Elmer Fannin and Sugar Loaf Farms, Inc. v. Ivy Tree Meadows, LLC ( 2017 )


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  •      IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    )
    Elmer Fannin and Sugar Loaf Farms, Inc.             )   C.A. No. 9404-MA
    )
    Plaintiffs,                       )
    v.                                                  )
    )
    Ivy Tree Meadows, LLC,                              )
    Defendant.                         )
    MASTER’S REPORT
    Date Submitted: August 5, 2016
    Draft Report: November 28, 2016
    Final Report: April 21, 2017
    In October 2013, the owner of a 54-acre farm (“the Property”) in Kent County,
    Delaware executed an agreement to sell the Property for $1,150,000 to a limited
    liability company based in New Jersey. The contract was a cash contract, and the
    only explicit contingency beyond good title was if there were hazardous substances
    on the Property. The original closing date was extended to December 19 th, but on
    that date the buyer canceled the contract claiming that it could not develop 153
    building lots on the Property due to the presence of wetlands and wetland buffers.
    After unsuccessfully trying to close the deal, the seller of the Property filed a
    complaint seeking specific performance of the contract. Pending before me are cross-
    motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the
    Court grant summary judgment on the seller’s request for specific performance of the
    Page 1 of 18
    contract, but deny summary judgment on the seller’s request for attorney’s fees and
    costs.
    Factual Background1
    Plaintiff Sugar Loaf Farms, Inc. (“Sugar Loaf”) is the owner of three parcels of
    land in Kent County totaling approximately 54 acres. Plaintiff Elmer Fannin is the
    president of Sugar Loaf.      Although the Property was not listed for sale, during the
    late summer of 2013, Fannin was contacted by Jeanne Palumbo, a New Jersey real
    estate agent and broker for Quinrick Realty, LLC, (“Quinrick Realty”) who was
    acting on behalf of a client potentially interested in buying the Property. Palumbo
    traveled to Kent County, visited the Property, and met with Fannin. Fannin provided
    Palumbo with a copy of a 2005 sketch plan (“the Sketch Plan”) showing a proposed
    layout of 153 lots, which had been prepared the purpose of applying to the county’s
    sewage disposal district for an allocation of sewer capacity.          The Sketch Plan
    contained contour lines clearly indicating the existence of wetlands, which Fannin
    brought to Palumbo’s attention. Fannin also informed Palumbo that the Sketch Plan
    had not been approved by Kent County for anything other than an equivalent
    dwelling unit (EDU) allocation so the Property could be connected to sewer, if and
    when the Property was approved for development. Fannin gave Palumbo a copy of
    the Kent County Sewage Disposal District Map (“District Map”) showing the
    Page 2 of 18
    Property in a proposed expansion of the county’s sewage disposal system. Sewer was
    approved for 145 proposed lots depicted on the Sketch Plan.
    On September 17th, Palumbo, acting as an agent for Defendant Ivy Tree
    Meadows, LLC (“Ivy Tree”), sent Fannin a proposed agreement of sale to purchase
    the Property for $818,018, subject to a contingency allowing termination in the event
    any hazardous substances, floodplains or wetlands were discovered on the Property
    during an inspection.   Fannin rejected the offer because the price was too low and
    because Palumbo was aware there were wetlands on the Property. On September
    24th, Fannin sent Palumbo a five-page document by facsimile, identifying “153 paper
    lots” and listing the improvements to the Property and personalty located thereon.
    Fannin offered to sell the Property with its improvements for $1,350,000 and the
    personalty for $85,000. Palumbo countered with offer to purchase the Property with
    its improvements for $919,018.        Fannin revised the proposed agreement by
    eliminating the contingency related to floodplains and wetlands and increasing the
    sales price to $1,150,000, and on October 2nd, he signed the revised agreement of sale
    and sent it to Palumbo. On October 4 th, Christine Beikman, managing member of Ivy
    Tree, signed the revised agreement of sale. Ivy Tree then paid a deposit of $10,000 to
    Quinrick Realty, to be held in escrow. Since the contract was a cash contract that did
    1
    The factual background is taken from the undisputed allegations of the Amended
    Complaint and the affidavits supporting the cross-motions for summary judgment.
