Acela Investments LLC v. Raymond DiFalco ( 2020 )


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  •   IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    ACELA INVESTMENTS LLC, ACELA             )
    FIRST INVESTMENTS LLC, ACELA NEW         )
    INVESTMENTS LLC, and DR. STEFAN          )
    AIGNER,                                  )
    )
    Plaintiffs,                    )
    )
    v.                                   )   C.A. No. 2018-0558-AGB
    )
    RAYMOND DIFALCO and MANISH               )
    SHAH,                                    )
    )
    Defendants,                    )
    )
    and                                  )
    )
    INSPIRION DELIVERY SCIENCES, LLC         )
    and INSPIRION DELIVERY                   )
    TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,                       )
    )
    Nominal Defendants.               )
    RAYMOND DIFALCO,                         )
    )
    Counterclaim and Third-Party   )
    Plaintiff,                     )
    )
    v.                                   )
    )
    DR. STEFAN AIGNER,                       )
    )
    Counterclaim Defendant,        )
    )
    and                                  )
    )
    INSPIRION DELIVERY SCIENCES, LLC,        )
    )
    Third-Party Defendant.         )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: April 20, 2020
    Date Decided: April 27, 2020
    Peter B. Ladig and Brett M. McCartney, BAYARD, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware;
    Attorneys for Acela Investments LLC, Acela First Investments LLC, Acela New
    Investments LLC, and Dr. Stefan Aigner.
    Carmella P. Keener, COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware;
    William T. Reid IV, Michael Yoder, Jordan L. Vimont, and Ryan M. Goldstein,
    REID COLLINS & TSAI LLP, Austin, Texas; Attorneys for Raymond DiFalco and
    Manish Shah.
    Donna L. Culver, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington,
    Delaware; Attorney for Liquidating Trustee Derek C. Abbott.
    BOUCHARD, C.
    In May 2019, the court appointed a liquidating trustee to wind up the affairs
    of Inspirion Delivery Services, LLC (“IDS” or the “Company”). On April 3, 2020,
    after hiring advisors and conducting a lengthy sale process, the liquidating trustee
    filed a motion requesting court approval to sell substantially all of the Company’s
    assets to OHEMO LIFE SCIENCES INC. (“OHEMO”). Two of IDS’s principals
    who made a last minute bid to acquire the assets themselves objected to the motion.
    For the reasons explained herein, the court grants the liquidating trustee’s motion.
    I.        BACKGROUND
    The factual background and procedural history of this litigation is discussed
    in detail in this court’s post-trial memorandum opinion dated May 17, 2019
    (“Opinion”).1 The court recites below only those facts directly relevant to the court’s
    consideration of the liquidating trustee’s motion for entry of an order approving the
    sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets to OHEMO pursuant to an asset
    purchase agreement dated March 31, 2020 (the “OHEMO Agreement”).
    A.     The Players
    IDS is a Delaware limited liability company that develops abuse-deterrent
    pharmaceutical products.2 It was formed as the successor to an entity called
    Inspirion Delivery Technologies, LLC (“IDT”), which was co-founded by Stefan
    1
    Acela Invs. LLC v. DiFalco, 
    2019 WL 2158063
    (Del. Ch. May 17, 2019).
    2
    Id. at *2.
                                                1
    Aigner, Raymond DiFalco, and Manish Shah.3 IDS owns the technology for two
    FDA-approved abuse-deterrent opioids: MorphaBond and RoxyBond.4
    Most of the funds that paid for the development of MorphaBond and
    RoxyBond came from the predecessor of Trygg IDT I Holdings Corporation
    (“Trygg”), a joint venture between private equity firm Lindsay Goldberg LLC and
    Norwegian industrial development company Aker AS.5 Trygg and its predecessor
    invested over $45 million in IDT, and Trygg is currently a major investor in IDS.6
    B.       The Sale Order
    IDS’s LLC agreement contains a bespoke governance structure that failed to
    resolve deadlocks that developed between, on the one hand, Aigner, and on the other
    hand, DiFalco and Shah, who were aligned with each other.7 That governance
    structure included the presence of an “independent representative” named Hafid
    Touam.8 For the reasons detailed at length in the Opinion, the court concluded that
    it was not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of IDS in conformity with
    its LLC agreement, that judicial dissolution of the Company was warranted under
    3
    Id. 4 Id.
    at *4.
    5
    Id. at *2.
    6
    Id. at *4-5.
    7
    Id. at *1-2.
    8
    Id. at *6-7.
                                               2
    
    6 Del. C
    . § 18-802, and that the court would appoint a liquidating trustee under
    
    6 Del. C
    . § 18-803 to wind up the Company’s affairs.
    On May 24, 2019, the parties jointly proposed that the court appoint Derek C.
    Abbott, Esquire, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, to serve as the liquidating
    trustee (the “Liquidating Trustee).9 On May 31, 2019, the court entered an order
    appointing Abbott as the Liquidating Trustee (the “Sale Order”).10
    The Sale Order provides that “the Liquidating Trustee shall have full control
    and dominion over the dissolution and liquidation of IDS.” 11 It also spells out that,
    subject to obtaining court approval, the Liquidating Trustee was authorized to
    dispose of the assets of IDS in a transaction that could be structured in whatever
    form the Liquidated Trustee determined to be in the best interest of IDS, including
    selling the Company as a going concern or selling its assets (including its intellectual
    property and license rights) individually or collectively:
    [T]he Liquidating Trustee is authorized and empowered with the sole
    and exclusive authority to . . . to identify and marshal the assets of IDS
    and dispose of those assets in the manner the Liquidating Trustee
    determines is in the best interest of IDS and designed to maximize the
    value of IDS, including by creating and implementing a sales process
    for IDS’s assets (including its intellectual property and rights under any
    license agreements), in such manner or form as the Liquidating Trustee
    decides in his or her sole discretion, whether selling IDS as a going
    concern, selling its assets individually or collectively, a merger
    9
    Dkt. 144; Dkt. 146.
