Deborah Pettry and Gail Friedt v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •      IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    DEBORAH PETTRY and GAIL      )
    FRIEDT,                      )
    )
    Plaintiffs,        )
    )
    v.                      )   C.A. No. 2020-0132-KSJM
    )
    GILEAD SCIENCES, INC.,       )
    )
    Defendant.         )
    )
    )
    RICHARD C. COLLINS,          )
    )
    Plaintiff,         )
    )
    v.                      )   C.A. No. 2020-0138-KSJM
    )
    GILEAD SCIENCES, INC.,       )
    )
    Defendant.         )
    )
    )
    HOLLYWOOD POLICE OFFICERS’   )
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM,           )
    )
    Plaintiff,         )
    )
    v.                      )   C.A. No. 2020-0155-KSJM
    )
    GILEAD SCIENCES, INC.,       )
    )
    Defendant.         )
    )
    )
    ANTHONY RAMIREZ,                       )
    )
    Plaintiff,                 )
    )
    v.                               )   C.A. No. 2020-0173-KSJM
    )
    GILEAD SCIENCES, INC.,                 )
    )
    Defendant.                 )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: August 26, 2020
    Date Decided: November 24, 2020
    Blake A. Bennett, COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Brian J.
    Robbins, Stephen J. Oddo, Eric M. Carrino, ROBBINS LLP, San Diego, California;
    Counsel for Plaintiffs Deborah Pettry and Gail Friedt.
    Kurt M. Heyman, Gillian L. Andrews, HEYMAN, ENERIO, GATTUSO & HIRZEL
    LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Gustavo F. Bruckner, Daryoush Behbood, POMERANTZ
    LLP, New York, New York; Counsel for Plaintiff Richard C. Collins.
    Gregory V. Varallo, BERNSTEIN, LITOWITZ, BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware; David Wales, Alla Zayenchik, BERNSTEIN, LITOWITZ,
    BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, New York, New York; Robert D. Klausner,
    KLAUSNER, KAUFMAN, JENSEN, & LEVINSON; Counsel for Plaintiff Hollywood
    Police Officers’ Retirement System.
    Gregory V. Varallo, BERNSTEIN, LITOWITZ, BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware; Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Anne B. Beste, BOTTINI & BOTTINI,
    INC., La Jolla, California; Mark C. Molumphy, Tyson C. Redenbarger, Noorjahan
    Rahman, COTCHETT, PITRE & MCCARTHY, LLP; Counsel for Plaintiff Anthony
    Ramirez.
    Brian C. Ralston, Aaron R. Sims, David M. Hahn, POTTER, ANDERSON &
    CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; John C. Dwyer, Shannon M. Eagan, Tijana
    Brien, Christopher Vail, COOLEY LLP, Palo Alto, California; Counsel for Defendant
    Gilead Sciences, Inc.
    McCORMICK, V.C.
    Each of the five stockholder plaintiffs seeks to inspect books and records of Gilead
    Sciences, Inc. (“Gilead” or the “Company”). The stated purpose of their respective
    inspections is to investigate possible wrongdoing in connection with the Company’s
    development, marketing, and sale of HIV drugs. 1 When a stockholder seeks inspection
    for the purpose of investigating wrongdoing, the stockholder must demonstrate a credible
    basis to suspect possible wrongdoing.
    To demonstrate a credible basis, the complaint tells a story as replete with inequity
    as the biblical verse that the Company’s namesake brings to mind. 2 In 2001, Gilead
    received FDA approval for tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (“TDF”), a life-saving
    medication for persons living with HIV. TDF has generated billions in revenue for
    Gilead year after year. These revenues incentivized Gilead to protect the market for TDF
    by forestalling the market entry of generic TDF and delaying the development of
    Gilead’s safer TDF-substitute drug called tenofovir alafenamide (“TAF”). The plaintiffs
    say that there is a credible basis to suspect that Gilead violated antitrust laws, committed
    mass torts, infringed on government patents, and defrauded government programs in its
    efforts to protect the TDF market.
    In stating their credible basis, the plaintiffs join in chorus with a host of other
    accusers. Gilead’s activities have drawn lawsuits and investigations from persons living
    1
    There are two forms of HIV, HIV-1 and HIV-2, and both can develop into the most
    severe phase of HIV infection, AIDS. While acknowledging that these are extremely
    important distinctions, this decision describes Gilead’s products as “HIV” drugs or
    treatments to avoid overcomplicating an already complex set of facts.
    2
    See, e.g., Hosea 6:8.
    with HIV, activists, regulatory agencies, the Department of Justice, and Congress. As
    just one example, in 2019, activists and union benefit funds filed a class action complaint
    in federal court alleging that Gilead and its competitors violated federal and state antitrust
    laws by engaging in anticompetitive conduct to prevent competition in the market for
    TDF-based drugs. The plaintiffs in that case seek billions of dollars in damages. In
    March 2020, the federal court partially denied a motion to dismiss, allowing portions of
    the case to move forward.
    The credible basis standard is widely described as the “lowest possible burden of
    proof” under Delaware law, 3 and Gilead does not meaningfully attack the plaintiffs’
    credible basis. Gilead half-heartedly argues that the plaintiffs’ credible basis is merely an
    echo of unsubstantiated allegations made in other lawsuits and should be given no
    credence. But Gilead does not explain why a credible basis analysis should ignore
    allegations forming the basis of other lawsuits, and there is no principled ground for
    categorically disregarding such information.
    Gilead’s main strategy is to launch a number of peripheral attacks designed to chip
    away at the plaintiffs’ proper purposes. Gilead asserts a defense based on Wilkinson v. A.
    Schuman, Inc., in which this court denied inspection where the defendant proved that the
    plaintiff was a passive conduit in a purely lawyer-driven inspection effort. 4 As multiple
    subsequent decisions of this court have made clear, Wilkinson involved extreme facts,
    3
    See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Verizon Comm’ns, Inc., 
    909 A.2d 117
    , 123 (Del. 2006).
    4
    See 
    2017 WL 5289553
    , at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2017).
    2
    and Gilead’s argument that five separate plaintiffs represented by four separate sets of
    counsel committed the same blunders found in Wilkinson borders on absurd.                A
    corporation is entitled to assert defenses in a Section 220 action and probe the bona fides
    of a plaintiff’s stated purpose. In this case, however, Gilead’s pursuit of the Wilkinson
    defense raises more questions about Gilead’s purposes than the plaintiffs’.
    Gilead asserts myriad other defenses, arguing that the plaintiffs should be denied
    inspection because any follow-on derivative claims they might pursue would not pass the
    pleading stage.    Gilead peddles these points as “standing” arguments, presumably
    because this court recently rejected a series of nearly identical points when framed as
    “proper purpose” deficiencies. 5    This semantic sleight of hand is unsuccessful, and
    Gilead’s so-called “standing” arguments fare no better.
    As a fallback, Gilead makes a series of arguments concerning the scope of
    inspection, contending that inspection should be limited to formal board materials. This
    decision rejects those arguments because multiple other categories of documents are
    necessary and essential to the plaintiffs’ stated purposes.
    Regrettably, Gilead’s overly aggressive defense strategy epitomizes a trend. As
    described recently by a group of scholars, defendants are increasingly treating Section
    220 actions as “surrogate proceeding[s] to litigate the possible merits of the suit” and
    “place obstacles in the plaintiffs’ way to obstruct them from employing it as a quick and
    5
    See Lebanon Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 
    2020 WL 132752
    ,
    at *6–24 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020).
    3
    easy pre-filing discovery tool.” 6 Defendants like Gilead adopt this strategy with the
    apparent belief that there is no real downside to doing so, ignoring that this court has the
    power to shift fees as a tool to deter abusive litigation tactics. Gilead’s approach might
    call for fee shifting in this case, and the plaintiffs are granted leave to move for their
    expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred in connection with their efforts to obtain
    books and records.
    I.       FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    The facts are drawn from the factual stipulations in the parties’ pre-trial order, the
    testimony of each plaintiff (all by deposition and one also at trial), and the 262 joint trial
    exhibits submitted by the parties. 7
    A.      Gilead’s HIV Treatments
    For more than a decade, Gilead has been a leader in the discovery, development,
    and commercialization of antiretroviral therapy for HIV. 8 Some estimate that Gilead
    controls approximately 75% of the HIV drug market. 9 Millions of people depend on
    6
    James D. Cox et al., The Paradox of Delaware’s “Tools at Hand” Doctrine: An
    Empirical Investigation, 75 Bus. Law. 2123, 2150 (2020).
    7
    Unless otherwise noted, pleadings are cited by reference to items docketed in C.A. No.
    2020-0173-KSJM (“Dkt.”). Factual citations are to: the Amended Pre-Trial Stipulation
    and Order, Dkt. 101 (“PTO”); Transcripts of Depositions of Richard C. Collins, Gail
    Friedt, Deborah Pettry, Anthony E. Ramirez, and Hollywood’s Rule 30(b)(6)
    Representative, David M. Williams, Dkt. 82 (cited using the deponent’s last name and
    “Dep. Tr.”); the Trial Transcript, Dkt. 97 (“Trial Tr.”); and Joint Trial Exhibits (cited by
    “JX” number).
    8
    JX-213.
    9
    See, e.g., JX-250 at 2.
    4
    Gilead’s HIV treatments for their survival. 10 The corollary is that Gilead depends on the
    sale of HIV treatments for much of its financial survival. In 2019, for example, the sale
    of HIV treatments produced more than $16.4 billion in revenue or 73% of its top-line. 11
    A brief history of the development and commercialization of Gilead’s HIV
    treatments lays the backdrop for this lawsuit.        Gilead received Food and Drug
    Administration (“FDA”) approval for its ground-breaking HIV treatment—TDF—in
    2001. 12 Initially sold commercially as Viread, TDF was a significant improvement over
    other drugs. 13 After TDF was approved, Gilead shifted its efforts toward reducing the
    number of pills a persons infected with HIV would take daily. Gilead developed a
    combined formulation of TDF and a drug called emtricitabine that could be administered
    as a fixed-dose, once-daily tablet. 14   The result, Truvada, was approved as an HIV
    treatment in 2004. 15 Truvada was later approved for use by high-risk, uninfected adults
    as part of an HIV-preventative strategy called pre-exposure prophylaxis (“PrEP”). 16 In
    addition to Viread and Truvada, the FDA approved three of Gilead’s other TDF-based
    HIV treatments: Atripla in 2006, Complera in 2011, and Stribild in 2012. 17
    10
    See JX-213.
    11
    See JX-135 at 34.
    12
    JX-77 at 3.
    13
    See 
    id.
    14
    Id. at 4.
    15
    JX-3 at 1.
    16
    JX-26 at 1.
    17
    JX-27 at 1.
    5
    TDF poses safety risks for the patients’ kidneys and bones. 18 In 2007, Gilead
    scientists published an article discussing TDF safety issues, which identified the most
    common adverse events as including renal failure, Fanconi syndrome, and serum
    creatinine increase. 19    In 2007, Gilead updated its labeling to recognize that TDF-
    associated renal damage also causes bone softening in patients. 20 A high dose of TDF is
    typically required to achieve the desired therapeutic effect. 21 The higher the dose of
    TDF, the greater are its toxic effects. 22
    Before the FDA approved Gilead’s first TDF-based drug in 2001, Gilead had
    discovered another way of administering tenofovir—TAF. 23 TDF and TAF both deliver
    tenofovir to the target blood cells, but TAF delivers tenofovir more efficiently, which
    allows for a dose of less than one-tenth that of TDF. 24 The lower dosage in turn reduces
    toxicity levels and makes TAF safer than TDF. 25 Gilead highlighted the benefits of TAF-
    based drugs over its TDF-based drugs in a 2001 10-K, 26 and Gilead continued testing
    18
    JX-244 ¶ 215.
    19
    JX-68 ¶ 221.
    20
    Id. ¶ 224.
    21
    Id. ¶ 212.
    22
    Id.
    23
    Id. ¶ 194.
    24
    JX-68 ¶ 195; JX-41 at 1–2.
    25
    See id.
    26
    JX-68 ¶ 243 (citing Gilead Sciences, Inc., Form 10-K 13,
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/882095/000091205702011690/a2073842z10-
    k.htm).
    6
    TAF through 2004, frequently touting positive results from clinical studies on the
    market. 27
    Despite its safety benefits, Gilead shelved the development of TAF-based drugs in
    October 2004, attributing the decision to patients’ increasing use of TDF-based Viread
    and the FDA approval of TDF-based Truvada, among other things. 28
    Gilead did not renew development of TAF-based drugs until 2010, six years after
    it shelved the project. 29 Gilead did not submit a new drug application for a TAF-based
    drug until November 2014. 30 When rolling out its TAF products, Gilead repeatedly
    marketed TAF as a safer replacement for TDF. 31
    27
    Id. ¶¶ 244–48.
    28
    Id. ¶ 249 (quoting Press Release, Gilead, Gilead Discontinues Development of GS 9005
    and GS 7340; Company Continues Commitment to Research Efforts in HIV (Oct. 21, 2004),
    https://www.gilead.com/news/press-releases/2004/10/gilead-discontinues-development-
    of-gs-9005-and-gs-7340-company-continues-commitment-to-research-efforts-in-hiv).
    29
    Id. ¶ 255.
    30
    JX-35 at 1.
    31
    See, e.g., JX-40 (describing TAF as a product for patients who wanted to “replace their
    current antiretroviral treatment regimen” and touting the “safety and efficacy” of TAF,
    despite acknowledging that “TAF-based regimens are investigational products and have
    not been determined to be safe or efficacious”); JX-42 at 2 (Gilead’s then-EVP of
    Commercial Operations, Paul Carter, stating that “[Genvoya] has been launched in the
    context of HIV patient around the world who are getting older and older. And the
    average age in the US now is actually over 50 years, for an HIV patient. And HIV in
    itself causes renal issues and can have impact on bone density. And so, I think everyone
    is very happy to see that we now have a new generation of HIV single-tablet regimens
    which have a much better safety profile and tolerability and can be used for many, many
    years.”); id. (stating that Genvoya would replace Truvada as the “backbone” component
    of the combination therapies); JX-58 at 2 (Gilead’s President and CEO, John Milligan,
    stating that he hopes TAF will be the “safest gentlest, yet most powerful option”
    available to HIV patients).
    7
    Gilead expanded its TAF franchise through 2015, submitting new drug
    applications for a fixed-dose combination of emtricitabine and TAF and a single-tablet
    TAF regimen in April and July 2015, respectively. 32 The FDA approved Gilead’s TAF-
    based treatment, Genvoya, in November 2015. 33         Within two weeks of Genvoya’s
    approval, TAF became listed as a preferred treatment option under the U.S. Department
    of Health and Human Services guidelines. 34 Gilead later received approval for the TAF-
    based drugs Odefsey, Descovy, and Biktarvy. 35
    B.        Criticisms of Gilead’s Development and Commercialization of HIV
    Treatments
    Gilead’s development and commercialization of its HIV treatments has drawn
    extensive criticism from persons living with HIV, regulatory agencies, HIV activists, the
    Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), and Congress. Gilead has faced antitrust lawsuits,
    mass tort claims, patent infringement litigation, and False Claims Act investigations.
    1.    Anticompetitive Activities
    Gilead is accused of delaying the launch of generic versions of its TDF-based HIV
    treatments by entering into anticompetitive licensing agreements with several branded
    32
    See JX-39 (fixed-dose combination TAF); JX-40 (single-tablet TAF regimen).
    33
    JX-41 at 1.
    34
    See JX-42 at 2 (noting that becoming listed that quickly as a preferred treatment option
    was “unprecedented”).
    35
    See JX-47 at 1 (Odefsey); JX-49 at 1 (Descovy); JX-64 at 1 (Biktarvy); see also JX-90
    at 1 (press release announcing approval of Descovy for PrEP use). Gilead also received
    approval for certain TAF-based drugs used to treat Hepatitis B. In January 2016, Gilead
    submitted an application for TAF to treat chronic Hepatitis B. JX-45 at 1. In November
    2016, the FDA approved Vemlidy, a TAF-based regimen, for the treatment of chronic
    Hepatitis B. JX-55 at 1.
    8
    drug     manufacturers    and    collusive   settlement   agreements   with   generic   drug
    manufacturers. 36
    Gilead is regulated by multiple agencies, including the FDA. 37 After a new drug
    is approved, federal law provides certain exclusivity benefits to pharmaceutical
    companies, such as a five-year new chemical exclusivity. 38            After four years of
    exclusivity, a generic manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
    (“ANDA”) showing, among other things, that the generic drug contains the same active
    ingredients as the branded drug and does not infringe on the branded drug’s patent. 39 If
    the branded drug manufacturer brings a claim against the generic drug manufacturer for
    patent infringement within the first 45 days after the filing of the ANDA, then the FDA
    stays the ANDA until the earlier of (a) the passage of 30 months running from date that
    exclusivity ends, or (b) the issuance of a decision holding that the patent is invalid or
    there was no infringement. 40 Thus, seven and a half years is usually the longest that a
    new chemical exclusivity period will run.
    36
    See JX-244.
    37
    JX-135 at 20 (“Our operations depend on compliance with complex FDA and
    comparable international regulations. Failure to obtain broad approvals on a timely basis
    or to maintain compliance could delay or halt commercialization of our products.”).
    38
    JX-244 at ¶¶ 88–91 (citing 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 355
    (j)(5)(F)(ii), 355(c)(3)(E)(ii); 
    21 C.F.R. § 314.108
    (b)(2)). During this period, no other drug using that chemical as an active
    ingredient can obtain FDA approval.
    39
    