    Page 3 of 18
    not contain a financing contingency, the closing date stated in the contract was
    November 19, 2013.
    A week before the settlement date, Fannin’s attorney sent a letter to Ivy Tree’s
    attorney regarding settlement matters. In response, on November 15, 2013, the
    attorney informed Fannin’s attorney that Ivy Tree would not be able to complete
    closing on November 19th because it had decided to obtain financing of a portion of
    the purchase price.   Although Fannin was ready, willing and able to complete
    settlement on November 19th, based on Ivy Tree’s representation that the delay in
    closing would only be two weeks, Fannin agreed to extend the closing date from
    November 19 to December 19, 2013, without modifying any other contract terms.
    In mid-December, Ivy Tree or Palumbo contacted Fannin directly to request a
    second extension of the closing date from December 19 to January 30, 2014, and
    offered to make partial payment of the purchase price in the amount of $200,000 if
    Fannin would agree to this extension request. Fannin agreed to extend the closing
    date a second time in exchange for the partial payment of $200,000, and signed a
    second Contract Addendum extending the closing date to January 30 th. Although
    Fannin was verbally informed that Ivy Tree was going to sign the second addendum
    and wire the $200,000 to Fannin’s attorney on December 19th, Ivy Tree sent a letter to
    its realtor on December 19th, stating that it was cancelling the contract based on the
    belief it could not develop the Property into 153 building lots due to wetlands and
    Page 4 of 18
    wetlands buffers. On December 20th, Fannin’s attorney sent Ivy Tree’s realtor a letter
    directing her not to refund the $10,000 deposit to Ivy Tree, and informing the realtor
    of her obligation to pay the deposit to Fannin based on Ivy Tree’s default and breach
    of contract. Despite Fannin’s attempt to resolve this matter by granting an extension
    until February 21, 2014, for Ivy Tree to complete its purchase of the Property, Ivy
    Tree never completed the purchase of the Property or expressed any intent to do so.
    Procedural Background
    On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff2 filed a complaint in this Court seeking specific
    performance of the contract and damages. The complaint was amended on April 14,
    2014, and on May 7th, Ivy Tree filed its answer to the amended complaint. After
    some discovery issues were resolved, the case stalled for nearly a year, prompting the
    Court to threaten dismissal under Court of Chancery Rule 41(e). Shortly thereafter,
    on May 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, and on June 20 th,
    Ivy Tree filed its cross motion for summary judgment. Both motions now have been
    fully briefed.
    Issues
    Plaintiff argues that it is undisputed the parties had a valid enforceable contract
    to purchase the Property. After engaging in several rounds of negotiations, Ivy Tree
    accepted Plaintiff’s offer to sell the Property for $1,150,000, and signed the revised
    2
    Plaintiff refers to both Fannin and Sugar Loaf unless otherwise indicated.
    Page 5 of 18
    agreement of sale. Ivy Tree’s deposit of $10,000 was further proof that it intended to
    be bound by the contract. According to Plaintiff, the terms of the written agreement
    were sufficiently definite, and did not contain any contingencies related to the
    number of lots, financing, or the existence of wetlands or wetland buffers.         Ivy
    Tree’s subsequent notice of intent to cancel was an anticipatory breach or repudiation
    of the contract, and Ivy Tree’s subsequent refusal to perform the contract resulted in a
    breach. The reason for repudiating the contract, i.e., Ivy Tree’s inability to develop
    153 lots due to the existence of wetlands and wetland buffers, was not a valid reason
    for repudiating the contract. At all times Ivy Tree had been aware that the “153 paper
    lots” listed on the Sketch Plan meant proposed lots, and not lots applied for or
    approved by any governmental entity. Most significantly, the agreement of sale did
    not contain any contingencies related to wetlands or wetland buffers, or the number
    of lots that could be developed.        Plaintiff argues that Ivy Tree’s unjustified
    repudiation of the contract constitutes bad faith entitling Plaintiff to attorney’s fees
    and costs. Finally, Plaintiff argues that it was ready, willing and able to perform
    under the contract at all times.