    10
    Sale Order ¶ 1 (Dkt. 149).
    11
    Id. ¶ 4.
                                                  3
    transaction, membership unit purchase transaction, redemption,
    business combination, asset sale, auction, or any other transaction
    structure or form (which sale process shall be approved by the Court
    after application by the Liquidating Trustee).12
    In July 2019, the Liquidating Trustee retained Locust Walk Partners LLC and
    Locust Walk Securities (together, “Locust Walk”), a life sciences investment
    banking firm, to advise him and to assist in conducting a sale process.13 The founder
    and Chief Executive Officer of Locust Walk is Geoff Meyerson.14
    The Liquidating Trustee subsequently filed a motion describing the steps of a
    proposed sale process that would target “firms active in the abuse-deterrent opioid
    space, firms active in the broader pain space, and global specialty pharmaceutical
    firms that have indicated an interest in expanding into the United States
    pharmaceutical market.”15 The proposed sale process contemplated receiving “best
    and final offers” by December 1, 2019, and entering into any “binding and definitive
    agreements by December 31, 2019.”16 The court entered an order approving the
    proposed sale process,17 which was unopposed.18
    12
    Id. ¶ 5.
    13
    Abbott Decl. ¶ 8 (Dkt. 186); Meyerson Decl. ¶¶ 1-2 (Dkt. 188).
    14
    Meyerson Decl. ¶ 1.
    15
    Mot. for Approval of Process for Sale ¶ 8 (Dkt. 173).
    16
    Id. ¶¶ 10-12.
    17
    Dkt. 177.
    18
    Dkt. 176.
    4
    C.       Daiichi Terminates its Licensing and Supply Agreement
    On September 4, 2019, Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. (“Daiichi”) terminated its
    licensing and supply agreement with IDS (the “Daiichi Agreement”).19 Under that
    agreement, which had been in place since October 2016, Daichii (i) agreed to
    commercialize MorphaBond and co-promote MorphaBond and RoxyBond and
    (ii) was obligated to “make royalty and milestone payments to IDS.”20
    Termination of the Daiichi Agreement, which became effective on March 4,
    2020,21 resulted in a critical loss of revenues for the Company. For the first half of
    2018, the Company’s sole revenues consisted of approximately $2.9 million in
    payments from Daiichi while its expenses were approximately $7.4 million.22 As of
    trial, in December 2018, IDS expected to have negative cash flow of approximately
    $6 million for all of 2018 and a cash balance of approximately $4.1 million by the
    fourth quarter of 2019, assuming the Daiichi Agreement remained in place.23
    19
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 3 (Dkt. 204).
    20
    Acela, 
    2019 WL 2158063
    , at *8.
    21
    Mot. for Order Approving Sale Hr’g Tr. (April 20, 2020) (“Tr.”) 12-13; see also Acela,
    
    2019 WL 2158063
    , at *8 n.90.
    22
    Acela, 
    2019 WL 2158063
    , at *15 n.187.
    23
    Id. at *15.
                                                 5
    D.     IDS Enters an Interim Supply Agreement with Cerovene
    On September 12, 2019, IDS entered into an interim supply agreement with
    Cerovene, Inc. (“Cerovene”) pursuant to which Cerovene agreed to provide an
    ongoing supply of MorphaBond to IDS (the “Cerovene Supply Agreement”).24
    Cerovene, which is co-owned by DiFalco and Shah, previously served as a
    development partner for MorphaBond and RoxyBond.25
    On December 6, 2019, Cerovene sent the Company a notice of breach under
    the Cerovene Supply Agreement for failure to pay invoices that were “due and
    owing.”26 On March 12, 2020, Cerovene terminated the agreement.27 According to
    Cerovene, IDS owes it at least $1.86 million for batches of MorphaBond it made,
    certain fixed fee commitments, and third-party costs and expenses.28
    E.     The Sale Process Conducted by Locust Walk
    In October 2019, Locust Walk sent a “teaser” to “approximately eighty-one
    entities that might be potential acquirers” of IDS, which included both financial and
    strategic prospective buyers.29 The teaser described the Company and its business
    24
    DiFalco Decl. ¶ 9 (Dkt. 196); see Saia Decl. Ex. 2 (Dkt. 195).
    25
    Acela, 
    2019 WL 2158063
    , *2.
    26
    Saia Decl. Ex. 7.
    27
    Id.; Saia Decl. ¶ 17; DiFalco Decl. ¶ 11.
    28
    DiFalco Decl. ¶ 12; Saia Decl. ¶ 17.
    29
    Meyerson Decl. ¶ 4.
