the Specialist Haematological
    Malignancy Diagnostic Service at the Royal Marsden Hospital & Biomedical
    Research Center in London, United Kingdom. I accord the evidence the weight and
    credibility I find it deserves.
    A.     The Parties
    Before the merger, Calistoga Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Calistoga”) was a
    privately-held biotechnology company that developed and held a portfolio of
    proprietary compounds for the treatment of inflammatory and autoimmune diseases
    and hematologic cancers.
    Defendant Gilead Sciences, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal
    place of business in California, is a biopharmaceutical company that develops and
    commercializes drugs for the treatment of life-threatening diseases and illnesses.
    Defendant Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland Corporation, a company formed under
    the laws of Ireland, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gilead Sciences, Inc.1 In this
    1
    On September 22, 2014, Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland Corporation was renamed
    Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland UC. JX702-004.
    3
    opinion, I refer to Gilead Sciences, Inc. and Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland
    Corporation together as “Gilead.”
    On February 21, 2011, Gilead and Calistoga executed an Agreement and Plan
    of Merger (the “Merger Agreement”) pursuant to which Gilead acquired Calistoga.
    Under Section 9.3(a) of the Merger Agreement, plaintiff Shareholder Representative
    Services LLC (“SRS”), a Colorado limited liability company, was appointed as the
    agent for the former securityholders of Calistoga for the purpose of, among other
    things, enforcing the terms of the Merger Agreement.
    B.     Calistoga Initiates a Sale Process
    In the fall of 2010, Calistoga began considering various potential strategic
    alternatives, including licensing the commercial rights of its drugs, an initial public
    offering, and a sale of the company. 2 By the fourth quarter of 2010, Calistoga
    decided to run a sale process.3 Around that time, it retained J.P. Morgan Securities
    LLP (“JP Morgan”) to assist it in the sale process.4 Carol Gallagher, Calistoga’s
    Chief Executive Officer, oversaw the sale process with assistance from Cliff Stocks,
    Calistoga’s Chief Business Officer.5
    2
    Tr. 140-41 (Gallagher).
    3
    Tr. 190 (Gallagher).
    4
    Tr. 142-43 (Gallagher).
    5
    Tr. 155 (Gallagher); Tr. 43 (Miller).
    4
    By December 7, 2010, Calistoga had received offers from a number of
    pharmaceutical companies including:         AstraZeneca, Human Genome Sciences,
    Bristol-Myers Squibb, Daiichi Sankyo, and GlaxoSmithKline.6 Later that month,
    Gilead expressed interest in acquiring Calistoga. 7 Gilead’s team was led by Dr.
    Muzammil Mansuri, Executive Vice President of Strategy, Business Development,
    and Licensing; and Sean O’Connell, Senior Director of Corporate Development.8
    C.      Calistoga Makes Due Diligence Presentations to Gilead
    At the time of the sale process, Calistoga held a portfolio of compounds.9
    Only two compounds (CAL-101 and CAL-263) had been tested on human beings,
    and only one (CAL-101) had demonstrated initial efficacy in humans.10
    CAL-101 had shown promise in early trials to treat blood cancers, including
    two types of incurable B-cell malignancies known as chronic lymphocytic leukemia
    (CLL) and indolent Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma (iNHL).11 CAL-101 also showed
    potential as a treatment in solid tumors and inflammatory ailments.12 CAL-101 was
    6
    JX057-004; Tr. 144 (Gallagher).
    7
    Tr. 144-45 (Gallagher); Tr. 831-32 (O’Connell); Mansuri Dep. 66-67; JX066.
    8
    Tr. 884 (O’Connell); JX712-005.
    9
    JX371-007.
    10
    Tr. 192-93 (Gallagher).
    11
    JX068-002; JX068-013; Tr. 15-16 (Miller).
    12
    JX068-065; Tr. 217 (Gallagher).
    5
    later given the generic name idelalisib, and is now sold by Gilead under the trade
    name Zydelig. 13 In this opinion, I use the terms “CAL-101,” “idelalisib,” and
    “Zydelig” interchangeably.
    During due diligence, Calistoga provided Gilead with information about
    CAL-101’s potential for treating hematologic cancers, with a particular focus on
    CLL and iNHL. 14 Calistoga also explained to Gilead the clinical trials it was
    conducting and planned to conduct for CAL-101 in support of regulatory approvals
    of the drug.15 For example, in two January 2011 presentations, Calistoga outlined
    its plans to obtain an accelerated approval of CAL-101 “for the treatment of patients
    with iNHL refractory to rituximab and alkylating agents” by 2013; and to obtain full
    approvals “for use in combination for the treatment of patients with previously
    treated CLL” by 2015, and “for use in combination for the treatment of patients with
    previously treated iNHL” by 2016.16
    In the United States, the term “accelerated approval,” which is known as
    “conditional approval” in Europe, is a special process that allows a drug to be
    approved more rapidly when there is a high unmet medical need.17 After one obtains
    13
    See Tr. 5 (Miller), Stephens Dep. 17-18.
    14
    Tr. 15-16 (Miller); Tr. 768-69 (Hawkins); see Tr. 13-14 (Miller); JX068.
    15
    Tr. 24-28 (Miller); see e.g., JX068-017 (summarizing studies).
    16
    JX068-050; JX084-004-05.
    17
    Tr. 23 (Miller); Tr. 151-52 (Gallagher); Tr. 401-02 (Arbuck); Tr. 907-08 (O’Connell).
    6
    an accelerated approval, additional studies still must be conducted to secure a full
    and unconditional approval from the relevant regulatory authority.18
    The term “refractory” or “previously treated” refers to “the time of treatment
    of the drug relative to previous therapies.”19 The cancers that are the subject of this
    case typically are incurable and will return.20 After the first therapy of a patient—
    known as the “first-line” or “frontline” treatment—a patient who relapses becomes
    “refractory.” 21 The next line of therapy for a refractory patient is known as a
    “second-line” treatment, which can progress to a third-line treatment and so on.22
    Early data for CAL-101 that Calistoga presented to Gilead suggested that the
    drug was effective in all patients with CLL. 23 The presentation highlighted the
    drug’s efficacy in one particular subgroup—CLL patients with genetic abnormalities
    known as “17p deletion/TP53 mutation.”24 Patients with 17p deletion do not have
    18
    Tr. 24 (Miller).
    19
    Tr. 250 (Gallagher).
    20
    Tr. 249 (Gallagher).
    21
    Tr. 381 (Arbuck).
    22
    Tr. 76 (Miller); Tr. 775 (Hawkins).
    23
    JX068-027; JX068-029; Tr. 771 (Hawkins).
    24
    JX068-027; Tr. 31-33 (Miller); Tr. 257 (Gallagher); see Milligan Dep. 68-69.
    7
    the short arm of chromosome 17, on which the TP53 gene resides.25 Even if a patient
    has the TP53 gene, the TP53 gene may have mutated and still not function.26
    The oncology community widely recognized that patients with the 17p
    deletion or the TP53 mutation had tumors that were particularly resistant to then-
    existing forms of treatment, such as chemotherapy and certain types of
    immunotherapy.27 As a result, those patients were commonly considered to have the
    worst prognosis among all CLL patients.28 Approximately 10% of newly diagnosed
    CLL patients and 50% of relapsed/refractory CLL patients have 17p deletion or
    TP53 mutation.29 Calistoga’s initial data for CAL-101 suggested that, unlike some
    traditional regimens, CAL-101 circumvented the treatment-resistant characteristics
    of the 17p deletion or TP53 mutation genetic abnormality.30
    25
    Tr. 579-80 (Dearden).
    26
    Tr. 580 (Dearden).
    27
    Tr. 412-13 (Arbuck); Tr. 673 (Dearden); Milligan Dep. 68.
    28
    Tr. 412-13 (Arbuck); JX1000-003; JX1002-003.
    29
    See Tr. 428-29 (Arbuck) (testifying that around 10% of newly diagnosed CLL patients
    have 17p deletion or TP53 mutation, and the number rises to 40-50% among relapsed and
    refractory CLL patients); JX785-006 (Gilead marketing presentation stating that around 7-
    13% of frontline CLL patients and 48-53% of relapsed/refractory CLL patients have 17p
    deletion or TP53 mutation); Tr. 114 (Miller) (“about 5 to 8 percent of CLL patients will
    exhibit 17p deletion or TP53 mutation if tested at the time of their first treatment”); Tr.
    659-60 (Dearden) (acknowledging studies that found around 10-15% of CLL patients have
    a defect in the TP53 gene at the time of diagnosis and that as high as 40-50% of refractory
    CLL patients have this genetic abnormality).
    30
    Tr. 32 (Miller); Tr. 771-72 (Hawkins).
    8
    D.     Gilead and Calistoga Exchange Drafts of the Merger Agreement
    On January 28, 2011, Gilead provided JP Morgan with a preliminary and non-
    binding expression of interest to acquire Calistoga.31 Gilead’s preliminary offer
    consisted of a cash payment of $310 million at closing and additional contingent
    payments totaling $275 million based on the achievement of three milestones:
    a) One time payment of $100M payable after receipt of the first
    accelerated approval (i.e., “Subpart H” in US or “Conditional” in
    EU) of CAL-101 for indolent Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma (iNHL)
    or Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL) provided such
    accelerated approval is obtained no later than December 31, 2013.
    For clarity, no such milestone payment will be payable if such
    accelerated approval is obtained after December 31, 2013.
    b) One time payment of $75 million upon dosing of first patient in a
    Phase III study of CAL-101 for first line treatment of patients with
    iNHL or CLL.
    c) One time payment of $100M payable upon obtaining first full
    regulatory approval of CAL-101 in US or EU for iNHL or CLL (in
    either relapsed/refractory or first line setting).32
    After Gilead made its preliminary offer, the parties began an exchange of drafts of a
    merger agreement,33 and occasionally engaged in conversations.
    31
    Tr. 148 (Gallagher); JX160.
    32
    JX160-003.
    33
    The dates of the drafts discussed in this opinion refer to the dates they were exchanged,
    which varies for some drafts by one day from the date that appears on the document.
    9
    1.    The February 1 Calistoga Draft
    On February 1, 2011, Calistoga sent Gilead a first draft of a merger agreement,
    which contemplated an up-front payment of at least $300 million and four different
    milestones totaling at least $300 million:34
     $100 million within “10 business days following the receipt of the
    first Regulatory Approval in the United States or an EU Country,
    whichever occurs first, of CAL-101 for a hematologic cancer
    indication.”35
     $75 million within “10 business days following the receipt of the
    second Regulatory Approval in the United States or an EU Country,
    whichever occurs first, of CAL-101 for a hematologic cancer
    indication.”36
     $50 million within “10 business days following the receipt of the
    first Regulatory Approval in the United States or an EU Country,
    whichever occurs first, of a P110 Delta Product, for an indication
    other than a hematologic cancer indication.”37
     $75 million within “10 business days following the Initiation of a
    Registration Study involving CAL-101 as a first line treatment for
    an oncology indication.”38
    34
    JX175-016; Tr. 154 (Gallagher).
    35
    JX175-053 § 9(bk)(i). If the first Regulatory Approval is obtained on or before June 30,
    2014, then the first milestone payment shall be increased to $150 million. 
    Id. 36 JX175-053
    § 9(bk)(ii).
    37
    JX175-053-054 § 9(bk)(iii). “P110 Delta Product” was defined as “a pharmaceutical
    product (i) the manufacture, use, importation or sale of which is covered by a Valid Claim
    or (ii) is a P13K-delta inhibitor for which clinical trials for an oncology indication are
    conducted prior to the fifth anniversary of the Closing Date.” JX175-013.
    38
    JX175-054 § 9(bk)(iv). “Initiation of a Registration Study” was defined as “first dosing
    of the first patient in such Registration Study.” JX175-012. “Registration Study” was
    defined as a “human clinical trial of a P110 Delta Product on patients, which trial is
    10
    The first two of these milestones were each triggered by a “Regulatory
    Approval” of CAL-101 for a “hematologic cancer indication,”39 which term was not
    defined. 40 The draft defined “Regulatory Approval” as “all approvals, licenses,
    registrations or authorizations by any Regulatory Authority necessary to market a
    P110 Delta Product in such country or jurisdiction. For clarity, an Accelerated
    Approval shall constitute a Regulatory Approval.”41 “Accelerated Approval” in turn
    was defined as “a Regulatory Approval in the United States or an EU Country, based
    on the results of a single Registration Study (such as Study 101-09), i.e., without a
    second Registration Study being required to be completed prior to the receipt of such
    Regulatory Approval.”42
    The February 1 draft of the merger agreement required Gilead to use
    “Commercially Reasonable Efforts” to achieve all of the milestones “in a prompt
    and expeditious manner.” 43 The term “Commercially Reasonable Efforts” was
    defined to mean “the expenditure of efforts and resources, consistent with the usual
    designed to establish substantial evidence of the efficacy and/or safety of the P110 Delta
    Product to support Regulatory Approval of such P110 Delta Product . . . .” JX175-014.
