Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. v. Intel Corporation ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    SANYO ELECTRIC CO., LTD.,            )
    )
    Plaintiff,                )
    )
    v.                              )     C.A. No. 2018-0723-MTZ
    )
    INTEL CORPORATION,                   )
    )
    Defendant.                )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: November 18, 2020
    Date Decided: February 26, 2021
    Todd C. Schiltz, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Wilmington,
    Delaware; David Ben-Meir, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, Los Angeles,
    California; Mark Eberhard, Erik Janitens, and Jaime Stark, NORTON ROSE
    FULBRIGHT US LLP, Houston, Texas, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim
    Defendant Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd.
    Jack B. Blumenfeld and Jennifer Ying, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT &
    TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Tiffany P. Cunningham, PERKINS COIE
    LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Chad S. Campbell, Tyler R. Bowen, and Bryan Banks,
    PERKINS COIE LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim
    Plaintiff Intel Corporation.
    ZURN, Vice Chancellor.
    Cross licensing is common in the computer and semiconductor industries, in
    which complex products are susceptible of being covered by hundreds of patents.1
    Generally, a cross license is “an agreement between two or more patentees to
    exchange licenses for their mutual benefit and use of the licensed products,”
    allowing each contracting party to participate in what would otherwise amount to
    patent infringement.2 Competitors in a common field of innovation come together
    and agree in advance that neither will be precluded by the other’s patents from
    introducing new products or adopting new processes.3 “As a result of the cross
    license, the industry leaders are effectively unable to use patents against one
    another.”4
    The parties here, market leaders in the computer and semiconductor industry,
    have been counterparties to a cross license since 1982. This action arises from a
    1
    Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Cornerstone Rsch., American Law Institute-American Bar
    Association Continuing Legal Education Advanced New ALI-ABA Course of Study,
    Intellectual Property Licensing in Today’s “E-conomy”, Licensing Strategies for
    Innovators 242 (May 29–30, 2003) (transcript available in West’s ALI database at SH087
    ALI-ABA 235); see also John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of
    Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 449, 462 (“Normally, when
    confronted with a variety of patents having overlapping claims and owned by a number of
    different firms, cross-licenses are negotiated, if only to avoid conflict over mutually
    blocking patents. The arrangements may relate only to current technologies or may affect
    future technologies as well. . . . Among the most important examples of such cross-licenses
    is the semiconductor fabrication sector.”).
    2
    License, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “cross-license”).
    3
    See Quillen, supra note 1, at 243.
    4
    Barton, supra note 1, at 463.
    1
    June 30, 2006 Patent Cross License Agreement (the “Cross License”) between
    Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. (“Sanyo”) and
    Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Intel Corporation (“Intel”). Sanyo and Intel
    have cross-moved for summary judgment on a number of issues, centering on
    whether the Cross License permits Intel to make and sell Wi-Fi adapters under
    Sanyo’s patents. This memorandum opinion resolves those cross motions with
    respect to the Cross License’s scope and the parties’ rights thereunder, as well as
    whether reformation is available as a remedy to Sanyo. For the reasons that follow,
    partial summary judgment is entered in Intel’s favor regarding the scope of the Cross
    License as written, with the caveat that Sanyo may still be able to prevail on
    reformation of the Cross License.
    2
    I.      BACKGROUND5
    Intel is a Delaware corporation and a leading manufacturer, designer, and
    supplier of integrated circuit products, also called chips or semiconductor devices.6
    For fifty years, Intel has designed, manufactured, and supplied a variety of chips,
    including microprocessors, digital signal processors, network processors,
    application processors, memory chips, radio frequency chips, and many others.7
    Intel’s contractual counterparty and competitor, Sanyo, is a Japanese corporation.8
    Historically, Sanyo has manufactured televisions and other consumer electronics,
    mobile phones, rechargeable batteries, solar cells, and a range of integrated circuit
    5
    Citations in the form of “Am. Compl. ¶ ––” refer to Sanyo’s Amended Complaint,
    available at Docket Item (“D.I.”) 28. Citations in the form of “Countercl. ¶ ––” refer to
    Intel’s Counterclaim, available at D.I. 32. Citations in the form of “Cross License § ––”
    refer to the Cross License, available as Exhibit 1 to Sanyo’s Amended Compliant and
    Exhibit A to Intel’s Counterclaim. Citations in the form of “Kitchin Decl. ––” refer to the
    Declaration of Duncan Kitchin in Support of Intel Corporation’s Motion for Partial
    Summary Judgment, available at D.I. 109. Citations in the form of “Counsel Decl. ––”
    refer to the Counsel Declaration (Nathan Kassebaum) in Support of Intel Corporation’s
    Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, available at D.I. 109. Citations in the form of
    “Def.’s Ex. ––” refer to exhibits to the Counsel Declaration, available at D.I. 109 and
    D.I. 110. Citations in the form of “Pl.’s Ex. ––” refer to exhibits to the Transmittal
    Affidavit of Todd C. Schiltz in Support of Sanyo’s Cross Motion for Partial Summary
    Judgment and in Opposition to Intel’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, available at
    D.I. 123, D.I. 124, D.I. 125, and D.I. 126.
    6
    See Def.’s Ex. 1 at 5; Def.’s Ex. 2 at 1.
    7
    See Def.’s Ex. 1 at 5.
    8
    Am. Compl. ¶ 23. Sanyo is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Panasonic Corporation.
    Id.
    3
    products, including microcontrollers and specialized chips for televisions and solar
    cells.9
    Intel and Sanyo first entered a long-term, portfolio-wide patent cross license
    agreement in 1982.10 More than two decades later, in 2005, they began negotiating
    a new agreement to capture additional patents that had issued in the interim. 11 The
    parties’ negotiations lasted over a year, spanned several drafts, emails, and in-person
    meetings, and culminated in the final Cross License.12 After extensive negotiations,
    including over whether chips mounted on cards—specifically Wi-Fi adapters
    referred to as Wireless Communication Modules (“WCMs”)—were included in the
    Cross License,13 the parties signed the final Cross License, which became effective
    on June 30, 2006.14          The Cross License punctuated the parties’ extensive
    negotiations with an integration clause.15
    9
    See Def.’s Ex. 3.
    10
    Def.’s Ex. 4.
    11
    See Am. Compl. ¶ 25.
    12
    See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8, 30; Pl.’s Ex. 9; Pl.’s Ex. 22; Pl.’s Ex. 23; Pl.’s Ex. 24; Pl.’s Ex. 25;
    Pl.’s Ex. 26; Pl.’s Ex. 27; Pl.’s Ex. 29; Pl.’s Ex. 30.
    13
    See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 10; Pl.’s Ex. 11; Pl.’s Ex. 12; Pl.’s Ex. 13; Pl.’s Ex. 14; Pl.’s Ex. 15;
    Pl.’s Ex. 27; Pl.’s Ex. 29; Pl.’s Ex. 31; Pl.’s Ex. 32; Pl.’s Ex. 33; Pl.’s Ex. 34; Pl.’s Ex. 35;
    Pl.’s Ex. 36; Def.’s Ex. 11; Def.’s Ex. 14; Def.’s Ex. 15; Def.’s Ex. 16.
