Hologram, Inc. v. Gregory Caplan ( 2021 )


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  •       IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    HOLOGRAM, INC.                           )
    )
    Plaintiff,                  )
    )
    v.                                )   C.A. No. 2021-0736-KSJM
    )
    GREGORY CAPLAN,                          )
    )
    Defendant.                  )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: December 10, 2021
    Date Decided: December 14, 2021
    Michael A. Barlow, ABRAMS & BAYLISS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael C. Tu,
    Peter J. Brody, COOLEY LLP, Santa Monica, California; Counsel for Plaintiff.
    Peter B. Ladig, Justin C. Barrett, BAYARD, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Kenneth S.
    Ulrich, W. Kyle Walther, GOLDBERG KOHN LTD., Chicago, Illinois; Counsel for
    Defendant.
    McCORMICK, C.
    Plaintiff Hologram, Inc. (“Hologram” or the “Company”) has moved for a
    preliminary injunction to prevent defendant Gregory Caplan from pursuing arbitration
    against the Company. This decision grants the motion.
    I.       FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    The facts are drawn from Caplan’s Answer,1 the Original2 and Supplemental3
    Declarations of Michael Barlow, the Declaration of Justin Barrett,4 and the exhibits
    submitted with the declarations.
    In the summer of 2013, Ben Forgan returned to Chicago after living in Australia.
    He was looking to start a business and reached out to Caplan, who he knew from high
    school.5 At the time, Caplan had a vision for a company that would “provide mobile
    connectivity to hardware developers that wanted to tap into the internet of things who were
    struggling to do that in a simply turnkey way.”6
    Forgan and Caplan met at a coffee shop.7 Caplan discussed his idea and the two
    began collaborating after the meeting.8 Caplan recalls that the parties contemplated terms
    1
    See C.A. No. 2021-0736-KSJM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 14 (“Answer”).
    2
    Dkt. 28, Decl. of Michael A. Barlow (“Barlow Decl.”).
    3
    Dkt. 33, Supp. Decl. of Michael A. Barlow (“Barlow Supp. Decl.”).
    4
    Dkt. 31, Decl. of Justin C. Barrett (“Barrett Decl.”).
    5
    Barrett Decl. Ex. 1, Tr. of the Dep. of B. Forgan taken on Oct. 15, 2021 (“Forgan Dep.
    Tr.”) at 53:23–54:5, 51:13–17.
    6
    Barrett Decl. Ex. 2, Tr. of the Dep. of G. Caplan taken on Oct. 12, 2021 (“Caplan Dep.
    Tr.”) at 40:15–18.
    7
    Forgan Dep. Tr. at 56:14–57:2.
    8
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 65:22–66:16.
    1
    of their collaboration—that Forgan would own 90% and would serve as the company’s
    President and CEO and that Caplan would own 10% in exchange for his ideas and
    connections.9
    Forgan incorporated Konect Inc., which he later renamed Hologram, on October 21,
    2013.10 Two days later, on October 23, 2013, Forgan emailed Caplan three documents,
    including a proposed “Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement of Konekt Inc.” (the
    “RSPA”).11
    The RSPA contemplated that Caplan would pay the Company $800 in cash for
    800,000 shares over a four-year vesting period and would contribute any “intellectual
    property” he possessed “related to the company’s business” to the entity.12
    The RSPA defined the required means of acceptance, stating that any sale of shares
    must “occur at the principal office of the Company simultaneously with the execution and
    delivery of [the] Agreement by the parties and the payment of the total purchase price.”13
    Forgan’s cover email transmitting the RSPA stated:
    Hey man – I need your signature on the file titled “caplan
    signature pages”.
    These signatures are required for the Initial Stockholder
    Agreement, the restricted stock purchase agreement, and the
    indemnification agreement.       I will also provide a
    9
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 64:12–22.
    10
    See generally Forgan Dep. Tr. at 12:1–6.
    11
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 3 (“Oct. 23, 2013 email”) at GCAPLAN000088.
    12
    Id.; Barlow Decl. Ex. 4 (“RSPA”) §§ 1, 3.
    13
    RSPA § 2 (emphasis added).
    2
    consultant/advisor agreement for your signature within the
    next 2 days.
    You will also need to provide a check for $800 for the initial
    purchase of the shares (next week), which I can refund to you
    immediately following deposit [sic] the Konekt Inc. account.
