In re Sanchez Energy Derivative Litigation ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN RE SANCHEZ ENERGY ) CONSOLIDATED
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION ) C.A. No. 9132-VCG
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Date Submitted: August 11, 2014
Date Decided: November 25, 2014
Stuart M. Grant, Michael J. Barry, Nathan A. Cook, Bernard C. Devieux, and Jacob
R. Kirkham, of GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and
Pamela S. Tikellis, Scott M. Tucker, Tiffany J. Cramer, and Vera G. Belger, of
CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Mark
Lebovitch, Amy Miller, and Evan Berkow, of BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
& GROSSMANN LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.
John D. Hendershot and Andrew J. Peach, of RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants Gilbert A. Garcia, Alan G.
Jackson and Greg Colvin.
Peter B. Ladig, Jason C. Jowers, and Elizabeth A. Powers, of MORRIS JAMES
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: R. Thaddeus Behrens and Daniel H.
Gold, of HAYNES & BOONE LLP, Dallas, Texas, Attorneys for Defendants
Eduardo Sanchez and Sanchez Resources, LLC.
William M. Laffery, Leslie A. Polizoti, and Lauren K. Neal, of MORRIS,
NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL:
M. Scott Barnard and Michelle A. Reed, of AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER &
FELD LLP, Dallas, Texas, Attorneys for Defendants A.R. Sanchez Jr. and A.R.
Sanchez III.
Rolin P. Bissell and Tammy L. Mercer, of YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT &
TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Michael C. Holmes and
Jeremy M. Reichman, of VINSON & ELKINS LLP, Dallas, Texas, Attorneys for
Defendants Altpoint Capital Partners LLC and Altpoint Sanchez Holdings LLC.
Kurt M. Heyman, Patricia L. Enerio, and Dawn Kurtz Crompton, of PROCTOR
HEYMAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Sanchez
Energy Corp.
GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
2
This case tests the limits of our pleading requirements under Court of
Chancery Rule 23.1. The Plaintiffs are stockholders who seek to derivatively
pursue claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporation, arising from a
transaction in which the corporation purchased assets from another entity
controlled by two members of the corporation‘s board of directors. The Plaintiffs
did not make a pre-suit demand on the board. The transaction at issue was
approved by the corporation‘s audit committee, which is specifically empowered
by the board of directors to review, and approve or reject, such transactions. The
audit committee is composed of the three other, disinterested board members, and
was assisted by a financial advisor in approving the transaction.
In arguing that demand should be excused, the Plaintiffs point to the
conflicted directors‘ managerial control over the corporation and what they see as
the disadvantageous nature of the transaction itself, together with conclusory
allegations that two of the three disinterested directors lacked independence. The
Complaint is silent about the process by which the audit committee evaluated the
transaction, however; indeed, it must be, because the Plaintiffs failed to pursue
information about the process, through a demand under Section 220 or otherwise.
If the procedural requirements of Rule 23.1 are to be meaningful and effective,
more than conclusory allegations of directors‘ lack of independence is required
before control of litigation is shifted from the board to the stockholders.
3
Accordingly, and for the reasons that follow, I grant the Defendants‘ Motions to
Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Sanchez Energy Corporation (―Sanchez Energy,‖ or the ―Company‖) is a
publicly traded Delaware corporation ―focused on the acquisition, exploration, and
development of unconventional oil and natural gas resources onshore along the
U.S. Gulf Coast.‖1 Sanchez Energy was established in 2011 by certain members of
the Sanchez family, two of whom—A. R. Sanchez Jr., a 16% stockholder, and A.
R. Sanchez III, a 5.5% stockholder—have since served on the Company‘s board of
directors. In addition to Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III, Sanchez Energy‘s board of
directors consists of individual Defendants Alan G. Jackson, Gilbert A. Garcia, and
Greg Colvin.
According to the Plaintiffs, in addition to its minority equity stake in
Sanchez Energy, the Sanchez family also owns and operates a ―web of four
privately held, affiliated companies,‖2 including Sanchez Resources, LLC
(―Sanchez Resources‖). In 1978, Sanchez Jr. and his father founded Sanchez Oil
& Gas Corporation (―SOG‖), a company that specializes in managing oil drilling
operations; Sanchez Jr. is the CEO and Chairman of SOG, which provides
1
Compl. ¶ 19. Unless otherwise indicated, all facts cited herein are taken from the Plaintiffs‘
Verified Consolidated Stockholder Derivative Complaint.
2
Id. ¶ 2.
4
management services to all Sanchez-affiliated entities, including Sanchez Energy.
Apart from directors, officers, and management services obtained from SOG,
Sanchez Energy ―has no employees and no directly managed operations.‖3 In
addition, SOG grants Sanchez Energy ―a license to the unrestricted proprietary
seismic, geological and geophysical information owned by SOG that is related to
the Company‘s properties.‖4 SOG, Sanchez Energy, and Sanchez Resources all
operate out of the same building complex in Houston, Texas.
In August 2013, Sanchez Energy entered into a transaction (the
―Transaction‖) with Sanchez Resources for the purchase of ―working interests‖—
rights to develop land and extract oil, subject to royalty payments owed to
landowners—in Sanchez Resources‘ ―Tuscaloosa Marine Shale‖ (―TMS‖) project.
Prior to the Transaction, Sanchez Resources held working interests in 40,000 acres
of developed land and 40,000 acres of undeveloped land in the TMS, and Altpoint
Capital Partners LLC (―Altpoint‖) held an unspecified equity stake in Sanchez
Resources. When oil reserves were proven on the 40,000 acres of developed land,
Sanchez Resources sought to develop the remaining undeveloped acreage, but
Altpoint declined to make an additional investment to fund that development.
Sanchez Resources and Altpoint therefore sought a third party willing to buy out
Altpoint‘s equity interest and to fund the additional development. Sanchez
3
Id.