    6
    and stated that “multiple structures” for a transaction were being explored: “IDS is
    currently seeking a strategic partnership / acquisition (exploring multiple structures)
    for the ongoing commercialization of MorphaBond . . . and RoxyBond.”30
    During the following weeks, Locust Walk initiated calls with and sent process
    letters to eleven prospective acquirers who expressed an interest in acquiring IDS.31
    The process letters solicited non-binding indications of interests on or before
    December 1, 2019, which were to include, among other things, the bidder’s desired
    transaction structure.32 Locust Walk ultimately received non-binding indications of
    interest from five parties, each of which executed confidentiality agreements that
    allowed them to access IDS’s data room and to participate in diligence calls with
    Locust Walk and members of IDS’s senior management.33
    During the sale process, the Liquidating Trustee met numerous times with key
    stakeholders of the Company and held weekly status update calls to which they were
    invited.34 These stakeholders included Aigner, DiFalco, Shah, Trygg, and/or their
    representatives.35 The Liquidating Trustee offered each of these stakeholders “the
    30
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 2 (Dkt. 205);
    id. Ex. A,
    at 2.
    31
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 3.
    32
    Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
    33
    Meyerson Decl. ¶ 6; Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 4.
    34
    Abbott Decl. ¶ 11.
    35
    Id. 7 opportunity
    to execute confidentiality agreements allowing them to receive
    confidential information identifying those entities invited to participate in the
    process and the identities of those parties that submitted indications of interest and
    the terms thereof.”36 Cerovene and its counsel were invited to participate in those
    calls but they “rarely attended” and “declined to execute the confidentiality
    agreements to enable them to receive information regarding the identity of the
    bidders.”37
    Although the sale process overseen by Locust Walk generated five indications
    of interest, the Liquidating Trustee was unable to reach definitive terms for a
    transaction with anyone before the contemplated December 31, 2019 deadline.
    F.    The Liquidating Trustee Secures a Bid from OHEMO
    The Liquidating Trustee continued his efforts to pursue a transaction in 2020.
    He realized during this period that the only parties who were meaningfully interested
    in pursuing a transaction were the stakeholders that had previously invested in IDS,
    i.e., Trygg, Cerovene and its principals (DiFalco and Shah), Aigner and Touam and,
    through them, Galephar Pharmaceutical Research, Inc. (“Galephar”).38
    36
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 5.
    37
    Id. 38 Abbott
    Decl. ¶ 11; Acela, 
    2019 WL 2158063
    , *10.
    8
    During March 2020, the Liquidating Trustee or his advisors urged each of the
    stakeholders “weekly if not daily to make a concrete bid as quickly as possible, as
    IDS’s resources were being depleted with no systematic and regular source of further
    revenue.”39 The Liquidating Trustee explained to each of them that “following
    execution of an acceptable bid and receipt of a deposit, [he] would shop that bid to
    the others for forty-eight hours and then seek this Court’s approval of such bid.”40
    On March 2, 2020, William Reid, counsel for DiFalco and Shah,41 requested
    that the Liquidating Trustee send him a confidential disclosure agreement for “a
    potential purchase of IDS’ assets.”42 On March 27, at which point the Liquidating
    Trustee was “very close” to entering into an agreement with OHEMO, DiFalco sent
    an email to the Liquidating Trustee requesting access to IDS’s data room for the
    purpose of “partaking in a possible purchase of IDS.”43           That same day, the
    Liquidating Trustee advised DiFalco that he was “very, very late to the process” and
    that the Liquidating Trustee “expected to sign a deal as early as the following
    39
    Abbott Decl. ¶ 11.
    40
    Id. 41 Reid
    Decl. ¶ 3 (Dkt. 195).
    42
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 6;
    id. Ex. A.
    43
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 7;
    id. Ex. B.
                                                 9
    Monday [i.e., March 30] against which [DiFalco] would have an opportunity to
    bid.”44
    On Saturday, March 28, Reid sent the Liquidating Trustee a text message
    advising that his clients intended to “put in a bid this week for IDS” and inquired
    whether there was a deadline.45 The Liquidating Trustee responded that he intended
    to “sign up the first acceptable deal and then shop it to others for 48 hours,” after
    which he would file a motion seeking court approval.46 Reid replied, “[l]et’s talk
    after you circulate the ‘acceptable deal.’”47
    On March 31, 2020, IDS entered into the OHEMO Agreement, with the
    Liquidating Trustee signing on behalf of IDS, and received a $750,000 deposit from
    OHEMO.48 OHEMO’s president, Arthur Deboeck, is the principal of Galephar,49 a
    pharmaceutical company based in Puerto Rico that Aigner tried to use as a
    44
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 7;
    id. Ex. B.
    45
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 8;
    id. Ex. C.
    46
    Abbott Supp. Decl. Ex. C.
    47
    Id. Abbott Decl.
    ¶¶ 12, 14; see Mot. for Order Approving Sale (“Mot.”), Ex. A (“OHEMO
    48
    Agreement”) (Dkt. 185).
    49
    DiFalco Decl. ¶ 15.
    10
    commercial manufacturer for IDS in the past.50 Aigner and Touam were the
    principal representatives that negotiated on behalf of OHEMO.51
    Under the OHEMO Agreement, OHEMO agreed to purchase substantially all
    of IDS’ intellectual property and other business assets for an upfront payment of
    $4 million in cash and royalties payments to IDS equal to 10% of the net sales of
    RoxyBond through the earlier of (i) the last valid patent claim covering RoxyBond
    or (ii) until such time as IDS has received $10 million of royalty payments.52
    Section 7.1(e) of the OHEMO Agreement provides that OHEMO may
    terminate the agreement if IDS has not filed for court approval of the transactions
    specified therein by 6 p.m. on the third business after OHEMO makes a deposit in
    the amount of $750,000 with an escrow agent, i.e., April 3.53 This provision created
    the 48-hour window for the Liquidating Trustee to attempt to secure a topping bid.