    14
    See generally Cross License.
    15
    Id. § 6.6.
    4
    The Cross License addresses the manufacture of, sale of, and materials and
    components used in computer chips, memory, processors, central processing units,
    solar cells, displays, and more.16           The relevant provisions here grant Intel a
    nonexclusive license under Sanyo’s patents to “make, use, sell (directly and/or
    indirectly), offer to sell, import and otherwise dispose of” Intel Licensed Products,17
    which include “any product that constitutes an Integrated Circuit.”18 The dispute in
    this case concerns the Cross License’s definitions of “Intel Licensed Product” and
    “Integrated Circuit,” and the actions the Cross License allows Intel to take with those
    items.
    The parties agree that, at bottom, an Integrated Circuit is a computer chip.19
    Such chips are used to make up the processing and memory of modern computers.20
    A chip is “a device consisting of a number of connected circuit elements, such as
    transistors and resistors, fabricated on a single chip of silicon crystal or other
    16
    See, e.g., id. §§ 1, 3.
    17
    Id. § 3.1(a).
    18
    Id. § 1.13; see also id. § 1.6 (defining “Integrated Circuit”).
    19
    See Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 98 (defining “chip” by referring to “integrated circuit”); id. at 277
    (defining “integrated circuit”); Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 67 (“An integrated circuit is . . . [a]lso called:
    chip.’”); id. ¶ 240 (“Based on the foregoing, one in the industry would conclude that 1.6(a)
    is a definition of what is conventionally known as a chip, or integrated circuit—the term
    sought to be defined.”). Both Sanyo and Intel have served expert reports that provide the
    parties’ views on technical aspects of the Cross License. See Pl.’s Ex. 1; Pl.’s Ex. 2.
    20
    See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 70.
    5
    semiconductor materials.”21 The silicon portion of the chip is a semiconducting
    substrate.22      The silicon is typically hermetically sealed in packaging, with
    conductive leads protruding from it that enable portions of the chip to connect to
    other components.23 Chips are often mounted on printed circuit boards (“PCBs”) to
    form what are known as cards or adapters that can be plugged into a computer to
    provide additional functionality.24 Such cards and adapters include, among other
    things, wireless adapters or cards that provide computers with wireless internet
    capabilities; such adapters are sometimes referred to as WCMs.25
    21
    Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 277; accord Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 67.
    22
    See Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 472; Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 66, 184.
    23
    See Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 102–15, 203, 205.
    24
    See Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 84 (defining “card” as “[a] printed circuit board or adapter that can be
    plugged into a computer to provide added functionality or new capability,” explaining that
    “[t]hese cards provide specialized services, such as mouse support and modem capabilities,
    that are not built into the computer,” and cross-referencing “adapter, board, printed circuit
    board”); id. at 419 (defining a PCB as a “flat board made of nonconducting material, such
    as plastic of fiberglass on which chips and other electronic components are mounted”);
    Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 39 (describing Wi-Fi adapters as “products generally consist[ing] of specialty
    baseband and MAC chips assembled on a printed circuit board with other components that
    are necessary to enable Wi-Fi communications”); id. ¶ 109 (describing how an integrated
    circuit is mounted on a PCB).
    25
    See Kitchin Decl. ¶¶ 6–17; see also Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 39 (describing various Intel Wi-Fi
    adapters or cards and referring to “these wireless cards as ‘wireless communication
    modules’ or ‘WCM’”).
    6
    After executing the Cross License, Intel began producing Intel-designed,
    single-chip MAC/baseband/radio processors for Wi-Fi (the “Wi-Fi Chips”).26 The
    parties agree that the Wi-Fi Chips are Integrated Circuits under the Cross License.27
    Each Wi-Fi Chip is mounted on a wireless adapter card that plugs into a computer’s
    main system board.28 When the Wi-Fi Chip is mounted on the adapter board, or
    PCB, it forms a WCM (the “Intel WCM”).29
    26
    See Kitchin Decl. ¶¶ 11–15. “MAC” stands for medium access control, one of three
    major tasks that the highly integrated processor provides. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12. The other two task
    categories are radio frequency processing and digital signal processing. Id.
    27
    Intel concedes that the Wi-Fi card as a whole does not meet the definition of Integrated
    Circuit under the Cross License. See Pl.’s Ex. 40 at 30 (contending only that the Wi-Fi
    Chips “are Integrated Circuits,” “regardless of whether the chips support wireless functions
    and regardless of the unit of sale that Intel makes to its customers”); D.I. 109 at 29
    (“Whether the wireless adapter as a whole constitutes an Integrated Circuit is beside the
    point.”); id. at 35 (“Intel does not contend that the license grant of Section 3.1 extends to
    ‘Wireless Communication Modules.’”).
    28
    See, e.g., Kitchin Decl. ¶¶ 11–16 (describing an Intel WCM as having a Wi-Fi Chip
    mounted on the adapter’s PCB); Pl.’s Ex. 32 ¶ 41 (noting that “an Intel-WiFi chip is
    mounted onto a printed circuit board . . . on the Intel 7265 Wi-Fi adapter”).
    29
    See Kitchin Decl. ¶¶ 11–16; Pl.’s Ex. 32 ¶ 41.
    7
    Intel has produced multiple generations of Intel WCMs and sells them to
    Lenovo to provide Wi-Fi functionality in Lenovo computers.30 Below is an image
    of the inside of a 2017 Lenovo Thinkpad T470 laptop computer.31 The red circle
    highlights the Intel WCM, specifically an Intel Dual Band Wireless-AC 8265
    wireless adapter.32
    30
    See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 38–39; Def.’s Ex. 10.
    31
    Kitchin Decl. ¶ 16.
    32
    Id. The Intel Dual Band Wireless-AC 8265 wireless adapter is one generation of an Intel
    WCM, but is generally representative of all Intel WCMs.
    8
    The next images zero in on that Intel WCM: the picture on the left shows the
    Intel WCM with the adapter’s cover intact, and the picture on the right shows the
    Intel WCM with the cover removed.33 As highlighted in red, a single large Integrated
    Circuit—a Wi-Fi Chip—is mounted on the Intel WCM’s adapter board.34
    In 2011, five years after executing the Cross License, Sanyo sold a large
    portfolio of “Wi-Fi Patents” related to wireless communication to nonparty Hera
    Wireless S.A., a patent enforcement entity (“Hera”).35 In the sale, Sanyo assigned
    only those rights “as would have been held and enjoyed by [Sanyo] had th[e]
    Assignment not been made.”36 Sanyo did not specifically identify the Cross License
    33
    Id. ¶ 14.
    34
    Id.
    35
    See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 97; Def.’s Ex. 8; D.I. 108, Ex. 2; D.I. 108, Ex. 4.
    36
    D.I. 108, Ex. 4 at SANYO0006164; D.I. 108, Ex. 3 at SANYO0006161.