4
Id. ¶ 40.
5
Resources and Altpoint found that third party in Sanchez Energy: the Company
agreed to purchase Altpoint‘s working interests in the TMS, but structured the
Transaction as a joint venture rather than an equity investment.
The Transaction was structured in three legs: Sanchez Resources transferred
its working interests in the 40,000 acres of undeveloped land to Altpoint; Altpoint
transferred those same interests to Sanchez Energy; and then Sanchez Energy
transferred the interests back to Sanchez Resources, in exchange for an undivided
one-half interest in both the 40,000 acres of undeveloped land and the 40,000 acres
of developed land. As consideration, Sanchez Energy paid roughly $77 million in
cash and stock, with approximately $62 million flowing to Altpoint and $15
million flowing to Sanchez Resources. In addition, Sanchez Energy committed to
constructing six oil wells on the undeveloped property—a benefit of approximately
$22 million to Sanchez Resources, according to the Plaintiffs—and agreed to pay
additional royalties to Sanchez Resources on future revenues from oil extracted
from the undeveloped property. According to the Plaintiffs, Sanchez Energy‘s $77
million payment valued the Transaction at approximately seventeen times the
value of an August 2013 ―comparable arms-length transaction[] in the TMS‖
between Goodrich Petroleum Corp., the largest acreage owner in the TMS, and
Devon Energy, ―a true third party.‖5 By another of the Plaintiffs‘ calculations,
5
Id. ¶ 52.
6
Sanchez Energy paid roughly $2,500 per acre for the same working interests that
Sanchez Resources had purchased in 2010, prior to development, at $184 per acre.
The Complaint does not detail the parties‘ negotiations leading up to the
Transaction, or even identify which principals at Sanchez Energy negotiated its
terms. Defendants Jackson, Garcia, and Colvin, acting as the Company‘s audit
committee (the ―Audit Committee‖)—a committee created for the express purpose
of evaluating and approving interested-party transactions between the Company
and Sanchez family members6—considered and approved the Transaction, with the
advice of an independent financial advisor. Although the Complaint contains few
specific allegations detailing the Audit Committee‘s evaluation of the Transaction,
the Plaintiffs contend that the members of the Audit Committee lacked
independence from Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III, and that the Committee‘s approval
of the Transaction is therefore not entitled to deference under the business
judgment rule. While the Plaintiffs conceded Colvin‘s independence in briefing
6
The Audit Committee is empowered to evaluate and approve transactions between the
Company and Sanchez-affiliated entities by the Audit Committee‘s Charter, which has been
ratified by the Company‘s board of directors. See Transmittal Affidavit of Andrew J. Peach to
Opening Br. of Defs.‘ Gilbert A Garcia, Alan G. Jackson and Greg Colvin in Supp. of their Mot.
to Dismiss, Ex. 12 (―Amended and Restated Charter of the Audit Committee of the Board of
Directors of Sanchez Energy Corporation‖) (―The Audit Committee (the ‗Committee‘) is
appointed by the Board of Directors (the ‗Board‘) of Sanchez Energy Corporation (the
‗Company‘) to assist the Board in . . . reviewing, and if it so determines, approving related party
transactions, including those with Sanchez Oil & Gas Corporation, Sanchez Energy Partners, I
and their affiliates (collectively, the ‗Sanchez Group‘).‖ (emphasis omitted)).
7
and at oral argument,7 the Plaintiffs allege that Jackson and Sanchez Jr. ―have been
close friends for more than five decades,‖ and that ―Jackson is beholden to
Sanchez Jr. in his professional career.‖8 According to the Plaintiffs, Jackson is
employed as an executive at IBC Insurance Agency, Ltd. (―IBC‖), the subsidiary
of International Bancshares Corporation, for which Sanchez Jr. serves as one of
nine directors and in which the ―Sanchez family‖—a group undefined in the
Complaint—―are the largest stockholders.‖9 The Complaint therefore alleges that:
If Jackson, in his capacity as a director at Sanchez Energy, were to act
against the interests of Sanchez Jr., he faces the threat of termination
at IBC, the loss of promotion opportunities, and the loss or decrease of
his salary—his very livelihood—because of Sanchez Jr.‘s position on
IBC‘s board [sic] and significant influence through his substantial
equity stake.10
To be clear, the Plaintiffs argue that Jackson would face these negative
consequences because of Sanchez Jr.‘s position on IBC‘s parent company’s
board—International Bancshares Corporation—not because of Sanchez Jr.‘s
position on IBC‘s board, as their language above suggests. The Complaint does
not allege, and the Plaintiffs have not argued, that Sanchez Jr. also serves directly
7
The Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that Colvin was ―unable to act independently and
disinterestedly consider a demand on Sanchez Energy because doing so would jeopardize his
personal relationship with the Sanchez family and the considerable compensation received for
his service on the Sanchez Energy Board,‖ as his ―six-figure salary [from the Company] is a
major personal benefit to Colvin, which materially affects his ability to act independently of the
Sanchez family.‖ Id. ¶ 78. However, the Plaintiffs declined to brief the issue and conceded at
oral argument that Colvin did not lack independence.
8
Id. ¶ 75.
9
Id.
10
Id.
8
on the board of IBC, the subsidiary entity that the Plaintiffs claim employs Jackson
as an executive.
In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that ―Garcia is unable to independently and
disinterestedly consider a demand on Sanchez Energy‖ due to Garcia‘s 30-year
relationship with the Sanchez family and ―the ongoing business relationship
between [Garcia-affiliated entities] and Sanchez Jr.‖11 The Plaintiffs point out that
Garcia and a third party, Sandman Ventures Investments, LLC (―Sandman‖), own
a respective 39% and 20% equity interest in Latin American Entertainment, LLC.