    Id.
     ¶¶ 73–76 (citing 
    21 U.S.C. § 355
    (j)(8)(B)).
    40
    See id. ¶¶ 78, 88–91, 280 (citing 
    21 U.S.C. § 355
    ; 
    21 C.F.R. § 314.108
    (b)(2)).
    9
    Generally, the introduction of a generic drug on the market causes price declines
    and sales erosion of branded drugs. 41      Branded drug manufacturers therefore have
    incentives to restrict and impede generics from entering the market.
    Between 2004 and 2011, Gilead entered into a number of agreements with
    branded drug manufacturers, including Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“Bristol-
    Myers”), Japan Tobacco, Inc. (“Japan Tobacco”), and Janssen R&D Ireland (“Janssen”),
    to create combination therapies that have multiple active ingredients or to license certain
    compounds for exclusive commercialization. 42 The agreements allegedly included “No-
    41
    A Federal Trade Commission study found that, on average, within one year of generic
    entry into the market, generics capture 90% of sales and prices decrease 85%. 
    Id.
     ¶ 93
    (citing FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions at 8
    (January 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-
    drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-
    study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf). Gilead has recognized the potential for sales erosion in its
    public filings. See, e.g., JX-135 at 12 (“[A]s new branded or generic products are introduced
    into major markets, our ability to maintain pricing and market share may be affected.”).
    42
    In December 2004, Gilead and Bristol-Myers formed a joint venture to develop and
    commercialize a once-daily, fixed-dose combination HIV treatment regimen later named
    Atripla. See JX-6 at 1; JX-74 ¶¶ 114–18. In March 2005, Gilead and Japan Tobacco
    entered into a licensing agreement that gave Gilead the exclusive right to develop and
    commercialize a novel HIV integrase inhibitor in all countries except Japan. JX-7 at 1.
    In July 2009 and June 2011, Gilead entered into licensing agreements with Janssen to
    develop and commercialize once-daily fixed-dose combination antiretroviral products.
    See JX-12 at 1 (press release announcing 2009 licensing agreement); JX-21 at 1 (press
    release announcing 2011 licensing agreement). (Janssen was formerly known as
    “Tibotec Pharmaceuticals.” See, e.g., JX-12; JX-21.) In December 2014, Gilead
    expanded its agreements with Janssen to allow for the development and
    commercialization of a new once-daily, single tablet regiment containing Gilead’s TAF
    and emtricitabine, and Janssen’s rilpivirine. JX-36 at 1. The agreement provided that the
    new product would be distributed by Janssen in “approximately 17 markets” and by
    Gilead in all other markets. 
    Id.
     In October 2011, Gilead entered into a licensing
    agreement with BMS to develop and commercialize a fixed-dose combination of BMS’s
    REYATAZ and Gilead’s cobicistat—later named Evotaz. See JX-24 at 1; JX-242 at 23.
    10
    Generics Restraints” barring the creation of competing versions of the combination
    therapies that use generic TDF. 43
    In 2013, Gilead entered into a settlement agreement with the largest generic
    manufacturer in the world, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (“Teva”). 44 Under the
    terms of the settlement, Teva would be prevented from launching a generic version of
    Truvada until December 2017. 45 The settlement also reduced the incentives for ANDA
    second-filers to enter the market before December 2017 because the settlement allowed
    Teva to enter the market should a second-filer gain market entry. 46
    In 2017, a group of prominent HIV activists, including Peter Staley, implored the
    New York attorney general to investigate the Teva settlement and other agreements with
    generic drug manufacturers concerning the generic production of Truvada. 47              The
    43
    JX-74 ¶¶ 89–112.
    44
    See JX-29. In 2008, Teva submitted an ANDA requesting permission to manufacture
    and commercialize a generic version of Truvada. JX-10. Teva alleged that two of the
    patents associated with Truvada were invalid, unenforceable, or would not be infringed
    by Teva’s manufacture of the product described in its ANDA. 
    Id.
     If Gilead agreed, then
    Teva could begin producing its generic product immediately. If Gilead sued for patent
    infringement within 45 days, however, Teva would be unable to produce its generic
    product until the earlier of 30 months or a district court decision that is adverse to Gilead.
    
    Id.
     Gilead sued Teva for patent infringement less than 45 days after Teva submitted its
    ANDA. See JX-11. In 2012, Lupin Limited (“Lupin”) and Cipla Ltd. (“Cipla”) both
    submitted an ANDA to manufacture and commercialize generic versions of Truvada and
    Viread, respectively. JX-32 at 23. Gilead filed patent infringement lawsuits in response
    to those ANDA submissions as well. 
    Id.
    45
    See JX-29.
    46
    See JX-74 ¶¶ 321–55.
    47
    JX-59; JX-60.
    11
    activists accused Gilead of paying generic drug manufacturers to delay launching
    generics. 48
    In May 2019, Staley and others filed a thirteen count class action complaint
    against Gilead and other companies in the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of California (the “Staley Action”). 49 The complaint alleges that Gilead and
    other branded drug manufacturers violated federal and state antitrust laws by engaging in
    anticompetitive conduct in the market for Gilead’s TDF-based drugs. 50               Several
    additional class action lawsuits followed, and they were subsequently consolidated into
    the Staley Action. 51
    The plaintiffs in the Staley Action seek billions of dollars in damages on behalf of
    a class of persons who purchased or reimbursed purchasers of HIV treatments sold by
    48
    JX-59; JX-60.
    49
    JX-74. On the same day that the Staley Action was filed, the House Committee on
    Oversight and Reform announced that it would hold a hearing to examine Gilead’s
    pricing of Truvada. See JX-75. Gilead Chairman and CEO Daniel O’Day testified at the
    hearing on May 16, 2019. See JX-77. After discussing Gilead’s contribution to the
    development of Truvada and related patents for PrEP, O’Day testified: “We priced
    Truvada, when it was originally approved, based on the price of its two component drugs,
    without adding a premium. We have increased its list price over the years at a rate
    consistent with average price increases in the industry.” JX-77, at 2, 7–8. An expert later
    testified that “Gilead insisted on valuing drug shipments based on the commercial price
    in the United States, rather than the cost of manufacturing, which was at least 300 times
    less. . . . PrEP [treatments] can be manufactured and distributed, including a profit, for
    about $6 per person per month. Gilead charges more than $2100 per person per month, a
    35000% markup.” JX-76 at 3, 2–5. On June 26, 2019, the committee sent Gilead
    requests for documents and information regarding its pricing of Truvada. JX-81.
    50
    JX-74.
    51
    See JX-255.
    12
    Gilead and the other defendants. 52 On March 3, 2020, the United States District Court
    (the “District Court”) in the Staley Action granted in part and denied in part Gilead’s
    motion to dismiss, and granted leave to amend certain of the claims that were
    dismissed. 53
    In relevant part, the District Court dismissed with leave to amend the claims that
    there was an overarching conspiracy among Gilead, Bristol-Myers, Japan Tobacco, and
    Janssen. 54 The court dismissed with prejudice the claims based on the Gilead/Japan
    Tobacco licensing agreement because the plaintiffs did not plead any specific allegations
    that “the exclusive license would be used in an anticompetitive way.” 55
    The District Court denied the motion to dismiss as to claims based on: the No-
    Generics Restraints in the Gilead/Bristol-Myers and Gilead/Janssen agreements; the Teva
    settlement agreement; and Gilead’s commercialization of TAF. 56                 As to the
    Gilead/Bristol-Myers and Gilead/Janssen agreements, the court found that a question of
    fact existed as to whether the No-Generics Restraints had sufficient anticompetitive effect
    to constitute an antitrust violation. 57 As to the Teva settlement agreement, the court cited
    52
    See JX-74 ¶ 429; see also PTO ¶ 4 (“If plaintiffs are successful in their claims, [Gilead]
    could be required to pay significant monetary damages or could be subject to permanent
    injunctive relief.”).
    53
    JX-242 at 85–87.
    54
    
    Id.
     at 15–16.
    55
    Id. at 32, 31–33.
    56
    Id. at 85–86.
    57
    Id. at 26.
    13
    several “yellow flag[s]” that could give rise to a finding of anticompetitive conduct. 58 As
    to Gilead’s delayed commercialization of TAF, the District Court found that the plaintiffs
    have “a plausible argument that there is no procompetitive justification for” it. 59
    In January 2020, a group of healthcare insurers filed a class action against Gilead
    and other companies in a Florida federal court, asserting claims substantially similar to
    those in the Staley Action. 60
    2.      Mass Torts
    Gilead is accused of intentionally withholding from the market its safer and
    potentially more effective TAF-based HIV treatments in order to extend the sales window
    for its more dangerous and less effective TDF-based treatments. 61
    As discussed above, multiple parties have alleged that Gilead shelved the
    development of TAF after receiving approval for Truvada, even though Gilead knew that
    TAF was a safer product. 62 Gilead then allegedly waited to resume development and
    58
    Id. at 41, 38–42.
    59
    Id. at 46. On April 21, 2020, the plaintiffs in the Staley Action filed an amended
    complaint, and on May 4, Gilead filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. See
    JX-175 (motion to dismiss amended complaint); JX-244 (amended complaint).
    60
    See JX-117; see also JX-118 at 3 (“The allegations are similar to those made in four
    consolidated class actions against Gilead pending in the Northern District of
    California.”).
    61
    See JX-252; see also PTO ¶ 4 (noting that “Gilead has been named as a defendant in
    product liability lawsuits related to Gilead’s HIV medications”).
    62
    See, e.g., JX-244 ¶¶ 236–98; JX-252.
    14
    commercialization of TAF-based products until the introduction of generic TDF-based
    treatments was imminent. 63
    Gilead is the subject of at least 250 tort actions pending in state and federal courts
    in California, Delaware, and Florida. The actions involve more than 15,000 plaintiffs
    claiming that Gilead’s TDF-based HIV medications caused them to suffer personal injury
    and economic loss. 64 If those claims are successful, Gilead “could be required to pay
    significant monetary damages.” 65
    3.    Patent Infringement
    Gilead is accused of infringing on government patents in the sales of its HIV PrEP
    treatments.
    The U.S. government claims that when administered as a PrEP treatment, Truvada
    and Descovy rely on patents developed by the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention (“CDC”) and owned by the U.S. government. 66
    During a May 2019 hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and
    Reform, an expert in HIV research and clinical care testified:
    The US Government is by far the majority funder of PrEP
    research. PrEP regimen selection was guided by research
    conducted by scientists at the CDC who demonstrated that
    adding emtricitabine to a tenofovir regimen increased
    protection. . . . The critically important research done by
    scientists at the CDC led to a US Government patent on the
    63
    See JX-244 ¶¶ 236–98; JX-252.
    64
    See JX-134 at 80; JX-255 at 2.
    65
    PTO ¶ 4; JX-134 at 80.
    66
    JX-73 at 1.
    15
    combined use of emtricitabine and tenofovir esters for
    PrEP. . . . Gilead Sciences did not provide leadership,
    innovation, or funding for these projects; Gilead’s role was
    limited to donating study medication and placebos. Our
    protocols were shared with Gilead, in accordance with an
    agreement between the [National Institutes of Health] and
    Gilead; I do not recall receiving any comments. 67
    On November 6, 2019, the U.S. government filed suit against Gilead. 68 The
    complaint alleges that Gilead has wrongfully denied the validity of the CDC’s patents
    and refused to obtain a license from the CDC to use the patented regimens. 69
    In February 2020, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board declined to institute
    Gilead’s petitions for inter partes review of the four U.S. government-held patents,
    finding that Gilead “has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” 70
    In April 2020, Gilead filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government related to the use
    of the same anti-HIV regimens. 71 Gilead’s complaint alleges that the CDC breached the
    67
    JX-76 at 2. The expert, Professor Robert M. Grant, is a credible source. As he
    explained to the committee, he had decades of experience “with research and clinical care
    related to HIV,” “pioneered research on PrEP that led to FDA approval in 2012 [and]
    recommendations from the CDC in 2014,” and “devoted . . . 20 years of [his] career to
    the development of PrEP.” Id.
    68
    JX-98; see also JX-99 (11/8/19 New York Times article discussing the lawsuit); JX-
    102 (11/8/19 Science Magazine article discussing the lawsuit).
    69
    Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
    70
    JX-246 at 21; JX-247 at 12.
    71
    JX-170, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. United States, 1:20-cv-00499-CFL (Fed. Cl. Apr. 24,
    2020).
    16
    agreements between the parties and the government’s patents are therefore invalid and
    unenforceable. 72
    4.    False Claims Act Violations
    Gilead is currently facing a federal investigation and civil litigation related to
    alleged violations of the False Claims Act. 73
    Under federal law, drug companies cannot provide direct copayment assistance to
    patients covered by Medicare. 74 Drug companies are permitted to donate to charities that
    help Medicare patients, so long as the companies’ donations do not exert sway over the
    nonprofit’s operations. 75 If a drug company uses donations to encourage a nonprofit to
    promote the company’s products, however, that conduct may violate anti-kickback
    laws. 76
    On May 27, 2016, Gilead received a subpoena from the U.S. Attorney for the
    District of Massachusetts seeking documents related to the Company’s relationship with
    nonprofits that provide financial assistance to patients. 77 Corporate disclosures “describe
    an expanding investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office” into Gilead and other
    72
    Id. ¶¶ 1–21.
    73
    See JX-50; JX-88.
    74
    JX-51 at 1.
    75
    Id.
    76
    Id.
    77
    JX-50.
    17
    pharmaceutical companies’ potential kickback violations. 78 In December 2017, one of
    the companies agreed to pay $210 million to resolve the Justice Department’s claims. 79
    C.     The Inspection Demands
    The plaintiffs are Deborah Pettry, Gail Friedt, Richard C. Collins, Hollywood
    Police Officers’ Retirement System (“Hollywood”), and Anthony Ramirez (collectively,
    “Plaintiffs”). Each Plaintiff made a written demand on Gilead to inspect and copy certain
    books and records of the Company pursuant to Section 220 (collectively, the
    “Demands”). 80 The Demands sought to investigate possible wrongdoing in connection
    with aspects of the development and commercialization of Gilead’s HIV treatments. 81
    78
    JX-51.
    79
    JX-61. Gilead is also facing a qui tam action alleging False Claims Act violations
    related to the Company’s TDF- and TAF-based Hepatitis-B treatments. JX-88. On
    September 19, 2019, a group of plaintiffs filed a second amended qui tam complaint
    against Gilead in Pennsylvania federal court, alleging multiple violations of the anti-
    kickback provisions of the False Claims Act. See id. ¶¶ 1, 12–13. The complaint alleges
    that Gilead used its speaker program and other methods to encourage healthcare
    providers to write prescriptions for Gilead’s name-brand drugs as opposed to generics.
    Id. ¶¶ 1–6. In particular, the complaint alleges that Gilead used illegal kickbacks to
    encourage healthcare providers to transition patients from Viread, a TDF-based drug that
    was about to face generic competition, to Vemlidy, its new TAF-based drug. Id. ¶¶ 30–
    35.
    80
    See JX-103 (Collins’s 12/2/19 inspection demand); JX-114 (Collins’s 1/13/20 reply to
    Gilead’s initial response); JX-128 (Collins’s 2/18/20 supplemental demand); JX-108
    (Pettry’s 12/30/19 inspection demand); JX-113 (Friedt’s 1/8/20 inspection demand); JX-
    120 (Pettry and Friedt’s 1/29/20 consolidated reply to Gilead’s initial response); JX-123
    (Ramirez’s 2/4/20 inspection demand); JX-136 (Ramirez’s 2/27/20 reply to Gilead’s
    initial response); JX-124 (Hollywood’s 2/10/20 inspection demand).
    81
    See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
    18
    Gilead declined to provide even a single document in response to any of the
    Demands, taking the position that each Demand was unfounded and deficient. 82
    D.     This Litigation
    Each Plaintiff filed suit under Section 220 to enforce their inspection rights, with
    Pettry and Friedt filing a joint complaint. 83 Gilead answered the complaints. 84
    Gilead requested that the court enter and order requiring Plaintiffs to coordinate
    their efforts,85 and the parties stipulated to a coordinated schedule and approach to
    discovery. 86
    Gilead served interrogatories on, sought documents from, and moved to compel
    discovery from Plaintiffs. 87 Gilead also deposed each Plaintiff.88
    82
    See JX-106 (Gilead’s 12/10/19 response to Collins’s initial demand); JX-130 (Gilead’s
    2/25/20 response to Collins’s supplemental demand); JX-115 (Gilead’s 1/15/20 response
    to Pettry’s demand); JX-116 (Gilead’s 1/15/20 response to Friedt’s demand, containing
    multiple mistaken references to “Ms. Pettry” as opposed to “Ms. Friedt”); JX-126
    (Gilead’s 2/14/20 response to Pettry and Friedt’s 1/29/20 communication); JX-125
    (Gilead’s 2/11/20 response to Ramirez’s 2/4/20 demand); JX-139 (Gilead’s 3/2/20
    response to Ramirez’s 2/27/20 communication); JX-127 (Gilead’s 2/18/20 response to
    Hollywood’s demand); JX-131 (Gilead’s 2/25/20 rejection of Hollywood’s invitation to
    meet and confer).
    83
    See JX-132; JX-137; JX-140; JX-141; see also JX-129.
    84
    JX-142; JX-144; JX-261; JX-262.
    85
    Dkt. 5, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. for Expedited Proceedings at 5–6 (“Gilead
    respectfully submits that the Court should enter an order coordinating the actions.”).
    86
    Dkt. 8, Stipulation and Appointment of Counsel and Case Scheduling Order.
    87
    See JX-147 (Def.’s First Set of Interrogs. Directed to Pls.); JX-148 (Def.’s First Set of
    Reqs. for Produc. of Docs. Directed to Pls.); Dkt. 38, Def.’s Mot. to Compel Disc. from
    Pls. Plaintiffs provided Defendants with responses and supplemental responses to these
    requests. See JX-155; JX-156; JX-157; JX-158; JX-159; JX-160; JX-161; JX-162; JX-
    163; JX-167; JX-169.
    19
    Gilead fought discovery directed to it and moved for a protective order, which the
    court denied. 89
    The court held trial on June 23, 2020, and the parties completing post-trial briefing
    on August 26, 2020.
    II.      LEGAL ANALYSIS
    To inspect books and records under Section 220, a plaintiff must establish by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is a stockholder, has complied with the
    statutory form and manner requirements for making a demand, and has a proper purpose
    for conducting the inspection. 90       If a stockholder meets these requirements, the
    stockholder must then establish “that each category of the books and records requested is
    essential and sufficient to the stockholder’s stated purpose.” 91
    Gilead disputes two of these requirements, arguing that Plaintiffs lack proper
    purposes and have failed to justify the scope of their inspections. Gilead also raises what
    it refers to as “standing” issues, arguing that Plaintiffs must overcome defenses to
    anticipated derivative claims in order to have standing to enforce their rights in this
    88
    See Dkt. 82.
    89
    See Dkt. 17, Def.’s Mot. for Protective Order; Dkt. 65, May 8, 2020 Oral Arg. re Def.’s
    Mot. for Protective Order and the Ct.’s Ruling; see also JX-164 (Def’s. Responses and
    Objs. to Pls.’ Am. First Set of Interrogs. Directed to Def. Gilead Sciences, Inc.); JX-149
    (Pls.’ Am. Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. of Def. Gilead Sciences, Inc.).
    90
    See 8 Del. C. § 220(c); Cent. Laborers Pension Fund v. News Corp., 
    45 A.3d 139
    , 144
    (Del. 2012); Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 
    132 A.3d 752
    , 775 (Del. Ch. 2016),
    abrogated on other grounds by Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., 
    214 A.3d 933
     (Del. 2019).
    91
    Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 
    681 A.2d 1026
    , 1035 (Del. 1996) (citing
    Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 
    525 A.2d 160
    , 167 (Del. Ch.
    1987)).
    20
    Section 220 action.        Gilead’s so-called “standing” arguments in substance speak to
    Plaintiffs’ proper purposes and this decision addresses the arguments in that context.
    A.     Each Plaintiff Has Demonstrated a Proper Purpose.
    “The paramount factor in determining whether    a   stockholder   is    entitled   to
    inspection of corporate books and records is the propriety of the stockholder’s purpose in
    seeking such inspection.” 92      A purpose is “proper” under Section 220 where it is
    “reasonably related” to the stockholder’s interest as a stockholder. 93         “In a section
    220 action, a stockholder has the burden of proof to demonstrate a proper purpose by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” 94
    The Demands state that they are for the purpose of investigating possible
    mismanagement, wrongdoing, or waste in connection with aspects of the development
    and commercialization of Gilead’s HIV treatments, although each Demand uses slightly
    different verbiage to express this purpose. 95
    92
    CM & M Gp., Inc. v. Carroll, 
    453 A.2d 788
    , 792 (Del. 1982) (citing 8 Del. C. § 220(b);
    Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 
    240 A.2d 755
     (Del. 1968); Skoglund v. Ormand Indus.,
    