    9
    to Hera as an encumbrance on Sanyo’s rights.37 In exchange for the Wi-Fi Patents,
    Hera agreed to give Sanyo, inter alia, a percentage of the revenues that Hera collects
    in the future through its efforts to license and enforce the Wi-Fi Patents.38
    In August 2017, Hera and its authorized licensing company, Sisvel UK
    Limited (“Sisvel”) sued Lenovo and other companies for patent infringement in the
    United States District Court for the District of Delaware.39 Hera and Sisvel alleged
    that Lenovo products that use Wi-Fi Chips in Intel WCMs infringe nine of the Wi-
    Fi Patents that Hera acquired from Sanyo.40 The suit specifically identifies and
    37
    See Def.’s Ex. 17 at 3 (stating that “Sanyo admits only that it did not inform Hera of the
    Cross License,” and that “Sanyo admits that Sanyo identified to Hera licensees to the
    Assigned Patents, and that Intel was not identified to Hera as a licensee”); see also D.I.
    108, Ex. 2; D.I. 108, Ex. 4.
    38
    See, e.g., Def.’s Ex. 8 § 3.1.
    39
    See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11–12; Countercl. ¶¶ 16–18. The Hera suits include the
    following: Hera Wireless SA v. Lenovo Holding Company, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17-cv01088-
    RGA (D. Del.); Hera Wireless SA v. LG Electronics, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17-cv01089-RGA
    (D. Del.); Hera Wireless SA v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17-cv-00947-RGA (D. Del.);
    Hera Wireless SA v. ARRIS Group, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17-cv-00948-RGA (D. Del.); Hera
    Wireless SA v. Belkin International, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17-cv-00949-RGA (D. Del.); Hera
    Wireless SA v. Buffalo Americas, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17-cv-00950- RGA (D. Del.); Hera
    Wireless SA v. Netgear, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17-cv-00951-RGA (D. Del.); Hera Wireless SA v.
    Roku, Inc., Civ. No. 1-17- cv-00952-RGA (D. Del.).
    40
    See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11–12; Countercl. ¶¶ 16–18. The Wi-Fi Patents are U.S. Patent
    Nos. 7,369,878; 7,454,234; 7,873,389; 7,962,103; 8,295,400; 8,412,115; 8,737,377;
    8,934,851; and 9,270,024. E.g., Countercl. ¶ 16. The lawsuit against Lenovo has been
    stayed pending completion of inter partes review proceedings at the Patent Trial and
    Appeal Board of the United States Patent and Trademark Office regarding eight of the nine
    asserted patents. To date, all challenged claims have been found unpatentable, and Hera
    has appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Counsel
    Decl. ¶¶ 19–20; Def.’s Ex. 18.
    10
    accuses nine generations of Intel WCMs that use Wi-Fi Chips as the source of
    infringement.41
    Intel later learned that Sanyo had never informed Hera about the existence or
    terms of the Cross License.42 Intel brought the Cross License to Hera’s attention and
    asked Hera to dismiss the claims targeting any Lenovo computer that is equipped
    with an Intel WCM that includes a Wi-Fi Chip. Intel reasoned that the Cross License
    authorized Intel to sell to Lenovo Intel WCMs that include Wi-Fi Chips and that,
    because the Wi-Fi Chips substantially embody the claims under Hera’s infringement
    theory, the patents were exhausted as to Lenovo computers using the Wi-Fi Chips.43
    Hera refused to dismiss the claims.44
    41
    See, e.g., Def.’s Ex. 10.
    42
    See Def.’s Ex. 17 at 3.
    43
    See Def.’s Ex. 19. The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits the patent rights that survive
    the initial authorized sale of a patented item and the patentee’s right to control what others
    can do with an article embodying or containing an invention. Under the doctrine, “the
    initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.” Quanta
    Comput. Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 
    553 U.S. 617
    , 625 (2008). However, “[e]xhaustion is
    triggered only by a sale authorized by the patent holder.” 
    Id. at 636
    . Thus, “if a patentee
    has not given authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the patentee’s
    rights.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Collegium NF, LLC, 
    2019 WL 2525399
    , at *4 (D. Del.
    June 19, 2019) (quoting Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 
    137 S. Ct. 1523
    ,
    1535 (2017)). But if authorized, the sale exhausts the patentee’s monopoly over the item
    and gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to use or resell that article. See
    Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 
    569 U.S. 278
    , 283 (2013).
    44
    See Def.’s Ex. 20.
    11
    In February 2018, Intel raised the issue with Sanyo and invoked the Cross
    License’s dispute resolution procedures.45        Intel and Sanyo met three times,
    including once with a mediator.46 The parties’ efforts were unsuccessful.
    Sanyo filed this action in October 2018.47 In September 2019, Sanyo filed the
    operative amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint”).48 Count I seeks a
    declaratory judgment of the parties’ rights under the Cross License, specifically
    requesting an order that the Cross License does not authorize Intel to make or sell
    WCMs and that any of Intel’s customers’ products incorporating Intel’s WCMs are
    not licensed or authorized under the Cross License.49 Count II asserts a claim for
    intentional interference with performance of contract by a third party, specifically
    Hera.50        Count III asserts a claim for intentional interference with another’s
    performance of his own contract.51 Count IV asserts a claim for trespass to chattels.52
    And Count V seeks reformation of the Cross License “[i]n the event that it is
    45
    See Def.’s Ex. 21.
    46
    See id.; D.I. 109 at 16.
    47
    D.I. 1.
    48
    See generally Am. Compl.
    49
    
    Id.
     ¶¶ 120–48.
    50
    
    Id.
     ¶¶ 149–56.
    51
    
    Id.
     ¶¶ 157–67.
    52
    
    Id.
     ¶¶ 168–79.
    12
    determined that the Cross License [], as written, licenses Intel to make and sell
    WCM.”53
    Intel filed its Answer and Counterclaim in October 2019.54 Count I alleges
    that Sanyo breached the Cross License by assigning the Wi-Fi Patents to Hera.55
    Count II seeks a declaratory judgment that the Wi-Fi Patents are subject to the Cross
    License; that Intel’s Integrated Circuits, specifically the Wi-Fi Chips that perform
    wireless communication functionality, are licensed under the Cross License; and
    that, therefore, the Cross License does not foreclose the production and sale of Intel
    WCMs.56
    After substantial discovery, the parties turned to summary judgment to resolve
    the pending claims. The parties filed and briefed cross motions on Count I of the
    Counterclaim, concerning whether Sanyo’s Hera assignment breached the Cross
    License.57 The parties also filed and briefed cross motions on Count I of the
    Amended Complaint and Count II of the Counterclaim, concerning whether Intel’s
    Wi-Fi Chips are licensed under the Cross License when used in Intel WCMs.58 In
    53
    Id. ¶ 186; see also id. ¶¶ 180–85, 187.
    54
    See generally Countercl.
    55
    Id. ¶¶ 60–77.
    56
    Id. ¶¶ 78–87.