Sanchez Jr. owns 17% of Sandman, and, according to the Complaint, the ―Sanchez
family‖ controls Sandman. In addition, the Plaintiffs explain that Garcia owns a
48% equity interest in an entity, Hacienda Records, L.P., in which Sandman is a
―preferred limited partner.‖12
On January 28, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed their Verified Consolidated
Complaint in this action, asserting Count I for breach of fiduciary duty against all
the individual director Defendants; Count II for breach of fiduciary duty against
Sanchez III in his capacity as an officer of the Company; Count III for aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty against Sanchez Resources, its principal,
Eduardo Sanchez, and Altpoint; and Count IV for unjust enrichment against
Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III. On April 1, 2014, Defendants Garcia, Jackson, and
11
Pls.‘ Answering Br. at 20–23; Compl. ¶ 76.
12
Id.
9
Colvin; Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III; Sanchez Resources and Eduardo Sanchez;
and Altpoint separately moved to dismiss. The remainder of this Memorandum
Opinion addresses those Motions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This action is before me on the Defendants‘ Motions to Dismiss, pursuant to
Court of Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6). In evaluating a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), this Court must accept all well-pled allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor from those allegations.13 While this
Court will not accept allegations that are merely conclusory, I must deny the
motion where a well-pled complaint alleges ―any reasonably conceivable set of
circumstances susceptible of proof.‖14
Rule 12(b)(6) seeks to eliminate the expense of litigation of meritless claims;
Rule 23.1 serves a different purpose. The latter is protective of our corporate
model, under which directors, and not the stockholders, run the corporation. In
order to permit directors to focus on this task, and at the same time protect the
interest of the stockholders, Rule 23.1 requires stockholders who believe that
corporate litigation is beneficial to make a demand for such action on the board of
directors. Under our case law, the demand requirement under Rule 23(b)(1) is
13
See, e.g., In re Ebix, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2014 WL 3696655, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2014).
14
Id.10
excused only in limited circumstances where demand would be futile. As our
Supreme Court has previously explained:
Because directors are empowered to manage, or direct the
management of, the business and affairs of the corporation, the right
of a stockholder to prosecute a derivative suit is limited to situations
where the stockholder has demanded that the directors pursue the
corporate claim and they have wrongfully refused to do so or where
demand is excused because the directors are incapable of making an
impartial decision regarding such litigation.15
The test for demand futility was set forth in the seminal case of Aronson v. Lewis,
where our Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff who has not made a demand on the
board must plead allegations raising a reasonable doubt that ―(1) the directors are
disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.‖16 In order for demand to be
excused, Rule 23.1 requires the plaintiff to ―allege with particularity‖ the facts
justifying demand futility under one of these two prongs of Aronson.17
It is notable that the requirement to plead demand futility with particularity
precedes the plaintiff‘s ability to conduct discovery. This apparent dilemma for
stockholder plaintiffs is relieved in part by Section 220 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, which permits stockholders to obtain information in order to
properly plead a derivative case. This Court and our Supreme Court have regularly
15
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993) (citation omitted).
16
473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244(Del. 2000).
17
Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a).
11
cautioned stockholder plaintiffs of the dangers of moving forward with derivative
suits without first taking advantage of the informational tools available to them—
particularly Section 220—because absent particularized pleadings in satisfaction of
Rule 23.1, a proposed derivative claim will be dismissed.18
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III; Audit Committee members Garcia,
Jackson, and Colvin; Sanchez Resources and Eduardo Sanchez; and Altpoint have
separately moved to dismiss all counts of the Plaintiffs‘ Complaint. The
Defendants move to dismiss primarily on the basis that the Plaintiffs did not make
a demand that the Company bring this derivative litigation, have not adequately
pled that such a demand would have been futile and thus is excused, and therefore
lack standing to bring the derivative claims asserted in the Complaint. I address
those contentions below, concluding that the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately
18
See, e.g., Rales, 634 A.2d at 934 n.10 (―Although derivative plaintiffs may believe it is
difficult to meet the particularization requirement of Aronson because they are not entitled to
discovery to assist their compliance with Rule 23.1, they have many avenues available to obtain
information bearing on the subject of their claims. . . . [A] stockholder who has met the
procedural requirements and has shown a specific purpose may use the summary procedure
embodied in 8 Del. C. § 220 to investigate the possibility of corporate wrongdoing.‖ (citations
omitted)); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 504 (Del. Ch. 2003) (―At oral argument, the
plaintiffs also conceded that they had failed to seek [the corporation‘s] books and records under
8 Del. C. § 220. These books and records could have provided the basis for the pleading of
particularized facts—i.e. for the filing of a complaint that meets the legally required standards. . .
. They have thus ignored the repeated admonitions of the Delaware Supreme Court and this
court for derivative plaintiffs to proceed deliberately and to use the books and records device to
gather the materials necessary to prepare a solid complaint.‖).
12
plead demand futility and, accordingly, granting all Motions to Dismiss on that
basis.19
A. The Plaintiffs Have Failed to Adequately Plead Demand Futility Under
the First Prong of Aronson
The Plaintiffs here concede that all three members of the Audit Committee
were financially disinterested in the Transaction, and that Defendant Colvin was
independent as well.20 However, as noted above, the Plaintiffs contend that
Jackson and Garcia lacked independence from Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III when
evaluating the Transaction. To challenge a director‘s independence from an
interested party, a plaintiff ―must allege particularized facts manifesting ‗a
direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or
interests of the [person] doing the controlling.‘ The shorthand shibboleth of
‗dominated and controlled directors‘ is insufficient.‖21 In alleging that a director
lacked independence from a person with whom the director has had an ongoing
relationship, the nature of that relationship must be of a kind that would support a
reasonable inference that ―the non-interested director would be more willing to risk
his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director.‖22
19
Because I dismiss the Plaintiffs‘ claims under Rule 23.1, I need not reach the Defendants‘
Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
20
Oral Arg. Tr. 79:1–9.
21
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (citation omitted).