    Let me know [sic] you have questions on these, happy to hop
    on a call to discuss.14
    In a one-sentence reply, sent just minutes after Forgan transmitted the offer, Caplan
    wrote: “We need to change these to non-vesting.”15 During his deposition, Caplan testified
    that, by sending this email, he believed that he was rejecting Forgan’s offer.16 Caplan
    contends that his response constituted a counteroffer.17
    Forgan replied to Caplan’s email, writing: “true, let me take care of that and get
    back to you,” to which Caplan emailed: “Thanks.”18 Caplan testified that he understood
    Forgan’s statement to mean that another draft of the documents was forthcoming.19
    14
    Oct. 23, 2013 email at GCAPLAN000088.
    15
    Id.
    16
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 108:2–5 (“Q: So when you responded, ‘We need to change these to
    non-vesting,’ were you in your mind rejecting the offer that was being made by Mr.
    Forgan? A: Yes”).
    17
    Id. at 108:8–12 (“Q: And did you understand that your response, ‘We need to change
    these to non-vesting,’ that that was indeed a counteroffer to the offer that you had just
    rejected? A: Yes.”) (objection omitted).
    18
    Oct. 23, 2013 email at GCAPLAN000088.
    19
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 110:5–8 (“Q: So from that response, did you understand that Mr.
    Forgan planned to send you a revised draft of these documents for your signature? A: That
    was my expectation.”).
    3
    On October 24, 2013, Forgan reached out to counsel to discuss a change to the
    RSPA.20 On October 30, 2013, Forgan emailed his attorney about “timing” for new
    documents.21 Forgan never sent corrected documents to Caplan.22
    Caplan admits that did not take any steps to pay and has never paid for his shares,23
    never signed any of the documents,24 and never met at the Company’s office to sign the
    RSPA.25 It is further undisputed that the Company never issued nor delivered stock to
    Caplan.26 And Caplan never appeared on the Company’s capitalization table.27
    In November 2013, however, Forgan sent an email suggesting that he and Caplan
    owned common stock of the Company. Caplan has seized on that email in this litigation
    to support his position that he in fact owns common stock of the Company. The email was
    to Sam Pessin and David Meis, who had offered to invest in the Company.28 Pessin and
    20
    Barrett Decl. Ex. 4 (Privilege Log) at CTRL_1.
    21
    Id. at CTRL_314.
    22
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 115:19–116:11.
    23
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 5 (Caplan RFA Resp. No. 6) (admitting that Caplan has never paid any
    cash for his shares); Answer ¶ 34 (“Caplan did not pay $0.000125 per share [for] his stake
    in the Company”).
    24
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 5 (Caplan RFA Resp. Nos. 3–5) (admitting that Caplan did not sign
    the Proposed RSPA or “any other agreement or contract with the Company regarding his
    equity interest in the Company”).
    25
    Answer ¶ 34 (admitting that “the parties never met at the Company’s office to execute
    the RSPA”); Caplan Dep. Tr. at 125:3–17.
    26
    Answer ¶ 34 (admitting that “the Company never delivered to Caplan certificates of his
    shares in the Company”).
    27
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 18 (pre- and post-Series A capitalization tables, which do not list any
    interest by Caplan).
    28
    Barlow Supp. Decl. Ex. 23.
    4
    Meis were close friends of Caplan, which Forgan knew.29 While discussing the investment,
    Meis asked Forgan, “what type of shares do you and [Caplan] hold? . . . Common?” 30
    Forgan responded “yes we hold common shares.”31 At his deposition, Forgan explained
    that he and Caplan “were in the process of attempting to sort out terms that would be
    mutually agreeable,” that the email “should not be construed to mean that there was an
    agreement by which [they] actually both held shares at that point in time, and that he
    “misspoke” and “should have qualified that [statement] more[,] potentially.”32 Forgan’s
    testimony comports with the rest of the evidence.
    In late 2013 or early 2014, Forgan told Caplan that he needed to change the 90/10
    split. Forgan told Caplan that it was not traditional for the market and that he “had been
    receiving feedback from potential investors that it was inappropriate.”33 Forgan offered
    Caplan 2.5% of the Company.34 Caplan declined.35
    On January 25, 2014, Forgan sent an email to Caplan on the Company’s behalf,
    stating that “the company has not yet received fully-executed copies of the stock purchase
    agreements that I sent you in October (or a check for the purchase of that stock).”36 He
    29
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 185:23–186:17.