    57
    See D.I. 108; D.I. 128; D.I. 133; D.I. 139.
    58
    See D.I. 109; D.I. 122; D.I. 134; D.I. 143.
    13
    particular, Intel moved on the grounds that the Wi-Fi Chips that are sold to Lenovo
    as a component of Intel WCMs are licensed;59 Sanyo cross-moved on the grounds
    that “Intel does not have a license [to] sell Wi-Fi adapters or Wi-Fi chips as
    components of Wi-Fi adapters under Section 3.1 of the Cross License.”60 Finally,
    Intel sought summary judgment on Count V of the Amended Complaint, contending
    that Sanyo’s reformation claim is barred by the Cross License’s integration clause.61
    The parties briefed these motions (the “Motions”) as of November 3.62
    I heard argument on the Motions on November 18.63 I took the Motions under
    advisement only with respect to the Cross License’s scope and the availability of
    reformation.64 The remaining issues depend at least in part on the outcome of this
    decision and therefore remain pending.65
    59
    D.I. 109, Mot.
    60
    D.I. 122, Mot.
    61
    See D.I. 109.
    62
    See D.I. 109; D.I. 122; D.I. 134; D.I. 143.
    63
    See D.I. 155 [hereinafter “Hr’g Tr.”].
    64
    Id. 69–70.
    65
    After argument, I concluded that judicial economy would be best served by handling the
    remaining issues in phases. Today, I adopt Intel’s reading of the Cross License and
    conclude its integration clause does not bar reformation. The next phase of litigation will
    focus on the parties’ negotiation history and whether there are genuine issues of material
    fact that preclude summary judgment on reformation, as well as whether Sanyo breached
    the Cross License via the Hera assignment and its involvement or lack of involvement in
    the underlying infringement litigation. See Hr’g Tr. 69–71. A scheduling conference is
    set in the coming weeks.
    14
    II.      ANALYSIS
    Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of
    material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.66
    Where the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment and
    have not presented argument to the Court that there is an issue of fact
    material to the disposition of either motion, the Court shall deem the
    motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits
    based on the record submitted with the motions.67
    In cases involving questions of contract interpretation, like this one, the Court will
    grant summary judgment in two scenarios: (1) when the contract is unambiguous,
    or (2) when the extrinsic evidence fails to create a triable issue of material fact.68
    Accordingly, “[s]ummary judgment is the proper framework for enforcing
    unambiguous contracts because there is no need to resolve material disputes of
    fact.”69
    The parties dispute whether the Cross License, as written, licenses Wi-Fi
    Chips when mounted on cards or adapters, as in an Intel WCM. The parties agree
    that the Cross License’s language is clear and unambiguous and that there are no
    66
    Ct. Ch. R 56(c).
    67
    Id. 56(h).
    68
    E.g., GRT, Inc. v. Marathon GTF Tech., Ltd., 
    2012 WL 2356489
    , at *4 (Del. Ch.
    June 21, 2012).
    69
    HIFN v. Intel Corp., 
    2007 WL 1309376
    , at *9 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
    15
    genuine disputes of material fact.70 Thus, the Cross License’s scope, the parties’
    rights thereunder, and reformation’s availability as a remedy based on the Cross
    License’s plain language are suited for resolution on the Motions.
    A.      Section 3.1 Of The Cross License Permits Intel To Use Wi-Fi
    Chips In Intel WCMs.
    The parties’ cross motions pose the question of whether Intel has engaged in
    a licensed activity by placing the Wi-Fi Chips on adapter boards to form Intel
    WCMs.71 Section 3.1(a) permits Intel to “make, use, sell (directly and/or indirectly),
    offer to sell, import and otherwise dispose of all Intel Licensed Products.”72 Section
    1.13 defines “Intel Licensed Product” as “any product that constitutes an Integrated
    Circuit, and that if sold, is sold by Intel or an Intel Licensed Subsidiary as its own
    product . . . and not on behalf of another, provided that Intel Licensed Product shall
    not include any Sanyo Proprietary Product.”73
    I conclude that the Wi-Fi Chips are and remain Intel Licensed Products when
    used or disposed of on an adapter board to form Intel WCMs. I also conclude that
    the Cross License broadly permits Intel to use or dispose of the Wi-Fi Chips, and
    70
    See Hr’g Tr. 68–69.
    71
    See, e.g., 
    id.
     45–46.
    72
    Cross License § 3.1(a).
    73
    Id. § 1.13.
    16
    that mounting them on adapter cards, even for eventual sale, is such a permitted use
    or disposal.
    1.    The Wi-Fi Chips Are Intel Licensed Products
    Under Section 1.13.
    The parties’ dispute centers on the proper reading of Section 1.13’s phrase
    “any product that constitutes an Integrated Circuit,” and the object or “product” it
    encompasses.        The primary issue is whether the “product that constitutes an
    Integrated Circuit” is the Wi-Fi Chip regardless of its installation in an Intel WCM,
    or the Intel WCM as a unit.74 I conclude that the “product” is the Wi-Fi Chip, not
    the Intel WCM. The rest of Section 1.13’s requirements readily apply to the Wi-Fi
    Chip.
    a.    Under Section 1.13, The Wi-Fi Chip Is A
    “Product.”
    Hera’s infringement allegations against Intel focus on the alleged misuse of
    the Wi-Fi Chips contained in Intel WCMs, not the Intel WCMs as a whole. Intel
    therefore seeks summary judgment on the grounds that the Wi-Fi Chips are licensed,
    asserting that a Wi-Fi Chip is a “product that constitutes an Integrated Circuit” even
    when a part of an Intel WCM, such that Section 3.1’s license encompasses the Wi-
    Fi Chips that are sold as components of Intel WCMs. Intel does not assert that Intel
    74
    Id.
    17
    WCMs themselves qualify as an Integrated Circuit or Intel Licensed Product, nor
    that Intel WCMs are licensed under the agreement.75
    Sanyo presses that the “product” under Section 1.13 is the Intel WCM as a
    whole, not the Wi-Fi Chip as a component. Under that theory, Sanyo concludes that
    the license does not encompass Intel WCMs. Sanyo’s argument is incongruent with
    the underlying infringement dispute, and, more importantly, is unsupported by the
    plain language of the Cross License.
    The plain meaning of Section 1.13 indicates that the “product” in question is
    the Wi-Fi Chip, in isolation or as a component of an Intel WCM. Section 1.13
    broadly includes “any product” in the definition of Intel Licensed Product, so long
    as it “constitutes an Integrated Circuit.”76 Merriam-Webster defines “product” as
    “something produced.”77 Intel produces Wi-Fi Chips.78 Therefore, the Wi-Fi Chip
    is a “product” under the Cross License’s plain terms, even as a component of an Intel
    WCM. Other sections of the Cross License use the term “product” according to its
    75
    See D.I. 109 at 27; D.I. 134 at 8–9.
    76
    Cross License § 1.13 (emphasis added).