22
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004).
13
With respect to Jackson‘s independence, the Plaintiffs allege that ―Jackson is
a close friend of Sanchez Jr.,‖ and that the two ―have been close friends for more
than five decades.‖23 It is a fact of human nature that close personal relationships
can influence decisionmaking, even, in certain circumstances, at the expense of
moral and legal strictures such as fiduciary duties. As this Court has explained,
however, allegations of personal friendship that do not detail the extent of the
friendship are insufficient to support a reasonable inference that a director lacked
independence.24 Other than the allegation that Jackson donated $12,500 to
Sanchez Jr.‘s Texas gubernatorial campaign in 2002,25 the Complaint lacks any
description of the friendship between Jackson and Sanchez Jr.;26 I therefore cannot
reasonably infer that Jackson lacked independence on that basis.
In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that Jackson is an executive at IBC; that his
compensation from IBC is material to him; that Sanchez Jr. is one of nine directors
on the board of IBC‘s parent; and that Sanchez Jr. ―and his family are the largest
23
Compl. ¶ 75.
24
See Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 979 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004)
(―Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise to this level and the Court cannot make a
reasonable inference that a particular friendship does so without specific factual allegations to
support such a conclusion.‖).
25
Compl. ¶ 75.
26
At oral argument for the Defendants‘ Motions to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs attempted, for the first
time, to introduce a newspaper article purporting to detail the close friendship between Sanchez
Jr. and Jackson. See Oral Arg. Tr. 88:6–89:6. As the Plaintiffs did not include this article in the
pleadings or briefing, I find its submission untimely and do not consider it here.
14
stockholders of [the parent’s] common stock.‖27 From these facts the Plaintiffs
surmise that, if Jackson were to take action as a director of Sanchez Energy against
the interests of Sanchez Jr., Jackson would be subjected to ―the threat of
termination at IBC, the loss of promotion opportunities, and the loss or decrease of
his salary—his very livelihood—because of Sanchez Jr.‘s position on IBC‘s board
[sic] and significant influence through his substantial equity stake.‖28 The
insufficiency of these allegations rests on the Plaintiffs‘ failure to even attempt to
explain how one of nine directors on the board of a parent corporation, owning an
undefined equity interest in that company, could exert power to remove an
executive in a subsidiary corporation. Without specific allegations that Sanchez Jr.
controlled IBC—or could have otherwise exercised any ability to retaliatorily
remove Jackson from his executive position—Jackson‘s financial interest in
continued employment with IBC cannot provide an adequate basis to infer that
Jackson lacked independence from Sanchez Jr. For similar reasons, the Plaintiffs‘
general allegation that Jackson‘s director compensation from Sanchez Energy is
material to him does not cast doubt on Jackson‘s independence, as the Plaintiffs
conceded at oral argument that neither Sanchez Jr. nor Sanchez III could remove
any director from the Sanchez Energy board.29
27
Compl. ¶ 75.
28
See supra text accompanying note 10.
29
See Oral Arg. Tr. 89:24–90:5.
15
With respect to Garcia‘s independence, the Plaintiffs conceded at oral
argument that the personal ties between Garcia and the Sanchez family are even
weaker than the personal ties I have just rejected with respect to Jackson;30 instead,
the Plaintiffs focus on Garcia‘s ongoing and long-term business relationships with
the Sanchez family. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that Sandman, in which
Sanchez Jr. owns a 17% interest and in which other Sanchez family members own
a 52% interest, owns a minority position in Latin American Entertainment, LLC
and a preferred limited partnership stake in Hacienda Records, L.P., companies in
which Garcia holds a respective 39% and 48% interest. However, neither the
Plaintiffs‘ Complaint nor their briefing attempts to explain the significance of these
business relationships, and it is not apparent from the allegations in the Complaint
why Sanchez Jr.‘s minority interest in two companies in which Garcia owns a large
equity interest would cause Garcia to abandon his fiduciary duties to favor Sanchez
Jr. If the Plaintiffs mean to suggest that Garcia might be influenced by the
prospect of future investments with Sanchez Jr., that Garcia might be so grateful to
Sanchez Jr. for his investment that he would be willing to breach his fiduciary
duties, or that Sanchez Jr. controls Garcia‘s investments such that he could cause a
financial detriment, the Complaint alleges nothing to that effect; nor does the
30
See id. at 91:7–13 (―Mr. Garcia has known the Sanchezes, Mr. Sanchez‘s dad in particular,
we‘ve alleged for at least 30 years. Now, it‘s not the same kind of relationship as Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Garcia‘s relationship appears to have been more professional, more parallel investing in the
companies we‘ve identified.‖).
16
Complaint explain whether these investments are material to Garcia. Instead, in
briefing, the Plaintiffs merely make the conclusory statement that ―Plaintiffs have
alleged much more than isolated personal or professional relations; Plaintiffs have
alleged direct material financial relationships between Garcia and Sanchez Jr.‖31
As this Court has often explained, allegations of ―a mere outside business
relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a
director‘s independence.‖32 Because the Plaintiffs have not attempted to explain
how the alleged business relationships between Garcia and Sanchez Jr. could have
impacted Garcia‘s evaluation of the Transaction, I find that the Plaintiffs have
failed to adequately plead that Garcia lacked independence.33
B. The Plaintiffs Have Failed to Adequately Plead Demand Futility Under
the Second Prong of Aronson
The Plaintiffs also contend that, even if the Audit Committee was
disinterested and independent, demand should be excused as futile because the
Transaction was ―otherwise [not] the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment.‖34 In support of that contention, the Plaintiffs argue that (1) the Court
should evaluate the Transaction under the entire fairness standard, as Sanchez Jr.
31
Pls.‘ Answering Br. at 22–23.
32
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004).
33
The Plaintiffs likewise make a conclusory allegation that Garcia‘s compensation as a member
of the board of Sanchez Energy is material to him; I reject that argument for the reasons
explained above.