    30
    Barlow Supp. Decl. Ex. 23.
    31
    Id.
    32
    Forgan Dep. Tr. at 213:12–214:16.
    33
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 77:15–78:6; Forgan Dep. Tr. at 187:19–22.
    34
    Forgan Dep. Tr. at 186:1–4.
    35
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 77:15–78:6.
    36
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 6 (Jan. 25, 2014 email).
    5
    informed Caplan that “the company is taking the position that you have rejected the offer
    detailed in those documents,” and, accordingly, “[a]ll offers for the purchase of common
    stock or preferred stock, whether oral or written, that I made to you at any time on the
    company’s behalf are withdrawn.”37
    Caplan testified that, around the same time, he hired counsel in a “hope to finalize
    the contract that we had in a more built-out fashion.”38 Negotiations continued for a time
    but finally ended in April 2014. The Company wrote to Caplan’s on April 23, 2014 that
    “Mr. Caplan never signed any agreements, Mr. Caplan never purchased or paid for any
    shares, and there was clearly never any meeting of the minds or binding agreement with
    respect to the issuance of shares to Mr. Caplan.”39
    Caplan then disappeared for nearly eight years. Other than a single text message to
    Forgan sent in May 2021, he had no further communications with the Company regarding
    his claimed ownership interest until August 2021.40
    Meanwhile, Hologram grew in the intervening years. Recently, the Company raised
    a $65 million Series B investment from a prominent private equity firm.41
    37
    Id.; see also Caplan Dep. Tr. at 206:4–17 (admitting that Forgan’s statements of fact
    were correct).
    38
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 207:18–23.
    39
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 7 (Apr. 23, 2014 letter between counsel).
    40
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 5 (Caplan RFA Resp. No. 8); Caplan Dep. Tr. at 222:23–223:2; Barlow
    Decl. Ex. 8 (May 2021 text message from Caplan to Forgan saying “[h]eard things are
    going well – do I need to file paperwork or should we work something out?”).
    41
    Forgan Dep. Tr. at 221:20–22.
    6
    On August 4, 2021, just days before the Company publicly announced its successful
    Series B funding round, Caplan commenced a private arbitration against the Company by
    filing a demand with ADR Systems in Illinois.42
    In the arbitration, Caplan claims that an agreement was formed when Forgan
    responded to Caplan’s October 23, 2013 email, that this alleged agreement is comprised of
    all the terms of the RSPA except the vesting provision that Caplan rejected, and that,
    pursuant to the purported agreement, the Company is required to arbitrate Caplan’s claim.43
    The RSPA contains mandatory Delaware choice of law and choice of forum provisions.44
    The applicable limitations period under Delaware law would likely bar Caplan’s claims.
    The arbitration seems like a bid to avoid that outcome.45
    42
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 9 (Arbitration Demand).
    43
    The RSPA contains both an arbitration clause and a choice of forum provision providing
    that all litigation related to the contract will take place in Delaware state or federal court.
    See RSPA §§ 9(a), (k).
    44
    RSPA § 9(a).
    45
    Caplan also alleged for the first time at his deposition in this litigation held on October
    12, 2021 that he believed he had an “oral contract,” with Forgan based on a conversation
    he may have had sometime during the “late spring” or “summer of 2013.” Caplan Dep.
    Tr. at 38:8–39:8 98:17–99:7, 99:20–100:9. Caplan could not remember many details of
    that conversation or that purported oral contract, the existence of which was not alleged in
    either his arbitration demand or any of his written discovery responses in this case. Id. at
    63:4–65:1; see also Barlow Decl. Ex. 9 (Arbitration Demand); Barlow Decl. Ex. 10
    (Interrog. Resp. No. 1) (“Caplan states that the Contract between him and the company
    consists of the [Proposed] Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement (‘RSPA’) and the email
    sent to Caplan by Forgan, on behalf of the Company, on or about October 23, 2013.”). At
    oral argument, Caplan’s counsel clarified that Caplan is not claiming the existence of an
    oral contract and is only relying on the RSPA and the October 23, 2013 email exchange as
    evidence of an agreement. In any event, the relevant statutes of limitations for oral
    contracts under both Delaware and Illinois law expired long ago. See 10 Del. C. § 8106
    (three years); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-205 (five years).