    Section 2.7 provides that IDS “shall not accept a competing bid from another party,
    if such other party is not similarly obligated to make a deposit with the Escrow Agent
    of at least [$750,000] on the date of execution of such party’s purchase agreement.”54
    50
    Acela, 
    2019 WL 2158063
    , at *10, *25.
    51
    Abbott Decl. ¶ 12. According to OHEMO’s counsel, Aigner is not an officer or
    stockholder of OHEMO but he served as a consultant to OHEMO. Tr. 61.
    52
    Abbott Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; OHEMO Agreement §§ 1.1 (definition of “Royalty Product”),
    2.1, 2.5(a), 2.5(b).
    53
    OHEMO Agreement § 7.1(e).
    54
    Id. § 2.7.
                                                11
    G.     Cerovene Seeks to Make a Topping Bid
    At 5:54 p.m. on March 31, 2020, the Liquidating Trustee sent an executed
    copy of the OHEMO Agreement to DiFalco and Reid via email with a note
    encouraging them “to bid against it.”55 The Liquidating Trustee sent a similar email
    that evening to Trygg, “which had also expressed an interest in bidding for IDS’s
    assets.”56
    At 6:58 p.m. on March 31, Locust Walk also sent a copy of the OHEMO
    Agreement to DiFalco via email along with instructions for submitting a topping bid:
    Interested parties must: (1) submit a signed APA that represents a
    higher and better offer, as interpreted by the Liquidating Trustee, to the
    company; and (2) transfer the greater of $750K or 10% of the bid
    deposit to an Inspirion-designated escrow account by close of business
    on Thursday, April 2nd.57
    Within hours after the OHEMO Agreement was executed, Locust Walk also
    contacted the eighty-one potential acquirers it solicited at the outset of the sale
    process, offering them a final opportunity to submit a superior bid in accordance
    with the terms quoted above.58
    55
    Reid Decl. Ex. 1.
    56
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 9.
    57
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 6;
    id. Ex. D.
    58
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 6.
    12
    At 3:59 p.m. on April 2, Michael Yoder, counsel for DiFalco and Shah,59 sent
    an email to the Liquidating Trustee stating that “we should be getting you a signed
    APA from Cerovene later today.”60 At 4:55 p.m. on April 2, Yoder sent the
    Liquidating Trustee via email a copy of an asset purchase agreement between IDS
    and Cerovene (the “Cerovene APA”) and a redline comparing it to the OHEMO
    Agreement.61 Yoder’s cover email stated that the changes between the OHEMO
    Agreement and the Cerovene APA “were fairly minor” and requested wire transfer
    instructions for the escrow deposit.62 Yoder’s cover email also stated that the
    attached agreement was “signed,” but it was not.63 Cerovene did not send the
    required wire transfer to the escrow agent at any time on April 2.
    The Cerovene APA states that Cerovene would deliver at closing $4.1 million,
    but $1.85 million of that amount would come in the form of a credit bid to discharge
    the debt IDS owes Cerovene under the Cerovene Supply Agreement.64                 The
    Cerovene APA contains the same royalty provision as the OHEMO Agreement
    except that the royalty cap was increased from $10 million to $15 million.65
    59
    Yoder Decl. ¶ 3 (Dkt. 195).
    60
    Id. ¶ 6;
    id. Ex. 2.
    61
    Yoder Decl. ¶ 6;
    id. Ex. 3
    at 2 (“Cerovene APA”).
    62
    Yoder Decl. Ex. 3 at 1.
    63
    Yoder Decl. ¶ 6; see Cerovene APA.
    64
    Cerovene APA §§ 2.5(a), 2.5(b).
    65
    Compare Cerovene APA § 2.5(c) with OHEMO Agreement § 2.5(b).
    13
    At 7:37 a.m. on April 3, a representative of Locust Walk sent Yoder an email
    stating that IDS would not evaluate Cerovene’s offer for the following reasons:
     Cerovene failed to post the deposit by the stated deadline of end of
    business on Thursday, April 2nd
     Cerovene failed to provide proof of financial wherewithal, and
    Cerovene has claimed near insolvency status the whole case
     The bid was not higher and better, and assignment involved an
    unspecified entity
     The lack of a deposit and executed APA entails higher closing risk.66
    Later on April 3, Yoder forwarded to the Liquidating Trustee an email Shah sent to
    Yoder at 3:16 p.m. on April 2, to which was attached a signature page for the
    Cerovene APA that Shah had signed on April 2 on behalf of Cerovene.67 Yoder
    noted in his forwarding email that he “just realized that this did not come through in
    [his] transmission yesterday for some reason.”68 At 3:34 p.m. on April 3, Reid sent
    the Liquidating Trustee an email with a confirmation that Cerovene had sent
    $2.3 million to his firm’s trust account on April 3 “to be used to back up [his clients’]
    bid.”69 The letter asked the Liquidating Trustee to hold a telephonic auction.70
    66
    Yoder Decl. Ex. 4.
    67
    Yoder Decl. ¶ 8; see
    id. Ex. 5.
    68
    Yoder Decl. Ex. 5.
    69
    Reid Decl. ¶ 6;
    id. Ex. 2.
    70
    Reid Decl. Ex. 2.
    14
    On April 3, 2020, the Liquidating Trustee filed a motion seeking court
    approval of the OHEMO Agreement,71 to which DiFalco and Shah objected on
    April 13.72
    II.       ANALYSIS
    DiFalco and Shah (together, “Objectors”) assert two objections to the
    proposed sale of the Company to OHEMO. Specifically, Objectors contend that
    (i) the Liquidating Trustee’s rejection of their bid for failing to comply with the
    bidding requirements was unwarranted and (ii) Cerovene’s offer provides more
    value to IDS’s stakeholders than the OHEMO Agreement.73 Before turning to the
    objections, the court will address the important threshold issue of what standard of
    review applies to its consideration of the two objections.