    Ivy Tree argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment in its favor
    because Plaintiff misrepresented to Ivy Tree the number of lots that were available
    for development. Plaintiff gave Ivy Tree’s agent, Palumbo, a plan showing a total of
    153 lots available for development, and the contract between the parties referred
    Page 6 of 18
    specifically to a sketch plan showing “Sugar Loaf Farms” consisting of the 153 lots.
    According to Ivy Tree, Plaintiff’s misrepresentation concerning the number of lots
    materially altered the contract so that Ivy Tree’s notice of its intent to cancel was not
    an anticipatory breach or repudiation of the contract. Ivy Tree could not perform
    under the contract because there were significantly fewer lots to develop; thus, a
    material term of the contract had changed. Since Plaintiff concedes that the existence
    of wetlands and wetland buffers could affect the number of lots that could be
    developed, Ivy Tree argues that Plaintiff appears to concede that there was a material
    mistake of fact that may be grounds for rescission of the contract. Furthermore,
    Plaintiff was not ready, willing and able to perform because it could not deliver a
    property that would yield 153 lots for development.
    In its cross-motion for summary judgment, Ivy Tree argues that Plaintiff’s
    misstatements or misrepresentations concerning the number of lots available to be
    developed are grounds for rescission of the contract. According to Ivy Tree, its
    decision to purchase the Property was based, in part, on what appeared to be 153 lots
    available for development.     Now, it appears that the number of lots will be fewer
    than 153 due to the existence of wetlands and wetland buffers. If this discrepancy is
    not a material misrepresentation by Plaintiff, then it is evidence of a mutual mistake
    of fact by the parties. Furthermore, Ivy Tree did not assume the risk of a mistake
    because the contract was silent as to the risk of mistake.
    Page 7 of 18
    In response, Plaintiff argues that there was no misrepresentation or mistake
    because Ivy Tree was at all times aware that the “153 paper lots” listed on the Sketch
    Plan meant only proposed lots, and the Sketch Plan clearly identified the wetlands
    information.   Ivy Tree was in possession of this document prior to signing the
    contracts of sale and, therefore, had notice of the existence of wetlands and wetland
    buffers and their potential impact on the number of developable lots that may
    ultimately be realized on the Property. Plaintiff argues that there was never an
    assumption that the land would be approved for 153 lots, and Ivy Tree knew it had
    limited knowledge with respect to the number of developable lots. Since Ivy Tree did
    not request any further information from Plaintiff and did not seek any survey or
    delineation report regarding the wetlands and/or wetland buffers and the number of
    developable lots, the risk of mistake should be allocated to Ivy Tree.
    Standard of Review
    The Court shall grant a motion for summary judgment when, “after reviewing
    the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together
    with the affidavits,” the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3 Where cross
    motions for summary judgment are pending, and “the parties have not argued that
    there is an issue of fact material to the disposition of either motion,” then they are
    Page 8 of 18
    deemed by the Court to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits
    based on the record submitted with the motions.4
    Analysis
    In support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted the
    following documents: (a) the agreement of sale dated October 4, 2013; (b) Ivy Tree’s
    proposed agreement of sale dated September 17, 2013; (c) several emails from or to
    Palumbo; (d) Ivy Tree’s Exclusive Buyer Agency Agreement with Palumbo; (e)
    excerpts from Palumbo’s deposition transcript; (f) portions of the Sketch Plan and the
    District Map; (g) letters from the parties’ counsel; (h) addendum to the agreement of
    sale dated November 19, 2013; and (i) excerpts from Ivy Tree’s responses to
    interrogatories.   Plaintiff also supported its motion for summary judgment with
    Fannin’s four-page affidavit. Ivy Tree supported its motion for summary judgment
    with Palumbo’s affidavit. Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to summary judgment
    on its request for specific enforcement of the contract while Ivy Tree contends that it
    is entitled to summary judgment on its request for rescission of the contract.
    The parties do not dispute that a valid contract was created. Nevertheless, Ivy
    Tree is seeking rescission of the contract. A party is entitled to rescission of a
    contract for the sale of real property on the basis of fraud, misrepresentation, or
    3
    Twin Bridges Ltd. P’ship v. Draper, 
    2007 WL 2744609
    , at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 14,
    2007) (citing Ct. Ch.R. 56(c)).