    7
    In response to the arbitration, Hologram initiated this action seeking a declaration
    that Caplan’s arbitration is improper because Hologram never agreed to arbitrate Caplan’s
    claims against it.46
    Hologram filed a motion for a preliminary injunction contemporaneously with the
    filing of its complaint to prevent Caplan from continuing to prosecute the Illinois
    arbitration. The parties agreed to stay arbitration until the earlier of the resolution of that
    motion or thirty days after the hearing that the court held on December 10, 2021.47
    II.      LEGAL ANALYSIS
    Hologram has moved for a preliminary injunction based on its claim that Hologram
    never agreed to arbitrate the claims pending in the Illinois arbitration. “To obtain a
    preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) a reasonable probability of success
    on the merits; (ii) that they will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is not granted; and
    (iii) that the balance of the equities favors the issuance of an injunction.”48 The Company
    has met each of these elements.
    46
    See Dkt. 1, Verified Compl. for Prelim. and Permanent Inj. and Declaratory J. The
    Complaint seeks declaratory judgments on additional issues as well. Hologram seeks a
    declaratory judgment that Caplan’s claim—which he brought nearly eight years after being
    informed of the Company’s position that no contract exists and that Caplan has no right to
    purchase shares in Hologram—is barred by Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations or,
    in the alternative, the doctrine of laches. Hologram also seeks a declaratory judgment on
    the alternative claim advanced in Caplan’s demand—that the parties’ October 23, 2013
    correspondence constitutes an agreement to continue negotiating in good faith. Those
    claims are not before the court on Hologram’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
    47
    Dkt. 12.
    48
    Mountain W. Series of Lockton Cos. v. Alliant Ins. Servs., Inc., 
    2019 WL 2536104
    , at *9
    (Del. Ch. June 20, 2019); see also Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 
    844 A.2d 1022
    , 1090 (Del.
    8
    A.     Hologram Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits.
    Hologram is likely to succeed in proving that Hologram never agreed to arbitrate
    the claims at issue in the Illinois arbitration.
    Under Delaware law, “a valid contract exists when (1) the parties intended that the
    contract would bind them, (2) the terms of the contract are sufficiently definite, and (3) the
    parties exchange legal consideration.”49 “[A]ll essential or material terms must be agreed
    upon,” and the parties must each overtly manifest their intent to be bound by the agreed
    terms.50 Where one party seeks to compel another to arbitrate, it falls to that party to
    establish that any agreement between the parties contained an enforceable arbitration
    clause.51
    Caplan claims that the RSPA, minus the vesting provision, combined with Forgan’s
    “true. Let me . . . get back to you” email of October 23, 2013, constitute a binding
    agreement that includes a mandatory arbitration provision.52 This claim is likely to fail for
    a number of reasons.
    Ch. 2004) (weighing likelihood of success “even more heavily” where the “merits
    determination is, for all practical purposes, akin to a final ruling”).
    49
    Osborn v. Kemp, 
    991 A.2d 1153
    , 1158 (Del. 2010).
    50
    Eagle Force Hldgs., LLC v. Campbell, 
    187 A.3d 1209
    , 1229–30 (Del. 2018) (“Under
    Delaware law, overt manifestation of assent—not subjective intent—controls the formation
    of a contract.” (quotation marks omitted)).
    51
    See, e.g., State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 
    2006 WL 4782248
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12,
    2006) (“Delaware law and federal law recognize that ‘arbitration is a matter of contract
    and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed
    so to submit.’”) (citations omitted).
    52
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 10 (Interrog. Resp. No. 1); Barlow Decl. Ex. 9 (Arbitration Demand).
    9
    First, Caplan never accepted the terms of the RSPA as drafted. Caplan understood
    that he needed to sign the RSPA to “acknowledge [his] acceptance of the deal,”53 but he
    did not do so. Instead, Caplan sent a short email saying that the RSPA needs to be non-
    vesting.54 He understood that the terms of vesting were a material and “important”
    component of the offer.55 He viewed his response as a counteroffer.56 If Caplan’s email
    was in fact a counteroffer,57 then it constituted a rejection of Hologram’s offer and
    terminated Caplan’s right to accept Hologram’s offer later.58
    53
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 102:10–16.