    A.       Standard of Review
    The Sale Order, which was proposed jointly by the parties in this litigation,
    expressly provides that “[a]ll actions taken by the Liquidating Trustee pursuant to
    this Order . . . shall be presumed to be taken on an informed basis, in good faith, and
    in the honest belief that such actions taken were in the best interests of IDS,” and
    that “[a]ny actions by the Liquidating Trustee may be challenged in this Court, but
    71
    Mot.
    72
    Obj. (Dkt. 195).
    73
    Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
                                                15
    shall be subject to reversal only after a finding by the Court that the Liquidating
    Trustee abused his discretion.”74 This court has adopted an abuse of discretion
    standard in similar orders involving the court-ordered sale of an entity.75
    At oral argument, Objectors argued that the Liquidating Trustee’s motion
    should be subject to plenary review.76 Objectors did not make this argument in their
    opposition and thus waived the issue.77 In any event, applying a plenary review
    standard would contravene the plain language of the Sale Order and make no sense.
    The Sale Order provides that “[a]ny actions by the Liquidating Trustee . . .
    shall be subject to reversal only after a finding by the Court that the Liquidating
    Trustee abused his discretion.”78       Such actions would include the Liquidating
    Trustee’s decision to enter into the OHEMO Agreement and to reject the Cerovene
    APA, as well as his valuation of the two bids.
    74
    Sale Order ¶ 8.
    75
    See, e.g., In re TransPerfect Global, Inc., 
    2018 WL 904160
    , at *14-16 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15,
    2018) (applying abuse of discretion standard for court-ordered sale of a corporation), aff’d
    sub nom. Elting v. Shawe, 
    185 A.3d 694
    (Del. 2018) (TABLE); In re Supreme Oil Co.,
    Inc., 
    2015 WL 2455952
    , at *6 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (abuse of discretion standard for
    interim decisions); In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 
    2015 WL 10371435
    , at *3 (Del. Ch. May
    4, 2015) (same).
    76
    Tr. 27.
    77
    Emerald P’rs v. Berlin, 
    726 A.2d 1215
    , 1224 (Del. 1999) (issues not briefed are deemed
    waived).
    78
    Sale Order ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
    16
    It also would make little sense for the court to casually disregard the
    Liquidating Trustee’s decisions and recommendations.             The parties mutually
    selected the Liquidating Trustee, who serves as an agent of the court.79 He is
    indisputably independent and has no personal financial interest in the outcome of the
    sale process. He also possesses invaluable knowledge and insight gained over the
    past ten months of his tenure as Liquidating Trustee concerning, among other things,
    the Company’s operations and finances as well as the capabilities of its stakeholders.
    It is for such reasons that this court routinely applies a deferential standard of review
    when the action of an agent of the court is challenged and, here, the agreed-upon
    standard of review in the Sale Order is abuse of discretion.
    Our Supreme Court has explained that a decision will not be overturned as an
    abuse of discretion if the decision “was based upon conscience and reason, as
    opposed to capriciousness or arbitrariness.”80        Stated differently, a court will
    overturn a decision for abuse of discretion only if it was “arbitrary or capricious”81
    79
    See 
    6 Del. C
    . § 18-803(a) (“the Court of Chancery, upon cause shown, may wind up the
    limited liability company’s affairs upon application of any member or manager . . . and in
    connection therewith, may appoint a liquidating trustee.”).
    80
    Chavin v. Cope, 
    243 A.2d 694
    , 695 (Del. 1968).
    81
    Lankford v. Lankford, 
    157 A.3d 1235
    , 1241 (Del. 2017) (citing Wright v. Wright, 
    49 A.3d 1147
    , 1150 (Del. 2012)).
    17
    or “exceeds the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances.”82 This is the
    standard the court will apply in reviewing Objectors’ two objections.
    B.       The Liquidating Trustee Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Rejecting
    the Cerovene Bid for Failing to Comply with the Bidding
    Requirements
    DiFalco and Shah’s first objection challenges the Liquidating Trustee’s
    decision to reject the bid Cerovene submitted on April 2 for failing to comply with
    the requirements for submitting a topping bid.
    It is undisputed that (i) DiFalco and Shah knew before OHEMO finalized its
    bid that there would be a 48-hour deadline for submitting a topping bid and
    (ii) Cerovene failed to comply with two of the requirements for submitting a topping
    bid, i.e., providing an executed agreement and a deposit of at least $750,000 before
    the deadline. Objectors nonetheless contend that it was “unreasonable” for the
    Liquidating Trustee to insist on compliance with these requirements given that, the
    day after the deadline, Cerovene (i) sent $2.3 million to its counsel’s trust account
    in an effort to satisfy the deposit requirement and (ii) provided a copy of the signature
    page for the Cerovene APA that Shah had signed on April 2, but which was not sent
    to the Liquidating Trustee on that date.83 The court disagrees.
    82
    Schultz v. Ginsburg, 
    965 A.2d 661
    , 667 (Del. 2009) (citing In re MCA, Inc., S’holder
    Litig., 
    785 A.2d 625
    , 633-34 (Del. 2001)).
    83
    Obj. ¶ 14.