    77
    Product,     Merriam-Webster        Online     Dictionary,     https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/product (last visited February 25, 2021).
    78
    See also Produce, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/produce (last visited February 25, 2021) (defining “produce” as
    “to compose, create, or bring out by intellectual or physical effort” or “to make available
    for public exhibition or dissemination”).
    18
    common and ordinary meaning of “something produced,” and use it to refer to
    components of a larger product.79
    Sanyo tries to muddy this straightforward conclusion with three unsuccessful
    arguments. First, Sanyo argues that this plain definition of “product” would render
    Section 3.6 of the Cross License ambiguous. Section 3.6(h) provides in part that
    79
    Section 1.33 defines “Sanyo Proprietary Product.” Cross License § 1.33. The definition
    includes “CCB Circuitry” and further defines that term to mean certain “circuit blocks”
    and “circuitry.” Id. Circuitry is a component integrated into a larger product (e.g., a
    semiconductor chip), yet it qualifies as a “Sanyo Proprietary Product.” Section 1.33 also
    notes that “CCB Circuitry” “shall not include any other product or circuitry.” Id. The
    language “other product” in the definition of “CCB Circuitry” makes clear that CCB
    Circuitry is itself a product.
    Section 1.13 provides, “Intel Licensed Product shall not include any Sanyo
    Proprietary Product.” Id. § 1.13. This language contemplates that one product could
    include another absent such a prohibition.
    And Section 3.3(b) provides that “[t]he Parties understand and acknowledge that a
    Party’s Licensed Products may consist of firmware and drivers.” Id. § 3.3(b). Thus, the
    term “product” refers to “firmware” and “drivers,” which are components of an Integrated
    Circuit. And while Sanyo attempts to circumvent Section 3.3’s illustration by arguing that
    firmware and drivers are supplied separately from an Integrated Circuit, Section 3.3(b) says
    no such thing. Instead, the provision describes distributing firmware and drivers using a
    “single master copy” without requiring separate shipments. Section 1.6 makes clear that
    such firmware and drivers can be “shipped with such integrated unit(s) and/or circuit(s).”
    Id. § 1.6. Contrary to Sanyo’s reading, Section 3.3(b) shows the term “product” may extend
    to components of a larger object.
    Finally, the Cross License contains another example of licensing a part of a whole
    where other parts of that whole may not be licensed. The last sentence of Section 1.6
    explains that “if an integrated unit contains circuitry that satisfies the above definition but
    also contains circuitry that would satisfy the definition of Solar Cell, Liquid Crystal
    Display or Electroluminescence Display, only that circuitry within the integrated unit that
    satisfies the above definition shall be deemed an Integrated Circuit.” Id. Accordingly, that
    circuitry does not lose its status as an Integrated Circuit and its associated rights simply
    because it is one component in a larger scheme.
    19
    Intel will grant a license to any entity that Sanyo divests so long as the divested
    entity’s “cumulative net sales of products that constitute Sanyo Licensed Products”
    in the previous year does not exceed three billion dollars.80 As with Intel Licensed
    Product, the Cross License defines Sanyo Licensed Product as “any product that
    constitutes an Integrated Circuit.”81 Sanyo argues that using the common and
    ordinary meaning of “product” in applying Section 3.6(h) would make it
    “impossible” to determine net sales of Sanyo Licensed Products under that section
    because a component part, like a Wi-Fi Chip sold as part of an adapter—does not
    “have a price per unit.”82
    Sanyo’s argument is flawed in two respects. First, it presupposes that a
    Licensed Product under the Cross License must, or certainly will, be sold. As
    explained in more detail infra, the Cross License licenses actions in addition to sales.
    Sections 1.13 and 3.1 contemplate a sale as a possibility, but do not require it.
    Second, Sanyo’s argument ignores the fact that a product within a component can
    have independent value, and that the value of the larger object in which it is
    incorporated can be apportioned to each of its components. As Sanyo’s corporate
    representative acknowledged, “Integrated Circuits” sold in retail packages,
    80
    Cross License § 3.6(h)(1)(i).
    81
    Id. § 1.30.
    82
    D.I. 122 at 4, 42–43.
    20
    including other items such as fans and heat sinks, would nevertheless be licensed,83
    even though such sales would require the very apportionment exercise that Sanyo
    deems impossible.
    Sanyo’s second argument against the common and ordinary meaning of the
    term “product” is that it renders part of the definition of “Integrated Circuit” in
    Section 1.6 meaningless. Section 1.6 offers two definitions of an Integrated Circuit.
    The first, Section 1.6(a), undisputedly encompasses a standalone Wi-Fi Chip.84
    Section 1.6(b) provides an additional definition of “an integrated unit” that (1)
    “consist[s] of one or more units falling within the terms of Section l.6(a), on one or
    more substrates”; (2) “has associated with such integrated unit conductive leads,
    and/or conductive pads, and/or conductive traces and/or wire bonds and/or
    conductive bumps and/or solder balls”; and (3) is “sealed in one package; or
    physically integrated and sold as a unit primarily comprising a circuit assembly, the
    material function of which is to perform general computing tasks . . . and/or to store
    data . . . .”85 Sanyo contends equating a Wi-Fi Chip with a “product,” rather than
    83
    See Pl.’s Ex.16 at 162–163.
    84
    Cross License § 1.6(a) (defining “Integrated Circuit” as “an integrated unit comprising
    one or more active and/or passive circuit elements associated on one or more
    semiconductor substrates, such unit forming, or contributing to the formation of, a circuit
    for performing electrical functions (including, if provided therewith, housing and/or
    supporting means)”).
    85
    Id. § 1.6(b)(1)–(3); see also id. § 1.6 (“The definition of ‘Integrated Circuit’ shall also
    include, without limitation, any and all firmware, microcode and drivers, if needed to cause
    such integrated unit(s) and/or circuit(s) to perform substantially all of its (their) intended
    21
    limiting “product” to the larger assembly containing the Wi-Fi Chip, would render
    Section 1.6(b) meaningless as “an inconsequential expansion of the license right to
    merely cover additional conventional electrical components” like the PCB.86
    But Section 1.6(b) covers assemblies of multiple chips and other technology
    that allows them to connect and cooperate, above and beyond inventions embodied
    by the single semiconductor chip defined in Section 1.6(a). Calling that singular
    chip a “product” under Section 1.13 licenses that chip as an Intel Licensed Product
    (assuming the other requirements of Section 1.13 are met). Licensing the chip does
    not transform any broader assembly of which it is a component into an Integrated
    Circuit or Intel Licensed Product. Such a broader assembly is licensed only if it
    meets other licensing requirements, like those in Section 1.6(b). Invoking the plain
    and ordinary meaning of “product” in Section 1.13 does not render Section 1.6(b)’s
    definition of Integrated Circuit meaningless.