    39
    JX175-053-054.
    40
    See generally JX175; Tr. 161 (Gallagher); Tr. 840 (O’Connell).
    41
    JX175-015.
    42
    JX175-007.
    43
    JX175-056 § 9(bl)(iii)(B).
    11
    practice of [Gilead], with respect to development and/or commercialization of its
    other important pharmaceutical products with significant market potential being
    actively and diligently pursued by [Gilead].”44
    After receiving Calistoga’s February 1 draft, Sean O’Connell, the lead
    negotiator for Gilead,45 prepared a summary of Calistoga’s proposed milestones for
    himself, which stated in relevant part as follows:
    (a) $100M upon first regulatory approval of CAL-101 in US or EU
    country (whichever occurs first) for hematological cancer
    ...
    (c) $75M upon first patient dosing in registrational [sic] study for CAL-
    101 for first line treatment
    (d) $75M upon second regulatory approval of CAL-101 in US or EU
    country (whichever occurs first) for hematological cancer
    (e) $50M upon first regulatory approval of a P110 Delta Product for an
    indication other than hematological cancer (e.g., CAL-101 for solid
    tumors or back-up compound for any non-hematological cancer
    indication)46
    On February 4, 2011, O’Connell sought clarification from Cliff Stocks,
    Calistoga’s lead negotiator,47 concerning the operation of the first two milestones.
    Stocks responded in an email the same day, explaining that each of the proposed
    milestones would have “significant commercial value:”
    As one potential example, iNHL approval in the US and then in an EU
    Country would trigger the First and Second milestones, respectively.
    44
    JX175-009.
    45
    Tr. 829 (O’Connell).
    46
    JX185-002 (emphasis in original); Tr. 841-42 (O’Connell).
    47
    Tr. 73 (Miller); Tr. 829 (O’Connell).
    12
    As a second potential example, iNHL approval in the US and then CLL
    approval in an EU Country also would trigger the First and Second
    milestones, respectively. As a third potential, iNHL approval in the US
    and then CLL approval in the US also would trigger the first and second
    milestones, respectively. . . . We believe in any of these cases . . . the
    event would result in significant commercial value and therefore
    worthy of the milestone defined.48
    2.    The February 8 Gilead Draft
    Later on February 4, O’Connell wrote an email to another member of Gilead’s
    deal team, asking for help to generate “a list of hematological cancers in order of
    size (either patient number or size of market),” so he could “qualify the . . . milestone
    payment obligations as only applying to the first or second approval for a ‘major’
    hematological cancer so [Gilead is not] paying a big milestone for a tiny hemonc
    indication.”49 “Hemonc” was O’Connell’s shorthand for “hematological.”50
    On February 6, a consultant from the Boston Consulting Group, which was
    assisting Gilead, sent O’Connell an email attaching some slides summarizing
    “estimated size of patient populations for all hematological cancers.” 51 The first
    slide in the attachment listed certain blood cancers in descending order based on the
    estimated incidence for each cancer in the United States in 2010.52 O’Connell drew
    48
    JX196-001; Tr. 847-48 (O’Connell).
    49
    JX192-001.
    50
    See Tr. 854 (O’Connell).
    51
    JX197-001; Tr. 851 (O’Connell).
    52
    JX197-002.
    13
    a line on the slide under “Chronic Myeloid Leukemia,” which was the last blood
    cancer on the list with an incidence in the United States exceeding 4,000 in 2010,
    and placed check marks next to nine of the blood cancers listed above the line.53
    The nine blood cancers O’Connell selected became Schedule 1.1 in a revised
    draft of the merger agreement that Gilead sent to Calistoga on February 8, 2011.54
    In this draft, which included an upfront payment of $310 million, Gilead replaced
    the undefined term “hematologic cancer indication” in the milestone provisions of
    the February 1 draft with the defined term “Specified Hematologic Cancer
    Indication,” which referred to “any hematologic cancer indication specifically listed
    on Schedule 1.1.”55 Schedule 1.1 in turn stated as follows:56
    53
    See JX197-002; Tr. 852-53 (O’Connell).
    54
    JX206-102; Tr. 852-53 (O’Connell).
    55
    JX207-021 & 075-076 § 9.1; JX207-019.
    56
    JX 207-100.
    14
    O’Connell explained that his intent in compiling the Schedule 1.1 was to make sure
    the milestones were triggered by “significant commercial events for Gilead.” 57
    In its February 8 draft, Gilead proposed several other changes to the milestone
    provisions contained in Calistoga’s February 1 draft, three of which are relevant
    here. First, Gilead revised the definition of “Regulatory Approval” to exclude
    accelerated approvals so that they would not trigger any of the milestones.58 Second,
    Gilead further narrowed the scope of milestone-eligible regulatory approvals by
    requiring the regulatory approval to come from the United States or a “Major Market
    Country,” which was defined to include only “France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the
    U.K.”59 Calistoga previously had proposed that the required regulatory approval
    could come from the United States or any “country that is a member state of the
    European Union.” 60 Third, Gilead removed the obligation to use Commercially
    Reasonable Efforts to achieve the third milestone once CAL-101 was approved for
    a Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication in both the United States and a Major
    Market Country.61
    57
    Tr. 852 (O’Connell); see also Tr. 913 (O’Connell).
    58
    JX207-019; see also Tr. 912 (O’Connell).
    59
    JX207-014; JX207-075-076.
    60
    JX175-011; JX175-053.
    61
    JX207-079 § 9.1(b)(iii)(B).
    15
    3.     The February 12 Calistoga Draft
    On February 12, Calistoga sent Gilead a revised draft of the merger agreement
    that pushed back against Gilead’s revisions to the milestone provisions in three
    ways. First, Calistoga introduced a new Schedule 1.1, set forth below, 62 which
    defined “Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication” as “[a]ny indication within the
    following tumor types,” and thereafter listed eleven types of tumors. It is undisputed
    that tumors are “cancers.”63
    62
    JX223-017 & 089.
    63
    Tr. Oral Arg. 26, 103 (Jan. 10, 2017).
    16
    Second, Calistoga again revised the definition of Regulatory Approval to include
    accelerated approvals. 64 Third, Calistoga reinstated Gilead’s obligation to use
    Commercially Reasonable Efforts to achieve all milestones and added that Gilead
    shall “refrain from taking any action the primary purpose of which is to avoid the
    satisfaction of any Milestone.”65
    Significant to this case, when it revised Schedule 1.1 in its February 12 draft,
    Calistoga relied on the WHO Classification of Tumours of Haematopoietic and
    Lymphoid Tissues (the “WHO Classification”) to establish what “indications”
    would trigger the regulatory milestones. 66 The WHO Classification, which is
    compiled by the World Health Organization, is considered the authoritative source
    of hematologic tumor classifications.67 Thus, although the subject was a matter of
    considerable dispute before trial, the evidence at trial clearly establishes that
    Calistoga effectively incorporated the framework of the WHO Classification into
    Schedule 1.1 for purposes of defining when the regulatory milestone payments
    would be due.68
    64
    JX224-018.
    65
    JX224-079 § 9.1(b)(iii)(B).
    66
    See e.g., Tr. 262, 264, 273-74 (Gallagher); Tr. 55, 64 (Miller).
    67
    Tr. 389-90, 537 (Arbuck); Tr. 569-70, 574 (Dearden).
    68
    There are slight differences in wording between Schedule 1.1 and the top-level tumor
    types in the WHO Classification, which Dr. Dearden credibly testified are likely the result
    of the use of different versions of the WHO Classification. Tr. 597-99 (Dearden).
    17
    Specifically, in connection with preparing the February 12 draft to send to
    Gilead, Dr. Gallagher asked Dr. Langdon Miller, Calistoga’s Executive Vice
    President of Research and Development, to prepare “a list of possible indications or
    possible diseases in which [CAL-101] might be used” that “would be used as part of
    the definition of the milestone.” 69 Dr. Miller was assisted by Dr. Albert Yu,
    Calistoga’s Vice President of Clinical Affairs and Chief Medical Officer.
    On February 11, 2011, Dr. Yu emailed Dr. Miller, attaching a document
    entitled “REAL WHO Classification Lymphoma.”70 The next day, on February 12,
    Dr. Miller emailed back to Dr. Yu, stating: “Just FYI. Here’s the final list sent to
    Carol [Gallagher]. Myeloid list comes from an update published in Blood in 2009.
    Thanks for the collective help on this.”71 The 2009 Blood article Dr. Miller referred
    to in his email was an article entitled “The 2008 revision of the World Health
    Organization (WHO) classification of myeloid neoplasms and acute leukemia:
    rationale and important changes.”72 Table 2 of the article “lists the major subgroups
    of myeloid neoplasms and acute leukemia in the WHO classification, and the
    specific entities of which they are composed.”73
    69
    Tr. 54 (Miller).
    70
    JX217-001.
    71
    JX226-001; Tr. 56-57 (Miller).
    72
    Tr. 61 (Miller); see JX028.
    73
    JX028-003; Tr. 62 (Miller).
    18
    Dr. Miller testified at trial that the final list he sent to Dr. Gallagher was a
    combination of the list Dr. Yu had sent him and the list he took from the 2009 Blood
    article.74 Dr. Miller also testified that the “List of Hematological Malignancies” he
    prepared is “a list of diseases within hematologic cancer tumor types,” which did not
    include any “subpopulations of patients,” “any type of patient risk stratification
    factors,” or any “genetic aberrations in CLL cells.”75
    On February 12, at 12:43 a.m., Dr. Gallagher emailed Calistoga’s legal and
    financial advisors, attaching the “List of Hematological Malignancies” that Dr.
    Miller had prepared.76 The email read: “Langdon went to the WHO listing which
    is attached for a definition of hematological malignancies.”77 The Schedule 1.1 in
    Calistoga’s revision of the merger agreement, which was sent to Gilead at 11:15 a.m.
    on February 12, tracks the top-level headers in Dr. Miller’s list, such as “B-cell
    neoplasms” and “T-cell and putative NK-cell neoplasms.” 78 It does not contain the
    more specific diseases listed under the top-level headers, but instead uses the phrase
    74
    Tr. 47-48, 64 (Miller).
    75
    Tr. 57-58, 60 (Miller).
    76
    JX227.
    77
    JX227-001.
    78
    JX223-001.
    19
    “Any indication within the following tumor types” before the list of top-level
    headers to capture the more specific diseases.79
    4.    The February 16 Gilead Draft
    After receiving Calistoga’s February 12 draft of the merger agreement,
    O’Connell recognized that the new Schedule 1.1 reflected “the WHO accepted
    classification system of hematological cancer diseases.” 80 O’Connell initially
    thought it “looked familiar” based on his work in the field and then consulted with
    Dr. Michael Hawkins, Gilead’s Senior Director of Oncology and the clinical advisor
    on Gilead’s deal team, who “confirmed that it was the accepted list of hematological
    diseases.”81
    Dr. Hawkins corroborated O’Connell’s testimony. He explained that, at some
    point during the merger negotiations, someone on Gilead’s team provided him with
    Calistoga’s proposed schedule and asked where it came from. 82 Dr. Hawkins
    recognized that the list came from the WHO Classification because of the
    nomenclature, and then went online and confirmed that there was a one-to-one
    79
    Compare JX227-002-004 with JX223-089.
    80
    Tr. 855-56 (O’Connell).
    81
    Tr. 856 (O’Connell). Dr. Mansuri testified similarly in deposition. See Mansuri Dep.
    42-43. Dr. Claire Dearden, Gilead’s expert, also testified that Part 1 of Schedule 1.1 was
    “immediately recognizable” as tumor types defined within the WHO Classification. Tr.
    595-98 (Dearden).
    82
    Tr. 789 (Hawkins).
    20
    correlation between the terms in Calistoga’s list and the terms in the WHO
    Classification.83 Dr. Hawkins reported back that, “This looks to me like the WHO
    classification.”84
    Recognizing that Calistoga had “[e]xpanded the definition of ‘Specified
    Hematologic Cancer Indication’ to include all hematologic cancer indications” by
    using the WHO Classification, O’Connell considered making a counter-proposal to
    limit the hematologic cancer indications that could trigger the milestones to only
    “those that satisfy a minimum number of annual cases.” 85 Gilead prepared an
    internal draft reflecting this approach, but did not sent it to Calistoga. 86 Gilead
    instead took a different approach.87
    Specifically, in a February 16 draft it sent to Calistoga, Gilead introduced a
    new term—Hematologic Cancer Indication—which was defined as “any
    hematologic cancer indication specifically identified in Part 1 of Schedule 1.1.” 88
    Gilead then divided Schedule 1.1 into two parts. Part 1 was identical to the Schedule
    83
    Tr. 789-90 (Hawkins).