    18
    As an initial matter, it is mystifying that Cerovene waited until literally the
    last few minutes of a six-month process before submitting a bid. DiFalco and Shah
    rationalize this delay based on their purported belief that the Liquidating Trustee was
    intent on selling the Company as a going concern, which did not interest them.84 But
    this belief is directly contradicted by the plain language of the Sale Order, which
    expressly authorized the Liquidating Trustee to sell IDS’s assets (including its
    intellectual property and license rights) individually or in whatever form he believed
    would maximize IDS’s value.85 If DiFalco and Shah believed that the Company’s
    intellectual property was, as they say, the “prize,”86 they were free to bid to acquire
    that intellectual property at any time.
    The reality is that DiFalco and Shah chose to disengage from the sale process.
    They rarely attended the Liquidating Trustee’s weekly meetings and declined to
    enter a confidentiality agreement to learn important details about the sale process
    that Locust Walk was conducting. And whatever may have caused their inaction
    before March 2020, DiFalco and Shah had no excuse for not getting in the game that
    month—or at least getting their ducks in a row—when the Liquidating Trustee urged
    them and the other stakeholders to make a “concrete bid as quickly as possible” and
    84
    Id. ¶ 8.
    85
    
    See supra
    Part I.B.
    86
    Obj. ¶ 14.
    19
    put them on notice that they would have 48 hours to submit a topping bid after
    “execution of an acceptable bid and receipt of a deposit.”87
    Under the OHEMO Agreement, OHEMO had the right to walk away from the
    transaction it proposed if the Liquidating Trustee did not seek court approval of that
    transaction within three business days (i.e., by April 3), and the Liquidating Trustee
    could only accept a competing bid that was accompanied by a deposit of at least
    $750,000 on the date of execution of a competing purchase agreement.88 DiFalco
    and Shah disparage these requirements as “arbitrary technicalities,”89 but the record
    suggests otherwise.
    Both the Liquidating Trustee and Meyerson attest that the bid requirements in
    the OHEMO Agreement “were heavily negotiated and formed a material part of” the
    transaction.90 This evidence is highly credible given that the Company had been
    engaged in a sale process for six months that failed to yield any bidders and that its
    financial condition was deteriorating,91 particularly with the loss of revenues from
    Daiichi after it terminated its contract with the Company.92 Whoever would step
    87
    Abbot Decl. ¶ 11.
    88
    
    See supra
    Part I.F.
    89
    Obj. ¶ 14.
    90
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 10; see also Meyerson Decl. ¶ 5.
    91
    Abbott Decl. ¶ 11 (noting that “IDS’s resources were being depleted with no systematic
    and regular source of further revenue”).
    92
    
    See supra
    Part I.C.
    20
    forward to make a bid at this point logically would have substantial leverage to
    demand tight restrictions on having its bid shopped. It thus was not arbitrary or
    capricious for the Liquidating Trustee to agree to the topping bid limitations in the
    OHEMO Agreement in order to secure a binding offer from OHEMO under the dire
    circumstances facing the Company at that time.93
    Nor did the Liquidating Trustee abuse his discretion when he refused to
    disregard the negotiated-for bidding requirements in the OHEMO Agreement in
    order to consider Cerovene’s bid.94 With respect to Cerovene’s failure to post the
    deposit, the Liquidating Trustee was particularly concerned because Cerovene
    “repeatedly stated that it lacks the funds necessary to continue operating its
    business.”95 Locust Walk, furthermore, specifically advised the Liquidating Trustee
    not to extend the 48-hour deadline because of the risk of losing the OHEMO
    transaction:
    Having failed to receive a qualifying bid prior to the expiration of the
    deadline, Locust Walk advised the Liquidating Trustee it was
    inadvisable to extend the deadline for submission of a qualifying bid
    93
    The OHEMO Agreement does not contain a termination fee. Thus, although the
    timeframe for submitting a topping bid was tight, acceptance of a topping bid would not
    have required the Company to pay a breakup fee.
    94
    After receiving Cerovene’s bid, and again after receiving DiFalco and Shah’s objection,
    the Liquidating Trustee (directly and through counsel) sought OHEMO’s consent to enable
    him to conduct a telephonic auction of IDS’s assets in order to avoid a contested hearing,
    but OHEMO declined, “citing Cerovene’s failure to submit a qualifying higher and better
    bid.” Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 12
    95
    Id. ¶ 11.
                                                21
    from Cerovene due to the material risk of losing the OHEMO
    transaction for failure to abide by the terms of the APA, with no
    guarantee that the [Liquidating] Trustee would, in fact, receive a
    binding superior offer from Cerovene.96
    Based on this advice and his own consideration of the matter, the Liquidating Trustee
    concluded he could not consider “Cerovene’s non-qualifying bid” without putting
    OHEMO’s binding offer at risk.97 This decision to protect the proverbial “bird in
    hand” was not arbitrary or capricious in my view.98
    C.      The Liquidating Trustee Did Not Abuse His Discretion in
    Determining that OHEMO’s Bid is the Better Offer
    DiFalco and Shah’s second objection challenges the Liquidating Trustee’s
    determination that the OHEMO Agreement “represents the highest and best offer for
    IDS’s assets.”99 There are two key differences between the terms of the OHEMO
    Agreement and the Cerovene APA that bear on the respective value of those
    proposals: (i) the nature and amount of the payment due at closing and (ii) the cap
    on potential future royalties.100 The court will address each of these issues in turn.
    96
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 7.
    97
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 10.
    98
    The Objectors criticize the Liquidating Trustee and Locust Walk for not providing wire
    transfer instructions “when inviting the bid.” Obj. ¶ 8. Although Objectors have a point,
    Cerovene’s counsel just as easily could have requested this information after receiving the
    bidding instructions from Locust Walk on March 31, but they inexplicably failed to do so
    until five minutes before the deadline on April 2. See Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 9.