    54
    
    Id.
     108:2–12 (“Q: So when you responded, ‘We need to change these to non-vesting,’
    were you in your mind rejecting the offer that was being made by Mr. Forgan? A: Yes, I
    was countering with a new offer, which was the same as that offer with that change based
    on what I believed it was. That was my action. Q: And did you understand that your
    response, ‘We need to change these to non-vesting,’ that that was indeed a counteroffer to
    the offer that you had just rejected? A: Yes, I did.”); see also Forgan Dep. Tr. at 182:11
    (Forgan testifying that “Greg rejected the initial offer”).
    55
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 106:12–14 (“Q: Was having shares without a vesting condition
    important to you? A: Yes.”); 
    id.
     at 118:21–23 (“Q: You considered the vesting provision
    to be important; is that a fair statement? A: Yes.”); see also CertiSign Hldg., Inc. v.
    Kulikovsky, 
    2018 WL 2938311
    , at *19 n.209 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2018) (in stock option
    context, “vesting” is a “material term”).
    56
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 102:20–21 (“A: I countered the offer with a new offered [sic] based
    on the terms that we had previously agreed to.”); 
    id.
     108:5–12 (“A: Yes, I was countering
    with a new offer, which was the same as that offer with that change based on what I
    believed it was. That was my action. Q: And did you understand that your response, ‘We
    need to change these to non-vesting,’ that that was indeed a counteroffer to the offer that
    you had just rejected? A: Yes, I did.”).
    57
    It is difficult to conclude that Caplan’s email contained sufficiently definite terms so as
    to constitute a counteroffer. Caplan did not propose terms, other than on the issue of
    vesting. Caplan Dep. Tr. at 109:1–23. Nor did he express that he would sign the RSPA or
    either of the other contracts if the vesting provision were removed. 
    Id.
     at 109:1–23.
    58
    Sandcastle Realty, Inc. v. Castagna, 
    2006 WL 2521437
    , at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2006)
    (holding that under Delaware law “a response to an offer that is not on the terms set forth
    10
    Second, Delaware law requires a meeting of the minds for contract formation.59 So,
    Forgan needed to accept the counteroffer for the parties to have formed a contract.
    Forgan’s reply does not evidence acceptance. Although Forgan responded “true,” he
    followed that with the statement that he would “get back to” Caplan. Under any reasonable
    reading, Forgan was indicating that another draft of the agreement would be necessary and
    forthcoming. Caplan understood as much.60 He knew that their dealings were incomplete
    and “believed that there would be further follow-up.”61 Courts confronted with such a
    situation—where a party promised to “get back to” the other with contract language—have
    consistently concluded that while the parties’ correspondence might show assent to a
    particular term, such statements do not manifest mutual consent to contract.62
    by the offeror constitutes a rejection of the original offer and a counter-offer. . . . Because
    it stated new terms not in the [original] offer, [the] response was a counter-offer and [] a
    rejection”).
    59
    See, e.g., Skinner v. Peninsula Healthcare Servs., LLC, 
    2021 WL 778324
    , at *3 (Del.
    Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Under Delaware law, contract formation requires mutual assent,
    meaning a complete meeting of the minds of the parties.”).
    60
    Caplan Dep. Tr. at 110:1–8 (“Q: So then Mr. Forgan responds to your email saying,
    ‘True, let me take care of that and get back to you.’ Do you see that? A: Yes, I do. Q: So
    from that response, did you understand that Mr. Forgan planned to send you a revised draft
    of these documents for your signature? A: That was my expectation.”).
    61
    
    Id.
     at 110:20–111:4.