    372 A.2d 204
    , 207 (Del. Ch. 1976)).
    93
    8 Del. C. § 220(b).
    94
    Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 121
    .
    95
    Collins seeks to “[i]nvestigat[e] whether any member of the Board or the Company’s
    senior officers have mismanaged the Company and/or breached their fiduciary duties to
    the Company and its stockholders.” JX-103 at 5; JX-128 at 15. Friedt and Petty seek to
    “investigate potential corporate mismanagement, wrongdoing, and waste by fiduciaries of
    the Company, including the [Board].” JX-108 at 1; JX-113 at 1. Hollywood seeks to
    investigate “possible breaches of fiduciary duty,” “possible violations of positive law,”
    “possible corporate misconduct by members of the [Board] and/or management in
    connection with . . . core HIV products,” and “possible prolonged concealment of the
    misconduct described herein.” JX-124 at 1. Ramirez seeks to “investigate whether the
    21
    Although a stockholder’s desire to investigate wrongdoing is a proper purpose
    under Delaware law, 96 a mere statement of that purpose without more will not entitle a
    stockholder to inspection. 97     To inspect documents for the purpose of investigating
    mismanagement or wrongdoing, a stockholder “must present some evidence to suggest a
    credible basis from which a court can infer that mismanagement . . . or wrongdoing may
    have occurred.” 98
    [Board] and certain senior Gilead executives may have breached their fiduciary duties to
    the Company by engaging in massive and long-standing wrongdoing in connection with
    the Company’s development, patenting, marketing of, and restraints related to, its
    antiviral HIV/AIDS drugs.” JX-89 at 4. Some of the demands also state that they are for
    the purpose of assessing the independence and disinterestedness of the members of the
    Board with respect to the possible wrongdoing at issue, see JX-124 at 1; JX-103 at 5; JX-
    128 at 15, but Plaintiffs did not treat this as an independent purpose in briefing. See Dkt.
    100, Pls.’ Corrected Combined Post-Trial Br. (“Pls.’ Opening Br.”) at 3–45, 56; Dkt. 104,
    Pls.’ Combined Post-Tr. Reply Br. at 3–24, 32. This decision treats Plaintiffs’ desire to
    investigate the independence and disinterestedness of Gilead’s Board members as a
    component of its investigation into possible wrongdoing. See infra Section II.C.2.e.
    96
    E.g., KT4 P’rs v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 
    203 A.3d 738
    , 758 (Del. 2019) (“One of the
    most traditional proper purposes for a § 220 demand is the investigation of possible
    wrongdoing by management. When a stockholder has made a colorable showing of
    potential wrongdoing, inspecting the company’s books and records can help the
    stockholder to ferret out whether that wrongdoing is real and then possibly file a lawsuit
    if appropriate.” ); City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 
    1 A.3d 281
    , 287 (Del. 2010) (“Our law recognizes investigating possible wrongdoing or
    mismanagement as a ‘proper purpose.’”); Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 121
     (“It is well
    established that a stockholder’s desire to investigate wrongdoing or mismanagement is a
    ‘proper purpose.’ Such investigations are proper, because where the allegations of
    mismanagement prove meritorious, investigation furthers the interests of all stockholders
    and should increase stockholder return.”).
    97
    Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 122
     (quoting Helmsman, 
    525 A.2d at 166
    ).
    98
    Id. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    22
    Gilead argues that no Plaintiff has demonstrated a credible basis to suspect
    possible wrongdoing. 99         Gilead further argues that each Plaintiff is acting as a
    Manchurian candidate for a law firm such that none of Plaintiffs’ stated purposes are their
    own. 100 Gilead additionally argues that legal defenses to a follow-on lawsuit challenging
    the wrongdoing foreclose Plaintiffs’ ability to investigate possible wrongdoing under
    Section 220. 101
    1.       Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated a Credible Basis to Suspect
    Wrongdoing.
    The credible basis standard imposes “the lowest possible burden of proof.” 102 It
    does not require a stockholder to prove that the wrongdoing “actually occurred.” 103 Nor
    does it require a stockholder “to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
    wrongdoing is probable.” 104 Any such requirement “would completely undermine the
    purpose of Section 220 proceedings, which is to provide shareholders the access needed
    to make that determination in the first instance.” 105 Rather, a stockholder need only
    99
    Dkt. 102, Def. Gilead Sciences, Inc.’s Post-Trial Answering Br. (“Def.’s Answering
    Br.”) at 5–15.
    100
    Id. at 22–36.
    101
    See id. at 36–44.
    102
    Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 123
    .
    103
    Marmon v. Arbinet-Thexchange, Inc., 
    2004 WL 936512
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28,
    2004); accord. Thomas & Betts, 
    681 A.2d at 1031
     (“While stockholders have the burden
    of coming forward with specific and credible allegations sufficient to warrant a suspicion
    of waste and mismanagement, they are not required to prove by a preponderance of the
    evidence that waste and mismanagement are actually occurring.”).
    104
    AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *8.
    105
    La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp. (LAMPERS), 2007
    23
    establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a credible basis to suspect a
    possibility of wrongdoing. 106
    In determining whether a plaintiff has presented a credible basis for inspection, the
    court looks at the allegations collectively. 107 The “threshold may be satisfied by a
    credible showing, through documents, logic, testimony or otherwise, that there are
    legitimate issues of wrongdoing.” 108 When evaluating whether a credible basis exists, the
    court may consider on-going lawsuits, investigations, circumstantial evidence, and even
    hearsay statements evincing possible wrongdoing. 
    109 WL 2896540
    , at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2007), order clarified, 
    2007 WL 4373116
     (Del.
    Ch. Dec. 6, 2007).
    106
    See AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *8–9; see also Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 118
     (holding that a Section 220 plaintiff need only allege a “‘credible basis’ from which a
    court can infer that mismanagement, waste or wrongdoing may have occurred” (emphasis
    added)).
    107
    See, e.g., In re Lululemon Athletica Inc. 
    220 Litig., 2015
     WL 1957196, at *11–14
    (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (collectively assessing founder’s inside knowledge based on
    company emails, suspicious timing and magnitude of founder’s trades, and the speed at
    which founder hit his monthly trading cap); Paul v. China MediaExpress Hldgs., Inc.,
    
    2012 WL 28818
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2012) (determining that plaintiff had identified a
    credible basis for Section 220 demand based on evidence which included “numerous
    third-party media reports,” “the noisy resignations of three board members” and a
    publicly announced “internal investigation”).
    108
    Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 123
     (quoting Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co.,
    
    687 A.2d 563
    , 568 (Del. 1997)).
    109
    See, e.g., AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *9 (“Ongoing investigations and
    lawsuits can provide the necessary evidentiary basis to suspect wrongdoing or
    mismanagement warranting further investigation. This type of evidence is strong when
    governmental agencies or arms of law enforcement have conducted the investigations or
    pursued the lawsuits.”); LAMPERS, 
    2007 WL 2896540
    , at *10–12 (finding a news article
    and independent statistical analysis of stock option grant dates sufficient to suspect
    options backdating); Elow v. Express Scripts Hldgs. Co., 
    2017 WL 2352151
    , at *5, *5–6
    24
    The Demands seek to investigate four categories of possible wrongdoing:
    1.     Anticompetitive activity resulting in a multi-billion dollar lawsuit accusing
    Gilead of violating federal and state antitrust laws by colluding with its
    competitors to unlawfully extend patent protection and drive up the price of
    its HIV drugs; 110
    2.     Mass torts resulting in more than 15,000 claims by plaintiffs who allege
    that they were seriously harmed by Gilead’s decision to intentionally delay
    the introduction of safer and more effective HIV treatments in order to
    protect the profitability of existing branded medications; 111
    3.     Patent infringement resulting in a lawsuit by the DOJ against Gilead for its
    “deliberate” and “wanton” infringement of patents held by the federal
    government relating to PrEP treatment regimens; 112 and
    4.     Kick-back schemes resulting in DOJ investigations into False Claims Act
    violations. 113
    At trial, Plaintiffs presented evidence to establish a credible basis to suspect
    possible wrongdoing in connection with each of these four categories.
    To demonstrate a credible basis as to the anticompetitive activity, Plaintiffs rely
    primarily on the allegations and information contained in the Staley complaint as well as
    the federal court’s decision on the motion to dismiss the Staley Action. 114 The Staley
    (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017) (finding “pleadings in the Anthem Action, the Securities Action
    complaints, and public statements by Express Scripts” sufficient to establish a credible
    basis), abrogated on other grounds by Tiger, 
    214 A.3d 933
    ; Carapico v. Phila. Stock
    Exch., Inc., 
    791 A.2d 787
    , 792 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding an “SEC inquiry” and “SEC
    Order” were “sufficiently concrete” to suspect mismanagement).
    110
    See JX-113 at 1; JX-123 at 1–2; JX-124 at 4; JX-128 at 1.
    111
    See JX-124 at 3–4; JX-128 at 1.
    112
    See JX-103 at 1; JX-113 at 1; JX-124 at 5–6; JX-128 at 1.
    113
    See JX-128 at 1.
    114
    See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 7–9.
    25
    complaint spans 134 pages and outlines a litany of allegedly anticompetitive conduct,
    reflecting significant research by the plaintiffs in that action. 115 The parties to the Staley
    Action collectively filed thirty-eight exhibits during briefing on a motion to dismiss,
    including copies of the relevant agreements. 116
    The Staley complaint discusses three broad categories of conduct that allegedly
    delayed the entry of generic competition: (i) No-Generics Restraints in agreements
    between Gilead and Japan Tobacco, Gilead and Bristol-Myers, and Gilead and Janssen;
    (ii) the Teva settlement; and (iii) the commercialization of TAF. 117 These categories of
    action are allegedly part of a broader scheme to restrain competition and increase the
    prices of HIV drugs. 118 The complaint contends that the No-Generics Restraints barred
    the creation of competing versions of combination therapies that use generic TDF. 119
    The complaint further contends that the Teva settlement delayed Teva’s entry in the TDF
    market and created disincentives for ANDA second-filers to launch their products. By
    thwarting the market entry of generic TDF, these agreements allowed Gilead to continue
    to charge high prices for TDF-based Stribild despite its toxicity, and later help Gilead
    115
    See JX-74.
    116
    See Decl. of Jayne A. Goldstein in Supp. of Pls.’ Omnibus Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’
    Mot. to Dismiss, Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-02573-EMC (N.D. Cal.
    2019); Decl. of Heather M. Burke in Supp. Of Gilead’s Mot. to Dismiss, Staley, Case No.
    3:19-cv-02573-EMC. The court can take judicial notice of these filings because they are
    “not subject to reasonable dispute.” See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder
    Litig., 
    897 A.2d 162
    , 169 (Del. 2006) (citing D.R.E. 201(b)).
    117
    See JX-74 ¶¶ 88–355.
    118
    