34
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
17
and Sanchez III should be treated as controlling stockholders, and (2) the
Transaction is so facially unfair that it could not possibly have been the product of
valid business judgment.
1. Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III Are Not Controlling Stockholders
Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III, as Sanchez Energy directors with significant
equity stakes in Sanchez Resources, concededly stand on both sides of the
Transaction in dispute. However, as I have found above, the Transaction was
approved by a disinterested, independent Audit Committee. The Plaintiffs
nevertheless contend that Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III are controlling stockholders.
According to the Plaintiffs, who cite in support a transcript ruling of this Court,35
because Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III exercised actual control over the operations of
the Company, the Court should review the terms of the Transaction for entire
fairness and excuse demand as futile. The Defendants challenge the Plaintiffs‘
contention that Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III are controlling stockholders, and,
35
See Montgomery v. Erickson Air-Crane, Inc., C.A. No. 8784-VCL, at 63:20–64:13 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 15, 2014) (TRANSCRIPT) (―[T]his is a case where a controlling stockholder stood on both
sides. Kahn v. Tremont teaches that when you have these controlling stockholder shuffle
situations, entire fairness, as in Kahn v. Lynch applies. There were no protective devices used
here. Although the independent directors constituted a majority of the Erickson board, they
weren‘t constituted as a separate committee. There wasn‘t a majority-of-the-minority vote or
even, here, a majority-of-the-independent-stockholders vote. Consequently, in the absence of
protective devices, this is, at least for pleadings purposes, a full entire fairness case. The second
prong of Aronson is the operative prong, and under that prong, demand is excused.‖); id. at 72:7–
14 (―Because the transaction involves a controller, entire fairness is the standard. Demand is
futile under the second prong of Aronson.‖).
18
distinguishing the transcript ruling relied upon by the Plaintiffs,36 suggest that,
even if those Defendants are controllers, where a decision is made by independent,
disinterested directors, application of entire fairness to a controlling stockholder
transaction does not obviate the need to plead demand futility. I need not reach the
latter question of law, however, because I find that the Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently pled that Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III are controlling stockholders.
A board‘s decision to enter into a transaction with a fiduciary is entitled to
the protection of the business judgment rule if that decision is made by
disinterested, independent directors.37 Where a fiduciary is a controlling
stockholder, however, she is ―required to demonstrate [her] utmost good faith and
the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain,‖38 unless the transaction is
conditioned ab initio on approval by both a disinterested, well-functioning
committee of directors and an informed majority of the minority stockholders.39
To establish that a defendant is a controlling stockholder ―[w]hen [that]
36
See Reply Br. of Defs. Gilbert A. Garcia, Alan G. Jackson and Greg Colvin in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss, at 27 n.22 (―Plaintiffs‘ appeal to the Court‘s transcript ruling in Montgomery v.
Erickson Air-Crane, Inc., . . . fails because the transaction at issue there involved a requirement
of stockholder approval (which was given by the controlling holder), and because the directors
employed neither a majority-of-independent-stockholders vote nor an approval by an
independent committee. The traditional rule, that either independent committee approval or
disinterested stockholder approval suffices to restore business judgment protection to a
transaction tainted by insider interest, was not implicated in Montgomery. It is implicated in this
case.‖ (citations omitted)).
37
See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (―Thus, if such director interest is present, and the transaction
is not approved by a majority consisting of the disinterested directors, then the business
judgment rule has no application whatever in determining demand futility.‖ (emphasis added)).
38
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
39
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014).
19
stockholder owns less than 50% of the corporation‘s outstanding stock, a plaintiff
must allege domination by a minority shareholder through actual control of
corporate conduct.‖40 This Court has previously explained that actual control of
corporate conduct means actual control over the corporation‘s board of directors in
the transaction at issue:
The bare conclusory allegation that a minority stockholder possessed
control is insufficient. Rather, the Complaint must contain well-pled
facts showing that the minority stockholder ―exercised actual
domination and control over . . . [the] directors.‖ That is, under our
law, a minority blockholder is not considered to be a controlling
stockholder unless it exercises ―such formidable voting and
managerial power that [it], as a practical matter, [is] no differently
situated than if [it] had majority voting control.‖ Accordingly, the
minority blockholder‘s power must be ―so potent that independent
directors . . . cannot freely exercise their judgment, fearing
retribution‖ from the controlling minority blockholder.41
This view—that minority stockholders are controllers only where they exercise
actual control over the board—was recently reaffirmed by Chancellor Bouchard in
In re KKR Financial Holdings LLC Shareholders Litigation42 and Vice Chancellor
40
In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 664 (Del. Ch. 2013) (quoting
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Grp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)).
41
Id. at 664–65 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Superior
Vision Servs., Inc. v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co, 2006 WL 2521426, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2006)
(―[T]he focus of the inquiry has been on the de facto power of a significant (but less than
majority) shareholder, which, when coupled with other factors, gives that shareholder the ability
to dominate the corporate decision-making process. The concern is that the significant
shareholder will use its power to obtain (or compel) favorable actions by the board to the
ultimate detriment of other shareholders.‖).