    62
    See, e.g., AMC Tech., LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 
    2013 WL 3559807
    , at *8 (N.D. Cal. July
    11, 2013) (noting that “Uliano even explicitly says ‘I’ll [talk to the team and] get back to
    you,’ rather than words of assent” (emphasis added)); Hammond v. Grengs, 
    2021 WL 856081
    , at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2021) (statements that a “fully-executed” contract
    was required and that party would “have [his] lawyers review” a proposal and “would ‘get
    back to’” the counterparty meant that the parties’ email exchange did not form a valid
    agreement); Spectrum Glass Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cty., 
    2005 WL 1580042
    , at *6–7 (Wash. Ct. App. July 5, 2005) (response to proposal regarding payment
    11
    Third, Caplan never formalized the deal. Caplan never attended a meeting at the
    Company’s headquarters to sign the agreement, signed any of the documents, nor
    attempted to pay for the shares, as the supposed agreement required.63 Nor did Caplan
    accept or sign either of the other two documents that were part of the package constituting
    the Company’s offer.64
    Fourth, the parties’ after-the-fact conduct provides circumstantial evidence that no
    agreement was reached in 2013.65 The parties continued their negotiations through the
    spring of 2014.66 During that period, Hologram consistently maintained that no agreement
    was formed on October 23, 2013. Forgan explained, on January 25, 2014, that because
    Caplan had not accepted the offer, the Company was withdrawing it.67 On April 23, 2014,
    term consisting only of “I’ll get back to you” was insufficient to show acceptance of
    payment term); see also Roh v. Devack, 
    2009 WL 3347105
    , at *1, *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 14,
    2009) (denying summary judgment on claim that “I agree to the 2.85 Million. We will get
    back to you soon with what terms we can offer” constituted an agreement; holding that
    while the defendant’s email “accept[s] the price term,” it “clearly contemplates that
    additional negotiation as to other terms is still required, and advises Plaintiff of such.”).
    63
    Answer ¶ 34; Caplan Dep. Tr. at 116:12–22; Barlow Decl. Ex. 5 (RFA Resp. Nos. 3–6).
    64
    See October 23, 2013 email. See also Barlow Decl. Ex. 14 (Initial Stockholder
    Agreement); Barlow Decl. Ex. 15 (indemnification agreement).
    65
    See Black Horse Capital, LP v. Xstelos Hldgs., Inc., 
    2014 WL 5025926
    , at *20 (Del. Ch.
    Sept. 30, 2014) (holding that there was no enforceable agreement where, among other
    things, “the parties’ after-the-fact conduct” revealed that “Defendants did not share
    Plaintiffs’ understanding and apparently never had”); Kotler v. Shipman Assocs., 
    2019 WL 4025634
    , at *17–18 (Del. Aug. 21, 2019) (no contract existed where the parties’ subsequent
    conduct evidenced no meeting of the minds).
    66
    See, e.g., Barlow Decl. Ex. 6 (asking, in a January 2014 email from Forgan to Caplan, to
    set a time to “continue our conv[ersation]” regarding Caplan’s investment).
    67
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 6.
    12
    Hologram again confirmed that Caplan had “rejected the offer” previously made in October
    2013, and that “there was clearly never any meeting of the minds or binding arrangement
    with respect to the issuance of shares to Mr. Caplan.”68
    Hologram’s position after this time period was consistent with its statements in the
    January 25 and April 23, 2014 emails. Caplan never received a stock certificate from the
    Company.69       Caplan never appeared on the Company’s capitalization table. 70          The
    Company also sent letters to post-2014 investors promising to issue them additional shares
    if Caplan re-appeared and successfully asserted a claim.71 Such an issuance would have
    come out of the Company’s reserve of shares and would have diluted the interest of early
    investors, including Forgan, thereby allocating the risk of loss from Caplan’s claim to itself
    and those early investors.72 As such, the Company’s letter would have only made sense if
    it understood that Caplan was not entitled to purchase any shares. Indeed, Forgan testified
    that the letters were issued in “an overabundance of caution,” at the request of later
    investors, and that he was willing to carry the risk of loss because he did not “think there’s
    any merit to [Caplan’s] claims,” and thus “saw no harm in it.”73
    68
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 7.
    69
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 5 (RFA Resp. 7).
    70
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 18 (tables).
    71
    Barlow Decl. Ex. 19 ¶ 2.
    72
    Id.; see also Barlow Decl. Ex. 18 (pre- and post-Series A capitalization tables, which do
    not list any interest by Caplan).
    73
    Forgan Dep. Tr. at 223:15–22; see also Barlow Decl. Ex. 20 (Forgan explaining to an
    investor in December 2015 that the letter “is just in place because” Caplan “made a
    frivolous claim that he owned 10% of the company in 2013”).