    Finally, Sanyo is correct that an Intel WCM is a “product” in that it is
    something Intel produces. But Intel WCMs can be products, and their component
    Wi-Fi Chips can also be products; either can only be an Intel Licensed Product by
    “constitut[ing] an Integrated Circuit” and meeting the other requirements of Section
    hardware functionality, whether or not such firmware, microcode or drivers are shipped
    with such integrated unit(s) and/or circuit(s) or are installed at a later time.”).
    86
    D.I. 122 at 41.
    22
    1.13.87 Nothing in the plain language mandates limiting “product” to the Intel
    WCM, to the exclusion of its component Wi-Fi Chip.
    b.     The Wi-Fi Chips Satisfy Section 1.13’s
    Other Requirements.
    Having determined that a Wi-Fi Chip is a “product” under Section 1.13, the
    other provisions of that Section readily apply. First, Wi-Fi Chips “constitute[] an
    Integrated Circuit.”88 In Sanyo’s words, the parties agree that this language means
    that “the product must be or is an Integrated Circuit.”89 They also agree Wi-Fi Chips
    are Integrated Circuits.90           The plain meaning of “constitutes” supports this
    equivalency. Merriam-Webster defines “constitute” as “make up, form, compose.”91
    “Constitute,” “compose,” and “comprise” are interchangeable;92 other synonyms for
    “constitute” include “form, make up.”93 “Compose” means “to form by putting
    87
    See Cross License § 1.13; see also Hr’g Tr. 17 (“The wireless adapter can be a product
    and also the chip itself is a product. And what we know is that Intel’s chips constitute an
    Integrated Circuit and would be licensed under the plain language of the cross license.”).
    88
    Cross License § 1.13.
    89
    Hr’g Tr. 38; see also id. 21–22, 39.
    90
    See id. 32; see also id. 18, 20, 29.
    91
    Constitute,   Merriam-Webster       Online    Dictionary,     https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/constitute (last visited February 25, 2021) (offering as examples
    that “12 months constitute a year,” that “high school dropouts . . . constitute a major
    problem in large city slums,” that “[w]omen constitute 70 percent of the student
    population at the college,” and that “nine players constitute a baseball team”).
    92
    See Comprise, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/comprise (last visited February 25, 2021).
    93
    Constitute, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, supra note 91 (listing synonyms).
    23
    together” or “to form by the substance of.”94 “Make up” means “to form by fitting
    together or assembling” or “to combine to produce (a sum or whole).”95 And “form”
    means “to serve to make up or constitute : be an essential or basic element of.”96
    Therefore, a Wi-Fi Chip “constitutes an Integrated Circuit” and is a “product that
    constitutes an Integrated Circuit” under Section 1.13.97
    94
    Compose,     Merriam-Webster       Online     Dictionary,   https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/compose (last visited February 25, 2021).
    95
    Make Up, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/make%20up (last visited February 25, 2021).
    96
    Form,     Merriam-Webster         Online     Dictionary,         https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/form (last visited February 25, 2021).
    97
    Sanyo contends that by adopting the plain meaning of the term “constitutes,” Intel reads
    the word “product” out of the definition of Intel Licensed Product. D.I. 122 at 4. Sanyo
    contends that “Intel is effectively rewriting the definition of Intel Licensed Product to read,
    in part, ‘any product that constitutes an Integrated Circuit.’” D.I. 143 at 3. Sanyo’s position
    fails for two reasons.
    First, the Court’s analysis gives meaning to each word of Section 1.13, including
    “product” and “constitutes.” The Wi-Fi Chip is a product, and it constitutes an Integrated
    Circuit in that the sum of its parts makes up an Integrated Circuit. See Constitute, Merriam-
    Webster Online Dictionary, supra note 91 (offering as an example that “12 months
    constitute a year,” indicating that a whole is constituted by the sum of its parts). The plain
    meaning of the term supports this equivalency.
    Second, Section 1.6 undermines Sanyo’s position that the language of Section 1.13
    “forecloses sale of Integrated Circuits as a component of a product.” D.I. 122 at 47.
    Reading the Cross License as a whole indicates that the parties drafted Section 1.13 to read
    “any product that constitutes an Integrated Circuit” to account for Section 1.6(b), which
    allows a “product” with multiple parts to “constitute an Integrated Circuit. See Cross
    License § 1.6(b). By drafting Section 1.13 to read “any product that constitutes an
    Integrated Circuit,” rather than “any Integrated Circuit,” the parties built in necessary
    leeway to address inventions, present and future, that may satisfy the pluralities of Section
    1.6(b).
    24
    Next, Section 1.13 mandates “that if sold,” the product constituting the
    Integrated Circuit must be “sold by Intel or an Intel Licensed Subsidiary as its own
    product . . . and not on behalf of another.”98 Sanyo contends that Intel cannot
    reconcile its interpretation of “product” with this language in Section 1.13 because
    Intel sells Intel WCMs, not Wi-Fi Chips as standalone products. But the plain
    language of Section 1.13 does not require that any product thereunder be sold, and
    is not confined to products that are in fact sold by Intel. Instead, Section 1.13
    requires that Intel sell any product “as its own” only “if sold” at all.99 Broadly
    drafted, Section 1.13 accounts for the reality that Intel may or may not sell “any
    product that constitutes an Integrated Circuit.” As discussed below, this reading is
    consistent with Section 3.1(a).100
    Finally, Section 1.13 requires that the “Intel Licensed Product shall not
    include any Sanyo Proprietary Product.”101 There is no dispute that each of Intel’s
    Wi-Fi Chips has no circuitry or other technology related to any “Sanyo Proprietary
    Product” as identified and defined in Section 1.33 of the Cross License. Each Wi-
    98
    Cross License § 1.13 (emphasis added).
    99
    Id.
    100
    Even if I were to conclude that the Wi-Fi Chips are technically “sold” when sold as a
    component of Intel WCMs, the chips would satisfy this requirement of Section 1.13: the
    Wi-Fi Chips are proprietary to Intel and are sold with Intel’s logo, as components of larger
    adapters which are also proprietary to Intel and sold with Intel’s logo.
    101
    Cross License § 1.13.
    25
    Fi Chip uses a proprietary Intel design.102 Because the Wi-Fi Chips do not include
    any Sanyo Proprietary Product, they satisfy that requirement of Section 1.13.
    The Wi-Fi Chips are products that constitute Integrated Circuits and do not
    include any Sanyo Proprietary Product. Hence, the Wi-Fi Chips are Intel Licensed
    Products under Section 1.13 and are licensed under Section 3.1.
    2.     Under Section 3.1, Intel May “Use” Or
    “Otherwise Dispose Of” The Wi-Fi Chips As
    Components Of Intel WCMs.
    The next issue is whether using the Wi-Fi Chips in Intel WCMs fits into one
    of the permissible actions under Section 3.1. Intel does not sell Wi-Fi Chips
    individually; it sells them as components of Intel WCMs. Section 3.1(a) permits
    Intel to “make, use, sell (directly and/or indirectly), offer to sell, import and
    otherwise dispose of all Intel Licensed Products.”103 I conclude that placing Wi-Fi
    Chips on adapter boards to form Intel WCMs is licensed as “us[ing]” or “otherwise
    dispos[ing] of” the Wi-Fi Chips.104
    Section 3.1 grants Intel broad authority to act with respect to the Wi-Fi Chips.
