Tarnjit Singh Gill v. Regency Holdings, LLC ( 2023 )


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  •    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    TARNJIT SINGH GILL and JAGJIT SINGH              )
    GILL,                                            )
    )
    Plaintiffs,                    )
    )
    v.                                         ) C.A. No. 2023-0349-BWD
    )
    REGENCY HOLDINGS, LLC, a                         )
    Delaware limited liability company,              )
    )
    Defendant.                     )
    MASTER’S POST-TRIAL FINAL REPORT
    Final Report: June 26, 2023
    Date Submitted: June 21, 2023
    David E. Ross and Roger S. Stronach, of ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Tarnjit Singh Gill and Jagjit Singh
    Gill.
    Paul J. Loughman and Daniel M. Baker, of YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT &
    TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Reagan D. Pratt and Paul
    D. Flack, of PRATT & FLACK, Houston, Texas, Attorneys for Defendant Regency
    Holdings, LLC.
    DAVID, M.
    This post-trial final report resolves one of seven lawsuits involving siblings
    Tarnjit “Mitch” Singh Gill, Jagjit “Jag” Singh Gill, and Jagjit “Jackie” Kaur, their
    family company, Regency Holdings, LLC (“Regency,” or the “Company”), and
    Regency’s subsidiaries. Through this action, Mitch and Jag1 seek an order to compel
    inspection of Regency’s books and records pursuant to Section 18-305 of the
    Delaware Limited Liability Company Act.
    For decades, Plaintiffs managed the family business alongside their father,
    who gifted them each 23.05% of the membership interests in the Company. After
    their father died unexpectedly in 2020, however, Plaintiffs’ mother removed them
    from positions of authority at the Company and its subsidiaries and asked their sister,
    Jackie, to manage the Company, due to allegations that Plaintiffs had mismanaged
    and misappropriated the Company’s assets. Those and related allegations are the
    subject of numerous lawsuits in the United Kingdom and Texas. Plaintiffs now seek
    books and records to evaluate the status of the business and financial condition of
    the Company, value their membership interests, and investigate potential
    wrongdoing.     The Company has rejected the demand, asserting, among other
    defenses, that the gifts of membership interests Plaintiffs received from their father
    are invalid due to breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, and undue influence, and that
    1
    For clarity, this report refers to the parties by their first names, but no disrespect is
    intended.
    1
    Plaintiffs’ true purposes are to gain a litigation advantage in the six other pending
    suits.
    In this final report, I reiterate my prior ruling in discovery that this summary
    books and records proceeding is not the appropriate forum to litigate the validity of
    the underlying transactions through which Plaintiffs acquired their membership
    interests, and Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on the Company’s membership ledger to
    establish their standing to demand books and records. I further conclude that
    Plaintiffs have stated proper purposes for seeking books and records; those purposes
    are their actual, primary purposes for making the demand; the Company cannot deny
    the inspection under Section 18-305(c); and Plaintiffs are entitled to inspect some,
    but not all, of the books and records they seek.
    I.       BACKGROUND
    The following facts are drawn from the factual stipulations in the parties’ pre-
    trial order, the deposition testimony of three witnesses that was submitted in lieu of
    live testimony at trial, and 95 joint trial exhibits.2
    2
    The joint trial exhibits are cited herein as “JX __”. The deposition testimony of Mitch
    Gill, Jag Gill, and Jackie Kaur, located at JX 86-88, is cited herein as “M. Gill at __”, “J.
    Gill at __”, and “J. Kaur at __”, respectively.
    Many of the facts presented at trial will be the subject of further litigation in the numerous
    other lawsuits the parties have filed. Where it is not necessary to my ruling to resolve these
    factual disputes, I do not, and instead summarize the parties’ positions for context.
    2
    A.     The Parties and Relevant Non-Parties
    Regency is a Delaware limited liability company that serves as a holding
    company for subsidiaries that own and operate real estate assets in the United
    Kingdom and Texas.          These assets include airport property, residential and
    commercial rental properties, and a hotel.