    4
    Ct.Ch.R. 56(h).
    Page 9 of 18
    mistake.5 Here, Ivy Tree claims that Plaintiff misrepresented the number of lots that
    were developable on the Property and, because of the existence of wetlands, 153 lots
    cannot be developed on the Property.        However, there is no evidence of any
    misrepresentation by Plaintiff. Before the agreement of sale was executed, Ivy Tree’s
    agent was informed of the existence of wetlands on the Property, and the agent knew
    that the 153 lots shown on the Sketch Plan were only proposed or paper lots laid out
    for the sole purpose of applying for sewer allocation.6 The agent knew that the
    proposed 153 lots shown on the Sketch Plan had not been approved for development.
    The agent’s knowledge may be imputed to her principal, Ivy Tree.7
    The record shows that Palumbo and a colleague visited the Property before
    meeting with Fannin and declined an opportunity to make another site visit with
    Fannin. Palumbo was informed of the presence of wetlands on the Property during
    the meeting, and was again informed of the existence of wetlands when Fannin
    refused to sign the proposed agreement of sale that contained an explicit contingency
    for wetlands.8 Palumbo sent Fannin a second proposal that no longer contained any
    contingencies related to the discovery of floodplains or wetlands, which is further
    5
    Liberto v. Bensinger, 
    1999 WL 1313662
    , at * 5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 1999).
    6
    Appendix to Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
    (“A-#”), at pp. 19, 40.
    7
    Williams v. White Oak Builders, Inc. 
    2006 WL 1668348
    , at *6 n. 91 (citing In re
    HealthSouth Corp. S’holders Litig., 
    845 A.2d 1096
    , 1108 n.22 (Del. Ch. 2003)
    (noting general rule that the knowledge of an agent is imputed to its principal)).
    8
    A-4-7.
    Page 10 of 18
    evidence of Palumbo’s awareness of the presence of wetlands on the Property.9
    Palumbo was given copies of: (1) the Sketch Plan, which depicts both “404 wetland
    lines” and “100 year flood plain limits” on the Property; 10 and (2) the District Map
    showing the proposed sewer extension to the Property if it was subsequently
    approved for development.11
    Palumbo returned to her office with the paperwork she had received from
    Fannin. Palumbo drafted the proposed agreement of sale, and in her draft Palumbo
    described the property to be sold as follows:12
    (a) The land and all the buildings, other improvements and
    fixtures to the land; (b) all of the Seller’s rights relating to
    the land; (c) all personal property specifically made
    reference to in this contract. The sale excludes any and all
    equipment, which is to be removed by seller through
    auction or other means within ninety (90) days from date of
    settlement. The real property to be sold is commonly known
    as: Parcel # 3-00-05600-01-0200-00101 at 6952 Pearsons
    Corner Road, town of Hartley (Dover Metro area), County
    of Kent, state of Delaware. The land consists of 53.98
    acres. There exists a site plan sketch for “Sugar Loaf
    Farms” which consists of 153 building lots. The sale also
    includes     ownership      rights    in     any     and     all
    municipal/governmental approvals obtained that run with
    the land.13
    9
    A-1-3.
    10
    A-14-17
    11
    A-18, 45. Sewer had been approved for 145 of the proposed lots depicted on the
    Sketch Plan. Affidavit of Elmer G. Fannin, at ¶ 6.
    12
    A-12, 19.
    13
    A-1,4.
    Page 11 of 18
    Although Palumbo included a reference to the Sketch Plan in her proposed agreement
    of sale, she omitted any reference to the District Map. Nevertheless, Palumbo knew
    that the Sketch Plan showed only proposed lots, as opposed to approved lots.
    Palumbo knew that there was a map showing the approved sewage disposal capacity
    for the Property. Palumbo also knew that there were wetlands on the Property.
    Moreover, by explicitly referring to the Sketch Plan in the proposed agreement of
    sale, Palumbo incorporated this document into the parties’ executed contract.14 Not
    only did the Sketch Plan depict wetlands contour lines throughout the proposed site
    plan of 153 lots, it also contained the following notations:
    Boundary information shown hereon was taken from a plat
    prepared by Earl D. Smith, Inc., Land Surveyor, titled “Sugar Loaf
    Stables,” dated 6-22-87 and is not the result of an actual field
    survey by Design Consultants Group, L.L.C.