    13
    Fifth, Forgan could not have accepted any counteroffer by email. Under Delaware
    law, “the offeror is the ‘master of his offer,’ and may specify” the only valid means of
    acceptance.74 The RSPA specifies the time, place, and manner of valid acceptance
    (simultaneously with payment, at the Company’s headquarters, and in writing).75 Because
    Caplan’s current theory is that he did not modify any of the terms of the RSPA other than
    with respect to vesting, the counteroffer that Caplan now contends he made incorporated
    all of the terms of the document, including its specifications as to the means of acceptance.
    Accordingly, Caplan’s alleged offer was required to be accepted simultaneously with the
    exchange of payment, at the company’s headquarters, and in writing. As such, Caplan’s
    counteroffer foreclosed the possibility of acceptance by email.76 Thus, even assuming that
    Caplan made a counteroffer on the terms he now claims, by those terms Forgan’s email
    was legally insufficient to accept it.77
    74
    Eaton v. Eaton, 
    2005 WL 3529110
    , at *6 n.38 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2005) (citing 2 Samuel
    Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 6.26 (4th ed. 1991);
    see also Montgomery v. Achenbach, 
    2007 WL 1784080
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 17,
    2007) (“The offeror may impose as many conditions or terms as they choose, including but
    not limited to conditions concerning time, place, and method of acceptance.”).
    75
    RSPA §§ 1, 2.
    76
    Cf. Montgomery, 
    2007 WL 1784080
    , at *2 (time limit in offer cuts off ability to accept
    after deadline).
    77
    See, e.g., Grunstein v. Silva, 
    2014 WL 4473641
    , at *31 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2014) (no
    contract, even where offeror “honestly believed” there was a deal, because offeree’s
    “failure to respond to an offer as explicitly set forth in the proposal was an implicit
    rejection”; offer “explicitly conditioned its effectiveness upon receipt . . . of an executed
    copy,” but the offeree never signed).
    14
    In sum, Caplan never accepted the Company’s offer, and if Caplan’s October 23,
    2013 email can be construed as a counteroffer, it was never accepted. No written
    agreement was formed.
    B.     Hologram Has Demonstrated a Likelihood of Irreparable Harm.
    Unless an enforceable contract exists on the terms that Caplan now asserts, Caplan
    has no valid basis to force the Company to arbitrate his claims against it. It is well-
    established Delaware law that “wrongful enforcement of an arbitration clause constitutes
    sufficient irreparable harm to justify an injunction.”78 Accordingly, without an injunction,
    Hologram will be irreparably harmed by having to litigate Caplan’s claims in a private
    arbitration in Illinois, a forum to which it never consented.
    C.     The Equities Favor Preliminary Injunctive Relief.
    The equities tilt in Hologram’s favor.      The hardship Hologram will suffer if
    injunctive relief is denied, and if Caplan is allowed to proceed in arbitration, would be
    greater than any hardship Caplan will suffer if the requested relief is granted. Further,
    Caplan’s harm from the entry of an injunction pending the resolution of this action will be
    minimal at most. On the one hand, if an injunction is entered and Hologram prevails on
    the merits, then Caplan will have no cognizable harm from the delay—the injunction will
    78
    Brown v. T-Ink, LLC, 
    2007 WL 4302594
    , at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2007) (finding
    irreparable harm when the wrongful arbitration was only “threatened”); see also, e.g.,
    AffiniPay LLC v. West, 
    2021 WL 4262225
    , at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2021) (reciting the
    holding of Brown and finding irreparable injury); Parfi Hldg. AB v. Mirror Image Internet,
    Inc., 
    842 A.2d 1245
    , 1259 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[I]t is well settled that parties cannot be
    required to arbitrate non-arbitrable claims and that the procession of an unwarranted
    arbitration poses the threat of irreparable injury to the party rightfully resisting
    arbitration.”).
    15
    have served to prevent him from asserting a right that he never had. On the other hand, if
    an injunction is entered and then Caplan prevails on the merits, his only harm will come
    from the delayed recognition of his right to proceed in arbitration. That harm cannot be
    great; after all, Caplan waited almost eight years from the 2013 negotiation to bring his
    arbitration in the first place.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Hologram’s motion for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Hologram must
    post a bond under Court of Chancery Rule 65(c). Because the “costs and damages” Caplan
    will incur if this motion is later determined to have been improvidently granted approach
    zero, a nominal security is appropriate. The parties shall confer on a form of order
    implementing this decision.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C.A. No. 2021-0736-KSJM

Judges: McCormick, C.

Filed Date: 12/14/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/14/2021