    Id.
     ¶¶ 1–15.
    119
    Id. ¶ 4.
    26
    shift prescriptions from Stribild to TAF-based Genvoya. 120 The agreements also allowed
    Gilead to avoid being pressured to release a standalone TAF product, because prescribers
    could not pair Gilead’s standalone TAF with drugs offered by Gilead’s competitors.121
    The plaintiffs allege that Gilead’s actions, taken collectively, “unlawfully manipulated
    the regulatory framework in order to impair and delay . . . competition.” 122
    In response to Gilead’s motion to dismiss, the District Court held that the
    plaintiffs’    allegations   regarding   the   Gilead/Bristol-Myers,   Gilead/Janssen,   and
    Gilead/Teva agreements and the commercialization of TAF stated a claim on which relief
    could be granted. 123 The federal motion-to-dismiss standard is higher than Section 220’s
    credible basis standard. 124 It follows that allegations which survive a motion to dismiss
    under the federal standard are sufficient to meet the credible basis standard. Thus, the
    court finds that the allegations that survived the motion to dismiss in the Staley Action
    120
    Id. ¶¶ 237–44.
    121
    Id. ¶ 245.
    122
    Id. ¶ 285.
    123
    See JX-242 at 85–86. The court dismissed the overarching conspiracy claims and the
    claim related to the Gilead/Japan Tobacco agreement. JX-242 at 15, 33. Plaintiffs have
    since filed an amended complaint. See JX-244.
    124
    Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007) (requiring a plaintiff
    to plead facts sufficient to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to
    plausible”) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009) (requiring a Section 220
    plaintiff seeking to investigate wrongdoing to holding that the Twombly plausibility
    standards applies to all civil cases in federal courts) with Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 123
    (describing the credible basis standard as “the lowest possible burden of proof” (internal
    quotation markets omitted)).
    27
    supply a credible basis to suspect possible wrongdoing as to the Gilead/Bristol-Myers,
    Gilead/Janssen, and Gilead/Teva agreements and the commercialization of TAF.
    To demonstrate a credible basis as to the mass torts, Plaintiffs rely on the
    allegations and information in the pleadings in state and federal courts in California,
    Delaware, and Florida. 125 The mass tort class action in California, as of June 12, 2020,
    involved more than 15,000 plaintiffs. 126 The complaint in that action runs forty-four
    pages, alleges injuries stemming from Gilead’s decision to intentionally delay its TAF-
    based HIV drugs, and asserts claims for negligence, strict product liability, breach of
    express warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud, and concealment. 127 In particular,
    the complaint alleges that Gilead developed and marketed its toxic TDF-based
    medications and withheld the safer TAF-based medications from the market. 128 Rather
    than releasing the TAF-based medication, Gilead allegedly continued to add ingredients
    to its existing TDF-based medications “in order to extend its monopoly on tenofovir in
    the treatment of HIV-1.” 129 The plaintiffs contend that Gilead did so knowing that
    reasonable alternatives were not available to patients. 130 The complaint references and
    125
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 9–11.
    126
    JX-255 at 2.
    127
    See JX-82. Further illustrating the scope of the litigation, Gilead produced nearly 2.6
    million pages of documents in response to the plaintiffs’ first and second requests for
    production—including FDA regulatory files, license agreements, a listing of clinical
    trials, and other documents—and trial is set for January 2022. See id.; JX-255 at 10–11.
    128
    JX-82 ¶¶ 12–14, 33–48.
    129
    Id. ¶¶ 76, 51–86.
    130
    Id. ¶ 2.
    28
    quotes from papers that Gilead has published, submissions that Gilead made to U.S. and
    European patent offices, public announcements by Gilead representatives, statistics that
    have been corroborated by the CDC, studies conducted by third parties, and FDA
    findings. 131 The plaintiffs’ complaint is cohesive and coherent, and the information and
    allegations in the complaint as well as the myriad evidence supporting it, supply a
    credible basis to suspect possible wrongdoing in the form of mass torts.
    To demonstrate a credible basis as to patent infringement, Plaintiffs rely on
    congressional      testimony and    subsequent    litigation   regarding   Gilead’s   alleged
    infringement of U.S. government patents in the sales of Gilead’s HIV PrEP treatments. 132
    After an expert provided the U.S. House Committee on Oversight with a detailed
    description of his work with the CDC and Gilead, 133 the U.S. government filed a patent
    infringement lawsuit against Gilead. 134 The complaint totaled 1,739 pages including the
    ninety-two attached exhibits, and its filing was reported by multiple news outlets. 135 The
    131
    See, e.g., id. ¶ 40 (quoting Gilead paper comparing the relative effectiveness and
    safety of TAF as compared to TDF); id. ¶ 41 (citing Gilead patent submission showing
    that TAF was more effective than TDF); id. ¶ 60 (citing an October 2004 company
    announcement regarding the future of TAF development); id. ¶ 67 (citing HIV-treatment
    statistics that have been corroborated by the CDC); id. ¶ 78 (citing an April 2012 HIV
    study conducted by researchers at San Francisco’s Veterans’ Administration Medical
    Center and the University of California, San Francisco); id. ¶ 79 (quoting FDA
    characterization of TDF’s safety profile); id. ¶ 91 (quoting Gilead’s Chief Scientific
    Officer during an October 2010 earnings call).
    132
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 11–14.
    133
    See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
    134
    See JX-98.
    135
    See id. (complaint); JX-99 (11/8/19 New York Times article covering the litigation);
    29
    exhibits included the relevant patents, various news articles, and relevant scholarship
    from the scientific community. 136 When Gilead sought review of the U.S. government’s
    patents, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board held that Gilead “has not demonstrated a
    reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” 137 The thoroughness of the U.S. government’s
    complaint and the Patent Trial and Appeals Board’s ruling easily clear the hurdle to
    establish a credible basis to suspect possible wrongdoing as to patent infringement.
    To demonstrate a credible basis as to False Claims Act violations, Plaintiffs rely
    on the existence of four subpoenas issued by the DOJ. 138 By 2016, Gilead was the
    subject of an “expanding investigation” by the U.S. Attorney for the District of
    Massachusetts related to possible violations of the False Claims Act. 139 As disclosed in
    its public filings, Gilead received subpoenas in 2016 and 2017 requesting documents
    related to Gilead’s relationship with certain charitable organizations, Gilead’s copay
    coupon program, and Gilead’s Medicaid price reporting methodology. 140
    Further, Gilead is facing a qui tam action in Pennsylvania federal court that alleges
    multiple violations of the anti-kickback provisions of the False Claims Act. 141 Although
    that action focuses on Hepatitis B-providers, one of the drugs at issue (Viread) is also
    JX-102 (11/8/19 Science Magazine article covering the litigation).
    136
    See JX-98 at 77–1739.
    137
    JX-246 at 21; JX-247 at 12.
    138
    See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 14–15.
    139
    See JX-51 at 1.
    140
    JX-134 at 79.
    141
    See JX-88 at ¶¶ 1, 13.
    30
    used to treat HIV. 142 The complaint alleges that Gilead provided healthcare providers
    with illegal kickbacks in exchange for prescribing Gilead products. 143 It contains public
    payment information from relevant healthcare providers to Gilead, detailed information
    regarding the composition of Gilead’s advisory boards, public pricing information
    regarding the drugs at issue, and quotes from internal emails referencing the speaker
    programs. 144 The combination of multiple government investigations relating to possible
    False Claims Act violations plus the ongoing qui tam litigation alleging the exact same
    conduct with respect to Gilead’s Hepatitis B business, establishes a credible basis to
    suspect possible wrongdoing as to False Claims Act violations.
    Gilead takes issue with Plaintiffs’ reliance on the complaints in the other lawsuits,
    contending that unsubstantiated allegations cannot supply a credible basis to suspect
    possible wrongdoing. 145 As discussed above, however, the credible basis requirement
    does not require that allegations of wrongdoing be substantiated or even probable; 146 they
    only need be credible. One of the reasons why Delaware courts urge stockholders to
    conduct pre-suit investigations is to investigate allegations before filing plenary litigation
    142
    See id.; see also JX-55 (noting that Vemlidy is a TAF-based drug and an alternative to
    Viread).
    143
    JX-88 ¶¶ 58–99.
    144
    Id. ¶ 64 & n.2 (citing “Open Payment” information, which is defined as “payments
    that are not associated with a research study such as compensation, food and beverage
    and lodging”); id. ¶ 69 (listing 2017 advisory boards and each of their composition); id. ¶
    76 (listing prices of drugs at issue in the litigation); id. ¶ 134 (quoting an internal email
    that allegedly read: “Let them hear the Message for $3,000”).
    145
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 5–22.
    146
    See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
    31
    to determine whether they are substantiated. In furtherance of that objective, this court
    attempts to avoid “placing an unduly difficult obstacle in the path of stockholders seeking
    to investigate . . . mismanagement.” 147 The allegations, information, and evidence in the
    complaints on which Plaintiffs rely meet this standard for the reasons discussed above.
    Requiring that Plaintiffs demonstrate more would place “an unduly difficult obstacle” in
    the path of stockholders.
    The parties also dispute whether Plaintiffs have presented evidence demonstrating
    that Gilead’s board of directors and senior officers were aware of the categories of
    alleged wrongdoing. 148 Such a showing is not required to support a credible basis where,
    as here, Plaintiffs have not limited their purposes to pursuing derivative claims. 149 If
    Plaintiffs must demonstrate a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing at the level of the
    board or senior management, then they have done so. Gilead’s HIV drugs generate 73%
    of Gilead’s revenue and were thus “intrinsically critical to the company’s business
    operation.” 150    There is thus a credible basis to suspect that the board and senior
    management knew about the possible wrongdoing. If they did not, there is a credible
    147
    See Thomas & Betts, 
    681 A.2d at 1032
    .
    148
    See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 15–17; Def.’s Answering Br. at 14–15.
    149
    See AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *15, *19.
    150
    See Marchand v. Barnhill, 
    212 A.3d 805
    , 822 (Del. 2019); accord. In re Caremark
    Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 
    698 A.2d 959
    , 967–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
    32
    basis to suspect that they failed to monitor a business segment that was “mission critical,”
    as well as vitally important to the lives of millions of people. 151
    2.     Plaintiffs’ Purposes Are Their Own.
    Only one Plaintiff must demonstrate a proper purpose for the court to grant some
    level of inspection.        Thus, for Gilead to avoid inspection entirely, Gilead must
    accomplish the difficult task of undermining all five Plaintiffs’ purposes.         Gilead’s
    primary argument toward this end is that each Plaintiff was a passive conduit in a purely
    lawyer-driven endeavor and thus lacks a proper purpose under Wilkinson v. A. Schulman,
    Inc. 152 Gilead bears the burden of proving this defense. 153
    In Wilkinson, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony revealed a discrepancy between
    the plaintiff’s actual purpose and the stated purpose in the demand. 154 The plaintiff
    wanted to investigate the company’s negative financial results, but the demand sought to
    investigate a board decision to accelerate equity awards. 155 Wilkinson’s counsel had
    ignored his client’s purpose and chose to send a demand concerning the counsel’s
    151
    See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824.
    152
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 22–36 (citing 
    2017 WL 5289553
     (Del. Ch. Nov. 13,
    2017)).
    153
    See Inter-Local Pension Fund GCC/IBT v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 
    2019 WL 479082
    ,
    at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2019) (“A corporate defendant may resist demand where it shows
    that the stockholder’s stated proper purpose is not the actual purpose for the demand.
    However, in order to succeed, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff pursued its
    claim under false pretenses. Such a showing is fact intensive and difficult to establish.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d 
    237 A.3d 818
     (Del. 2020).
    154
    See Wilkinson, 
    2017 WL 5289553
    , at *2–3.
    155
    
    Id.
    33
    purpose. 156 The disconnect between the client and counsel persisted through the Section
    220 enforcement action. 157 Wilkinson verified the complaint, but he did nothing to
    confirm the accuracy of its allegations and knew nothing about the inspection process or
    litigation. 158 He failed to play any meaningful role in the litigation and testified that he
    was unaware of any facts concerning the wrongdoing that his counsel sought to
    investigate. 159 This confluence of unusual facts led the court to find that the plaintiff
    lacked a proper purpose. 160
    Gilead fails to prove that the facts of this case rise to the level seen in Wilkinson.
    In this case, Plaintiffs testified that they actually sought to investigate wrongdoing. 161
    They reviewed their respective Demands and complaints prior to authorizing their service
    and filing. 162 For the most part, they were knowledgeable about the basis for their
    Demands. 163 They remained in contact with their respective counsel throughout the
    156
    
    Id.
    157
    See 
    id.
    158
    Id. at *3.
    159
    Id. at *2–3.
    160
    See id. at *2–4; see also Calgon Carbon, 
    2019 WL 479082
    , at *9 (noting that the
    “misalignment of goals between the stockholder and his counsel was a key factor in the
    [Wilkinson] Court’s determination that there was no proper purpose for the demand.”).
    161
    See Collins Dep. Tr. at 86:22–87:11; Friedt Dep. Tr. at 65:24–66:8; Pettry Dep. Tr. at
    77:5–78:11; Trial Tr. at 12:23–13:15 (Ramirez); Ramirez Dep. Tr. at 87:15–19, 98:6–7,
    119:9–22; Williams Dep. Tr. at 57:22–58:10.
    162
    See Collins Dep. Tr. at 67:21–24; Friedt Dep. Tr. at 74:18–22, 111:18–112:12,
    124:42–125:2; Pettry Dep. Tr. at 59:15–61:21, 101:9–18; Trial Tr. at 12:20–22
    (Ramirez); Ramirez Dep. Tr. at 58:22–24; Williams Dep. Tr. at 54:21–24, 77:5–18.
    163
    See Collins Dep. Tr. at 95:17–113:22; Pettry Dep. Tr. at 79:16–82:17; Trial Tr. at
    34
    demand process and litigation. 164 This testimony is sufficient to establish that Plaintiffs’
    purposes are their own.
    To be sure, Gilead proved that lawyers were heavily involved in the process, but
    that is to be expected considering the significant role lawyers play in representative
    litigation generally.
    On that point, In re Fuqua Industries, Inc. Shareholder Litigation 165 is instructive.
    There, former Chancellor Chandler denied a motion to disqualify a derivative plaintiff
    who was unfamiliar with the basic facts of the case and largely deferred control of the
    litigation to counsel. 166   After canvasing state and federal case law concerning the
    adequacy standard imposed on derivative plaintiffs, the court held that the plaintiffs’ bare
    knowledge of the “basic facts” was sufficient to meet the adequacy requirement, and that
    12:23–13:15, 32:5–34:4 (Ramirez); Ramirez Dep. Tr. at 50:22–53:4, 87:15–93:18;
    Williams Dep. Tr. at 58:21–62:13.          Although Friedt demonstrated a general
    understanding the subject matter of her demand (see Friedt Dep. Tr. at 65:24–66:8), her
    knowledge of the basis for her demand was exceptionally weak; this fact standing alone
    does not compare to the confluence of unusual facts present in Wilkinson.
    164
    See Collins Dep. Tr. at 40:3–122:9; Friedt Dep. Tr. at 61:9–125:2; Pettry Dep. Tr. at
    53:6–81:18; Trial Tr. at 10:10–23, 14:8–15:8, 23:20–24:6, 41:20–42:20 (Ramirez);
    Ramirez Dep. Tr. at 56:5–213:9; Williams Dep. Tr. at 23:4–85:24. Gilead accuses
    Collins of lying about who initiated the process and his level of involvement based
    mostly on Collins’ poor recall of demands he served on Gilead in 2016 and 2018 and his
    lack of direct contact with litigation counsel. See Def.’s Post-Trial Answering Br. at 28–
    31. But those demands are largely irrelevant, and Collins’ sworn testimony established
    that he had reviewed the demand letters sent on his behalf and maintained contact with
    his referring counsel. See Collins Dep. Tr. at 40:3–122:9. This is sufficient to support
    the finding that Collins’ stated purposes were his own.
    165
    