42
See C.A. No. 9210-CB, at 21–22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014) (concluding that the minority
stockholder, KKR, was not a controlling stockholder of the corporation, KFN, because
―[a]lthough [the] allegations demonstrate that KKR, through its affiliate, managed the day-to-day
operations of KFN, they do not support a reasonable inference that KKR controlled the KFN
20
Parsons in In re Crimson Exploration Inc. Stockholders Litigation.43 In Crimson
Exploration, Vice Chancellor Parsons helpfully conducted an extensive survey of
Court of Chancery cases—nine in all—that considered controller status for a
minority stockholder, with a focus on whether there is any correlation between the
size of the minority stockholder‘s equity stake and its categorization as a
controller.44 After considering the facts of these cases at length, Vice Chancellor
Parsons concluded that ―the cases do not reveal any sort of linear, sliding-scale
approach whereby a larger share percentage makes it substantially more likely that
the court will find the stockholder was a controlling stockholder;‖ rather, ―[t]hese
cases show that a large blockholder will not be considered a controlling
stockholder unless they actually control the board‘s decision about the challenged
transaction.‖45 Vice Chancellor Parsons‘s survey confirms that, although it may
take various forms, and thus the controller analysis is highly fact specific,46 actual
board control in the transaction at issue is undoubtedly the defining and necessary
feature of a minority controlling stockholder:
board—which is the operative question under Delaware law—such that the directors of KFN
could not freely exercise their judgment in determining whether or not to approve and
recommend to the stockholders a merger with KKR‖).
43
See C.A. No. 8541-VCP, at 39 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (―[T]o adequately plead that a non-
majority blockholder was a controlling stockholder, a plaintiff would have to allege facts to show
that the blockholder actually controlled the board‘s decision about the transaction at issue.‖).
44
Id. at 24–30.
45
Id. at 26, 29.
46
Id. at 26 (―[T]he scatter-plot nature of the holdings highlights the importance and fact-
intensive nature of the actual control factor.‖).
21
Lynch involved a controller who literally dominated the boardroom
and threatened a hostile takeover; Cysive involved managerial
dominance combined with an ability to muster up to 40% of the
common stock; and infoGROUP involved a potential 37%
stockholder, who was the founder and ousted CEO, but remained on
the board and allegedly dominated the other directors, who
―succumbed to [his] control after being cowed by his threats and
hostile, erratic behavior.‖ Absent a significant showing such as was
made in these prior cases, the courts have been reluctant to apply the
label of controlling stockholder—potentially triggering fiduciary
duties—to large, but minority, blockholders.47
The Plaintiffs submit that the Complaint pleads sufficient facts to support an
inference that, despite their collective 21.5% equity interest in the Company,
Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III together exercise actual control over the operations of
Sanchez Energy, and exercised actual control over the terms of the Transaction.48
In support of that contention, the Plaintiffs allege that ―Sanchez Energy is a shell
47
Id. at 29–30 (referencing Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), In re
Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003), and N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v.
infoGROUP, Inc., 2011 WL 4825888 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2011), all cases where this Court or the
Supreme Court found that a minority stockholder was nonetheless a controlling stockholder in
the transaction).
48
As a preliminary matter, I note that in briefing the Plaintiffs attempt, without elaboration, to
cast Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III as a singular entity for the sake of the controlling stockholder
analysis, arguing that ―the Sanchez family exercises actual control over every aspect of Sanchez
Energy‘s business and operations, including the Transaction, and thus entire fairness applies,
thereby excusing demand.‖ Pls.‘ Answering Br. at 27 (emphasis added). Under our case law,
―in appropriate circumstances, multiple stockholders together can constitute a control group,
with each of its members being subject to the fiduciary duties of a controller.‖ In re Crimson
Exploration, C.A. No. 8541-VCP, at 37. In order for the court to aggregate individual
stockholders into a single control group, however, ―[t]he alleged members of [the] control group
. . . must be ‗connected in some legally significant way‘—such as ‗by contract, common
ownership, agreement, or other arrangement—to work together toward a shared goal.‘‖ Id.(quoting Dubroff v. Wren Hldgs., LLC, 2009 WL 1478697, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2009)). I
assume, for purposes of these Motions to Dismiss only, that Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III should
be viewed as a singular entity.
22
company established by the Sanchez family in 2011 to take advantage of public
funding‖ and that ―[t]he Company has no employees and no directly managed
operations;‖49 that ―[d]espite ostensibly giving up voting control of the Company
to the public, the Sanchez family retained an equity stake in the Company and firm
control over operations and the Board following the IPO;‖50 that Sanchez III ―has
served as President and CEO of Sanchez Energy and as a member of the Board
since the Company‘s formation in August 2011;‖ that Sanchez III ―is also the
President or Managing Director of several privately-held affiliates of Sanchez
Energy, including SOG,‖ and, as such, ―Sanchez III manages all aspects of [the
affiliates‘] daily operations, including exploration, production, engineering and
land management;‖51 and that SOG provides management services to Sanchez
Energy and is located in the same office complex as Sanchez Energy.52 In
addition, the Plaintiffs cite an Internet ―analyst report‖ stating that:
In my opinion, Sanchez Energy Corporation for all practical purposes
appears to be a complex private financial arrangement by which A. R.
Sanchez Jr. is handing over the reins of Sanchez Oil & Gas to his son,
A. R. Sanchez, III. I see no value to public shareholders at this time. 53
These allegations do not support a reasonable inference that Sanchez Jr. and
Sanchez III, individually or in the aggregate, are controlling stockholders, as they
49
Compl. ¶ 2.
50
Id. ¶ 33.
51
Id. ¶ 21.
52
Id. ¶¶ 31, 36.
53
Id. ¶ 37 (quoting Jack Holland, Sanchez Energy: When an IPO Isn’t, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 6,
2012, 4:20 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/317985-sanchez-energy-when-an-ipo-isnt).
23
fail to support a reasonable inference that those Defendants actually controlled the
Company‘s board in the Transaction. The Complaint indicates that Sanchez Jr.
and Sanchez III own at most a combined 21.5% stake of Sanchez Energy, and that
Sanchez III, as the Company‘s CEO, has the authority to direct the management of
the Company. The Complaint does not suggest, however, that Sanchez III
exercises greater control than that typical of a CEO, that he dominates or controls
the board, or that he has even attempted to dominate the board through threats,
bullying, or the like; instead, the allegations of the Complaint are insufficient to
demonstrate that Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III possess ―as a practical matter . . . a
combination of stock voting power and managerial authority that enable[d] [them]
to control the corporation, if [they] so wishe[d].‖54 Rather, the assertion that
Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III should be treated as a control group is diminished by
the Plaintiffs‘ admission at oral argument that those directors could not exert
power to remove a dissenting director.55 The Complaint alleges that the Sanchez
family has managerial control, but not board control, of Sanchez Energy; in fact,
nearly 80% of the voting control of the Company is in the hands of independent
stockholders, according to the Complaint.