    Wetlands information was obtained from public information
    on the Kent County, Delaware website, and is not the result of any
    delineation or survey.
    Layout may not reflect all code requirements of Kent
    County.15
    A reasonably prudent buyer interested in developing the Property would have:
    (a) taken the opportunity to inspect the Property and to obtain an official (as opposed
    to approximate) wetlands delineation report; (b) contacted the Kent County Planning
    and Zoning office regarding zoning or the developmental status of the Property; and
    14
    See McKinney Family Ltd. P’ship v. Stubbs, 
    2007 WL 1883121
     (Del. July 2, 2007).
    Page 12 of 18
    (c) contacted Kent County to confirm the sewage disposal capacity of the Property.
    Despite having the information contained in the Sketch Plan and District Map, Ivy
    Tree made no inquiries about zoning requirements or the presence of wetlands on the
    Property before executing the contract on October 4, 2013.16
    Even disregarding the imputed knowledge of its agent, if Ivy Tree believed that
    the Property contained 153 developable lots because of the reference in the contract
    to a “site plan sketch … which consists of 153 building lots,”17 the Sketch Plan itself
    contained sufficient “qualifying information” to have cured such a mistaken belief. 18
    Ivy Tree’s unjustified reliance on this statement in the contract drafted by its agent is
    not a basis for rescission of the contract due to misrepresentation.
    Nor is Ivy Tree entitled to rescission on the ground of mistake because in this
    case, Ivy Tree bore the risk of mistake. Delaware courts follow the Restatement
    (Second) of Contracts’ approach to determining which party bears the risk of a
    mistake. Under Section 152 of the Restatement, a party bears the risk of mistake
    when:
    (a) The risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or (b) he is aware,
    at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with
    respect to the fact to which the mistake relates but treats his limited
    15
    A-14.
    16
    A-34-35.
    17
    A-1.
    18
    Norton v. Poplos, 
    443 A.2d 1
    , 5 (Del. 1982).
    Page 13 of 18
    knowledge as sufficient, or (c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on
    the ground that it is reasonable under the circumstances to do so.19
    The record shows that Ivy Tree and Palumbo entered into an exclusive buyer agency
    agreement on August 1, 2013, in which Palumbo agreed to search for, locate, and
    purchase real estate in Kent County for Ivy Tree. 20 Sometime that summer, Palumbo
    and a colleague visited the Property. They drove down a paved driveway, but did not
    get out and walk around the Property. Nor did Palumbo take any pictures of the
    Property.21 After Palumbo and her colleague talked with Fannin in his Milford
    office,22 she returned to her office with the documents Fannin had provided. Palumbo
    was not an engineer or developer; she was a realtor just looking for land that might be
    developed.23   Palumbo did not even know to ask whether the Sketch Plan had
    received any governmental approval.24 She admitted that she did not spend much
    time looking at the Sketch Plan and that she did not read the notes on the Sketch
    Plan.25 Palumbo did not report to anyone nor did anyone ask her for additional
    information after she delivered the documents to Ivy Tree. 26
    19
    Darnell v. Myers, 
    1998 WL 294012
    , at *7 (Del. Ch. May 27, 1998) (quoting
    Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981)).
    20
    A-9.
    21
    A-13.
    22
    A-12.
    23
    A-42-43.
    24
    A-43.
    25
    A-45.
    26
    A-13.
    Page 14 of 18
    Palumbo transmitted Ivy Tree’s initial offer to purchase the Property to Fannin
    on September 17th. Less than three weeks later, the parties signed the agreement of
    sale – Fannin on October 2nd and Ivy Tree on October 4th - in which there were no
    contingencies relating to wetlands, floodplains, the number of developable lots, or
    financing. Ivy Tree was willing to proceed with the contract even though it was
    aware that it had minimal information about the Property. Ivy Tree was willing to
    proceed with the contract even though it was aware that its request for a contingency
    relating to wetlands and floodplains had been rejected by the other party. In its haste
    to acquire the land, Ivy Tree took the risk that it could be mistaken as to the number
    of developable lots on the Property. As a result, Ivy Tree is barred from seeking
    rescission of the contract on the grounds of mistake. And Plaintiff is entitled to
    specific performance of its contract because at all times, it was ready, willing, and
    able to convey 53.98 acres of land to Ivy Tree in exchange for $1,150,000, and the
    contract did not contain a liquidated damages clause.