    752 A.2d 126
     (Del. Ch. 1999).
    166
    
    Id.
     at 134–37.
    35
    knowledge of “the particulars” was not required. 167 In reaching this conclusion, the court
    observed that Delaware law provides incentives for private attorneys to bring derivative
    suits as a solution to the collective action problem, that those attorneys naturally play a
    “dominant role in prosecuting litigation on behalf of clients,” and that lawyer
    involvement is particularly appropriate “in cases involving fairly abstruse issues of
    corporate governance and fiduciary duties.” 168
    Of course, the adequacy requirement of Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 at issue in
    Fuqua and the proper purpose requirement of Section 220 at issue in this case are not the
    same. This decision does not suggest otherwise. The point is that Delaware courts have
    encouraged stockholders to pursue Section 220 actions in advance of derivative suits for
    decades. 169 It would be inconsistent with this policy to require that Section 220 plaintiffs
    167
    
    Id. at 136
     (“[The plaintiff] was at times quite lucid and able to independently
    communicate the basic facts and claims underlying her lawsuit. She did not know the
    particulars.”).
    168
    
    Id. at 135
    ; 
    id. at 133
     (“Our legal system has privatized in part the enforcement
    mechanism . . . by allowing private attorneys to bring suits on behalf of nominal
    shareholder plaintiffs.”); see also In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 
    2011 WL 2535256
    , at *14 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2011) (“Delaware courts recognize the value of
    representative litigation.”); In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
    990 A.2d 940
    , 959 (Del.
    Ch. 2010) (“[R]epresentative litigation serves as a valuable check on managerial conflicts
    of interest. Stockholder plaintiffs can and do achieve meaningful results.” (citation
    omitted)); Bird v. Lida, Inc., 
    681 A.2d 399
    , 402–03 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that
    entrepreneurial plaintiff attorneys can “pursue monitoring activities that are wealth
    increasing for the collectivity (the corporation or the body of its shareholders)”).
    169
    See, e.g., Cal. State Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 
    179 A.3d 824
    , 839 (Del. 2018)
    (“[T]his Court has repeatedly admonished plaintiffs to use the ‘tools at hand’ and to
    request company books and records under Section 220 to attempt to substantiate their
    allegations before filing derivative complaints.”); Sec. First Corp., 
    687 A.2d at 571
     (Del.
    1997) (“[A] Section 220 proceeding may serve a salutary mission as a prelude to a
    36
    know more than what is required of derivative plaintiffs. It would also be inconsistent
    with this policy to prohibit lawyers from playing a “dominant role” in Section 220 actions
    while permitting them to do so in derivative litigation. This is particularly so given the
    increasing complexities plaguing Section 220 actions. 170
    The incentives in representative litigation are imperfect, and judicial oversight is
    required in Section 220 actions as elsewhere. In Fuqua, the court went on to admonish
    the plaintiffs’ counsel for effectively “supplanting” his client in a deposition, explaining
    that “extreme facts call for the court to exercise its discretion and to curb the agency costs
    inherent in private regulatory and enforcement mechanisms.” 171 It was similarly extreme
    derivative suit.”); Ash v. McCall, 
    2000 WL 1370341
    , at *15 n.56 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15,
    2000) (“As the Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly exhorted, shareholders plaintiffs
    should use the ‘tools at hand,’ most prominently § 220 books and records actions, to
    obtain information necessary to sue derivatively.”).
    170
    See, e.g., Wilkinson, 
    2017 WL 5289553
    , at *3 (“A stockholder obviously can use
    counsel to seek books and records. Section 220 expressly contemplates that a
    stockholder can make a demand ‘in person or by attorney or other agent.’ Indeed, given
    the complexity of Delaware’s sprawling Section 220 jurisprudence, a stockholder is well-
    advised to secure counsel’s assistance.” (quoting 8 Del. C. § 220(b)); Calgon Carbon,
    
    2019 WL 479082
    , at *10 (holding that stockholders are entitled to rely on counsel “to
    raise concerns, to advise them on how to remedy those concerns, and to pursue
    appropriate remedies”); Kosinski v. GGP Inc., 
    214 A.3d 944
    , 951–52 (Del. Ch. 2019)
    (“The fact that Plaintiff sought and accepted the advice of counsel is to his credit, not his
    detriment.”); see also Cox et al., supra note 6, at 2150 (attributing the increased
    complexity in Section 220 actions to the fact that “defendants have turned books and
    records litigation into a surrogate proceeding to litigate the possible merits of the suit
    where they place obstacles in the plaintiffs’ way to obstruct them from employing it as a
    quick and easy pre-filing too”).
    171
    Fuqua, 
    752 A.2d at
    133–34.
    37
    facts that drove the outcome in Wilkinson, where the attorneys disregarded their client’s
    objectives entirely and pursued their own. 172
    In this case, the degree of lawyer involvement does not come close to the line-
    crossing conduct at issue in Fuqua or Wilkinson. This case reflects benign manifestations
    of the role that plaintiffs’ law firms play generally in representative litigation.
    Gilead singles out Pettry and Friedt because they were enrolled in a portfolio
    monitoring program and had no knowledge of alleged wrongdoing at Gilead before
    counsel contacted them. 173 But there is nothing inappropriate about such programs.
    They are voluntary and serve the purpose of keeping stockholders abreast of corporate
    developments that may affect the value of their stock holdings. They do not obligate
    participants to send Section 220 demands or file suits. 174
    Gilead also complains about Hollywood’s involvement in portfolio monitoring
    programs, 175 but those arguments are similarly misguided.            Hollywood is a police
    officers’ retirement fund that is run by a seven-member Board of Trustees, all of whom
    172
    See Wilkinson, 
    2017 WL 5289553
    , at *2–3.
    173
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 24–28; Trial Tr. at 147:9–16; 
    id.
     at 149:22–150:4; Friedt
    Dep. Tr. at 61:24–64:9; Pettry Dep. Tr. at 38:12–22, 40:19–41:22, 75:10–19.
    174
    See Calgon Carbon, 
    2019 WL 479082
    , at *10 (“Advice from counsel comes in many
    forms. Individual stockholders and smaller institutions cannot be expected to have an
    independent, in-house team to cultivate purely homegrown legal analyses of their
    investments. Stockholders are entitled to hire counsel to review and monitor their
    portfolios for potential mismanagement or wrongdoing. They are also entitled to rely on
    that counsel to raise concerns, to advise them on how to remedy those concerns, and to
    pursue appropriate remedies.”).
    175
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 31–33; Trial Tr. at 156:15–158:22.
    38
    are volunteers. 176        Hollywood works with portfolio monitoring counsel, who raise
    potential issues with Hollywood, first by bringing them the attention of Hollywood’s
    outside general counsel. 177 If the general counsel determines that the matter is worthy of
    consideration, he elevates the discussion first to the Chairman of the Board and then to
    the Board to make the determination of whether to take action. 178 Hollywood followed
    its process in this case, 179 and that process is sound.       Like boards of Delaware
    corporations, 180 boards of pension funds are encouraged to rely on professional advisors
    when fulfilling their duties to act in the best interests of the retirees. Hollywood’s
    reliance on professional advisors, including portfolio monitoring counsel, strengthens the
    integrity of Hollywood’s purpose, not the opposite.
    Demonstrating how far Gilead was willing to go in attacking Plaintiffs, Gilead
    tries to impugn Ramirez’s testimony based on a cut-and-paste error in Ramirez’s retainer
    agreement with counsel. 181 The error (failing to replace the word “opioid”) was made by
    counsel—not Ramirez. 182 Ramirez explained that he was caught by surprise when asked
    about the error at his deposition; the “curveball,” as he called it, confused him because
    176
    See Williams Dep. Tr. at 22:23–23:3, 42:1–11; see also 
    id.
     at 25:7–9 (“Q. Who at
    Hollywood has decision-making authority with respect to litigation decisions? A. That
    would be the board of trustees.”).
    177
    
    Id.
     at 41:13–21.
    178
    
    Id.
     at 55:11–56:7.
    179
    See JX-129 at 1; Williams Dep. Tr. 56:8–57:3.
    180
    See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 141(e).
    181
    See Trial Tr. at 39:21–40:8 (Ramirez).
    182
    See id. at 10:19–11:11, 40:16–21 (Ramirez).
    39
    this case has nothing to with opioids. 183 Ramirez confirmed throughout his deposition
    and trial testimony that his aim in seeking records was true, even stating that he was
    inspired by an article he read related to wrongdoing related to Gilead’s HIV drugs. 184
    In the end, Gilead failed to establish that any Plaintiff’s lawyers’ involvement
    undermined any Plaintiff’s purpose (much less all of them). The record reflects that each
    Plaintiff genuinely holds its stated purpose of investigating possible wrongdoing in the
    development and commercialization of Gilead’s HIV treatments.
    B.     Gilead’s So-Called “Standing” Arguments
    In its second attack on Plaintiffs’ purposes, Gilead argues that “Plaintiffs’
    Demands are defective because Plaintiffs lack standing to investigate the claimed
    wrongdoing.” 185      This is so, according to Gilead, because any derivative claims
    challenging the wrongdoing at issue would be dismissed for the following reasons:
    (i) Plaintiffs did not own shares at the time of the alleged wrongdoing; 186 (ii) the
    183
    Id. at 13:13–15, 32:5–34:4 (Ramirez).
    184
    See id. at 12:23–13:15 (Ramirez); Ramirez Dep. Tr. at 87:15–19, 98:6–7, 119:9–22.
    185
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 36.
    186
    See id. at 36 (citing Graulich v. Dell Inc., 
    2011 WL 1843813
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. May 16,
    2011) (“If plaintiff would not have standing to bring suit, plaintiff does not have a proper
    purpose to investigate wrongdoing because its stated purpose is not reasonably related to
    its role as a stockholder.”); W. Coast Mgmt. & Cap., LLC v. Carrier Access Corp., 
    914 A.2d 636
    , 641 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“If a books and records demand is to investigate
    wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s sole purpose is to pursue a derivative suit, the plaintiff
    must have standing to pursue the underlying suit[.]”)); 
    id.
     at 37–38.
    40
    derivative claims they seek to pursue are time-barred; 187 and (iii) any derivative claims
    they seek to pursue would be barred by an exculpatory charter provision. 188
    Gilead devoted extensive resources to this argument. To support it, Gilead served
    discovery, brought a motion to compel, and took five depositions. Gilead explored these
    issues at trial and devoted eight pages of post-trial briefing to them. 189
    There are a number of vexing aspects of this argument. For starters, although
    certain of these points may speak to a plaintiff’s standing to pursue a derivative suit, they
    do not speak to a plaintiff’s standing to pursue a Section 220 action. Under Delaware
    law, “[t]he issue of standing is concerned ‘only with the question of who is entitled to
    mount a legal challenge and not with the merits of the subject matter in controversy.’” 190
    Where the right at issue is statutory, “the real determinant” of standing “is the statutory
    language itself.” 191 Section 220(c) answers the question of who has standing to pursue an
    187
    See 
    id.
     at 36 (citing Graulich, 
    2011 WL 1843813
    , at *6 (denying Section 220 demand
    where “plaintiff ha[d] articulated no stated purpose other than to investigate wrongdoing
    in order to bring an appropriate suit against defendant, and plaintiff [was] time-barred
    from bringing that suit”)); 
    id.
     at 39–43.
    188
    See 
    id.
     at 43 n.26 (citing Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Abbvie Inc., 
    2015 WL 1753033
    , at
    *13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015) (investigating corporate wrongdoing and waste were not
    proper purposes when the facts alleged amounted to only a possible breach of the duty of
    care, damages for which would be barred by the corporation’s exculpation clause)).
    189
    See Trial Tr. at 185:4–190:15; Def.’s Answering Br. at 36–43.
    190
    Dover Hist. Soc’y v. City of Dover Plan. Comm’n, 
    838 A.2d 1103
    , 1110 (Del. 2003)
    (quoting Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 
    596 A.2d 1378
    , 1382 (Del. 1991)).
    191
    Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilm. Stevedores, Inc., 
    636 A.2d 892
    , 900 (Del. 1994);
    Newark Landlord Assoc. v. City of Newark, 
    2003 WL 21448560
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. June 13,
    2003).
    41
    enforcement action under Section 220(c)—a stockholder. 192 In this case, it is undisputed
    that each Plaintiff held stock when filing their complaints (and also for significant periods
    prior to filing the complaints). 193
    Gilead’s arguments speak not to Plaintiffs’ standing to pursue a Section 220 action
    but, rather, to the viability of derivative claims that Plaintiffs might pursue in the future.
    “This Court has repeatedly stated that a Section 220 proceeding does not warrant a trial
    on the merits of underlying claims.” 194 Yet Gilead pushes the court do just that—
    192
    See 8 Del. C. § 220(c) (providing that “[i]f the corporation . . . refuses to permit an
    inspection sought by a stockholder . . . the stockholder may apply to the Court of
    Chancery for an order to compel such inspection” (emphasis added)); see also
    Weingarten v. Monster Worldwide, Inc., 
    2017 WL 752179
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2017)
    (“[T]he legislature has made clear that only those who are stockholders at the time of
    filing have standing to invoke this Court’s assistance under Section 220.”).
    193
    Collins has held Gilead stock since 1999, except for a five-month period in 2008. JX-
    52. Friedt has held Gilead stock since 2013. See JX-157 at 9; Friedt Dep. Tr. at 31:15–
    19, 38:13–22. Pettry has held Gilead stock since 2016. See JX-155 at 9; Pettry Dep. Tr.
    at 43:7–16. Ramirez has held Gilead stock since 2016. See JX-46; Ramirez Dep. Tr. at
    27:3–15. Hollywood has held Gilead stock since 2010. JX-161 at 9.
    194
    In re UnitedHealth Gp., Inc. Section 
    220 Litig., 2018
     WL 1110849, at *7 & n.95 (Del.
    Ch. Feb. 28, 2018) (Montgomery-Reeves, V.C.) (collecting cases); see also Lavin, 
    2017 WL 6728702
    , at *9 (Slights, V.C.) (holding that a Corwin defense will not impede an
    otherwise properly supported demand for inspection and observing that “when a
    stockholder demands inspection as a means to investigate wrongdoing in contemplation
    of a class or derivative action, Delaware courts generally do not evaluate the viability of
    the demand based on the likelihood that the stockholder will succeed in a plenary
    action”); Amalgamated Bank v. UICI, 
    2005 WL 1377432
    , *2 (Del. Ch. June 2, 2005)
    (Noble, V.C.) (“The potential availability of affirmative defenses to withstand fiduciary
    duty claims cannot solely act to bar a plaintiff under Section 220. First, these are
    summary proceedings; the factual development necessary to assess fairly the merits of a
    time-bar affirmative defense, for example, as to each potential claim, is not consistent
    with the statutory purpose. Second, courts should not be called upon to evaluate the
    viability of affirmative defenses to causes of actions that have not been, and more
    importantly may not ever be, asserted. Third, that a claim arising out of a particular
    42
    evaluate, in the context of a summary proceeding, defenses to causes of action that have
    not yet been asserted and might have never been asserted.
    Beyond the obvious practical concerns raised by such an approach, the theoretical
    problems with Gilead’s argument are rife, as Vice Chancellor Laster persuasively
    explained in AmerisourceBergen. 195 As the court held in AmerisourceBergen, a defense
    to a future derivative claim affects a stockholder’s ability to invoke Section 220 only
    where the stockholder identifies pursuing a derivative claim as its sole purpose, as was
    the case in Graulich and West Coast Management. 196 In this case, Plaintiffs did not limit
    transaction may be barred does not mandate the conclusion that documents relating to
    that transaction are not ‘necessary, essential, and sufficient’ for a shareholder's proper
    purpose with respect to more recent transactions.”); LAMPERS, 
    2007 WL 2896540
    , at
    *12 (Noble, V.C.) (rejecting, in a Section 220 proceeding, that no springloading ever
    occurred because “by raising such a defense, Countrywide seeks to litigate the ultimate
    issue in a possible future derivative suit that might eventually be filed by LAMPERS”
    and holding that “[t]his is neither the time nor the procedural setting to address that
    issue”).
    195
    See AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *14–24; see also Okla. Firefighters
    Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup Inc., 
    2014 WL 5351345
    , at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2014)
    (“Although Citigroup disclaims any effort to turn this proceeding into a trial on the merits
    of Plaintiffs possible derivative claims, Citigroup essentially seeks that result by implying
    that Plaintiff must have specific, tangible evidence that Citigroup’s Board or senior
    management was complicit in the fraud at Banamex. That argument ignores the
    inferences that this Court can—and must—draw under the credible basis standard, and
    would discourage the very behavior this Court has sought to encourage among would-be
    derivative or class plaintiffs.”).
    196
    See Graulich, 
    2011 WL 1843813
    , at *5 (“[P]laintiff’s only purpose is to pursue
    potential derivative claims.” (emphasis added)); W. Coast Mgmt., 
    914 A.2d at 641
     (“It is
    clear that West Coast’s sole purpose for investigating claims of wrongdoing is to obtain
    additional information to replead demand futility in order to pursue a second derivative
    suit.” (emphasis added)). To be clear, a Section 220 plaintiff is not required to limit the
    end-uses of the information they seek at the outset of their investigation.
    AmerisourceBergen 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *12 (holding that the proper purpose
    43
    themselves to the sole purpose of pursuing derivative claims. 197            Rather, Plaintiffs
    expressly identified multiple potential end-uses for the information obtained through their
    investigations. 198
    Gilead acknowledges that Plaintiffs have stated multiple potential end-uses for the
    information obtained through their investigations, 199 but Gilead pivots to argue that “it is
    obvious based on Plaintiffs’ [i] deposition testimony, coupled with their [ii] retention
    agreements, that their only true purpose is to pursue such a lawsuit.” 200
    A review of Plaintiffs’ testimony and a close examination of Gilead’s citations
    reveal that Gilead’s position is unsupported and its citations are misleading. As an initial
    requirement does not require a stockholder to pick one of these end-uses at the outset, or
    “commit in advance to what it will do with an investigation before seeing the results of
    the investigation”).
    197
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 37 (acknowledging that “Plaintiffs claim that their
    purposes ‘are not limited to bringing a derivative lawsuit’” (citing Pls.’ Opening Br. at
    46)); JX-123 at 2 (Ramirez’s demand stating that if the investigation supports doing so,
    he “may use the documents to pursue a shareholder derivative action” (emphasis added));
    JX-128 at 15 (Collins’s demand stating that the information sought will enable him “to
    determine whether wrongdoing or mismanagement has taken place such that it would be
    appropriate to initiate litigation”); JX-108 at 1 (Pettry’s demand listing “presenting a
    litigation demand to the Board” or “suggesting corporate governance reforms” as other
    potential end uses of the fruits of their investigation); JX-113 at 1 (Friedt’s demand
    listing “presenting a litigation demand to the Board” or “suggesting corporate governance
    reforms” as other potential end uses of the fruits of their investigation); JX-124 at 1
    (Hollywood’s demand expressly stating that Hollywood reserves the right to “take other
    action to seek appropriate relief”).
    198
    See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 25–45.
    199
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 37 (acknowledging that “Plaintiffs claim that their
    purposes ‘are not limited to bringing a derivative lawsuit’” (citing Pls.’ Opening Br. at
    46)).
    200
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    44
    matter, although Gilead makes this point as to “Plaintiffs” as a whole, Gilead does not
    cite to any deposition testimony from one of the five Plaintiffs—Hollywood. 201 Nor
    could they.      Hollywood’s 30(b)(6) representative Williams testified that he had not
    predetermined what would happen after the investigation. 202 Williams, a retired police
    officer, expressly likened a Section 220 inspection to a police investigation, and stated
    that “[t]his is simply an investigation. If it turns out that there is no [wrongdoing], then it
    will be the end of it.” 203 Gilead can only avoid inspection if it defeats all five Plaintiffs’
    proper purposes. By failing to show that Hollywood had predetermined what to do with
    the fruits of its investigation, Gilead’s argument falls short from the get-go.
    Gilead’s other citations amount to misrepresentations of the record.         For the
    position that it is “obvious” from “Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony” that Plaintiffs’ “only
    true purpose” was to pursue derivative claims, Gilead offers the following:
    •       Gilead cites to the portion of Collins’s testimony where Collins directly
    denies any plans to file a derivative claim. 204 The examining attorney
    asked: “Do you intend to file a derivative action against Gilead?” Collins
    201
    See 
    id.
     at 36–43.
    202
    See Williams Dep. Tr. at 58:1–10 (“Well, as I understand it, it’s similar to a police
    investigation, if you will. If there is some wrongdoing that's being alleged, there’s an
    investigation that follows. That investigation may turn out to be completely prudent.
    Any and all the action taken was in the best interests of the company. And as I stated
    before, if there’s nothing there, then we move on. If it turns out that there’s wrongdoing,
    then the matter would be brought back to the board for any other consideration.”).
    203
    