54
In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 666 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing In re
Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
55
Oral Arg. Tr. 89:24–90:5.
24
In addition, the Plaintiffs‘ suggestion in briefing that Sanchez III controlled
negotiations with Sanchez Resources and Altpoint does not appear in the
Complaint, which alleges no details about the Transaction‘s process, other than to
concede that the Audit Committee obtained a fairness opinion and to recite
Sanchez III‘s brief description of the Transaction, after it was announced, on an
August 8, 2013 Sanchez Energy earnings call. On that call, the Complaint relays,
Sanchez III stated:
The bulk of what ended up being the ultimate purchase price was
negotiated between us and the private equity group [Altpoint] that I
have previously mentioned. This was a process that took a couple of
months as you can imagine we had different views and what it should
transact at. We ultimately got to a purchase price of $61 million with
them so two-thirds of the answer which is two-third of the purchase
price is a function of negotiated price that we agreed to, basically to
take them out of this position.56
The Plaintiffs highlight this statement as an admission that Sanchez III controlled
the negotiation process and strong-armed the deal past the Audit Committee, but
that is not a reasonable interpretation. While the Plaintiffs suggest that Sanchez
III‘s references to ―us‖ and ―we‖ refer to his personal participation in the
negotiation process, as opposed to that of the Company, they simply do not.
Rather, based on the bare allegations of the Complaint, I have no basis to know to
what extent anyone—including Sanchez Jr., Sanchez III, or the Audit Committee
members—participated in the negotiation process. The Plaintiffs chose not to file
56
Compl. ¶ 55. This quotation from the Complaint appears in its unedited form.
25
a Section 220 demand to uncover documents relating to the negotiation process,
and under Rule 23.1 they are not entitled to the inference, based on no alleged
facts, that Sanchez III directed the terms of the agreement with Sanchez Resources
and Altpoint.
Because I cannot reasonably infer from the allegations of the Complaint that
Sanchez Jr. and Sanchez III, individually or in the aggregate, are controlling
stockholders, and because the Transaction was approved by disinterested,
independent directors, the Plaintiffs‘ contention that the operative standard of
review is entire fairness must be rejected.
2. The Transaction Is Not Clearly Unfair
In addition, the Plaintiffs contend that the Transaction is so facially unfair
that it could not possibly have been the product of a valid business judgment. The
Plaintiffs face a steep uphill battle with this argument. As our Court has repeatedly
emphasized, ―The second prong of Aronson is, for plaintiffs challenging board
actions, something of a last resort that, in extreme circumstances, provides the
court with the basis to review a transaction despite the appearance of otherwise
independent and disinterested fiduciaries.‖57 Recognizing that ―substantive
57
Protas v. Cavanagh, 2012 WL 1580969, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2012); see also Kahn v.
Tremont Corp., 1994 WL 162613, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1994) (―The second prong of Aronson
is, I suppose, directed to extreme cases in which despite the appearance of independence and
disinterest a decision is so extreme or curious as to itself raise a legitimate ground to justify
further inquiry and judicial review.‖).
26
second-guessing of the merits of a business decision . . . is precisely the kind of
inquiry that the business judgment rule prohibits,‖58 a plaintiff who challenges the
substance of the transaction under the second prong of Aronson59 must plead
particularized facts so egregious that they raise a reasonable doubt that the
transaction was a course of action ―taken honestly and in good faith.‖60 This Court
has frequently likened this burden to pleading ―facts amounting to corporate
waste,‖61 where the standard is ―whether what the corporation has received is so
inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would
deem it worth what the corporation has paid.‖62 Though I am required to apply a
standard similar to waste, it is important to note that the Plaintiffs have not actually
58
In re Dow Chemical Co. Derivative Litig., 2010 WL 66769, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010).
59
This as opposed to a plaintiff who challenges whether the directors were adequately informed
in their decisionmaking, which is also available under the second prong of Aronson and is
measured by a standard of gross negligence. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del.
2000) (―Pre-suit demand will be excused in a derivative suit only if . . . the particularized facts in
the complaint create a reasonable doubt that the informational component of the directors‘
decisionmaking process, measured by standards of gross negligence, included consideration of
all material information reasonably available.‖). Having failed to make a demand under Section
220, the Plaintiffs have no basis to make such an accusation here.
60
Protas, 2012 WL 1580969, at *9; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d
275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003) (―Thus, plaintiffs must plead particularized facts sufficient to raise (1) a
reason to doubt that the action was taken honestly and in good faith or (2) a reason to doubt the
board was adequately informed in making the decision.‖).
61
Protas, 2012 WL 1580969, at *9; see also Bakerman v. Sidney Frank Importing Co., 2006 WL
3927242, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2006) (―The burden is on the party challenging the decision to
establish facts rebutting the [business judgment rule] presumption; typically such showing of
facts must be tantamount to corporate waste to satisfy the second prong of the demand futility
analysis.‖ (citations omitted)); Kahn v. Tremont, 1994 WL 162613, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21,
1994) (―The test for this second [prong of Aronson] is thus necessarily high, similar to the legal
test for waste.‖).
62
E.g., Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 486 (Del. Ch. 1962).