    84
    Tr. 790 (Hawkins).
    85
    JX385-003 (original phrase was in all caps); Tr. 858-59 (O’Connell).
    86
    See JX247-276 § 9.1(a)(i) & (ii).
    87
    JX240.
    88
    JX241-012.
    21
    1.1 that Calistoga proposed in its February 12 draft.89 Part 2 was identical to the
    Schedule 1.1 Gilead proposed in its February 8 draft. 90 Gilead also revised the
    definition for Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication, which now meant “any
    hematologic cancer indication specifically identified in Part 2 of Schedule 1.1.”91
    The February 16 draft included an up-front payment of $310 million and up
    to $300 million in five milestone payments.92 The first and second milestones of
    $100 million and $50 million, respectively, would be triggered by the first and
    second Regulatory Approvals in the United States or in a Major Market Country of
    CAL-101 for a Hematologic Cancer Indication,93 unless both approvals were in the
    same location (i.e., both in the United States or in a Major Market Country), in which
    case one of the two approvals must be for a Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication
    to trigger the second milestone.94 Once again, Gilead removed accelerated approvals
    from the definition of Regulatory Approval.95
    89
    Compare JX241-095 with JX223-089.
    90
    Compare JX241-095-096 with JX207-100.
    91
    JX241-018.
    92
    JX241-019; JX241-072-073 § 9.1(a).
    93
    JX241-072-073 § 9.1(a)(i) & (ii).
    94
    JX241-072-073 § 9.1(a)(ii). The remaining three milestones in this draft were dropped
    from the later draft and are irrelevant to the analysis in this opinion.
    95
    JX241-017.
    22
    Shortly before sending the February 16 draft to Calistoga, O’Connell sent
    Stocks an email giving him “a heads up on the draft” and summarizing the proposed
    second milestone as follows:
    $50M 2nd approval in any hematological indication but if it is for a
    second indication in the same territory as the 1st, one of the two
    indications would need to be in the narrower list of Specified
    Hematological Indication (i.e., CLL, iNHL and the other major hemonc
    cancers, as we tentatively agreed yesterday in Foster City)96
    As O’Connell’s email to Stocks reflects, the intent of creating the term “Specified
    Hematologic Cancer Indication” was to create a “narrower list” of “cancers” to
    trigger the milestone when that term applied rather than the boarder term
    “Hematologic Cancer Indication.”
    5.     The February 18 Calistoga Draft
    On February 18, 2011, the day after Gilead’s board of directors authorized the
    purchase of Calistoga for up to $750 million in total consideration,97 Calistoga sent
    Gilead a further revision of the merger agreement. The February 18 draft increased
    the up-front payment from $310 million to $375 million and contained a new set of
    three milestones totaling $225 million—down from $300 million in the prior draft.98
    O’Connell summarized the terms of the milestones in an email to Stocks, stating that
    96
    JX256-001.
    97
    JX274-007. See also Milligan Dep. 84; Mansuri Dep. 111-12.
    98
    JX277-018; JX277-072-073 § 9.1(a).
    23
    if his summary was correct, “we are in agreement with the economic terms of the
    agreement:”99
    (1) $100M upon first approval of CAL-101 in [the] US or EMA
    (centralized approval) for any hematologic indication (CRE[ 100 ]
    APPLIES)
    (2) NO EARLY APPROVAL MILESTONE[101]
    (3) $75M upon second approval of CAL-101 in [the] US or EMA,
    provided that if the second approval is in the same territory as the
    first, one of the approvals must be for a “specified” hematologic
    indication (CRE APPLIES)
    (4) $50M for the first to occur of the following: (i) approval of CAL-
    101 for solid tumors, (ii) approval of CAL-101 as a first-line
    treatment for any hematologic indication, OR (iii) if annual net sales
    of CAL-101 exceed $1B (NO CREs)102
    Calistoga made several other changes to the milestone provisions. First, it
    revised the definition of Hematologic Cancer Indication in Part 1 of Schedule 1.1 to
    add a twelfth category to the previous list of eleven tumor types, namely: “Any
    Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication listed in Part 2 of this Schedule 1.1.”103
    Second, it again defined Regulatory Approval to include an accelerated approval,
    99
    JX304-001.
    “CRE” and “CREs” are acronyms for “Commercially Reasonable Efforts.” See Tr. 184
    100
    (Gallagher); Mansuri Dep. 120.
    101
    In some of the earlier drafts of the merger agreement, the first milestone payment could
    be increased to $150 million if the first Regulatory Approval was obtained on or before
    June 30, 2014. See JX175-053; JX207-075; JX223-068; JX241-072.
    102
    JX304-001.
    103
    JX277-096.
    24
    which term was not separately defined. 104 Third, it changed the geographical
    limitation in the milestone provisions from “in the United States or in a Major
    Market Country” back to “in the United States or in the European Union”—what it
    proposed in its initial February 1 draft. 105 Finally, it agreed to limit Gilead’s
    obligation to use Commercially Reasonable Efforts to the first two milestones,
    although it still required Gilead to “refrain from taking any action the primary
    purpose of which is to avoid the satisfaction of any Milestone.”106
    E.     The Parties Finalize and Execute the Merger Agreement
    On the evening of February 18, Calistoga informed Gilead that its “Board
    supports management’s recommendation to move forward expeditiously with
    Gilead to get to a deal announcement by Monday [February 21] night.” 107 On
    February 21, the parties executed the Merger Agreement.
    The milestone provisions in the final Merger Agreement differed from
    Calistoga’s February 18 draft in one significant respect: the requirement that Gilead
    refrain from taking any action for the primary purpose of avoiding the third
    104
    JX277-016-017.
    105
    JX277-072-073 § 9.1(a).
    106
    JX277-075-076 § 9.1(b)(iii)(B).
    107
    JX307-001; Mansuri Dep. 114-16.
    25
    milestone payment was removed.108 The final Schedule 1.1, which was renamed
    “Section 1.1” in the Company Disclosure Schedule, reads as follows:109
    108
    JX351-070-071 § 9.1(b)(iii)(B).
    109
    JX350-002-003.
    26
    Hereafter, I refer at times to the two parts of Section 1.1 of the Company Disclosure
    Schedule as “Part 1” and “Part 2.”
    Under Section 9.1(a)(i) of the Merger Agreement, the first milestone payment
    of $100 million (the “First Milestone”) became due fifteen business days after the
    receipt of “the first Regulatory Approval in the United States or in the European
    Union, whichever occurs first . . . of CAL-101 for a Hematologic Cancer Indication.”
    Under Section 9.1(a)(ii) of the Merger Agreement, the second milestone payment of
    $75 million (the “Second Milestone”) became due fifteen business days after the
    receipt of the second “Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 in the United States or in
    the European Union, whichever occurs first, for a Hematologic Cancer Indication,”
    but if the second approval was obtained in the same location as the first approval,
    and the First Milestone was “achieved for an indication other than a Specified
    Hematologic Cancer Indication, then the [Second Milestone] shall not be satisfied
    unless such second Regulatory Approval is received for a Specified Hematologic
    Cancer Indication.”
    Under Section 9.1(a)(iii) of the Merger Agreement, the third milestone of $50
    million (the “Third Milestone”) became due fifteen business days after the earliest
    to occur of:
    (A) the receipt of Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 in the United States
    or the European Union, whichever occurs first, for a solid tumor
    indication, (B) the receipt of Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 in the
    United States or the European Union, whichever occurs first, as a first-
    27
    line drug treatment (i.e., a treatment for patients that have not
    previously undergone systemic drug therapy therefor) for a
    Hematologic Cancer Indication, or (C) Annual Net Sales of CAL-101
    achieving at least $1 Billion, so long as such Annual Net Sales are
    achieved on or before the first day of the first calendar quarter
    beginning after the Outside Date [i.e., the tenth (10th) anniversary of
    the Closing Date110].
    The Merger Agreement further provides that, if the First Milestone has been
    met but the Second Milestone has not when CAL-101 achieves annual net sales of
    at least $1 billion, then the Second Milestone shall be deemed to have been met.111
    In other words, the achievement of annual net sales of at least $1 billion for CAL-
    101 potentially could trigger both the Second and Third Milestones, provided that
    they have not already been paid and the First Milestone has been met.
    In a presentation to Calistoga dated February 21, 2011, the day the Merger
    Agreement was executed, JP Morgan estimated that there was a 63% chance that the
    Third Milestone could be triggered by 2019.112
    On March 8, 2011, after the parties executed the Merger Agreement but before
    the merger closed, representatives from Calistoga and Gilead met to discuss their
    110
    JX351-068 § 9.1(a)(iv)(A).
    111
    JX351-069 § 9.1(a)(iv)(C).
    112
    JX345-004. In a footnote, JP Morgan suggested that it believed it was more likely for
    Calistoga to trigger the third milestone by meeting the $1 billion annual sales requirement
    than by obtaining a Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 for a solid tumor indication or as a
    first-line treatment for a Hematologic Cancer Indication.
    28
    strategic plans after the merger. 113 A slide deck for the meeting identified a
    “comprehensive” development program for CAL-101 that Calistoga was generating,
    which included three registration studies.114
    F.     Gilead’s Development of CAL-101 after the Merger
    According to a Gilead internal document dated May 3, 2013, Gilead’s project
    review committee had “previously approved two Phase 3 . . . trials [of idelalisib] in
    previously untreated CLL patients,” 115 and Gilead’s idelalisib project team was
    “requesting approval for a companion single arm Phase 2 study, in order to address
    the del(17p) patient population which is unlikely to participate in the Phase 3 trials
    due to concerns of lack of efficacy on either of the control arms.”116 Dr. Hawkins
    explained the rationale for taking this approach, as follows:
    [The] concern was that if you only had the two Phase 3 studies and you
    didn’t have very many 17p patients in it, that the regulators might come
    back to you and say[:] “Well, you haven’t studied enough 17p patients.
    And so you can’t include them in your label,” even though you knew
    that the drug worked in that population. So to get around that, you
    create a Phase 2 study, a single-arm study, where all the patients get
    CAL-101.117
    113
    JX371-001; Tr. 778-79 (Hawkins).
    114
    JX371-032.
    115
    JX434-022.
    116
    JX434-001; JX434-022.
    117
    Tr. 798 (Hawkins).
    29
    The same internal document showed that the idelalisib project team planned to meet
    with the FDA “to discuss the proposed development plan in untreated CLL (two
    Phase 3 studies plus this proposed Phase 2 study). Included in this meeting will be
    a discussion of whether data from the proposed Phase 2 study could support
    accelerated approval in patients with untreated CLL with 17p deletion.”118
    On September 5, 2013, representatives of Gilead met with FDA officials “to
    discuss Idelalisib for the treatment of previously untreated chronic lymphocytic
    leukemia.” 119 When requesting this meeting, Gilead stated that the “Proposed
    Indication” was “[f]or the treatment of previously untreated chronic lymphocytic
    leukemia (CLL).”120
    According to the minutes of the September 5 meeting, Gilead asked if the
    FDA had “any comments on whether [the Phase 2 study in subjects with previously
    untreated CLL with 17p del and/or TP53 mutation] meets the requirements for
    regular approval in patients with previously untreated CLL with 17p del and/or TP53
    mutation.”121 The FDA officials responded that they “do not agree that the proposed
    study design would be adequate for regulatory submission because it does not isolate
    118
    JX434-023.
    119
    JX457-001.
    120
    JX443-003.
    121
    JX457-008.
    30
    the effect of idelalisib.”122 Gilead also asked whether the FDA “agree[d] that with
    demonstration of efficacy of IDELA in the 3 proposed CLL registration studies, a
    companion diagnostic for 17p del and/or TP53 mutation will not be required in the
    post-approval setting.”123 The FDA referred Gilead to the previous response and
    added that it was “unclear at this time whether a companion diagnostic [would] be
    required for the indications described in this submission.”124
    G.     Gilead Receives Approval from the FDA and Pays the First and
    Second Milestones
    On July 23, 2014, Gilead announced that the FDA had granted approval for
    CAL-101 under the trade name Zydelig.125 The FDA-approved label (the “FDA
    Label”) states as follows:
    ---------------------INDICATIONS AND USAGE---------------------
    Zydelig is a kinase inhibitor indicated for the treatment of patients with:
     Relapsed chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), in combination with
    rituximab, in patients for whom rituximab alone would be
    considered appropriate therapy due to other co-morbidities. (1.1)
     Relapsed follicular B-cell non-Hodgkin lymphoma (FL) in patients
    who have received at least two prior systemic therapies. (1.2)
     Relapsed small lymphocytic lymphoma (SLL) in patients who have
    received at least two prior systemic therapies. (1.3)
    Accelerated approval was granted for FL and SLL based on overall
    response rate. Improvement in patient survival or disease related
    122
    JX457-008.