    Id.
     52:1–3; see also 
    id.
     at 51:10–17 (“Q. And when you say ‘the action,’ what do you
    mean by that? A. The books and records investigation involving Gilead. Q. Has
    Hollywood considered bringing a derivative lawsuit related to the allegations in the
    Section 220 demand letter? A. No.”).
    204
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 37 (citing Collins Dep. Tr. at 103–05).
    45
    responded: “I don’t have any plans to do that at the moment.” 205 The
    attorney continued: “Are you aware of any other Gilead stockholders who
    are contemplating bringing a derivative action against Gilead?” He
    responded: “No, I’m not.” 206
    •       Gilead cites to the portion of Pettry’s testimony where she directly denies
    that her purpose is limited to pursuing a derivative claim. 207 The examining
    attorney asked: “Now, at the time you entered into this engagement
    agreement [with counsel], did you intend to file derivative litigation
    relating to Gilead?” Pettry answered: “It was a matter of first finding out.
    I mean, obviously, although it’s potentially a shareholder derivative matter,
    clearly there was first to do inspection demand to get information in order
    to determine whether it’s appropriate to file derivative, shareholder
    litigation.” 208
    •       Gilead cites to the portion of Ramirez’s deposition transcript where
    Ramirez uses equivocal language when referring to a future derivative
    lawsuit. 209 Counsel for the defendants identified each category of
    documents requested in Ramirez’s demand and asked: “[F]or what purpose
    do you need this information?” 210 In response to the first few such
    questions, Ramirez vaguely indicated that he believed that the information
    would strengthen his “case.” 211 In response to the last such question,
    Ramirez went further to say that he believed the information would
    strengthen the allegations for the purpose of a potential lawsuit, but he used
    conditional language, stating: “if there is a case to be brought.” 212 The
    205
    Collins Dep. Tr. at 104:19–23.
    206
    
    Id.
     at 105:1–4.
    207
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 37 (citing Pettry Dep. Tr. at 64–65).
    208
    Pettry Dep. Tr. at 64:23–65:8 (emphasis added).
    209
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 37 (citing Ramirez Dep. Tr. at 102–12).
    210
    Ramirez Dep. Tr. at 107:21–22, 108:19–20, 110:1–2.
    211
    See 
    id.
     at 108:3–5 (“I think they could help strengthen our case against the
    allegations.”); 
    id.
     at 109:15–17 (“As I had previously stated, I believe they could shed
    some light and strengthen our case.”); 
    id.
     at 110:15–17 (“I would again say adding merit
    and strength to the allegations that were present . . . for all the points as like a
    collective.”).
    212
    
    Id.
     at 111:18–21 (emphasis added) (“[A]s previously stated, these conversations could
    add merit and strength to our allegations, if there is to be a case brought.”).
    46
    reference to a “case to be brought” called for a follow-up question, which
    counsel eventually asked: “What specific case are you talking about.”213
    Ramirez responded by claiming privilege, but again using conditional
    language: “I think any of the discussions about any potential case, if there
    is to be one, were between my counsel and I. So I don’t know if I can
    properly answer that for you.” 214 The examining attorney let the
    questioning end there. 215
    •      Gilead cites to the portions of Friedt’s testimony where Friedt suggests that
    she will rely on her counsel in determining the end-uses of her
    investigation. 216 The lead-off question in this series, which the examiner
    insisted required a “yes or no” response, was: “[H]ave you informed
    Gilead that you may file a derivative action against it?” 217 To this question,
    Friedt responded “[t]hrough counsel, yes,” and then said “I left it up to my
    counsel to inform Gilead.” 218 The examiner had not previously asked
    whether Friedt had considered filing a derivative claim, and thus the
    question assumed aspects of the very fact that Gilead seeks to prove—
    Friedt’s intent to pursue derivative claims. Moreover, on its face, this
    examiner’s question only asks whether Friedt “may” file a derivative
    action, and not that she has predetermined that a derivative claim is the only
    end-use she intended to pursue. Friedt later clarified, in other pages
    specifically relied on by Gilead, that she intended to leave it to her counsel
    to determine whether to pursue derivative claims, implicitly denying any
    then-present intention of pursuing derivative claims. 219
    This deposition testimony does not support, and portions directly contradict,
    Gilead’s contention that Plaintiffs’ “only true purpose” is to pursue a derivative lawsuit.
    213
    
    Id.
     at 112:14–15.
    214
    
    Id.
     at 112:16–20 (emphasis added).
    215
    See 
    id.
    216
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 37 (citing Friedt Dep. Tr. at 54–56).
    217
    Friedt Dep. Tr. at 54:1–5.
    218
    
    Id.
     at 54:9–15.
    219
    
    Id.
     at 81:4–9 (“Q. At the time you entered into this engagement agreement, did you
    intend to file a derivative action relating to Gilead . . . ? A. . . . I would leave that up to
    my counsel.”).
    47
    Plaintiffs’ retention agreements with counsel similarly fail to demonstrate that
    Plaintiffs’ sole purpose was to pursue a derivative suit. Gilead argues that “the retention
    agreements make clear that counsel will not be paid until Plaintiffs achieve a financial
    settlement or judgment—an implausible scenario absent the prosecution of derivative
    claims.” 220 Once again, Gilead fails to make this point as to all Plaintiffs—only four of
    the five Plaintiffs executed retention agreements with counsel. 221 Collins represented that
    he did not have a retention agreement with counsel. 222
    It is true that plaintiffs’ attorneys commonly take matters on contingency and
    receive compensation only as a consequence of the prosecution and settlement of
    derivative claims. This common arrangement is, again, a benign aspect of Delaware’s
    solution to the collective action problem that stockholders face. Moreover, the fact that
    retention agreements with counsel provide that counsel only gets paid in the event of
    plenary litigation does not prevent Plaintiffs from using “the fruits of their investigation
    for other ends.” 223 It is logical that the agreements would address litigation because
    “[t]he plaintiffs would need their counsel to conduct litigation,” but not to pursue
    220
    Def.’s Opening Br. at 37 (citing JX-79 at 2 (Friedt Retention Agreement); JX-80 at 2
    (Pettry Retention Agreement); JX-87 at 1–2 (Ramirez Retention Agreement); JX-122 at 2
    (Hollywood Retention Agreement)).
    221
    See JX-79 (Friedt Retention Agreement); JX-80 (Pettry Retention Agreement); JX-87
    (Ramirez Retention Agreement); JX-122 (Hollywood Retention Agreement).
    222
    Collins Dep. Tr. at 45:19–24.
    223
    See AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
     at *14.
    48
    alternative courses of action. 224 The retention agreements standing alone, therefore, do
    not undermine Plaintiffs’ proper purposes.
    To sum up the defects in Gilead’s so-called “standing” arguments as a whole:
    They are not actually about standing to bring a Section 220 action. They speak to the
    viability of a derivative claim, which is largely beyond the scope of Section 220
    proceedings. Even the authorities on which Gilead relies limit the application of Gilead’s
    arguments to situations where pursuing a derivative claim is the plaintiff’s sole purpose.
    Section 220 plaintiffs generally need not specify the end-uses of their investigation at the
    outset of their investigation, and Plaintiffs here have stated multiple potential end-uses.
    Gilead’s arguments to the contrary based on Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony fail to
    address all Plaintiffs and are misleading. Plaintiffs’ retention agreements with their
    counsel do not support Gilead’s point.
    Gilead’s arguments fail for other reasons as well. Gilead argues that Plaintiffs
    lack standing to seek inspection because Plaintiffs did not own shares at the time of the
    possible wrongdoing. 225 Yet, in Saito, the Delaware Supreme Court found that “the date
    on which a stockholder first acquired the corporation’s stock does not control the scope
    224
    
    Id.
    225
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 36 (citing Graulich, 
    2011 WL 1843813
    , at *5 (“If
    plaintiff would not have standing to bring suit, plaintiff does not have a proper purpose to
    investigate wrongdoing because its stated purpose is not reasonably related to its role as a
    stockholder.”)); W. Coast Mgmt., 
    914 A.2d at 641
     (“If a books and records demand is to
    investigate wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s sole purpose is to pursue a derivative suit, the
    plaintiff must have standing to pursue the underlying suit[.]”)).
    49
    of records available under § 220.” 226 As the court explained, a stockholder can seek
    inspection of records pre-dating their stock ownership “[i]f activities that occurred before
    the purchase date are ‘reasonably related’ to the stockholder’s interest as a
    stockholder.” 227 A document can reasonably relate to a stockholder’s current interests if
    it provides background and context to the current or ongoing wrong the stockholder seeks
    to investigate. 228     In this case, any records sought that arguably pre-date Plaintiffs’
    ownership of Gilead stock are “reasonably related” to Plaintiffs’ current interest as
    stockholders, and concern post-purchase date wrongs that have their roots in earlier
    events.
    In any event, Gilead’s timing-of-ownership argument does not apply to the on-
    going False Claim Acts investigations, and the antitrust abuses, mass torts, and patent
    violations are all alleged to be continuing. 229
    There is also a non-frivolous argument that Gilead waived its statute of limitations
    and Section 102(b)(7) defenses by failing to identify them in its interrogatory responses,
    despite this court ordering discovery into Gilead’s defenses. 230 Gilead responds that it
    226
    Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 
    806 A.2d 113
    , 117 (Del. 2002).
    227
    
    Id.
    228
    UICI, 
    2005 WL 1377432
    , at *2 (“A document that contributes to the investigation of a
    continuing wrong or provides background and context to a current, actionable wrong may
    be relevant and, indeed, necessary to a shareholder’s proper purpose regardless of
    whether the events revealed in the documents are themselves actionable.”).
    229
    See JX-82 at ¶ 2; JX-98 at 3, 69–75; JX-244 at ¶¶ 155, 163.
    230
    See JX-164; JX-191; JX-206; JX-210; see also IQ Hldgs., Inc. v. Am. Com. Lines Inc.,
    