    Plaintiff is also seeking to shift its attorneys’ fees and costs to Ivy Tree
    because of Ivy Tree’s alleged bad faith in repudiating and breaching the contract and
    for asserting frivolous reasons for its anticipatory breach and repudiation. Ivy Tree
    argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any strong public policy or any
    egregious conduct that would justify an award of attorneys’ fees or costs.          In
    Page 15 of 18
    particular, Ivy Tree argues that even if it had breached the contract, such conduct
    would not amount to “vexatious, wanton, or oppressive conduct” in any way. 27
    The bad-faith exception to the American Rule that each side bears its own
    attorney’s fees does not apply to the conduct that gives rise to the claim itself,
    although a court may consider the losing party’s conduct prior to litigation as
    evidence for the purpose of determining whether the party defended the action in bad
    faith.28 Nevertheless, the bad-faith exception may apply “where the pre-litigation
    conduct of the losing party was so egregious as to justify an award of attorneys’ fees
    as an element of damages.”29 Here, there is no indication that Ivy Tree
    “‘unnecessarily prolonged or delayed litigation, falsified records, or knowingly
    asserted frivolous claims[,] … mis[led] the court, alter[ed] testimony, or chang[ed]
    position on an issue.’”30 There was nothing egregious about either the circumstances
    surrounding Ivy Tree’s breach of contract or the ensuing litigation. Plaintiff has
    failed to demonstrate as a matter of law any strong public policy in favor of awarding
    attorneys fees in this case, or that it would be inequitable to require each party to bear
    its own attorneys’ fees and costs. Therefore, I recommend that the Court deny
    27
    Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 10.
    28
    See Johnston v. Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG, 
    720 A.2d 542
    , 546 (Del.
    1998).
    29
    Choupak v. Rivkin, 
    2015 WL 1589610
    , at * (Del. Ch. April 6, 2015) (quoting
    Hardy v. Hardy, 
    2014 WL 3736331
    , at *17 (Del. Ch. July 2014)).
    Page 16 of 18
    Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in part as to its request for an award of fees
    and costs.
    Exceptions
    Both parties have filed exceptions to the Draft Report. After reviewing the
    parties’ briefs, I see no reason to modify my recommendation that the Court deny
    Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment as to its request for rescission of
    contract. Plaintiffs’ sole exception pertains to the Draft Report’s failure to include a
    deadline for specific performance by Defendant. Therefore, I am modifying the Draft
    Report by recommending that, in addition to granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
    judgment as to its request for specific performance, the Court should require
    Defendant to complete the purchase of the land and improvements which are the
    subject of the cash contract at issue within sixty (60) days after this report becomes
    final.
    Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, I recommend that the Court grant summary
    judgment in part in favor of Plaintiffs Elmer Fannin and Sugar Loaf Farms, Inc. as to
    their request for specific performance within 60 days of the agreement of sale of the
    Property for $1,150,000 to Defendant Ivy Tree Meadows, LLC, and deny
    30
    Dover Historical Soc., Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 
    902 A.2d 1084
    ,
    1093 (Del. 2006) (quoting Beck v. Atlantic Coast PLC, 
    868 A.2d 840
    , 850-51 (Del.
    Page 17 of 18
    Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to its request for rescission of contract.
    In addition, I recommend that Court deny summary judgment in part as to Plaintiffs’
    request for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The parties are referred to Court of
    Chancery Rule 144 for the process of taking exception to a Master’s Final Report.
    Respectfully,
    /s/ Kim E. Ayvazian
    Kim E. Ayvazian
    Master in Chancery
    KEA/kekz
    Ch. 2005)).
    Page 18 of 18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 9404-MA

Judges: Ayvazian M.

Filed Date: 4/21/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2017