    123
    JX457-009.
    124
    JX457-009.
    125
    PTO ¶ II.19; JX643 ¶ 5.
    31
    symptoms has not been established. Continued approval for these
    indications may be contingent upon verification of clinical benefit in
    confirmatory trials.126
    It is undisputed that CLL, FL, and SLL are all B-cell blood cancers, and that CLL
    and FL are both Specified Hematologic Cancer Indications under Part 2 of Schedule
    1.1 of the Merger Agreement.127
    On July 24, 2014, the day after receiving the FDA Label, Gilead sent Calistoga
    a notice that the First and Second Milestones had been satisfied, but the notice did
    not specify which of the three approvals had triggered either the First or Second
    Milestone.128 In August 2014, Gilead paid $175 million to the former Calistoga
    securityholders in satisfaction of those milestone obligations.129
    H.    Gilead Receives Approval from the European Commission
    When Gilead sought regulatory approval of idelalisib in the United States, it
    also sought regulatory approval in the Europe. On October 29, 2013, Gilead
    submitted a “Marketing Authorization Application” for idelalisib to the European
    Medicines Agency (“EMA”). 130           The application stated that the “proposed
    126
    JX510-001.
    127
    JX702 ¶ 5.
    128
    See JX540.
    129
    JX643 ¶ 28; JX702 ¶ 28.
    130
    JX455.
    32
    indications are treatment of refractory indolent non-Hodgkin lymphoma and, alone
    or in combination, treatment of relapsed chronic lymphocytic leukaemia.”131
    On June 26, 2014, the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use
    (“CHMP”), the scientific committee of the EMA, provided its preliminary review of
    Gilead’s application. The CHMP noted the exceptional result of idelalisib among
    patients with either 17p deletion or TP53 mutation, and asked Gilead “to discuss a
    potential (explicit) inclusion of these patient groups in the indication for idelalisib,
    ie as first line treatment.”132
    On June 28, 2014, Gilead responded to the CHMP’s preliminary review,
    noting that:
    The development program for IDELA in CLL has to date reported on
    clinical outcomes from 153 subjects with either 17p deletion or TP53
    mutation; an additional 216 subjects are currently enrolled in the
    ongoing, randomized studies. Both treatment-naïve and relapsed,
    refractory subjects with these and other adverse genetic features have
    been successfully treated with IDELA monotherapy or with IDELA in
    combination with chemoimmunotherapy.133
    Gilead also discussed four clinical studies in its response, based on which it proposed
    “that the data summarized herein are sufficient to support the following proposed
    indication statement:”
    131
    JX455-002.
    132
    JX505-049.
    133
    JX508-005.
    33
    Zydelig is indicated in combination with rituximab for the treatment of
    adult patients with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (CLL):
         who have received at least one prior therapy, or
         as first line treatment in the presence of high-risk features,
    such as a 17p deletion or TP53 mutation.134
    On July 14, 2014, the Rapporteurs (i.e., reporters) for the CHMP issued an
    assessment report in which they recommended following modified approval for
    Zydelig:
    Zydelig is indicated in combination with rituximab for the treatment of
    adult patients with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (CLL):
    -who have received at least one prior therapy, or
    -as first line treatment in the presence of 17p deletion or TP53 mutation
    in patients unsuitable for chemo-immunotherapy.135
    On July 25, 2014, the CHMP recommended that the European Commission approve
    Zydelig as a first-line treatment in combination with rituximab for CLL patients in
    the presence of 17p deletion or TP53 mutation who are unsuitable for chemo-
    immunotherapy.136
    An internal Gilead presentation in this timeframe noted that “17p deletion is
    an important segment,” “[f]rontline is a smaller population,” and “[t]he fact that
    Zydelig is ‘EVEN’ indicated for frontline (difficult patients) suggests that it should
    be an excellent option for second/third.”137 Another internal Gilead presentation,
    134
    JX508-006 (emphasis in original).
    135
    JX518-004.
    136
    See JX536; JX537.
    137
    JX549-210.
    34
    dated August 15, 2014, similarly noted that “[t]he first line indication in the hardest-
    to-treat patients will have a positive halo effect on the attractiveness of Zydelig,”
    and that going forward, “CLL relapse forecast should assume . . . [s]trong
    competitive advantage for both Zydelig and irutinib in patients with 17pDel/TP53
    which account for 31% of the whole relapse population: expect maximum
    penetration in this segment at peak.”138
    On September 19, 2014, Gilead announced that it had received approval of
    Zydelig from the European Commission.            139
    The “Summary of Product
    Characteristics” the European Commission issued in connection with its approval
    states in relevant part:
    4.1 Therapeutic indications
    Zydelig is indicated in combination with rituximab for the treatment of
    adult patients with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (CLL):
     who have received at least one prior therapy, or
     as first line treatment in the presence of 17p deletion or TP53
    mutation in patients unsuitable for chemo-immunotherapy.
    Zydelig is indicated as monotherapy for the treatment of adult patients
    with follicular lymphoma (FL) that is refractory to two prior lines of
    treatment.140
    138
    JX556-077-078.
    139
    JX591; JX702 ¶ 29.
    140
    JX796-002.
    35
    The part of this label authorizing the use of Zydelig “as first line treatment in the
    presence of 17p deletion or TP53 mutation in patients unsuitable for chemo-
    immunotherapy” is referred to hereafter as the “17p/TP53 Label.”
    I.     Disputes over the Third Milestone Payment Arise
    On July 15, 2014, Pat Kilgannon, a former Calistoga employee now working
    at Gilead, asked Robert Christian, a member of Gilead’s Alliance Management team
    tasked with interacting with Calistoga’s former securityholders, whether the
    potential approval of Zydelig as a “first line treatment in the presence of high-risk
    features, such as a 17p deletion or TP53 mutation in patients unsuitable for chemo-
    immunotherapy” would trigger the Third Milestone.141 Later that day, Christian
    forwarded the inquiry to O’Connell.142
    On July 28, 2014, Chris Letang, a managing director at SRS responsible for
    monitoring the progress on achieving the milestones, emailed Dr. Topper,
    Calistoga’s founder and Chairman, and Dr. Gallagher, both of whom are members
    of the committee controlling this litigation on behalf of Calistoga’s former
    securityholders. In his email, Letang recapped the terms of the Third Milestone,
    stating that one of the triggers for the Third Milestone was “approval as a first-line
    141
    JX520; Tr. 947 (O’Connell).
    142
    JX520.
    36
    drug treatment.” 143 The next day, Dr. Gallagher sent an email to her husband
    containing a link to a Gilead press release announcing that the CHMP had
    recommended the approval of the 17p/TP53 Label.144 The text of the email stated:
    “Approval in EU as well!”145
    The Merger Agreement obligates Gilead to provide status reports to SRS
    periodically concerning the progress of its development and regulatory activities.146
    On August 18, 2014, Christian emailed Dr. Mansuri a draft of such a report, noting
    in the text of his email that “[t]he Shareholder agent sent me an e-mail last week,
    asking about the third milestone and its status.”147 Dr. Mansuri replied on August
    25: “With regard [to] the final payment, can we not simply say we are looking at
    this. I still have not had a chance to discuss with John Milligan and Norbert.”148
    Milligan was Gilead’s President and Chief Executive Officer, and Norbert
    Bischofberger was its Executive Vice President of Research and Development and
    Chief Scientific Officer.
    143
    JX567-003; Tr. 312-13 (Gallagher).
    144
    JX544; JX536; Tr. 319 (Gallagher).
    145
    JX544.
    146
    See JX351-072 § 9.1(b)(iii)(F).
    147
    JX564-002.
    148
    JX564-002.
    37
    On August 27, 2014, Letang emailed Drs. Topper and Gallagher again,
    attaching an update report from Gilead.149 Page 3 of the update report stated that:
    “Plans for registration trials in patients with previously untreated CLL are being
    implemented and include two phase 3 studies and one phase 2 study (described
    below). As of 31 July 2014, 2 studies were open for enrollment.”150 Page 5 of the
    update report noted the most recent positive opinion from the CHMP concerning
    Zydelig:
     CHMP Positive Opinion on 24 July 2014—proposed label text
    below
    The approved indication is:
    o Zydelig is indicated in combination with rituximab for the
    treatment of adult patients with chronic lymphocytic
    leukaemia (CLL): who have received at least one prior
    therapy, or as first line treatment in the presence of 17p
    deletion or TP53 mutation in patients unsuitable for chemo-
    immunotherapy.151
    The same day, Dr. Topper forwarded Letang’s email, including the attached update
    report, to another partner in his venture capital firm, noting: “Phase 3 upfront trials
    are enrolling[.] That is one of the triggers for the rest of the milestones[.]”152
    149
    JX567-001; JX567-007-013.
    150
    JX567-009.
    151
    JX567-011.
    152
    JX567-001.
    38
    On September 19, 2014, the day the European Commission approved the
    17p/TP53 Label, Dr. Topper sent an email to the partners in his venture capital firm
    entitled “zydelig was approved in EU today.” The text of the email stated: “No
    milestone, but good progress to next one.”153
    Also on September 19, Dr. Topper sent an email to some of Calistoga’s former
    executives announcing that “Zydelig was just approved in the EU today.”154 Dr.
    Roger Ulrich, Calistoga’s Chief Development Officer, emailed back, asking what
    the Third Milestone conditions were.155 In reply, Dr. Topper wrote: “One of three[:]
    1B in sales[;] Approval in an upfront indication for heme malig[;] Approval of a non
    hem onc indication (solid tumors e.g.)[.] I think first two are likely to happen, given
    it is phase III in upfront now[.]”156
    Still on September 19, Kamal Puri, a former Calistoga employee now working
    at Gilead, asked several former Calistoga executives in an email whether the
    17p/TP53 Label would trigger the Third Milestone.157 At 2:44 p.m., Dr. Gallagher
    replied: “The last milestone will most likely be achieved by a sales goal so a few
    153
    JX589 (emphasis added).
    154
    JX585-001.
    155
    JX585-001.
    156
    JX585-001.
    157
    JX587.
    39
    years away perhaps.”158 At 3:24 p.m., Dr. Yu informed Dr. Gallagher that he had
    “[j]ust got a message from Leanne that Gilead is indicating the frontline label in
    subset of CLL patients does not meet milestone” and asked Dr. Gallagher for her
    thoughts on the subject.159 At 3:35 p.m., Dr. Gallagher replied to Puri’s email again,
    stating: “I forgot about the front-line path for the milestone. I haven’t heard through
    the official channels yet.”160
    Later on September 19, Dr. Gallagher emailed Letang, stating that since the
    17p/TP53 Label “is a front-line label in a heme malignancy, it seems that this
    approval could trigger the third milestone.”161 Letang agreed to “take a closer look”
    and to get back to Dr. Gallagher.162 On September 20, Dr. Topper also emailed
    Letang, stating: “With the approval of Zydelig in the EU, for in part, the up front
    treatment of 17p negative or p53 mutant patients with heme malignancy, it would
    seem pretty clear that milestone 3 has been satisfied. . . . My suggestion is that we
    notify Gilead that we believe the milestone has been triggered.”163
    158
    JX587; Tr. 321-22 (Gallagher).
    159
    JX854.
    160
    JX586.
    161
    JX583-002.
    162
    JX583-001.
    163
    JX592-001.
    40
    On September 24, 2014, Letang emailed Cryn Nutt, corporate counsel at
    Gilead, stating Calistoga’s belief that “the new approvals [in Europe] . . . would
    appear to trigger the third ($50M) milestone.” Letang further stated that he “was
    hoping to connect with [Nutt] or someone at Gilead to confirm that this milestone
    was achieved and begin to work through the mechanics for the distribution of the
    milestone payment.”164
    On October 7, 2014, Christian notified Letang that Gilead did not believe the
    Third Milestone had been triggered because “the intent of the agreement was that
    the approval needed to be for a broad indication, not a smaller subset of an indication,
    for it to trigger the milestone.”165 To date, Gilead has not made the Third Milestone
    payment.
    II.      Procedural Posture
    On January 14, 2015, SRS filed a complaint against Gilead asserting a single
    claim for breach of the Merger Agreement for failure to pay the Third Milestone as
    a result of the European Commission’s approval of the 17p/TP53 Label.