    2012 WL 3877790
    , *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2012) (“The underlying purpose of discovery
    50
    was not required to raise these defenses in its answer or otherwise because they are not
    defenses to a books and records action but, rather, to the plenary lawsuit. 231     This
    decision need not reach this argument given the multiple other defects in Gilead’s
    position.     But it bears noting that Gilead’s position only underscores that Gilead’s
    “standing” arguments speak to the viability of a potential derivative claim and not
    Plaintiffs’ entitlement to inspection under Section 220.
    C.     Scope of Production
    Once a Section 220 plaintiff establishes a proper purpose, the court must
    determine the scope of inspection. A stockholder with a proper purpose “bears the
    burden of proving that each category of books and records is essential to accomplishment
    of the stockholder's articulated purpose for the inspection.” 232
    The Delaware Supreme Court recently articulated this burden as follows:
    Books and records satisfy this standard “if they address the
    ‘crux of the shareholder’s purpose’ and if that information ‘is
    unavailable from another source.’” That determination is
    “fact specific and will necessarily depend on the context in
    which the shareholder’s inspection demand arises.” Keeping
    in mind that § 220 inspections are not tantamount to
    “comprehensive discovery,” the Court of Chancery must
    tailor its order for inspection to cover only those books and
    records that are “essential and sufficient to the stockholder's
    stated purpose.” In other words, the court must give the
    in general is to reduce the element of surprise at trial . . . .”).
    231
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 40 n.23 (“The statute of limitations is not an affirmative
    defense in a books and records action.”).
    232
    Palantir, 203 A.3d at 751 (quoting Thomas & Betts, 
    681 A.2d at 1035
    ).
    51
    petitioner everything that is “essential,” but stop at what is
    “sufficient.” 233
    In this case, Plaintiffs seek inspection of formal board materials, including board
    minutes, presentations, reports, agendas, and preparation materials, dating back to 2004
    and concerning the topics of the Demands. Plaintiffs additionally seek five specific
    categories of documents.
    Gilead’s response is three-fold. Gilead first argues that inspection should be
    limited to formal board materials. Gilead next makes arguments as to each category of
    additional documents. Gilead finally argues that each Plaintiff should be limited to
    inspecting only the documents specifically sought in their respective Demands.
    1.       Formal Board Materials
    Gilead agrees that, upon a finding that Plaintiffs have stated proper purposes, the
    production of the formal board materials is appropriate. 234 Gilead has collected and
    reviewed approximately 1,600 centrally-stored formal board materials from December 1,
    2004 to February 25, 2020, and identified over 400 of them as potentially related to the
    topics sought in the Demands. 235       Because Plaintiffs have stated proper purposes,
    Plaintiffs are entitled to inspect this category of documents. These documents should
    have been produced in response to the Demands without resort to litigation.
    233
    
    Id.
     at 751–52.
    234
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 47–50.
    235
    JX-210 at 21–23.
    52
    2.       Categories of Additional Documents
    Gilead argues that the court should limit inspection to the formal board materials
    based on what Gilead describes as the “default rule that only formal board materials are
    necessary and essential in a Section 220 proceeding.” 236 There is no such default rule.
    Gilead         relies   primarily   on   Vice   Chancellor   Laster’s   decision   in
    AmerisourceBergen. 237            There, the Vice Chancellor classified corporate books and
    records into three categories:                “Formal Board Materials,” 238 “Informal Board
    Materials,” 239 and “Officer-Level Materials.” 240 The Vice Chancellor explained that
    “[t]he starting point (and often the ending point) for an adequate inspection will be board-
    level documents.” 241 The premise for that observation is that companies can and should
    provide these documents voluntarily without forcing stockholders to litigate over them.
    236
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 54.
    237
    See 
    id.
    238
    AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
     at *24 (defining “Formal Board Materials” as
    “board-level documents that formally evidence the directors’ deliberations and decisions
    and comprise the materials that the directors formally received and considered”)
    (collecting cases limiting the scope of production to Formal Board Material); see also
    Woods v. Sahara Enters., 
    2020 WL 4200131
    , at *11 (Del. Ch. July 22, 2020) (same).
    239
    AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
     at *25 (defining “Informal Board Materials” as
    “generally include[ing] communications between directors and the corporation’s officers
    and senior employees, such as information distributed to the directors outside of formal
    channels, in between formal meetings, or in connection with other types of board
    gatherings” and sometimes including “emails and other types of communication sent
    among the directors themselves, even if the directors used non-corporate accounts”).
    240
    
    Id.
     (defining “Officer Level Materials” as “communications and materials that were
    only shared among or reviewed by officers and employees”).
    241
    Id. at *24.
    53
    Gilead misses this point and invokes the AmerisourceBergen taxonomy for a contrary
    purpose—to broaden the already extensive disputes among the parties.
    Formal board materials need not be an end point, particularly where the
    wrongdoing          appears   vast.   As   the    Vice   Chancellor   further   explained   in
    AmerisourceBergen, “[i]f the plaintiff makes a proper showing, an inspection may extend
    to informal materials,” 242 and “wide-ranging mismanagement or waste” might require a
    “more wide-ranging inspection.” 243 In this case, Gilead’s efforts to draw the line at
    formal board materials fall short because Plaintiffs have shown a need for additional
    categories of documents by demonstrating a credible basis to suspect wide-ranging
    misconduct and wrongdoing.
    In addition to formal board materials, Plaintiffs seek the following categories of
    documents: (a) the agreements with other companies at issue in the antitrust litigation;
    (b) policies and procedures concerning the topics covered in the Demands; (c) senior
    management materials; (d) communications between Gilead and the government; and (e)
    director questionnaires.
    242
    Id. at *25.
    243
    Id. at *24 (first quoting Freund v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 
    2003 WL 139766
    , at *5 (Del.
    Ch. Jan. 9, 2003); then citing Skoglund v. Ormand Indus., 
    372 A.2d 204
    , 211 (Del. Ch.
    1976)).
    54
    a.    Anticompetitive Agreements
    Plaintiffs seek to inspect the agreements between Gilead and its competitors at
    issue in the antitrust litigation. 244    Plaintiffs suspect that these agreements violated
    antitrust laws or otherwise perpetuate unlawful anticompetitive activity. 245 They are core
    to the wrongdoing Plaintiffs seek to investigate. 246 They are therefore necessary and
    essential to Plaintiffs’ proper purposes. They are unlikely to be available from another
    source. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to inspect this category of documents. 247
    Because of the centrality of these agreements to Plaintiffs’ purposes, Gilead should have
    produced them without resorting to litigation.
    244
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 56–57.
    245
    
    Id.
    246
    See, e.g., AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *28 (ordering inspection of
    settlement agreements with the DEA to identify the scope of the company’s compliance
    obligations and determine whether the Board willfully disregarded them).
    247
    The parties dispute the significance of AmerisourceBergen on this category of
    documents. In that case, the court ordered inspection of documents related to the
    defendant’s participation in trade associations where the plaintiffs suspected that the
    defendant violated the law by collaborating with trade associations. See 
    id.
     Plaintiffs
    argue that this outcome weighs in favor of production of the antitrust agreements in this
    action. Pls.’ Opening Br. at 57 n.191. Gilead responds that the Court limited production
    in AmerisourceBergen to formal board materials, and argues that this court should
    “follow AmerisourceBergen and not order the production of the underlying antitrust
    agreements.” Def.’s Answering Br. at 53. Defendant misconstrues AmerisourceBergen,
    where the Court found that “[t]he record is inadequate to determine whether the plaintiffs
    can inspect any other materials because AmerisourceBergen refused to provide any
    discovery into what types of books and records exist, how they are maintained, and who
    has them.” See 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *1. The court expressly granted the plaintiffs the
    ability to seek further discovery to determine what books and records exist. See id. at
    *29. Here, Plaintiffs obtained that discovery, so there is no need for bifurcation.
    55
    In holding that Plaintiffs are entitled to inspect the allegedly anticompetitive
    agreements, the court does not distinguish between the Gilead/Japan Tobacco agreement
    and those still at issue in the Staley Action. The complete set of agreements is necessary
    to understanding the pattern of behavior that the Demands seek to investigate.
    b.        Policies and Procedures
    Plaintiffs seek to inspect Gilead’s policies and procedures concerning Gilead’s
    compliance with antitrust regulations and patent law. 248 These requests seek discrete
    categories of information, which are easy to produce, and where inspection is routinely
    granted. 249 Gilead argues that the formal board materials from the relevant time period
    are sufficient to understand whether Board and management decisions were made in
    compliance with Gilead’s policies and procedures. 250 But the formal board materials may
    not reflect what, if any, policies and procedures were in place during that time period.
    These documents are therefore necessary and essential to Plaintiffs’ proper purposes.
    They are unlikely to be available from another source.        Accordingly, Plaintiffs are
    248
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 57.
    249
    See, e.g., AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *27 (ordering production of the
    Amerisourcebergen’s written policies regarding its anti-diversion and compliance
    program); In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig. (Facebook 220), 
    2019 WL 2320842
    , at
    *18 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2019) (ordering the production of Facebook’s formally adopted
    policies and procedures regarding data privacy and access to user data, including those
    promulgated following the entry of the Consent Decree); UnitedHealth, 
    2018 WL 1110849
    , at *10 (ordering the production of UnitedHealth’s policies and procedures
    regarding Medicare billing); Lucent, 
    2003 WL 139766
    , at *6 (ordering production of
    policies and procedures concerning accounting compliance, including policies for (i)
    preparing revenue “targets” or preparing and disclosing “financial guidance” or
    projections; and (ii) recognizing revenue, on sales to its distributors).
    250
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 53–54.
    56
    entitled to inspect this category of documents. This is another category of documents that
    Gilead should have produced without resorting to litigation.
    c.     Senior Management Materials
    Plaintiffs seek to inspect two categories of officer-level documents that they refer
    to as “Senior Management Materials” to determine “whether and to what extent
    mismanagement occurred and what information was transmitted to Gilead’s directors and
    officers.” 251
    This court will permit inspection of officer-level documents under certain
    circumstances. As the Delaware Supreme Court described in Saito when affirming
    inspection of officer-level documents, “generally, the source of the documents in a
    corporation’s possession should not control a stockholder's right to inspection under
    § 220.” 252 Although inspection of officer-level documents can be appropriate, in general,
    “the Court of Chancery should not order emails to be produced when other materials
    (e.g., traditional board-level materials, such as minutes) would accomplish the
    petitioner’s proper purpose, but if non-email books and records are insufficient, then the
    court should order emails to be produced.” 253 The burden lies on Plaintiffs to establish a
    reasonable basis to suspect that other materials are likely to be insufficient to accomplish
    the stockholder’s proper purpose.
    251
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 60–62.
    252
    Saito, 
    806 A.2d at 118
    ; accord. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 95 A.3d at 1273; see also
    Woods, 
    2020 WL 4200131
    , at *11; Mudrick Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Globalstar, Inc., 
    2018 WL 3625680
    , at *9 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018).
    253
    Palantir, 203 A.3d at 752–53.
    57
    First, Plaintiffs seek approximately thirty sets of materials emailed to senior
    management members prior to their bi-monthly “Leadership Team Meetings” and ad hoc
    meetings. 254 Plaintiffs observe that Gilead stores the materials circulated in connection
    with the bi-monthly meetings in a centralized location. 255 Plaintiffs contend that these
    materials are likely to include information about the government investigations, the
    antitrust lawsuits, and Gilead’s decision to sue the U.S. government. 256 These thirty sets
    are necessary and essential to Plaintiffs’ ability to investigate whether and to what extent
    wrongdoing occurred and what information was transmitted to Gilead’s directors and
    officers. 257 They are also unlikely to be available from another source. Accordingly,
    Plaintiffs are entitled to inspect this category of documents.
    Second, Plaintiffs request electronically stored information—previously gathered
    and produced in connection with the congressional investigation, the Staley Action, and a
    2016 subpoena—from the files of two former inside directors John Milligan and John
    Martin. 258 Plaintiffs say that Milligan and Martin were highly influential Board members
    254
    Trial Tr. at 87:7–21; JX-210 at 26, 39.
    255
    See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 62 & n.204; see also JX-210 at 40 (“From June 2019 to
    present, documents may be accessed via OneDrive and projected for shared viewing.”).
    256
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 60–62.
    257
    Cf. Facebook 220, 
    2019 WL 2320842
    , at *18 (ordering the production of “electronic
    communications, if coming from, directed to or copied to a member of the Board,
    concerning” the plaintiffs’ allegations in that case, “to be collected from the following
    [senior management] custodians: Erskine B. Bowles, Sheryl Sandberg, Alex Stamos, and
    Mark Zuckerberg”).
    258
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 61–62; see also JX-210 at 27 n.4 (alleging that Milligan and
    Martin, as former executives, were “custodians in certain Matters by virtue of their roles
    58
    and thus their documents are critical because any wrongdoing will likely involve what
    these Board members knew. 259 As to this one category, Plaintiffs’ efforts fall short. A
    director’s status as a management member or highly influential Board member can
    sometimes provide a basis for inspecting that director’s emails, typically where the
    director played a key role in the suspected wrongdoing. 260 The mere fact that a director
    holds a management position or is influential seldom makes their documents necessary
    and essential to investigating wrongdoing. 261 In this case, Plaintiffs offer no additional
    justification for seeking to inspect these documents. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to
    demonstrate that these emails are necessary and essential to their stated purposes and are
    not entitled to inspect this category of documents.
    d.        Gilead’s Communications with the Government
    Plaintiffs seek to inspect high-level communications between Gilead and
    government       investigators    that   state   the   basis   for   the   ongoing   government
    investigations. 262 This court regularly orders companies to produce communications
    as Senior Officers).
    259
    Pls.’ Post-Trial Opening Br. at 61–62.
    260
    See, e.g., Yahoo!, 132 A.3d at 791–793 (permitting inspection of CEO’s “email and
    other electronic documents” because she “was the principal corporate actor in the hiring
    process”).
    261
    Cf. Kaufman v. CA, Inc. (Kaufman II), 
    905 A.2d 749
    , 755 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding
    that the plaintiff “conflate[d] the usefulness or responsiveness of further discovery . . .
    with the proper standard of necessity under Section 220” and “[t]hat a document would
    be potentially discoverable under Rule 34 does not make it necessary and essential under
    Section 220”).
    262
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 58–60.
    59
    related to government investigations and litigation in Section 220 cases where those
    investigations supply or support a credible basis for wrongdoing. 263
    Just as Gilead’s policies and procedures are necessary and essential to reveal the
    degree of Gilead’s compliance with internal rules, these documents are necessary and
    essential to reveal the degree of Gilead’s compliance with positive law and government
    regulations.    Considering that the ongoing government investigations supported
    Plaintiffs’ credible basis for inspection, these documents are necessary and essential to
    assess whether wrongdoing occurred. These communications might also inform whether
    the Company has taken any steps to address the possible wrongdoing.               Ongoing
    government investigations might threaten Gilead’s ability to secure future government
    funding, which would present a serious problem for Gilead’s business.
    These documents are therefore necessary and essential to Plaintiffs’ proper
    purposes. They are also unlikely to be available from another source. Accordingly,
    Plaintiffs are entitled to inspect this category of documents.
    263
    See, e.g., Facebook 220, 
    2019 WL 2320842
    , at *18 (ordering production of documents
    and communications related to “investigations conducted by the FTC, DOJ, SEC, FBI
    and ICO regarding Facebook’s data privacy practices”); China MediaExpress, 
    2012 WL 28818
    , at *6 (ordering production of any materials provided to the United States
    Patent Office or any patent office in any other country, including the People's Republic of
    China); Lucent, 
    2003 WL 139766
    , at *5 (ordering production of “[o]rders and other
    communications with the SEC concerning its investigation”); Carapico, 
    791 A.2d at 792
    (ordering production of “reports presented to or minutes of meetings of the Exchange
    Board of Governors (or any committees or subgroups thereof) relating to (a) the SEC
    inquiry, (b) the decision to authorize the settlement of the SEC inquiry, or (c) the impact
    of the terms of the SEC Order on the business of the Exchange or any of its
    subsidiaries”); see also AmerisourceBergen, 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *25 (“In an appropriate
    case, an inspection may extend further to encompass communications and materials that
    were only shared among or reviewed by officers and employees . . . .”).
    60
    e.     Director Questionnaires
    Plaintiffs seek to inspect the directors’ and officers’ questionnaires for each Board
    member. 264 This court regularly orders companies to produce director questionnaires
    where a plaintiff has demonstrated a credible basis to suspect possible wrongdoing. 265
    Because that the Demands investigate alleged violations of positive law and
    government regulations, understanding the directors’ motives and potential conflicts is
    paramount. Further, the burden on Gilead in producing these documents is minimal.
    Gilead stores these documents in a central location, 266 so they are easy to locate and
    produce. They are unlikely to be available from another source. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
    are entitled to inspect this category of documents.
    3.        Plaintiff-Specific Restrictions on Inspection
    Gilead seeks to limit the scope of each Plaintiffs’ inspections to the documents
    requested in their respective Demands. 267 Gilead argues that if a Plaintiff elected not to
    request a certain category of documents in its Demand, then it conceded that such
    264
    Pls.’ Opening Br. at 56.
    265
    See, e.g., Facebook 220, 
    2019 WL 2320842
    , at *18 (ordering defendant to produce
    director questionnaires); UnitedHealth, 
    2018 WL 1110849
    , at *9 (same); Lavin, 
    2017 WL 6728702
    , at *14 (same). Often, a stockholder will assert the desire to investigate
    director independence as a separate purpose for seeking books and records. See, e.g.,
    Facebook 220, 
    2019 WL 2320842
    , at *1 (one of the plaintiffs’ stated purposes was to
    investigate the independence and disinterest of the board); UnitedHealth, 
    2018 WL 1110849
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2018) (same); Lavin, 
    2017 WL 6728702
    , at *1
    (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2017) (same). In this case, Plaintiffs desire to investigating director
    independence is a component of investigating the corporate wrongdoing at issue.
    266
    JX-210 at 24 n.2.
    267
    See Def.’s Answering Br. at 45–46.
    61
    category of information is nonessential to its stated purpose.       Gilead contends that
    Plaintiffs may not by piggyback on other stockholders’ separate Demands. 268
    As a general rule, a stockholder’s inspection rights are limited by the scope of the
    demand letter, and a Section 220 plaintiff will be foreclosed from recasting the scope of
    its demand at the eleventh hour. 269 The conventional wisdom underlying this rule is that
    it is difficult and inefficient for companies to consider the merits of an evolving request.
    Preventing Section 220 plaintiffs from revising the scope of their demands during
    litigation promotes the policy of protecting corporations from the burden and additional
    costs created by these inefficiencies. 270
    268
    Id. at 46 (first citing Paraflon Invs., Ltd. v. Linkable Networks, Inc., 
    2020 WL 1655947
    , at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2020) (refusing to order production of documents not
    requested in demand); then citing Fuchs Fam. Tr. v. Parker Drilling Co., 
    2015 WL 1036106
    , at *4, *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2015) (rejecting a Section 220 plaintiff’s late-stage
    attempts to expands its inspection)).
    269
    See, e.g., Fuchs, 
    2015 WL 1036106
    , at *4 (rejecting a Section 220 plaintiff’s efforts to
    expand the scope of requested documents through a supplemental demand sent on the eve
    of trial); Quantum Tech. P’rs IV, L.P. v. Ploom, Inc., 
    2014 WL 2156622
    , at *14 n.118
    (Del. Ch. May 14, 2014) (“I note, however, that if Quantum later seeks to inspect
    information that is not within the categories of information sought in this action,
    Quantum would need to make a new demand and, if necessary, file a new action.”);
    Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corp., 
    906 A.2d 156
    , 167 (Del. Ch. 2006),
    and aff’d sub nom. Highland Equity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corp., 
    922 A.2d 415
     (Del.
    2007) (“None of these revisions adequately address the court’s concern as to the breadth
    of the original demand sued upon or the scope of relief Highland Select continues to
    seek.”).
    270
    Paraflon, 
    2020 WL 1655947
    , at *6 (“Striking the proper balance between a
    stockholders’ inspection rights and the right of a company’s board to manage the
    corporation without undue interference from stockholders is a core principle in our
    Section 220 jurisprudence. Limiting inspection to what is specified in a demand letter is
    a key way of maintaining that balance. A corporate board is entitled to be informed of
    exactly what the stockholder is demanding to inspect so it can make the call, before
    62
    This general rule serves to promote litigant and judicial efficiency and is not
    strictly applied when those purposes are not furthered.          For example, Section 220
    plaintiffs often lack information about what type of corporate records exist when making
    their demands. This informational asymmetry can force Section 220 plaintiffs to make
    broad requests.        Tailored discovery in a Section 220 action can allow Section 220
    plaintiffs to refine their requests with greater precision and drop requests for non-existent
    information. The iterative process that occurs through Section 220 discovery thus helps
    to eliminate pointless hypothetical disputes and promote judicial and litigant efficiencies,
    all good things this court strives to encourage. 271
    To that end, sometimes this court will ask Section 220 plaintiffs to revise their
    requests to streamline disputes.        In Facebook, for example, the court required the
    defendant to respond to a demand as “refined by the parties’ several and meet and confer
    sessions.” 272      The “refined” demand was “the version of the Demand that [the
    defendants] addressed in their pre-trial brief and at trial.” 273 The court held: “The scope
    litigation, whether to allow inspection or litigate the demand. Holding that inspection
    will not be ordered unless a request is presented in the stockholder’s inspection demand
    preserves this balance and prevents a demand letter from turning into an iterative,
    ongoing request for production.”).
    271
    See, e.g., ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, 
    2006 WL 3783520
    , at *2 (Del. Ch.
    Dec. 21, 2006); Loppert v. WindsorTech, Inc., 
    865 A.2d, 1282
    , 1290–91 (Del. Ch. 2004);
    see also Dkt. 65, Oral Arg. Re Def.’s Mot. for Protective Order and the Ct.’s Ruling at 9–
    10, 57–58.
    272
    In re Facebook 220, 
    2019 WL 2320842
    , at *18.
    273
    