    Regency’s founder, Jagmail Singh Gill (“Jack”), and his wife, Amarjit Gill,
    had three children—Plaintiffs Mitch and Jag, and their sister, Jackie. Jack’s father
    began the Gill family business in the 1950s as a clothing company in London. Over
    the years, operations expanded to include real estate.3 In 1989, the family purchased
    the David Wayne Hooks Memorial Airport in Houston, Texas.4 In the late 2000s,
    Jack’s brother passed away, prompting a “demerger” through which the business’s
    assets were divided between Jack and his brother’s heirs.5
    Jack allocated portions of the Gill family assets to himself, Jag, Mitch, and
    Jackie, and kept others in the family portfolio.6 Jack then reorganized the portfolio
    assets with Regency as the holding company. At the time of Regency’s formation,
    Jack executed a limited liability company agreement to govern its operations (as
    3
    J. Kaur at 198.
    4
    M. Gill at 168.
    5
    J. Kaur at 209.
    6
    Id. at 209-10.
    3
    amended and restated, the “Operating Agreement”). Jack appointed himself and
    Mitch as Regency’s two directors.7 As reflected in a ledger of membership interests
    attached to the Operating Agreement, Jack owned 100% of the membership interests
    in the Company.8
    The Operating Agreement requires that Regency maintain “[p]roper and
    complete records and books of account of the business of the” Company “on a basis
    consistent with . . . treatment [as a disregarded entity for United States income tax
    purposes] and on the same basis utilized in preparing the [Company]’s United States
    federal income tax (if required).” JX 3, Operating Agreement §§ 13(b), (d). Under
    the Operating Agreement, “[t]he Member and its duly authorized representatives
    may, for any reason reasonably related to its interest as a member of the [Company],
    examine the [Company]’s books of account and make copies and extracts therefrom
    at its own expense.” Id. § 13(e).
    7
    JX 3, Operating Agreement § 6 (“[T]he business and affairs of the Company shall be
    managed exclusively by a Board of Directors[.] . . . The number of Directors who shall
    serve on the Board shall be two (2) . . . . The initial Directors, who are hereby elected by
    the Member, shall be Jagmail Singh Gill [Jack] and Tarnjit Singh Gill [Mitch], each of
    whom shall serve as a Director until his or her successor has been elected and qualified or
    until his or her earlier death, resignation or removal, as the case may be.”).
    8
    The Operating Agreement provides that “[t]he Company shall maintain records of
    Membership Interests and certificates in the books and records of the Company.” JX 3,
    Operating Agreement § 10(d).
    4
    B.     The Role of the Gill Siblings in the Management of Regency’s
    Businesses
    Regency wholly owns three subsidiaries—Glissen Properties Ltd. (a U.K.
    entity), Transomas Investments Ltd. (a U.K. entity), and Jetson Properties Ltd. (an
    Isle of Man entity). Jetson Properties Ltd. wholly owns West Properties Holdings
    Ltd. (a U.K. entity) (“West Properties”), which, in turn, wholly owns Transomas
    Ltd. (a U.K. entity), as well as 49% of Gill Aviation Inc. (a Texas entity). West
    Properties is also a 48.51% limited partner, and Gill Aviation Inc. is the general
    partner, of Northwest Airport Management LP (a Texas entity) (“Northwest
    Airport”). The following graphic illustrates that organizational structure:
    5
    Plaintiffs refer to the U.K. entities collectively as the “Regency Companies”
    and the two Texas entities as the “Airport Companies.”
    After Plaintiffs obtained degrees (Jag with a master’s degree in tax and Mitch
    with a bachelor’s degree in finance), they joined the family business.9 Mitch
    eventually became responsible for managing the Regency Companies in the U.K. In
    addition to serving as a director of Regency, he served as a director of Glissen
    Properties Ltd., Transomas Investments Ltd., West Properties, and Transomas Ltd.
    Jag became responsible for managing the Airport Companies in Texas. Jag
    served as a director of Gill Aviation Inc. and became President of Northwest Airport,
    which expanded from an airport asset to also include a hotel, residential properties,
    and commercial properties leased to government agencies.
    In the eight years preceding the events in this action, Jackie, who holds a B.S.
    in Economics and International Relations from the London School of Economics
    and a law degree from the University of Houston,10 was not involved in Regency’s
    businesses.