    On February 27, 2015, Gilead filed an answer and three counterclaims, which
    it later amended. The first counterclaim seeks a declaration that the European
    Commission’s approval of the 17p/TP53 Label did not trigger the Third Milestone.
    164
    JX607-004.
    165
    JX609-001; see also Letang Dep. 134-35.
    41
    The second and third counterclaims, which were asserted in the alternative to the
    first counterclaim, sought reformation of the Merger Agreement on the grounds of
    mutual and unilateral mistake. On December 11, 2015, Gilead notified the Court
    that it had dropped its two reformation counterclaims and associated affirmative
    defenses.
    On January 13, 2016, SRS filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on its
    claim for breach of the Merger Agreement and Gilead’s remaining counterclaim for
    declaratory relief. On May 25, 2016, after briefing and argument, I deferred
    resolution of the motion for judgment on the pleadings until after trial because the
    scientific and technical nature of the subject matter at issue in this case prevented
    me from being able to resolve the matter on the pleadings.
    III.   Analysis
    A.    Legal Standard
    To succeed at trial, “Plaintiffs, as well as Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, have the
    burden of proving each element, including damages, of each of their causes of action
    against each Defendant or Counterclaim-Defendant, as the case may be, by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” 166 “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence
    166
    inTEAM Associates, LLC v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc., 
    2016 WL 5660282
    , at
    *13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2016).
    42
    means proof that something is more likely than not.”167 This standard applies to both
    SRS’s claim for breach of the Merger Agreement for failure to pay the Third
    Milestone, and Gilead’s counterclaim for a declaration that the Third Milestone was
    not triggered by the European Commission’s approval of the 17p/TP53 Label.168
    “A contract’s express terms provide the starting point in approaching a
    contract dispute.”169 If, on its face, the “contract is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence
    may not be used to interpret the intent of the parties, to vary the terms of the contract
    or to create an ambiguity.”170 If a contract is ambiguous, however, the Court may
    consider extrinsic evidence, including “evidence of prior agreements and
    communications of the parties as well as trade usage or course of dealing.”171
    Under Delaware’s objective theory of contracts, “a contract is not rendered
    ambiguous simply because the parties do not agree upon its proper construction.
    Rather, a contract is ambiguous only when the provisions in controversy are
    reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more
    167
    
    Id. 168 See
    Medicalgorithmics S.A. v. AMI Monitoring, Inc., 
    2016 WL 4401038
    , at *17 (Del.
    Ch. Aug. 18, 2016).
    169
    Ostroff v. Quality Servs. Labs., Inc., 
    2007 WL 121404
    , at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2007).
    GMG Capital Inv., LLC v. Athenian Venture P’rs I, L.P., 
    36 A.3d 776
    , 783-84 (Del.
    170
    2012) (quoting Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 
    702 A.2d 1228
    , 1232
    (Del. 1997)).
    171
    Eagle 
    Indus., 702 A.2d at 1233
    .
    43
    different meanings.”172 In considering extrinsic evidence, the Court should uphold,
    “to the extent possible, the reasonable shared expectations of the parties at the time
    of contracting.”173 “In giving effect to the parties’ intentions, it is generally accepted
    that the parties’ conduct before any controversy has arisen is given ‘great
    weight.’”174
    Importantly, ascertaining the shared intent of the parties does not mandate
    slavish adherence to every principle of contract interpretation. As this Court recently
    stated:     “Contract principles that guide the Court—such as the tenet that all
    provisions of an agreement should be given meaning—do not necessarily drive the
    outcome. Sometimes apparently conflicting provisions can be reconciled, but in
    order to prevail on a contract claim, a party is not always required to persuade the
    172
    Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 
    616 A.2d 1192
    , 1196 (Del.
    1992).
    173
    Comrie v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 
    837 A.2d 1
    , 13 (Del. Ch. 2003).
    174
    Ostroff, 
    2007 WL 121404
    , at *11; see also Radio Corp. of Am. v. Philadelphia Storage
    Battery Co., 
    6 A.2d 329
    , 340 (Del. 1939) (“It is a familiar rule that when a contract is
    ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge
    of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight,
    and will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the courts. The reason underlying
    the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where
    it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract,
    and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence
    of their intention.”).
    44
    Court that its position is supported by every provision or collection of words in the
    agreement.”175
    B.     The Term “Indication” is Ambiguous as used in the Merger
    Agreement
    The provision of the Merger Agreement at the center of this dispute is the
    Third Milestone, which states that:
    Within fifteen (15) Business Days following . . . (B) the receipt of
    Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 in the United States or the European
    Union, whichever occurs first, as a first-line drug treatment (i.e., a
    treatment for patients that have not previously undergone systemic drug
    therapy therefor) for a Hematologic Cancer Indication . . ., [Gilead]
    shall notify [SRS] that the [Third Milestone] has been satisfied and pay
    or cause to be paid to the Company Securityholders in accordance with
    Section 9.1(b) Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000), as such amount
    may be adjusted pursuant to Section 9.1(b).176
    It is undisputed that the 17p/TP53 Label constituted a “Regulatory Approval of
    CAL-101 in the European Union,” but it is heavily disputed whether CAL-101 was
    approved “as a first-line drug treatment (i.e., a treatment for patients that have not
    previously undergone systemic drug therapy therefor) for a Hematologic Cancer
    Indication,” and in particular, what the word “indication” means as used in this term.
    “Hematologic Cancer Indication” is defined in the Merger Agreement to mean
    “any hematologic cancer indication specifically identified in Part 1 of Section 1.1 of
    175
    Cyber Hldg. LLC v. CyberCore Hldg., Inc., 
    2016 WL 791069
    , at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26,
    2016).
    176
    JX351-068 § 9.1(a)(iii)(B).
    45
    the Company Disclosure Schedule.” 177 Part 1 of Section 1.1 of the Company
    Disclosure Schedule in turn states that “Hematologic Cancer Indications” means
    “[a]ny indication within the following tumor types,” the first of which is “B-cell
    neoplasms,” and the last of which is “[a]ny Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication
    listed in Part 2 of this Schedule 1.1.”178
    “Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication” is defined in the Merger
    Agreement as “any hematologic cancer indication specifically identified in Part 2 of
    Section 1.1 of the Company Disclosure Schedule.”179 Part 2 of Section 1.1 lists nine
    specific diseases, including “Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia,” or CLL.180
    The definitions in the Merger Agreement are only the starting point, rather
    than the end, of the parties’ dispute. As witnesses for both SRS and Gilead testified,
    in the oncology industry, the meaning of the term “indication” is context specific.181
    Depending on the context, for example, it could refer to a “disease,” a “tumor,” “an
    indication for starting treatment in a patient,” or “a regulatory approval.”182
    177
    JX351-011.
    178
    JX350-002 (emphasis added).
    179
    JX351-016.
    180
    JX350-002.
    181
    See, e.g., Tr. 88 (Miller); Tr. 336 (Gallagher); Tr. 386; 502 (Arbuck); Tr. 613 (Dearden);
    Tr. 889 (O’Connell).
    182
    See, e.g., Tr. 88 (Miller); Tr. 386-87, 502 (Arbuck); Tr. 889 (O’Connell).
    46
    Gilead contends that in the context of the Merger Agreement the only
    reasonable interpretation of the word “indication” is that it means a “disease.”183 By
    contrast, SRS contends that the only reasonable interpretation of the word is “the
    approved use of a drug in a population of patients with a particular disease.” 184
    Thus, according to SRS, the term “indication” does not describe a disease but instead
    “refers to the label or indication statement that Gilead receives from a regulatory
    authority such as the EMA or FDA,” which describes “the particular patient
    population with that disease that a drug can be used to treat.”185 Despite their sharp
    disagreement, SRS and Gilead both argue that the Merger Agreement is
    unambiguous and that the plain language of the contract supports their respective
    interpretations.
    “Indication” appears five times in Schedule 1.1, and the parties agree that it
    has the same meaning in all five places.186 The parties also agree that Part 2 of
    Schedule 1.1 (set forth below) is a list of blood cancers or diseases.187
    183
    Answering Post-Trial Br. 45.
    184
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 1.
    185
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 44; see also Reply Post-Trial Br. 2.
    186
    Tr. Oral Arg. 16; Answering Post-Trial Br. 46-47; see also Tr. 523-24 (Arbuck); Tr.
    601-02 (Dearden).
    187
    Tr. 166; 273 (Gallagher); Tr. 602 (Dearden); see also Answering Post-Trial Br. 45;
    Reply Post-Trial Br. 7.
    47
    Building on this point of agreement, Gilead argues that, since “Specified
    Hematologic Cancer Indications” is defined as “any hematologic cancer indication
    specifically identified in Part 2” and since Part 2 consists of a list of diseases, it
    logically follows that the term “Hematologic Cancer Indications” as used in Part 1
    also must refer to diseases.
    SRS advances two arguments in response to Gilead’s plain meaning
    argument. First, SRS argues that to interpret “indication” to mean “disease” would
    render the very same word superfluous as used in the phrase “Hematologic Cancer
    Indications,” contrary to the principle of contract construction that each word in a
    contract must be given meaning and effect. It is undisputed that a “hematologic
    cancer” is a “blood cancer,” which is a disease.188 Therefore, according to SRS, if
    “indication” also means “disease,” it adds nothing to the phrase “Hematologic
    188
    Tr. 718 (Dearden).
    48
    Cancer Indication.” In essence, SRS argues that people in the oncology industry do
    not use the phrase “hematologic cancer disease” or “cancer disease” because that
    would be repetitive.
    Although this argument has some appeal to a law-trained judge accustomed
    to applying interpretative principles to construe a contract, the reality of life is that
    human language is not perfect.189 In this case, for example, O’Connell, Gilead’s lead
    negotiator, used the term “hematologic cancer diseases” at least ten times in a
    natural, unforced manner when responding to questions at trial.190 As reflected in
    numerous publications, moreover, people in the oncology industry in fact do use the
    phrase “cancer diseases” or “hematologic cancer diseases,” including in peer-
    reviewed journals, to describe the disease of cancer or blood cancer.191 Thus, I am
    189
    See Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 
    96 A.2d 652
    , 656 (N.J. Supr. 1953)
    (“Language is only too often an imperfect and uncertain means of communicating ideas
    and concepts.”).
    190
    See e.g., Tr. 846; 852; 859-60; 864; 919; 920; 956 (O’Connell). O’Connell also used
    “hematological cancer” and “hematologic cancer indication” interchangeably in Gilead’s
    internal documents concerning the milestones. See, e.g., JX185-002.
    191
    Gilead’s Objs. to New Reply Evid. 2-3 (citing nine different publications). Although
    Gilead submitted these publications after the close of the evidence, I take judicial notice of
    them in the interests of fairness because they were submitted in response to certain
    dictionary definitions SRS relied on for the first time in its post-trial reply brief and because
    the contents of these publications are not subject to reasonable dispute. Khanna v. McMinn,
    
    2006 WL 1388744
    , at *30 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2006) (“[T]he Court may take judicial notice
    ‘of matters that are not subject to reasonable dispute.’”).
    49
    not persuaded that it would be unreasonable to construe “indication” to mean
    “disease” based on SRS’s surplusage argument.192
    SRS next argues that Gilead’s interpretation of “indication” to mean “disease”
    makes no sense when the initial clause of Part 1 is read together with the last bullet
    point in Part 1. More specifically, according to SRS, it would be nonsensical “to
    read the reference in the disclosure schedule to ‘[a]ny indication within . . . any
    Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication listed in Part 2 of this Schedule 1.1’ as
    meaning ‘[a]ny [disease or blood cancer] within . . . any Specified Hematologic
    Cancer Indication’” because “Part 2 of the Company Disclosure Schedule lists only
    ‘diseases’ such as CLL” but “there are no diseases ‘within’ CLL.” 193 Although a
    highly technical point, this discrepancy illustrates an apparent inconsistency when
    Gilead’s proffered interpretation is applied to all uses of the word “indication” found
    in Schedule 1.1.
    SRS’s plain meaning argument, on the other hand, suffers from more
    profound problems. To start, there is no obvious textual anchor in the Merger
    Agreement from which to import into the word “indication” the concept of a
    regulatory label reflecting an “approved use of a drug in a population of patients
    192
    See Cyber Hldg. LLC, 
    2016 WL 791069
    , at *7 (“in order to prevail on a contract claim,
    a party is not always required to persuade the Court that its position is supported by every
    provision or collection of words in the agreement.”).