    99
    Mot. ¶10.
    Objectors note that their bid also excludes “litigation claims” against Touam. Obj. ¶ 25.
    100
    Objectors do not explain, however, the nature of any claims IDS might have against
    22
    1.    Closing Payment
    Under the OHEMO Agreement, OHEMO is obligated to pay IDS $4.0 million
    in cash at closing.101 The Cerovene APA provides for a “closing payment” with a
    nominal value of $4.1 million consisting of two components: (i) $2.25 million in
    cash due at closing and (ii) a credit bid in the amount of $1.85 million to be used to
    discharge the debt IDS owes under the Cerovene Supply Agreement.102
    The Liquidating Trustee contends that the credit bid component of Cerovene’s
    proposal makes it “less attractive than OHEMO’s all cash offer” “given IDS’s
    current liquidity situation and the need to establish a reserve for potential claims and
    anticipated wind down costs.”103 Stated differently, in the Liquidating Trustee’s
    opinion, the closing payment in Cerovene’s proposal is worth less than $4 million in
    cash because the $1.85 million attributable to the credit bid “may not be paid in full
    depending upon IDS’ cash position at closing after the establishment of a reserve
    Touam, making it impossible to ascribe a value to the Company of this aspect of their
    proposal.
    The Cerovene APA also expressly excludes certain equipment located at a Galephar
    facility. Compare Cerovene APA § 2.2(j) with OHEMO Agreement § 2.2(j). But this
    equipment, which the Liquidating Trustee contends only has “little salvage value,” also is
    excluded (albeit not expressly) from the OHEMO Agreement. Abbott Decl. ¶ 17;
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 11.
    101
    OHEMO Agreement § 2.5(a).
    102
    Cerovene APA §§ 2.5(a), 2.5(b).
    Liquidating Trustee’s Reply ¶ 13 (Dkt. 203); Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 13; Meyerson Supp.
    103
    Decl. ¶ 8.
    23
    and anticipated wind down costs.”104 In my opinion, the Liquidating Trustee did not
    abuse his discretion in coming to this conclusion.
    As of the time of trial, in December 2018, IDS was experiencing significant
    negative cash flows (approximately $6 million in 2018) and was entirely reliant on
    Daiichi for revenues.105 In September 2019, when Daiichi terminated the Daiichi
    Agreement, IDS’s financial position became precarious as it lost the “source of
    liquidity” on which it had been “dependent.”106 Two months later, in December
    2019, IDS stopped paying Cerovene, which led to the termination of the Cerovene
    Supply Agreement in March 2020.107 Currently, IDS has less than $600,000 of cash
    on hand108 and “does not have the financial wherewithal to continue marketing [its]
    assets for sale.”109
    Given these circumstances, and given the need to establish reserves to pursue
    claims (e.g., against Daiichi) as well as to wind-up the Company after the closing of
    a transaction, it was reasonable in my view—and certainly was not an abuse of
    104
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 8.
    105
    
    See supra
    Part I.C.
    106
    Abbott Decl. ¶ 19; see also Tr. 50 (Objectors’ counsel acknowledging that IDS was
    “financially distressed” at this time).
    107
    Saia Decl. ¶ 17;
    id. Ex. 7.
    Objectors apparently did not terminate the Cerovene Supply
    Agreement earlier as an accommodation to enable Locust Walk to market IDS with a
    supply agreement in place. Obj. ¶ 8.
    108
    Tr. 16.
    109
    Abbott Decl. ¶ 18.
    24
    discretion—for the Liquidating Trustee to conclude that OHEMO’s all-cash offer is
    superior by discounting the credit bid component of Cerovene’s bid.110
    2.    Potential Royalties
    The OHEMO Agreement and the Cerovene APA both provide for the
    payment of royalties to IDS equal to 10% of the net sales of RoxyBond through the
    earlier of (i) the last valid patent claim covering the product or (ii) until such time as
    IDS has received a certain level of royalty payments.111 The only difference between
    the agreements is that royalty cap is $10 million in the OHEMO Agreement and $15
    million in the Cerovene APA.112
    Although the royalty caps in the two proposals differ by $5 million,
    determining and comparing the potential value of the royalty component in the two
    proposals is far more complicated than focusing on that difference. Indeed, valuing
    the royalty component of the two proposals is inherently speculative because both
    OHEMO and Cerovene have never manufactured RoxyBond on a commercial scale
    or tried to sell, much less actually sold, the product. Given both bidders’ lack of a
    110
    Objectors contend that “the net benefit to IDS’s stakeholders of Cerovene forgiving
    $1.85 million in undisputed debt is the same as $1.85 million in cash” because “Section 18-
    804 of the LLC Act dictates that creditors be paid prior to equity.” Obj. ¶ 24. This misses
    the point of the Liquidating Trustee’s analysis, which is that the credit bid must be
    discounted because it is far from clear whether there will be sufficient proceeds for IDS to
    pay all of its creditors. See Tr. 57.
    111
    OHEMO Agreement § 2.5(b); Cerovene APA § 2.5(c).
    112
    Compare OHEMO Agreement § 2.5(b) with Cerovene APA § 2.5(c).