27
alleged waste, and in fact cannot because this was a value-for-value transaction.63
Nonetheless, in briefing, the Plaintiffs argue that they easily clear the high hurdle
embodied in the second prong of Aronson:
[D]emand is also excused under the second prong of Aronson because
the Complaint‘s particularized allegations give rise to claims that the
Defendants acted disloyally by causing the Company to acquire assets
from the Sanchez family at a staggeringly unfair price, following an
unfair process, and then brazenly lied to their own stockholders by
failing to disclose the Sanchez family‘s full financial interest in the
Transaction.64
The Plaintiffs point to four factors in support of their contention. First, the
Plaintiffs suggest that ―Sanchez Energy paid a staggering 17 times the market price
to acquire undeveloped properties from Sanchez Resources.‖65 The Plaintiffs
argue that I can reasonably infer from the Complaint that the terms of the deal were
grossly unfair based on the allegation that Sanchez Energy purchased its working
interests for roughly $2,500 per acre, considering Sanchez Resources paid only
$184 per acre for those same interests several years prior. The Plaintiffs fail to
acknowledge, however, that of the total 80,000 acres purchased for $184 per acre,
40,000 acres are now developed and contain proven oil reserves. Without an
63
See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (―Most often the claim [of
waste] is associated with a transfer of corporate assets that serves no corporate purpose; or for
which no consideration at all is received. Such a transfer is in effect a gift. If, however, there is
any substantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith judgment
that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even
if the fact finder would conclude ex post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.‖).
64
Pls.‘ Answering Br. at 30.
65
Id. at 1.
28
explanation of the level of risk, as well as market conditions, reflected in the
original purchase price, compared to that reflected in the Transaction price, I have
no basis to infer that the consideration paid in the Transaction was grossly unfair.66
Second, the Plaintiffs point to a third-party transaction in the TMS in which
working interests were recently purchased for significantly less than the
consideration paid in the Transaction. The Plaintiffs allege that:
In August 2013, Goodrich Petroleum Corp. (―Goodrich‖), the largest
acreage owner in the TMS, acquired a 172,000 acre working interest
in the TMS from Devon Energy. According to the November 10,
2013, WSJ article, Goodrich paid only $144 per acre for working
interests in land virtually next door to the Sanchez Energy [acreage].
Thus, Sanchez Energy agreed to pay roughly 17 times more per
similarly situated acre to Sanchez Resources than Goodrich did in a
true third party deal.67
As is evident from those allegations, the Plaintiffs do not describe the Goodrich
transaction with details that could provide a basis to infer that the transaction was
in fact comparable to the Transaction at issue here. The Complaint lacks sufficient
information about the nature, quality, and duration of the Goodrich working
interests to allow a meaningful comparison to those acquired by Sanchez Energy.
Third, the Plaintiffs explain that, when the working interests on 40,000 acres
of undeveloped land were transferred to Altpoint, Altpoint agreed to an increased
66
I assume that mineral leases of land without developable resources turn out to be virtually
worthless, and that mineral leases of land with developable resources have value based on the
value of the resources to be obtained; the Complaint provides no basis to infer the value of the
leases on the developed acreage.
67
Compl. ¶ 52.
29
royalty payment. While prior leases required a payment of between 12% and 16%
in royalties to landowners, the parties at that time increased those royalties to 25%,
with the overage due to Sanchez Resources; when Altpoint transferred those
interests to Sanchez Energy, Sanchez Energy assumed the increased royalty
obligations. While the Defendants suggest that the increased royalty payments are
simply a way the parties agreed to structure the consideration paid in the
Transaction, the Plaintiffs argue that the Company‘s Form 8-K describing the
Transaction ―omitted exhibits to the Purchase Agreement containing references to
the 25% royalty payments,‖68 demonstrating, according to the Plaintiffs, that the
Defendants intended to hide the royalty payments from the stockholders, and that
the directors who approved those payments acted in bad faith. Despite the
Plaintiffs‘ suggestion of a nefarious motive on the part of the Defendants in
obscuring the full consideration paid in the Transaction by increasing royalty
payments owed to Sanchez Resources, the allegations of the Complaint provide no
basis to infer such a motive on the part of the otherwise independent, disinterested
directors who approved the Transaction.
Finally, the Plaintiffs point to statements made by Sanchez III on an earnings
call indicating that the price Sanchez Energy paid in the Transaction ―was not
purely a function of the market value of the subject acreage in an arm‘s-length
68
Pls.‘ Answering Br. at 16.
30
negotiation, but was based primarily on the price it would take to ‗take [Altpoint]
out‘ of their stake in Sanchez Resources.‖69 The Plaintiffs therefore argue that
―buying out Altpoint Capital from its investments in Sanchez Resources may have
been a priority for the Sanchez family, but was not a legitimate business objective
for Sanchez Energy.‖70 That Sanchez III acknowledged Altpoint would not agree
to transfer its stake in the working interests unless it could be bought out at a
certain price does not demonstrate bad faith, but rather a realistic assessment of the
goals of the negotiating parties.
C. The Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Dismissed
As noted above, the Plaintiffs‘ Complaint asserts counts for breach of
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.
These claims belong to the Company, and because the Plaintiffs have failed to
bring a demand on the Company or adequately plead demand futility, the claims
must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The stockholder Plaintiffs seek to litigate alleged breaches of fiduciary duty
involving a deal between the Company and Sanchez Resources, but they failed to
make a demand on the Company‘s board. In order to excuse this failure, they point
to friendships and business interests between the disinterested directors and the
69
Id. at 32 n.14 (emphasis omitted).
70
Id.
31
Sanchez family, but without the specificity needed to imply control. The Plaintiffs
allege that the Sanchez family, owners of about one-fifth of the Company stock,
controls the board of directors, but fail to allege facts to demonstrate that as well.
Finally, the Plaintiffs point to what they contend is the one-sided nature of the
transaction itself, but attempt to demonstrate this by comparing the price of
working interests in land without developed oil resources to the price of working
interests in land subject to this deal, half of which has proven reserves. Because
the Complaint fails to specifically plead facts excusing demand, it fails to satisfy
Rule 23.1. For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants‘ Motions to Dismiss are
GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
32