    Selling the Wi-Fi chips is only one of at least six actions Intel can take. While “sale”
    may be a narrow term, the other actions are more expansive. For example, “use”
    102
    Kitchin Decl. ¶ 12.
    103
    Cross License § 3.1(a).
    104
    Id.
    26
    means “to carry out a purpose or action by means of.” 105 “Use” of an Intel
    Licensed Product, such as a Wi-Fi Chip, can encompass a number of actions,
    including incorporating it into or onto an adapter card to enable the card “to carry
    out” a wireless communication purpose or function.
    The broadest action is Section 3.1’s catchall: “or otherwise dispose of.”106
    “Dispose of” means “to get rid of,” “to deal with conclusively,” “to transfer to the
    control of another,” or “to place, distribute, or arrange, especially in an orderly
    way.”107 Synonyms include “deposit, emplace, fix, lay, place, position, put, set,
    set up, situate, stick.”108 Accordingly, by “placing” or “putting” Wi-Fi Chips on
    adapter boards to form Intel WCMs, Intel “otherwise dispose[d] of” the Wi-Fi
    Chips.
    Sanyo contends that “‘otherwise dispose of’ may mean a lot of different
    things . . . but it doesn’t mean ‘sell’” and that “the word that’s relevant here is ‘sell’
    because that’s the activity that’s at issue.”109 Sanyo’s argument that the Cross
    License forecloses the use or of disposition of Wi-Fi Chips in Intel WCMs because
    105
    Use,     Merriam-Webster         Online     Dictionary,     https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/use (last visited February 25, 2021).
    106
    Cross License § 3.1(a).
    107
    See Dispose, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,                https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/dispose (last visited February 25, 2021).
    108
    See id. (listing synonyms).
    109
    Hr’g Tr. 45.
    27
    those WCMs are then sold is unsupported by its plain terms. This argument is a
    symptom of Sanyo’s misplaced focus on Intel WCMs, rather than the Intel Licensed
    Products at issue: the Wi-Fi Chips.
    Sanyo is correct that “otherwise dispose of” does not mean sell and requires
    some distinct action under Section 3.1. The product Intel “sells” is the Intel
    WCMs.110 Sanyo skips the intermediate, yet critical, step before the sale of Intel
    WCMs: placing the Wi-Fi Chip on the adapter board for the purpose of enabling the
    adapter to carry out a wireless communication function. Other verbs govern what
    Intel does with the licensed Wi-Fi Chips it puts on adapter boards to form Intel
    WCMs. The fact that “sale” is a possible and express activity under Section 3.1 does
    not preclude licensing the potential intermediate steps of using or otherwise
    disposing of the Wi-Fi Chips. Sanyo conceded as much at argument, stating that
    Sanyo “wouldn’t necessarily take issue with the idea that [Intel] can put [a Wi-Fi
    Chip] on a card, because that might be a use, too.”111
    Sanyo also argues that the Cross License permits Intel to sell the Wi-Fi Chips
    only with certain enumerated parts, such as those enumerated in Section 1.6(b), but
    110
    See id. 37 (“Intel is not selling Integrated Circuits alone. . . . [I]f we were talking about
    selling Integrated Circuits alone, we wouldn’t be having an argument about this. What
    they’re doing is selling -- the thing that they’re doing, the thing that they’re selling, are
    these [WCMs].”).
    111
    Id. 47.
    28
    not with any type of Wi-Fi adapter card or in any WCM that is not specifically
    permitted or enumerated in the agreement.112 But the Cross License is broadly
    permissive once the Wi-Fi Chips are “used” or “disposed of.” Nothing in the Cross
    License mentions, let alone forbids, the use or disposition of Intel Licensed Products,
    such as the Wi-Fi Chips, in WCMs.113 Nothing in the Cross License strips the Wi-
    Fi Chip of its license when it is used in an Intel WCM that is eventually sold. The
    Cross License prohibited certain combinations; the final sentence of Section 1.6
    explicitly excludes Solar Cells, Liquid Crystal Displays, and Electroluminescence
    Displays from Integrated Circuits.114 The plain text of the Cross License includes
    no such carveout for WCMs.
    The Cross License’s plain terms allow Intel to use or dispose of the Wi-Fi
    Chips by placing them on an adapter board to form an Intel WCM. Intel is therefore
    entitled to summary judgment on Count I of the Amended Complaint and Count II
    of the Counterclaim.
    B.        Reformation Is Not Foreclosed By Section 6.6 Of The Cross
    License.
    Having determined that Intel’s actions are permitted under the plain text of
    the Cross License, I turn to Sanyo’s contention that reformation is appropriate here.
    112
    See id. 37–38.
    113
    See generally Cross License.
    114
    See id. § 1.6.
    29
    According to Sanyo, interpreting the Cross License to allow Intel to use Wi-Fi Chips
    in Intel WCMs that are sold is inconsistent with what the parties agreed upon in
    negotiations.115     In response, Intel contends that any claim for reformation is
    foreclosed by the integration clause in Section 6.6 of the Cross License.116 I
    conclude that Section 6.6 does not foreclose reformation.
    The Court may reform a contract “only when the contract does not represent
    the parties’ intent because of fraud, mutual mistake or, in exceptional cases, a
    unilateral mistake coupled with the other parties’ knowing silence.”117 “It is true
    that evidence of agreements and negotiations prior to the adoption of a fully
    integrated contract are admissible to establish grounds for granting or denying the
    remedy of reformation.”118 But failure of justifiable reliance is fatal to a claim for
    mutual mistake that supports reformation.119 This Court has determined that a
    115
    As explained in note 65, supra, Sanyo’s reformation argument will be addressed and
    resolved in a future opinion.
    116
    See Cross License § 6.6.
    117
    Great-W. Invs. LP v. Thomas H. Lee P’rs, L.P., 
    2011 WL 284992
    , at *11 (Del. Ch.
    Jan. 14, 2011) (quoting James River-Pennington Inc. v. CRSS Cap., Inc., 
    1995 WL 106554
    ,
    at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1995)).
    118
    T.P. Inc. v. J&D’s Pets, Inc., 
    1999 WL 135243
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 1999).
    119
    See Progressive Int’l Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
    2002 WL 1558382
    , at
    *7 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002) (stating that “sophisticated parties may not reasonably rely upon
    representations that are inconsistent with a negotiated contract, when that contract contains
    a provision explicitly disclaiming reliance upon such outside representations” and
    dismissing mistake and fraud claims given anti-reliance integration clause in the written
    contract); Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 
    788 A.2d 544
    , 555–56 (Del. Ch.