    25
    track record in commercializing RoxyBond, the Liquidating Trustee determined that
    “there is a very real possibility that no future royalty stream will be paid by either
    bidder,” and “almost entirely discounted the value of those potential streams.”113
    Objectors “agree that [OHEMO’s] promised royalties are worthless” but
    contend that “the probability of [Cerovene] successfully manufacturing
    RoxyBond . . . is far greater than zero.”114 More specifically, DiFalco and Shah
    argue that Cerovene is better positioned than OHEMO to generate royalties for IDS
    for essentially three reasons: (i) Cerovene’s facility in Valley Cottage, New York
    “is already an FDA-approved facility for RoxyBond manufacture;” (ii) they “have
    demonstrated a track record in obtaining regulatory approval and manufacturing
    abuse-deterrent opioids, including RoxyBond;” and (iii) Deboeck, who is OHEMO’s
    principal, “flopped in previously attempting to launch RoxyBond at Galephar”
    where “that effort . . involved significant data irregularities, possible product defects,
    and troubling questions regarding unaccounted-for opioid substances.”115
    With respect to Cerovene’s past experience manufacturing RoxyBond, the
    trial record shows (and DiFalco’s recent declaration confirms) that Cerovene’s
    experience was limited to making test batches of RoxyBond during the new drug
    113
    Abbott Decl. ¶18.
    114
    Obj. ¶¶ 16, 22.
    115
    Id. ¶¶ 18-20.
                                               26
    application process leading up to its receipt of FDA approval three years ago, in
    April 2017.116 Shah confirmed at trial that Cerovene was not in a position to
    manufacture RoxyBond commercially.117 DiFalco elaborated: “In RoxyBond’s
    case, we’re not making it, and we never said we were going to make it. It was never
    planned for us to make it.”118 And with respect to Galephar’s past experience, the
    Liquidating Trustee points out that two other contract manufacturing organizations
    (Patheon N.V. and Catalent Pharma Solutions, LLC) also failed to commercialize
    RoxyBond “despite significant technology transfer assistance” from DiFalco.119
    In examining Cerovene’s bid, Locust Walk advised the Liquidating Trustee
    that Cerovene (i) “lacks a salesforce and supporting commercial infrastructure;”
    (ii) “lacks the working capital and capacity to produce both MorphaBond and
    Roxy[B]ond at a commercial scale;” and (iii) “has no prior experience leading efforts
    to commercialize opioids.”120 Based on his own “extensive interactions with Mr.
    DiFalco while negotiating for a continued supply of MorphaBond,” the Liquidating
    Trustee also had “significant reservations regarding Cerovene’s ability to act in a
    116
    Acela, 
    2019 WL 2158063
    , at *4, *34; DiFalco Decl. ¶ 44 (“Mr. Shah and I, through
    Cerovene, oversaw the manufacture of the RoxyBond tablets used in obtaining the
    approved NDA for RoxyBond.”).
    117
    Trial Tr. 600 (Shah) (Dkt. 134).
    118
    Trial Tr. 753 (DiFalco).
    119
    Liquidating Trustee’s Reply ¶ 16.
    120
    Id. ¶¶ 14-15
    (citing Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶ 9).
    27
    commercially reasonable fashion so as to enable it to reach an agreement with a third
    party to successfully and commercialize and sell” RoxyBond.121
    Significantly, as the Liquidating Trustee observed, “Cerovene’s offer
    contained a provision that would have allowed it to assign the asset purchase
    agreement to an unidentified designee without the benefit of any understanding or
    information regarding that entity’s financial wherewithal or ability to fulfill the
    financial and other obligations required of it under the terms of the asset purchase
    agreement.”122 Thus, irrespective of whatever conclusions one may reach about
    DiFalco and Shah’s ability to commercialize RoxyBond successfully, the Cerovene
    APA carried the additional risk that those obligations would be assigned to another
    party whose ability to commercialize RoxyBond is completely unknown.
    Locust Walk, an experienced life sciences investment banking firm, 123
    concluded it had “no reason to believe that Cerovene will be able to commercialize”
    RoxyBond “so as to create any future downstream royalty payments to IDS,” and
    that “OHEMO is more likely than Cerovene to be able to commercialize RoxyBond
    in the future.”124 Based on this advice, and for the other reasons explained above,
    the Liquidating Trustee did not “perceive the increased cap on future royalty
    121
    Id. ¶ 16
    (citing Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 14).
    122
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 11; see Cerovene APA § 1.1 (definition of “Purchaser”).
    123
    See Meyerson Decl. ¶ 1.
    124
    Meyerson Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.
    28
    payments from $10 million to $15 million to be a material improvement on the
    OHEMO [Agreement].”125
    In accordance with the Sale Order, the conclusions the Liquidating Trustee
    reached in evaluating the royalty component of the OHEMO and Cerovene bids
    “shall be presumed to be taken on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest
    belief that such actions were in the best interests of IDS.”126 Given the Liquidating
    Trustee’s good faith consideration of the factors summarized above, furthermore, it
    can hardly be said that the Liquidating Trustee was arbitrary or capricious, or
    exceeded the bounds of reason, in reaching those conclusions.
    *****
    For the reasons explained above, no basis exists under the applicable standard
    of review for the court to second guess the Liquidating Trustee’s determination that
    the OHEMO Agreement provides more value to IDS than the Cerovene APA.127
    125
    Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶ 15.
    126
    Sale Order ¶ 8.
    127
    Notably, Trygg, a major stakeholder of IDS that followed the sale process closely, did
    not express to the court any disagreement with this determination. See Abbott Decl. ¶ 11.
    29
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the reasons explained above, the court grants the Liquidating Trustee’s
    motion and approves the sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets pursuant
    to the terms and conditions of the OHEMO Agreement.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    30
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C.A. No. 2018-0558-AGB

Judges: Bouchard C.

Filed Date: 4/27/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/27/2020