    193
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 53 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
    50
    with a particular disease,” as SRS advocates. Additionally, it is difficult to see how
    such a construction can be reconciled with the fact that Part 2 of Schedule 1.1
    concededly defines “Specified Hematologic Cancer Indications” to mean a specified
    list of diseases.
    SRS counters that it is consistent for Part 2 to be a list of blood cancers and
    for “indication” to mean an approved label or an indication statement, since a label
    normally would identify both the type of disease and the population of disease
    sufferers the drug is approved to treat.194 This contention is unconvincing. It is true
    that a drug label would identify the specific disease the drug is approved to treat, but
    that does not turn the label into a disease. The definition of Specified Hematologic
    Cancer Indication in the Merger Agreement is clear in my view.               It is “any
    hematologic cancer indication specifically identified in Part 2 of Section 1.1 of the
    Company Disclosure Schedule.” What is identified in Part 2 is a list of diseases, not
    labels that describe diseases.
    For the reasons discussed above, I find the word “indication” to be ambiguous
    when considered within the four corners of the Merger Agreement. This result is
    hardly surprising given the shifting positions both parties have taken in this
    litigation. In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, for example, SRS advanced
    194
    Reply Post-Trial Br. 7-8.
    51
    a seemingly different interpretation, arguing that the term Hematologic Cancer
    Indication meant “[t]he basis for initiation of a treatment or of a diagnostic test.”195
    For its part, Gilead did not display much confidence in the plain meaning of the term
    at the outset of this case when it asserted, albeit in the alternative, that the Merger
    Agreement should be reformed because of a mutual or unilateral mistake—claims it
    has since abandoned.196 Given the ambiguity, I turn to extrinsic evidence to interpret
    the term.
    C.    The Parties’ Negotiation History Demonstrates that “Indication”
    Means “Disease” in the Merger Agreement
    When the extrinsic evidence in the record is considered, in particular the
    negotiation history concerning the Merger Agreement, the overwhelming weight of
    the evidence demonstrates in my opinion that the parties mutually understood when
    they entered into the Merger Agreement that the term “indication” meant “a
    disease.” I begin by recapping the evolution of the terms “Hematologic Cancer
    Indication” and “Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication” as the parties negotiated
    the milestone structure in the Merger Agreement.
    On January 28, 2011, Gilead made its preliminary offer to Calistoga,
    proposing three milestones, two of which were based on regulatory approvals of
    195
    JX729-027-028 n.9.
    196
    JX702-037-040.
    52
    CAL-101 for one of two specific blood cancers, i.e., indolent Non-Hodgkin’s
    Lymphoma (iNHL) or Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL).197 On February 1,
    Calistoga sent Gilead the first draft of the merger agreement, introducing a new set
    of four milestones, the first two of which would be triggered by regulatory approvals
    for a “hematologic cancer indication,” which term was not defined.198
    On February 8, Gilead responded with a revised draft of the merger agreement
    in which it replaced the undefined term “hematologic cancer indication” with a
    defined term “Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication,” which referred to “any
    hematologic cancer indication specifically listed on Schedule 1.1.” 199 Gilead’s
    proposed “Schedule 1.1” was a list of nine blood cancers O’Connell had compiled
    with the assistance of the Boston Consulting Group for the purpose of limiting the
    milestone payments to “major” blood cancers.200
    On February 12, Calistoga sent Gilead another draft of the merger agreement,
    replacing Schedule 1.1 in Gilead’s last draft with a new list of eleven tumor types
    that came under the heading “Specified Hematologic Cancer Indications.” 201
    Significantly, as discussed above, the trial record clearly establishes that Calistoga
    197
    JX160-003 (emphasis added).
    198
    JX175-053-054 § 9(bk)(i)&(ii).
    199
    JX207-075-076 § 9.1(a); JX207-019.
    200
    JX206-102; Tr. 852 (O’Connell).
    201
    JX223-089.
    53
    derived its list of eleven tumor types from the top level categories of diseases in the
    WHO Classification, which lists numerous other diseases under these eleven
    categories. These subcategories of diseases were not listed by name in Calistoga’s
    February 12 revision of Schedule 1.1, but to ensure that the disease subcategories
    would trigger a milestone payment, Calistoga inserted a clause before the list of
    eleven tumor types stating: “Any indication within the following [eleven] tumor
    types.” Dr. Gallagher, the person who oversaw Calistoga’s sale process, confirmed
    at trial that the “within the following tumor types” language “was intended to sweep
    in the subcategories of diseases.”202
    When Gilead received Calistoga’s February 12 draft, it recognized that
    Calistoga’s revision of Schedule 1.1 tracked the WHO Classification and thus that
    Calistoga was seeking to expand Gilead’s prior list of nine blood cancers “to include
    all hematologic cancer indications” in the WHO Classification.203 On February 16,
    Gilead went back with a compromise in order to narrow the triggers for the second
    milestone that was under discussion.
    Specifically, in its February 16 draft, Gilead divided Schedule 1.1 into two
    parts, Part 1 being the last schedule Calistoga had proposed on February 12, and Part
    202
    Tr. 271 (Gallagher); see also Tr. 67-68 (Miller).
    203
    JX385-003.
    54
    2 being the nine blood cancers Gilead had proposed on February 8.204 The draft
    introduced a new defined term “Hematologic Cancer Indication,” meaning “any
    hematologic cancer indication specifically identified in Part 1 of Schedule 1.1,” and
    changed the definition of “Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication” to mean “any
    hematologic cancer indication specifically identified in Part 2 of Schedule 1.1.”205
    Under the February 16 draft, if both the first and the second regulatory approvals
    were in the same location (i.e., the United States or a Major Market Country), then
    in order for the second milestone to be triggered, one of the two approvals had to be
    for a Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication.206
    On February 18, Calistoga sent another draft to Gilead, proposing a new set
    of three milestones and adding what became the twelfth and final bullet to the
    definition of Hematologic Cancer Indication in Part 1 of Schedule 1.1, namely to
    include “[a]ny Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication listed in Part 2 of this
    Schedule 1.1.”207 Although the record provides no definitive evidence of the reason
    for this late change to Schedule 1.1, the timing of its addition—coming two drafts
    after Calistoga already had introduced into Part 1 of the schedule the “within the
    204
    JX241-095-096.
    205
    JX241-012; JX241-018.
    206
    JX241-072-073 § 9.1(a)(ii).
    207
    JX277-096.
    55
    following tumor types” language to pick up the subcategories of diseases for the first
    eleven bullets—suggests to me, and I so find, as Dr. Gallagher testified,208 that it
    was added simply to make clear (for the avoidance of any doubt) that the Specified
    Hematologic Cancer Indications “listed in Part 2” also were included in Part 1. The
    final Merger Agreement maintained the milestone structure and Schedule 1.1 from
    the February 18 draft.209
    In sum, the drafting history of the Merger Agreement shows that the parties
    always were talking about regulatory approval of CAL-101 for a disease when they
    were negotiating over the milestone payments. By contrast, the drafting history does
    not reflect that the parties were discussing regulatory labels when negotiating the
    triggers for the milestone payments. Indeed, to find that “indication” means “label”
    or “label approval” would contradict Dr. Gallagher’s testimony that “the ‘within the
    following tumor type’ language was not intended to depart from the scientifically
    recognized definition of diseases,” that “no one at Calistoga evinced, in words or
    deeds, to Gilead that the purpose of Section 1.1 was to depart from the scientifically
    recognized definition of diseases,” that she “never told anyone at Gilead that the
    purpose of the ‘any hematologic indication’ language in Schedule 1.1 was to sweep
    Tr. 273 (“Q. And the purpose of the last bullet point in part 1 is to confirm that it also
    208
    sweeps in the specific blood cancers listed in part 2, correct? A. Yes.”); see also Arbuck
    Dep. 81.
    209
    JX350-002-003; JX351-067-068 § 9.1(a).
    56
    in any patient with any genetic mutation that may also have a blood cancer,” and
    that it “was not the intent of Calistoga to depart from the scientific[ally] accepted
    definition of ‘tumors’ when it prepared Schedule 1.1.”210
    In addition to the merger agreement drafts, other contemporaneous
    communications between SRS and Gilead show that both parties used “indication”
    as synonymous for “disease” during their negotiations.           For example, when
    O’Connell sought clarification from Stocks concerning the operation of the
    milestones in the first draft of the merger agreement that Calistoga had prepared,
    Stocks focused on approvals for diseases (e.g., iNHL and CLL) as the triggers for
    the first two milestones:
    As one potential example, iNHL approval in the US and then in an EU
    Country would trigger the First and Second milestones, respectively.
    As a second potential example, iNHL approval in the US and then CLL
    approval in an EU Country also would trigger the First and Second
    milestones, respectively. As a third potential, iNHL approval in the US
    and then CLL approval in the US also would trigger the first and second
    milestones, respectively.211
    As another example, in a February 16 email to Stocks to give him “a heads up” on
    Gilead’s forthcoming revisions to the merger agreement, O’Connell characterized
    the trigger for second milestone as an approval for a blood cancer:
    $50M 2nd approval in any hematological indication but if it is for a
    second indication in the same territory as the 1st, one of the two
    210
    Tr. 271-72 (Gallagher).
    211
    JX196-001 (emphasis added).
    57
    indications would need to be in the narrower list of Specified
    Hematological Indication (i.e., CLL, iNHL and the other major hemonc
    cancers, as we tentatively agreed yesterday in Foster City)212
    Calistoga also used “indication” to refer to “diseases” in some of the
    presentations and regulatory materials it sent to Gilead during the negotiations.213 In
    fact, Dr. Gallagher expressed no surprise to the prospect of being shown
    “presentation after presentation in which ‘indication’ was used as synonymous with
    ‘blood cancer’ at Calistoga,”214 and testified that when using the word “indication”
    in a presentation to refer to blood cancers, Calistoga was “trying to use it in the way
    that folks generally in the industry use it.”215
    In contrast to the abundance of evidence supporting Gilead’s position, SRS
    could point to little concrete evidence in its favor. Gilead’s February 16 draft of the
    merger agreement defined the term “Phase II Trial” as “a randomized controlled
    clinical human study conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of a drug for a
    particular indication or indications in patients with the disease or condition under
    study.”216 Pointing to this definition, SRS argues that Gilead “specifically used the
    212
    JX256-001 (emphasis added).
    213
    See, e.g., JX123-018; JX874-009 § 2.2; JX377-007 § 2.2; JX086-011 § 3; JX086-046
    § 10.1.7 (“in the indications indolent B-cell NHL, MCL and CLL”); JX086-152 § 4; Stocks
    Dep. 25-26; Tr. 507-11 (Arbuck).
    214
    Tr. 245 (Gallagher).
    215
    Tr. 240-43 (Gallagher) (discussing JX183-014).
    216
    JX241-016.
    58
    term ‘particular indication or indications’ to describe the use of a drug in a patient
    population with a disease.”217 This definition, however, actually makes as much, if
    not more, sense if “indication” means “disease” than if it means “label,” because
    people normally talk about the “effectiveness of a drug for a particular [disease] or
    [diseases],” as opposed to the “effectiveness of a drug for a particular [label] or
    [labels].”
    SRS next points to some slide presentations during the parties’ negotiations
    where the term “indication” was used to refer to “the approved use of a drug” in the
    context of regulatory approval. 218 But as discussed above, the parties also used
    “indication” to refer to “disease” in those presentations as well as in regulatory
    materials Calistoga shared with Gilead.219 Thus, this evidence is non-conclusive and
    just highlights a point on which both parties agree—that use of the term “indication”
    in the oncology industry is context specific.
    The fact that SRS failed to identify any better evidence to support its
    interpretation is hardly surprising, considering Dr. Gallagher’s admission that she
    could not recall any time during the negotiations when Calistoga told Gilead that
    “indication” meant “a label that you would receive for the specific patient population
    217
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 56.
    218
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 56-60.
    219
    
    See supra
    note 213.
    59
    that you would treat with the hematologic cancer.”220 Nor could she recall any time
    during the negotiation when Calistoga used the term “indication” to refer to any
    genetic subpopulations.221
    In an attempt to make up for a scarcity of helpful evidence from the
    negotiation history, SRS argues that the Court should construe the milestone
    provisions in the context of regulatory approval of a drug, and cites to parts of the
    record where people testified that in the regulatory approval context, “indication”
    could mean the indication statement in a drug label. Putting aside that SRS used
    “indication” to refer to “disease” in some of its own regulatory materials that it
    shared with Gilead during the negotiations, as discussed above, 222 this argument
    misses the mark. The milestone at issue here is triggered by a regulatory approval,
    but the appropriate context in which the contract provision should be construed is
    the context in which the Merger Agreement was negotiated, which is evinced, first
    and foremost, by the parties’ contemporaneous communications, such as their
    exchange of drafts of the merger agreement.223
    *****
    220
    Tr. 233 (Gallagher).