    2001) (“[W]ere we to permit plaintiffs’ use of the defendants’ prior representations . . . to
    30
    plaintiff’s reliance is unreasonable where the parties have agreed to explicit anti-
    reliance language in the terms of the governing agreement.120 In Progressive
    International Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., then-Vice Chancellor Strine
    stated,
    As a general matter, under the objective theory of contracts to which
    Delaware adheres, it is presumed that the language of a contract governs
    when no ambiguity exists. Under the objective theory, “‘intent’ does
    not invite a tour through [the plaintiff’s] cranium, with [the plaintiff] as
    the guide.” This presumption that parties will be bound by the language
    of the contracts they negotiate holds even greater force when, as here,
    the parties are sophisticated entities that bargained at arm’s length.
    More specifically, Delaware courts have held that sophisticated parties
    may not reasonably rely upon representations that are inconsistent with
    a negotiated contract, when that contract contains a provision explicitly
    disclaiming reliance upon such outside representations.121
    Delaware’s enforcement of clear anti-reliance provisions reverberates through a long
    line of cases.122 “[A] party cannot promise, in a clear integration clause of a
    defeat the clear words and purpose of the Final Agreement’s integration clause, contracts
    would not be worth the paper on which they are written.” (quoting One-O-One Enters.,
    Inc. v. Caruso, 
    848 F.2d 1283
    , 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Liberto v. Bensinger, 
    1999 WL 1313662
    , at *14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 1999) (“I believe that, just as the [plaintiff’s] innocent
    misrepresentation claim has failed in part due to unjustifiable reliance, their mutual mistake
    argument is also flawed because it was they who assumed the risk of the mistake.”).
    120
    See, e.g., Progressive Int’l Corp., 
    2002 WL 1558382
    , at *7.
    121
    
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth
    on Contracts § 3.6 (2d ed. 2000)).
    122
    See, e.g., Prairie Cap. III, L.P. v. Double E Hldg. Corp., 
    132 A.3d 35
     (Del. Ch. 2015);
    Abry P’rs V, L.P. v. F & W Acq. LLC, 
    891 A.2d 1032
     (Del. Ch. 2006); Kronenberg v. Katz,
    
    872 A.2d 568
     (Del. Ch. 2004); H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 
    832 A.2d 129
     (Del. Ch.
    2003); Progressive Int’l Corp., 
    2002 WL 1558382
    .
    31
    negotiated agreement, that it will not rely on promises and representations outside
    of the agreement and then shirk its own bargain in favor of a ‘but we did rely on
    those other representations’ . . . claim.”123
    “To be effective, a contract must contain language that, when read together,
    can be said to add up to a clear anti-reliance clause by which the plaintiff has
    contractually promised that it did not rely upon statements outside the contract’s four
    corners in deciding to sign the contract.”124 Such provisions “identify the specific
    information on which a party has relied and which foreclose reliance on other
    information.”125 “Delaware law does not require magic words.”126
    Section 6.6 of the Cross License is a standard integration clause that does not
    include clear anti-reliance language. Section 6.6 provides:
    Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire understanding
    of the Parties and their Granting Subsidiaries with respect to the subject
    matter hereof, and merges all prior oral or written communications
    between them. Neither of the Parties or their Granting Subsidiaries
    shall be bound by any conditions, definitions, warranties,
    understandings, or representations with respect to the subject matter
    hereof other than as expressly provided herein. No oral explanation or
    oral information by either Party or any Granting Subsidiary shall alter
    the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. . . .
    123
    Abry P’rs, 
    891 A.2d at 1057
    .
    124
    Prairie Cap. III, 132 A.3d at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
    Kronenberg, 
    872 A.2d at 593
    ).
    125
    
    Id.
     at 50 (citing RAA Mgmt., LLC v. Savage Sports Hldgs., Inc., 
    45 A.3d 107
    , 118–19
    (Del. 2012)).
    126
    Id. at 51.
    32
    The first sentence is a standard integration clause. The third sentence is a more
    specific integration clause, codifying the parol evidence rule and confining
    interpretation to the four corners of the Cross License. The second sentence comes
    closest to anti-reliance language, but falls short.
    While “Delaware law does not require magic words,”127 the relevant clauses
    of Section 6.6, taken together or standing alone, do not amount to clear anti-reliance
    language that forecloses Sanyo from seeking reformation. Section 6.6 does not
    include any clear or express statement that Sanyo has contractually promised that it
    did not rely upon statements outside the Cross License’s four corners.128 Nor does
    Section 6.6 identify the specific information on which Sanyo relied, which would
    foreclose Sanyo’s reliance on other information.129
    Instead, Section 6.6 reads as a “standard integration clause alone, which does
    not contain explicit anti-reliance representations and which is not accompanied by
    other contractual provisions demonstrating with clarity that [Sanyo] had agreed that
    it was not relying on facts outside the contract,” and therefore does not suffice to bar
    reliance allegations that underlie a mistake theory.130           Delaware Courts have
    concluded that similar clauses stating that the contract “contains the final and entire
    127
    Id.
    128
    See id.
    129
    See id. at 50.
    130
    Kronenberg, 
    872 A.2d at 593
    .
    33
    Agreement between the parties” and that “neither they nor their agents shall be
    bound by any terms, conditions, or representations not herein written” do not amount
    to clear anti-reliance language.131 By agreeing not to be bound “by any conditions,
    definitions, warranties, understandings, or representations with respect to the subject
    matter hereof other than as expressly provided” in the Cross License, Sanyo did not
    simultaneously promise that it would not rely on Intel’s representations and
    understandings beyond the agreement’s four corners.132 Section 6.6 does not, by
    itself, negate any argument that Sanyo justifiably relied on Intel’s representations
    during negotiations about WCMs and multi-chip adapters, and therefore does not
    foreclose Sanyo’s reformation claim.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Sanyo’s Motion is DENIED with respect to Count I of the Amended
    Complaint and Count II of the Counterclaim. Intel’s Motion is GRANTED with
    131
    Two Farms, Inc. v. Davis, Bowen & Friedel, Inc., 
    2018 WL 2714796
    , at *4 (Del. Super.
    Ct. June 4, 2018) (noting such language does not indicate that the plaintiff “contractually
    promised that it did not rely upon statements outside the contract’s four corners in deciding
    to sign the contract” (quoting Kronenberg, 
    872 A.2d at 593
    )); see also Alltrista Plastics,
    LLC v. Rockline Indus., Inc., 
    2013 WL 5210255
    , at *5–6 (Del. Super. Sept. 4, 2013)
    (denying motion to dismiss fraud claim based on anti-reliance clause in contract that stated:
    “The Agreement sets forth the entire understanding between the Parties with respect to the
    subject matter herein, and supersedes and replaces the terms of any and all prior
    discussions, agreements or understanding between the parties. There are no covenants,
    promises, agreements, warranties, representations, conditions or understandings, either
    oral or written, between the Parties with regard to the subject matter herein other than as
    set forth in the agreement.”).
    132
    Cross License § 6.6.
    34
    respect to Count I of the Amended Complaint and Count II of the Counterclaim, and
    is DENIED with respect to Count V of the Amended Complaint. The parties shall
    submit an implementing order within twenty days of this decision.
    35