    Id.
    63
    of documents requested in that version, therefore, has been properly joined for
    decision.” 274
    The general rule does not promote efficiency when applied to coordinated Section
    220 actions like this case. Often, corporate actions will draw demands for inspection
    from multiple plaintiffs. In such cases, Section 220 plaintiffs may agree to coordinate
    their efforts, or sometimes the court or the defendants will ask the Section 220 plaintiffs
    to do so. A coordinated approach is almost always desirable because it allows the court
    to resolve, and the defendant to litigate, and a single Section 220 action rather than
    multiple actions. A coordinated approach also reduces the likelihood of inconsistent
    determinations on similar issues.
    In this case, it was Gilead that asked Plaintiffs to coordinate their litigation efforts,
    and Plaintiffs agreed. 275 As part of their coordinated process, Plaintiffs worked together
    to narrow their over sixty overlapping documents requests to a streamlined list.
    In this context, limiting Plaintiffs to the documents they demanded before
    coordination would make no sense. There is no prejudice to Gilead in producing all
    categories of information deemed necessary and essential to all Plaintiffs. In fact, it
    would be easier for Gilead to create and track one production set rather than five.
    Gilead’s approach would force the court to conduct four separate scope analyses,
    defeating some of the judicial efficiencies gained by coordination. It would also risk
    274
    
    Id.
    275
    See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
    64
    inconsistent rulings on whether categories of documents were necessary and essential as
    to certain stockholder plaintiffs but not to others who seek to investigate the same
    wrongdoing. In sum, strict application of the general rule in this case would defeat the
    rule’s purpose of promote litigant and judicial efficiency.
    For this reason, Gilead’s final argument seems yet another indication that Gilead’s
    real goal in this litigation is not to protect its interests but, rather, to make the process of
    investigating wrongdoing as difficult as possible for its stockholders.
    D.     Conditions on Inspection
    This decision does not address whether it is appropriate to enter conditions on
    inspection. In its pretrial brief, Gilead asked that inspection be subject to four specific
    conditions. 276 In its post-trial brief, Gilead suggests that the parties should meet and
    confer regarding the conditions. 277 Plaintiffs appear to agree that a meet and confer is
    warranted. 278 The parties shall confer on whether conditions are appropriate and report to
    the court within twenty days of issuance of this decision.
    276
    Dkt. 85, Def. Gilead Sciences, Inc.’s Pre-Trial Br. at 56–57 (requesting that inspection
    be subject to a mutually-agreeable form of confidentiality order, a Delaware forum
    selection provision applicable to any future litigated that uses the fruits of Plaintiffs’
    inspection, an incorporation condition like that entered in Yahoo!, and Gilead’s ability to
    assert that certain documents are privileged or nonresponsive).
    277
    Def.’s Answering Br. at 60.
    278
    See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 62–63.
    65
    E.     Plaintiffs Are Granted Leave to Move for Their Fees and Expenses.
    Delaware courts follow the American Rule that “each party is generally expected
    to pay its own attorneys’ fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation.” 279 Even under
    the American Rule, however, this court retains the ability to shift fees for bad faith
    conduct “to deter abusive litigation and protect the integrity of the judicial process.” 280 In
    assessing “bad faith,” this court can consider both litigation-related conduct and the
    party’s pre-litigation conduct. 281 Although there is “no single, comprehensive definition
    of ‘bad faith’ that will justify a fee-shifting award,” 282 this court commonly employs the
    “glaring egregiousness” standard. 283         “The bad faith exception is applied in
    279
    Shawe v. Elting, 
    157 A.3d 142
    , 149 (Del. 2017) (citing Montgomery Cellular Hldg.
    Co. v. Dobler, 
    880 A.2d 206
    , 227 (Del. 2005)).
    280
    Montgomery Cellular, 
    880 A.2d at 227
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
    Martin v. Harbor Diversified, Inc., 
    2020 WL 568971
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 2020)
    (“Shifting fees for bad faith is not, properly speaking, an exception to the American Rule
    on fees; it is a method for reducing and appropriately allocating the costs of vexatious
    behavior sufficiently serious that justice requires such mitigation.”).
    281
    Compare In re SS & C Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 
    948 A.2d 1140
    , 1149–52 (Del. Ch.
    2008) (applying the bad faith exception to the American Rule and shifting fees because
    plaintiffs’ counsel brought a motion to withdraw on notice in bad faith and made a series
    of misstatements in filings “that tended to misrepresent or downplay the facts”), with
    Hardy v. Hardy, 
    2014 WL 3736331
    , at *17 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2014) (applying the bad
    faith exception to the American Rule to pre-litigation conduct and holding that the
    exception can apply “where the pre-litigation conduct of the losing party was so
    egregious as to justify an award of attorneys’ fees” (quoting Est. of E. Murton DuPont
    Carpenter v. Dinneen, 
    2008 WL 2950764
     (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2008))).
    282
    Montgomery Cellular, 
    880 A.2d at 227
    .
    283
    See, e.g., RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 
    129 A.3d 816
    , 879 (Del. 2015) (affirming
    this court’s determination under the “glaring egregiousness” standard to shift fees); Isr.
    Disc. Bank of N.Y. v. First State Depository Co., 
    2013 WL 2326875
    , at *28–29 (Del. Ch.
    May 29, 2013) (applying the “glaring egregiousness” standard in assessing potential fee
    shifting); eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc. v. Newmark, 
    16 A.3d 1
    , 47–48 (Del. Ch. 2010)
    66
    ‘extraordinary circumstances,’” 284 and it “is not lightly invoked,” 285 but this court has
    shifted fees in Section 220 actions where a party’s conduct rose to the level of bad
    faith. 286
    Delaware courts have urged stockholders to use the “tools at hand” and pursue
    Section 220 inspections before filing derivative lawsuits for decades, 287 and this court has
    seen a rise in Section 220 enforcement actions in recent years. 288 The regrettable reaction
    by defendant corporations has been massive resistance.           As one academic article
    commented, “defendants have turned books and records litigation into a surrogate
    proceeding to litigate the possible merits of the suit where they place obstacles in the
    plaintiffs’ way to obstruct them from employing it as a quick and easy pre-filing
    (same); In re Charles Wm. Smith Tr., 
    1999 WL 596274
    , at *2–4 (Del. Ch. July 23, 1999)
    (same).
    284
    E.g., Shawe, 
    157 A.3d at
    150–51; Montgomery Cellular, 
    880 A.2d at 227
    ; accord.
    Dover Hist. Soc., 902 A.2d at 1092; Henry v. Phixios Hldgs., Inc., 
    2017 WL 2928034
    , at
    *14 (Del. Ch. July 10, 2017) (Montgomery-Reeves, V.C.).
    285
    Ravenswood Inv. Co. v. Winmill & Co., 
    2014 WL 2445776
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. May 30,
    2014) (quoting Beck v. Atl. Coast PLC, 
    868 A.2d 840
    , 851 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
    286
    See, e.g., Carlson v. Hallinan, 
    925 A.2d 506
    , 545–46 (Del. Ch. 2006); McGowan v.
    Empress Ent., Inc., 
    791 A.2d 1
    , 3–8 (Del. Ch. 2000); Technicorp Int’l II, Inc. v. Johnston,
    
    2000 WL 713750
    , at *44 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2000).
    287
    See supra note 169.
    288
    See Edward B. Micheletti, et al., Recent Trends in Books-and-Records Litigation, 38
    Del. Law. 18, 18 (2020) (“[T]he frequency of stockholder demands to inspect corporate
    books and records has increased . . . .”); Cox et al., supra note 6 at 2123, 2146–47
    (comparing the number of Section 220 actions filed from 1981 to 1994 with those filed
    from 2004 to 2018 and finding a thirteen-fold increase).
    67
    discovery tool.” 289 These obstacles increase the investment required from stockholder
    plaintiffs and their counsel when pursuing Section 220 inspections.
    It seems that defendants like Gilead think that there are no real downsides to
    overly aggressive defense campaigns at the Section 220 phase. Although aggressively
    defending a Section 220 action will result in higher defense costs during that phase, the
    approach can undermine follow-on derivative claims if successful, thereby lowering net
    costs for defendants. Even if the approach is unsuccessful in thwarting inspection, the
    work product created in building legal defenses to follow-on derivative claims can be
    repurposed in the context of the derivative suit. And the risk of reputational harm to
    defendants resulting from a decision detailing possible corporate wrongdoing rendered
    under a plaintiff-friendly Section 220 appears to lack the deterrent effect one might
    expect it to have.
    Scholars have recommended fee shifting as one means of recalibrating the risks of
    Section 220 litigation. 290 This proposition finds support in prior decisions of this court
    and the Model Business Corporation Act. 291
    289
    Cox et al., supra note 6 at 2150.
    290
    See id. at 2151 (“Delaware should give serious consideration to awarding plaintiffs
    their attorneys’ fees in cases where the defendants make untoward efforts to delay the
    resolution of these summary cases.”); Randall Thomas, Improving Shareholder
    Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 
    38 Ariz. L. Rev. 331
    , 335 (1996) (arguing that for Section 220 to facilitate effective
    stockholder monitoring, it must be significantly streamlined, including shifting attorneys’
    fees to deter frivolous refusals to produce information).
    291
    See supra note 286; Model Business Corporation Act § 16.04(c) (“If the court orders
    inspection and copying of the records demanded, it shall also order the corporation to pay
    68
    Fee shifting may be appropriate here. Gilead exemplified the trend of overly
    aggressive litigation strategies by blocking legitimate discovery, misrepresenting the
    record, and taking positions for no apparent purpose other than obstructing the exercise of
    Plaintiffs’ statutory rights. Gilead’s pre-litigation failure to provide any Plaintiff with
    even a single document despite the ample evidence of a credible basis and the obvious
    responsiveness of certain categories of documents amplifies the court’s concerns.
    For these reasons, Plaintiffs are granted leave to move for fee-shifting.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs. The parties
    shall confer regarding conditions on inspection and concerning a form of order
    memorializing the scope of Gilead’s production. Plaintiffs may seek leave to move for
    fee-shifting.
    the shareholder’s costs (including reasonable counsel fees) incurred to obtain the order
    unless the corporation proves that it refused inspection in good faith because it had a
    reasonable basis for doubt about the right of the shareholder to inspect the records
    demanded.”).
    69