    221
    Tr. 256-57 (Gallagher).
    222
    See JX086-011 § 3; JX086-046 § 10.1.7 (“in the indications indolent B-cell NHL, MCL
    and CLL”); JX086-152 § 4.
    223
    See Tr. 246 (Gallagher).
    60
    For all the reasons discussed above, the overwhelming weight of the extrinsic
    evidence demonstrates in my opinion that the parties mutually understood when they
    entered into the Merger Agreement that the term “indication” meant “a disease.”
    D.     The Third Milestone Can Only Be Triggered by a Disease-Level
    Approval
    SRS next argues that even if the word “indication” means a blood cancer or
    disease, the Third Milestone was still triggered because the Merger Agreement does
    not specify that a Regulatory Approval must cover an entire population of disease
    sufferers to qualify for the milestone. More specifically, SRS argues that even
    though the 17p/TP53 Label limited the patient population to those with “17p deletion
    or TP53 mutation [who are] unsuitable for chemo-immunotherapy,” Zydelig still
    was approved as a first-line treatment for CLL.224 The parties do not dispute that
    CLL is a blood cancer within the tumor type B-cell neoplasms listed in Part 1 of
    Schedule 1.1 as well as a Specified Hematologic Cancer Indication listed in Part 2
    of Schedule 1.1.225 Thus, according to SRS, the 17p/TP53 Label triggered the Third
    Milestone under both Parts 1 and 2.
    I disagree with SRS’s position for two basic reasons. First, the negotiation
    history of the milestone provisions, the subsequent conduct of SRS’s own witnesses,
    224
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 61.
    225
    JX702 ¶ 5.
    61
    and the structure and operation of the milestone provisions all support the conclusion
    that the form of regulatory approval necessary to trigger a milestone payment must
    be a disease-level approval. Second, the 17p/TP53 Label does not satisfy the
    disease-level approval requirement in the Third Milestone.
    1.        The Parties’ Negotiation History Demonstrates, and Their
    Subsequent Conduct Confirms, that only a Disease-Level
    Regulatory Approval Could Trigger the Third Milestone
    Simplifying its second line of argument to its essence, SRS contends that the
    “key is . . . are the people being treated with this drug for diseases [that are] listed”
    in Schedule 1.1. 226 In other words, under SRS’s logic, as long as Zydelig was
    approved to treat a subpopulation of CLL patients, no matter how small that
    subpopulation may be, the Third Milestone payment would be due. Fatal to SRS’s
    position, however, is that this argument finds no support in the parties’ negotiation
    history.
    As discussed in detail above, the extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the
    parties were discussing disease-level regulatory approvals throughout their
    negotiations over the milestones.227 No evidence was presented suggesting that they
    discussed approvals for subpopulations of disease sufferers when negotiating the
    milestones. As Dr. Hawkins testified, that subject “never came up” during the
    226
    Tr. Oral Arg. 49.
    227
    
    See supra
    Section III.C.
    62
    negotiations.228 Rather, the consistent focus of the parties’ discussions was on which
    diseases would trigger the milestones.             Indeed, by incorporating the WHO
    Classification—an authoritative list of hematologic tumors—into Part 1 of the
    Schedule 1.1, and by agreeing to a specific list of diseases in Part 2, the parties
    effectively excluded subpopulation approvals as a trigger for a regulatory milestone.
    In short, for the same reasons I have concluded that the term “indication” means
    “disease” in the Merger Agreement, the form of regulatory approval required to
    trigger a milestone payment under the Merger Agreement logically must be a
    disease-level approval.
    SRS points to evidence that Calistoga “repeatedly rejected Gilead’s efforts to
    limit the application of the milestones as (a) applying only to major hematological
    cancers; (b) as applying only to approvals in ‘Major Market Countries;’ and (c) as
    not including accelerated or conditional approvals.”229 This evidence is beside the
    point. The fact that SRS was successful in expanding the list of blood cancers that
    could trigger a milestone (from the two initial diseases Gilead proposed (iNHL and
    CLL) to all of the blood cancers in the WHO Classification), and in broadening the
    scope of the necessary Regulatory Approval (to include more countries and
    accelerated approvals), may have enlarged the number of opportunities to trigger a
    228
    See Tr. 795 (Hawkins).
    229
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 62 n.26; see also Reply Post-Trial Br. 18-19.
    63
    milestone payment in certain respects, but that does not change the fact that the
    necessary approval had to occur at the disease level.
    The conduct of Calistoga’s principals before the dispute in this action arose
    confirms my finding that both parties understood that the milestones could only be
    triggered by a disease-level regulatory approval. Dr. Gallagher (who oversaw the
    merger negotiations) and Dr. Topper (Calistoga’s founder and Chairman at the time
    of the merger) both worked with SRS to oversee this litigation on behalf of
    Calistoga’s former securityholders.230 Significantly, for the two-month period from
    July 29, 2014, when the CHMP publicly recommended the 17p/TP53 Label, until
    September 19, 2014, when Gilead publicly announced the European Commission’s
    approval of the 17p/TP53 Label, they both believed that the Third Milestone was not
    due. 231 Indeed, neither of them concluded that the Third Milestone had been
    triggered even after first learning about the European Commission’s approval of the
    17p/TP53 Label.
    230
    Tr. 315 (Gallagher).
    231
    Dr. Gallagher admitted that she did not inform anyone between July 29, 2014 and
    August 27, 2014 that she believed the Third Milestone was triggered. Tr. 319-20
    (Gallagher). Dr. Topper similarly admitted that, on August 27, 2014, after reading a Gilead
    update report disclosing both CHMP’s positive opinion on Zydelig and the fact that Gilead
    was conducting two phase 3 studies and one phase 2 study in patients with previously
    untreated CLL, he looked to the phase 3 trials, rather than the 17p/TP53 Label, as the
    potential trigger for the Third Milestone. JX567; Topper Dep. 25-26.
    64
    On September 19, 2014, upon learning about the European Commission’s
    approval, Dr. Topper specifically said in an email entitled “zydelig was approved in
    EU today” that “No milestone, but good progress to next one.”232 Later that day, in
    emails responding to two separate inquiries from former Calistoga employees as to
    whether the 17p/TP53 Label triggered the Third Milestone, both Drs. Topper and
    Gallagher, who had been reminded about the terms of the Third Milestone in an
    email from SRS as recently as July 28, 2014,233 took the same position.
    At 2:38 p.m., Dr. Topper, after summarizing the three triggers in the Third
    Milestone in his email, did not say that the milestone had been triggered because of
    the 17p/TP53 Label, but that it was “likely” the milestone would be satisfied in the
    future because of the pending Phase III study: “I think first two [triggers] are likely
    to happen, given it is phase III in upfront now.”234 At 2:44 p.m., Dr. Gallagher also
    did not say that the milestone had been triggered because of the 17p/TP53 Label, but
    that it “most likely” would be triggered under the $1 billion sales subpart of the
    milestone: “The last milestone will most likely be achieved by a sales goal so a few
    years away perhaps.”235
    232
    JX589 (emphasis added).
    233
    JX567-003.
    234
    JX585-001 (emphasis added).
    235
    JX587; Tr. 321-22 (Gallagher).
    65
    Dr. Gallagher attempted to minimize this evidence at trial, testifying
    emphatically that shortly after sending her 2:44 p.m. email she pulled out a copy of
    the Merger Agreement at her home office and reviewed the milestone provisions,
    which prompted her to send out another email at 3:35 p.m. saying she “forgot about
    the front-line path for the milestone.”236 Putting aside that the meaning of the 3:35
    p.m. email is inconclusive, Dr. Gallagher’s explanation for why she sent it strains
    credibility given her previous testimony that she had not read the Merger Agreement
    on September 19, 2014, and that she was out of town that day and thus could not
    have reviewed it then at her home as she claimed so confidently at trial.237
    Noting that the reactions of Drs. Topper and Gallagher discussed above
    occurred several years after the Merger Agreement was signed, SRS argues that this
    evidence is not useful to the interpretation of the Merger Agreement. Although
    contemporaneous evidence is far more probative of the shared expectations of
    contracting parties as a general matter, that does not mean that a party’s subsequent
    conduct has no probative value. Indeed, this Court has stated that, “[i]n giving effect
    to the parties’ intentions, it is generally accepted that the parties’ conduct before any
    controversy has arisen is given ‘great weight.’”          238
    That proposition rings
    236
    JX586, Tr. 353-58 (Gallagher).
    237
    Tr. 363-64 (Gallagher).
    238
    Ostroff, 
    2007 WL 121404
    , at *11. In support of its position, SRS relies on Eagle Indus.,
    Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 
    702 A.2d 1228
    (Del. 1997). There, the Supreme Court
    66
    particularly true here, where the party whose conduct is at issue acts in a manner
    directly contrary to their personal financial interests.
    In any event, even if I were to completely disregard this evidence, it would
    make no difference. The extensive evidence concerning the negotiation of the
    milestone provisions is more than sufficient by itself in my opinion to support the
    conclusion that the parties both understood that a disease-level approval was
    necessary to trigger the Third Milestone. The Topper/Gallagher admissions are
    merely corroborative. Also corroborative are reasonable inferences concerning the
    commercial logic of the Third Milestone that can be drawn from its structure and
    operation, which I address next.
    2.     The Structure and Operation of the Milestone Provisions
    Further Corroborates that the Regulatory Approval Must Be
    at the Disease Level
    SRS argues that the Third Milestone “was a great deal for Gilead” even if it
    could be triggered by a regulatory approval in a subpopulation of disease sufferers
    as evidenced by the fact that Gilead was not obligated to use “Commercially
    Reasonable Efforts” to meet the Third Milestone and was not even prevented from
    taking any action for the primary purpose of avoiding the Third Milestone.239 In
    did not proscribe reliance on all subsequent conduct evidence, but commented only that
    “backward-looking evidence gathered after the time of contracting is not usually helpful.”
    Eagle 
    Indus., 702 A.2d at 1233
    n.11 (emphasis added).
    239
    See JX351-070 § 9.1(b)(iii)(B).
    67
    SRS’s words, Gilead “had the liberty under the contract to actually [step] in front of
    the train and stop the third milestone from happening.”240
    The problem with this reasoning is that if the Third Milestone could be
    triggered by a subpopulation approval, then the First and Second Milestones
    logically also could be triggered by subpopulation approvals, since they similarly
    were conditioned upon a regulatory approval of CAL-101 for a Hematologic Cancer
    Indication.241 But Gilead was obligated to use Commercially Reasonable Efforts to
    achieve the first two milestones and to refrain from taking any action the primary
    purpose of which was to avoid the satisfaction of the first two milestones.242
    There are genetic mutations within CLL that are present in only 0.44% of CLL
    patients.243 Thus, under SRS’s reasoning, Gilead negotiated a Merger Agreement
    that potentially obligated it to pay $175 million if it received regulatory approvals
    for the treatment of patients who have CLL and a mutation present in 0.44% of
    CLL.244 Not only is this interpretation contrary to reasonable business expectations,
    240
    Tr. Oral Arg. 42; Opening Post-Trial Br. 66.
    241
    JX351-067-068 § 9.1(a)(i)-(ii).
    242
    JX351-070 § 9.1(b)(iii)(B).
    243
    JX705-023.
    244
    SRS contends that Gilead “had no obligation to pursue a milestone that it did not believe
    would result in [significant commercial gain]” because Commercially Reasonable Efforts
    was defined as efforts “consistent with the usual practice of [Gilead], with respect to
    development and/or commercialization of its other important pharmaceutical products with
    significant market potential being actively and diligently pursued by [Gilead].” Reply
    68
    it contradicts the express language of the Merger Agreement, which states that “[t]he
    parties acknowledge and agree that [Gilead’s] achievement of the Milestones are
    material factors in determining the valuation of [Calistoga by Gilead].”245
    The structure of the Third Milestone itself suggests that the parties did not
    contemplate it would be triggered by a frontline approval for treatment of a
    subpopulation of disease sufferers. As set forth below, the Third Milestone could
    be triggered by the earliest to occur of three events:
    (A) the receipt of Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 in the United States
    or the European Union, whichever occurs first, for a solid tumor
    indication, (B) the receipt of Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 in the
    United States or the European Union, whichever occurs first, as a first-
    line drug treatment (i.e., a treatment for patients that have not
    previously undergone systemic drug therapy therefor) for a
    Hematologic Cancer Indication, or (C) Annual Net Sales of CAL-101
    achieving at least $1 Billion, so long as such Annual Net Sales are
    achieved on or before the first day of the first calendar quarter
    beginning after the Outside Date [i.e., the tenth (10th) anniversary of
    the Closing Date].246
    Post-Trial Br. 17. But this would not necessarily shield Gilead from the risk of milestone
    payments for approvals in a tiny population. If, for example, Gilead pursued a disease-
    level approval, but the Regulatory Authority only granted an approval for treatment of a
    small subpopulation of the disease sufferers because of weakness in its data or for some
    other reason, Gilead could be required as a practical matter to make the milestone payments
    under SRS’s theory even if the approval was not commercially valuable. See Arbuck Dep.
    88, 190 (“[I]f the European Union asked you to do something, you’d do what they ask you
    to do. . . . [A]nd for sure if they asked us to submit language to get an indication, we would
    do that.”).
    245
    JX351-072 § 9.1(b)(iii)(E).
    246
    JX351-068 § 9.1(a)(iii).
    69
    As Calistoga’s lead negotiator Stocks testified, each of the three subparts were
    “intended to recognize value inflections that could lead to significant commercial
    reward.” 247 Obtaining an approval for a solid tumor in satisfaction of the first
    subpart would be highly valuable because it would expand the drug’s use “to a
    completely different class and universe of cancers.”248 The commercial value of
    achieving annual net sales of at least $1 billion in satisfaction of the third subpart is
    self-evident.249 Given Stocks’ testimony, which accords with common sense and
    which I credit, one reasonably would expect that satisfaction of the second subpart—
    Regulatory Approval of CAL-101 as a first-line drug treatment for a Hematologic
    Cancer Indication—also was intended to reward an event of significant commercial
    success. Yet the record is devoid of any hard evidence that a first-line regulatory
    approval for a small subpopulation of disease sufferers would yield such a result.
    SRS’s best evidence on this point is Dr. Gallagher’s testimony that “having
    any first-line approval gives a halo effect to the drug, to be able to then continue to
    broaden the use” because even though the drug “may be indicated for this small
    247
    Stocks Dep. 52.
    248
    Yu Dep. 70; Tr. 872 (O’Connell) (“[S]olid tumors is very large diseases, much larger
    than hematological diseases in terms of patient numbers. So it meant a significant
    commercial gain, really an upside for Gilead that we hadn't even anticipated.”); Tr. 803-04
    (Hawkins).
    249
    Yu Dep. 70.
    70
    patient population . . . it tells physicians that there’s a positive risk/benefit profile
    that would then have them think about using it in other first-line indications.”250 Dr.
    Gallagher also acknowledged, however, that the parties put in the “$1 billion annual
    sales” trigger of the Third Milestone as a “backstop” or “schmuck insurance” for
    protection for “a small approval.”251 Although not dispositive, the existence of such
    a backstop cuts against the notion that the second subpart of the Third Milestone was
    intended to trigger an immediate payment for a sub-disease level approval (i.e.,
    before a meaningful amount of sales is achieved), particularly if, as Stocks testified,
    each of the three subparts was intended to capture events that one reasonably would
    expect to lead to a significant commercial reward.
    3.        SRS’s Other Subpopulation Arguments Also Fail
    I next address two remaining arguments SRS advances in support of its
    subpopulation approval argument. First, SRS contends that the FDA Label that
    triggered the First and Second Milestones was itself a subpopulation approval.252
    The FDA Label approved Zydelig for the treatment of patients with:
    250
    Tr. 188-89 (Gallagher).
    251
    Tr. 210-12, 359-60 (Gallagher); See also Tr. 873-76 (O’Connell). Indeed, under Section
    9.1(a)(iv)(C) of the Merger Agreement, if the First Milestone has been met but the Second
    Milestone has not been met when CAL-101 achieves annual net sales of at least $1 billion,
    then Gilead would be obligated to make both the Second and Third Milestone payments.
    252
    Tr. Oral Arg. 57.
    71
     Relapsed chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), in combination with
    rituximab, in patients for whom rituximab alone would be
    considered appropriate therapy due to other co-morbidities. (1.1)
     Relapsed follicular B-cell non-Hodgkin lymphoma (FL) in patients
    who have received at least two prior systemic therapies. (1.2)
     Relapsed small lymphocytic lymphoma (SLL) in patients who have
    received at least two prior systemic therapies. (1.3)253
    In other words, the FDA Label contained three approvals. The first approval was
    for the treatment of relapsed CLL patients with certain co-morbidities; the second
    approval was for the treatment of FL patients who were receiving third-line or later
    therapies; and the third approval was for the treatment of SLL patients who were
    receiving third-line or later therapies.
    SRS asserts that the concept of “relapse” or “third-line” denotes
    “subpopulation” in the same sense as genetic mutations such as 17p deletion or TP53
    mutation. 254 This argument is disproved by both the language of the Merger
    Agreement and trial testimony.
    The Third Milestone expressly separates the concepts of “lines of therapy”
    and “Hematologic Cancer Indication” by requiring “receipt of Regulatory Approval
    of CAL-101 . . . as a first-line drug treatment . . . for a Hematologic Cancer
    Indication.”255 As Dr. Gallagher admitted, when “the parties were thinking about
    253
    JX510-001.
    254
    See Opening Post-Trial Br. 62.
    255
    JX351-068 § 9.1(a)(iii)(B) (emphasis added). See also Tr. 617-18 (Dearden).
    72
    hematologic cancer indication, whatever it meant, it was defined separately from the
    line of treatment.”256
    Gilead’s lead negotiator O’Connell explained that he understood lines of
    therapy to be a description of usage rather than a subpopulation of patients because
    at each stage of therapy, the same patient is being treated.257 Drs. Hawkins and
    Dearden concurred.258 SRS’s witnesses also do not seriously dispute the point. Dr.
    Miller expressly agreed that the same patient could receive different lines of
    treatment,259 and Dr. Arbuck agreed that first line, second line and later lines are
    “usage descriptors.”260 Therefore, even though the second and third approvals under
    the FDA Label were for patients who were receiving third-line or later treatments,
    these two approvals were still at the disease level.
    The first approval under the FDA Label, on the other hand, was limited to
    relapsed CLL patients “for whom rituximab alone would be considered appropriate
    therapy due to other co-morbidities” and thus might be considered a subpopulation
    approval. But as SRS itself acknowledged, it did not know whether the first approval
    256
    Tr. 250-51 (Gallagher). See also Stocks Dep. 40-41 (line of therapy “doesn’t have
    anything to do with tumor type”).
    257
    Tr. 835-36 (O’Connell).
    258
    Tr. 774-75 (Hawkins); 633 (Dearden).
    259
    Tr. 76 (Miller).
    260
    Tr. 493-94 (Arbuck).
    73
    was a basis for triggering either of the first two milestones because the notice Gilead
    sent out announcing satisfaction of the first two milestones did not specify which of
    the three approvals in the FDA Label triggered them.261
    Second, SRS contends that the parties’ inclusion of “accelerated approval or
    conditional approval” in the definition of “Regulatory Approval” shows that Gilead
    contemplated paying milestones for a subpopulation of disease sufferers.262 SRS
    acknowledges, however, that “accelerated or conditional approval is granted upon a
    showing of unmet medical need.”263 It has no direct correlation with whether the
    approval sought is for a disease or a subpopulation.264 Indeed, in the FDA Label that
    Gilead received, the FDA granted disease-level accelerated approvals of Zydelig for
    third-line treatment of two diseases: follicular B-cell non-Hodgkin lymphoma (FL)
    and small lymphocytic lymphoma (SLL).265
    *****
    261
    Tr. Oral Arg. 58; see JX540.
    262
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 63.
    263
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 63 (emphasis added); see also Tr. 23 (Miller); Tr. 151-52
    (Gallagher); Tr. 401-02 (Arbuck); Tr. 907-08 (O’Connell).
    264
    Tr. 784 (Hawkins).
    265
    JX510-001. Another example is that the drug Imbruvica recently received accelerated
    approval as a second-line treatment for “Mantle cell lymphoma (MCL),” a blood cancer.
    JX841-001.
    74
    In view of the extrinsic evidence as well as the structure and operation of the
    milestone provisions discussed above, I conclude that to trigger the second subpart
    of the Third Milestone, the required regulatory approval must be at the disease level.
    4.     The European Commission Did Not Approve CAL-101 as a
    First-Line Drug Treatment for the Disease CLL
    Having determined that the required form of regulatory must be a first-line
    disease-level approval, the final issue is whether the17p/TP53 Label constitutes such
    an approval.         SRS contends that the European Commission’s approval
    “unquestionably” was for a “first line treatment for the disease CLL.”266 The record,
    however, is replete with evidence to the contrary.
    In a March 18, 2016 report concerning certain safety issues related to
    idelalisib, the EMA’s Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee observed that
    “[p]reviously untreated CLL” is “[n]ot an authorized indication for CLL.” 267
    Reviewing this report, SRS’s expert, Dr. Arbuck, agreed that the EMA was
    observing that “Idelalisib in Europe was not previously approved as front line or for
    previously untreated CLL patients.” 268           Dr. Miller testified similarly, stating
    266
    Opening Post-Trial Br. 61.
    267
    JX723-005.
    268
    Tr. 460. Dr. Arbuck re-characterized her testimony at trial to suggest that the report
    meant that idelalisib had not been approved for “all” persons with CLL. 
    Id. 466-67. Even
    if true, it would not matter because, as discussed above, only a disease-level approval could
    trigger the second subpart of the Third Milestone.
    75
    explicitly that “Zydelig has not been approved in Europe for the disease of CLL.”269
    Both witnesses also admitted that there is no disease recognized as “within” CLL.270
    Both sides agree that a first-line approval is “the culmination of a complex
    regulatory program proceeding through trials that appropriately demonstrate safety
    and efficacy as treatment for the disease” and makes the drug a “gold standard.”271
    Gilead received the 17p/TP53 Label, however, in a situation very different from the
    typical first-line drug approval process.          For example, although Zydelig had
    demonstrated effectiveness in CLL patients, including those with 17p deletion or
    TP53 mutation, Gilead had not even completed the “pivotal” phase 3 studies in
    previously untreated CLL patients when the 17p/TP53 Label was approved.272 As
    the CHMP’s Rapporteurs noted in their July 14, 2014 assessment report, “the front-
    line experience for idelalisib in del17p / TP53 is limited to 9 patients” and the follow-
    up period was only 6 to 12 months.273 In other words, as expert witnesses from both
    sides testified, the efficacy and safety data for Zydelig was insufficient to support a
    regulatory approval as a first-line treatment for the disease CLL.274
    269
    Tr. 114 (Miller) (emphasis added). See also Tr. 112 (Miller).
    270
    Tr. 67 (Miller); 527-29 (Arbuck).
    271
    Tr. 79-80 (Miller), 804 (Hawkins), Tr. 649 (Dearden); see also JX372-031.
    272
    See JX567-001, JX567-009, Bischofberger Dep. 78-79; Tr. 624 (Dearden) (describing
    “Phase 3 randomized trials” as being “pivotal”).
    273
    JX518-003; see also Tr. 626-27 (Dearden).
    274
    See Tr. 624-25, 633-34, 637 (Dearden); Tr. 482, 478-79 (Arbuck).
    76
    The European Commission nevertheless granted the 17p/TP53 Label not as a
    first-line treatment for the disease of CLL, but to address the dire needs of a specific
    subpopulation of patients with CLL. As Gilead’s expert Dr. Dearden credibly
    explained, the EMA was,
    making an exceptional circumstance for an exceptional population of
    patients who not only have this genetic abnormality, but also were
    unable to receive other treatments, that they don’t have options. That
    couldn’t be more different from the situation of a regular CLL patient,
    who has in the first-line a number of excellent options for treatment that
    have been well defined through pivotal registration Phase 3 randomized
    trials.275
    In sum, when Gilead submitted its application to the EMA on October 29,
    2013, it sought approval of CAL-101 for treatment of “relapsed chronic lymphocytic
    leukaemia.”276 Gilead did not seek approval of CAL-101 as a first-line treatment for
    the disease CLL, and the record shows that it did not receive such an approval.
    IV.      Conclusion
    For the reasons explained above, SRS has failed to prove by a preponderance
    of evidence that the 17p/TP53 Label triggered the Third Milestone under the Merger
    Agreement, and Gilead has proven by a preponderance of evidence that it did not.
    Accordingly, SRS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. Gilead is
    entitled to judgment in its favor on its counterclaim for declaratory judgment and on
    275
    Tr. 624 (Dearden).
    276
    JX455-002 (emphasis added).
    77
    SRS’s claim for breach of contract.      The parties are directed to submit an
    implementing form of final order and judgment within five business days.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    78