    9
    M. Gill at 168.
    10
    J. Kaur at 199, 202.
    6
    C.    Jack Assigns Membership Interests in the Company to Plaintiffs.
    On April 5, 2018, Jack executed two Assignment Agreements to “assign and
    transfer” membership interests of the Company to each of Mitch and Jag. Those
    Assignment Agreements state, in part:
    WHEREAS, the Assignor [Jack] currently owns a certain
    percentage Membership Interest in REGENCY HOLDINGS, LLC, a
    Delaware limited liability company (the “Company”), after taking into
    account a contemporaneous transfer of a percentage of his Membership
    Interest in the Company to [Mitch and Jag];
    WHEREAS, the Assignor wishes to assign and transfer to
    Assignee, as a gift, an amount of his Membership Interest in the
    Company having an aggregate fair market value, as finally determined
    for United States federal gift tax purposes, equal to Five Million Six
    Hundred Thousand Dollars ($5,600,000.00), the transferred
    Membership Interest in the Company is referred to herein as the
    “Subject Interest”;
    WHEREAS, the Assignor wishes that the Assignee shall become
    a Member in the Company in his own right;
    WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 17 of the Amended and
    Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement of the
    Company (as may be further amended from time to time, the
    “Operating Agreement”), a Member may assign in whole or in part their
    Membership Interests, and the transferee shall be admitted to the
    Company as a Member upon its execution of an instrument signifying
    its agreement to be bound by the terms and conditions of the Operating
    Agreement, which instrument may be a counterpart signature page to
    the Operating Agreement;
    WHEREAS, the Assignee is willing to accept the Subject Interest
    pursuant to the terms set forth herein and in the Operating Agreement.
    NOW THEREFORE, the undersigned hereby agree as follows:
    7
    1.    The Assignor hereby assigns and transfers to the Assignee a
    portion of the Assignor’s Membership Interest in the Company equal
    in value, as finally determined for United States federal gift tax
    purposes, to Five Million Six Hundred Thousand Dollars
    ($5,600,000.00) . . . .
    4.     The Assignee hereby agrees to be bound by all of the provisions
    of the Operating Agreement as a Member (with respect to the Subject
    Interest) and by its execution of this Assignment Agreement hereby
    delivers a counterpart signature page to the Operating Agreement as
    confirmation that the Assignee shall be bound by all the terms and
    conditions of the Operating Agreement as a Member. . . .
    6.    The Assignor, as Director of the Company, agrees to amend the
    ownership schedule attached as Exhibit A to the Operating Agreement,
    and also to issue new Membership Certificates to himself and the
    Assignee, upon a final determination of the Assignee’s percentage
    Membership Interest in the Company resulting from the assignment
    under this agreement.11
    On June 6, 2018, Jack and Plaintiffs executed addenda to the Assignment
    Agreements agreeing that, based on an appraisal, the $5.6 million gifts to Plaintiffs
    each represented a 17.55% membership interest in the Company.12 On December
    15, 2018, Jack and Plaintiffs executed additional addenda to the Assignment
    Agreements voiding the prior addenda and agreeing that, based on a revised
    appraisal, the $5.6 million gifts to Plaintiffs each represented a 23.05% membership
    interest in the Company.13
    11
    JX 9 at 0001-2.
    12
    Id. at 0004.
    13
    Id. at 0006.
    8
    Also on December 15, 2018, Jack and Mitch, as Regency’s directors, executed
    a Resolution by Consent of the Directors of Regency Holdings, LLC, dated
    December 15, 2018, resolving to amend the ownership schedule attached to the
    Operating Agreement as set forth in Exhibit A. Exhibit A is a ledger of “Percentage
    Interests of the Members and Status of Membership Certificates” reflecting Jack,
    Mitch, and Jag’s respective 53.9%, 23.05% and 23.05% interests in the Company.14
    The directors also resolved to issue membership certificates as reflected in Exhibit
    B, which attaches membership certificates issued to Jack, Mitch, and Jag reflecting
    those same membership interests.15
    D.      Amarjit Reviews the Company’s Finances Following Jack’s Death.
    Tragically, on April 2, 2020, Jack suddenly passed away from COVID-19.16
    Jack’s property—including his majority membership interests in Regency—passed
    to his wife, Amarjit.
    After Jack’s death, Jackie assisted Amarjit with reviewing her finances.
    Jackie testified that when she did, she discovered that Plaintiffs had misappropriated
    Company assets and engaged in self-dealing transactions.17 For example, Jackie
    14
    JX 11 at 0003.
    15
    Id. at 0004-7.
    16
    M. Gill at 203; J. Gill at 192-93; J. Kaur at 212-13.
    17
    J. Kaur at 237-40.
    9
    claims that she found Transomas Investments Ltd. had incurred a £10 million debt
    with the Bank of Singapore that was used to fund renovations at the Westbourne
    Hyde Park hotel, an asset that Mitch purportedly purchased from Transomas at an
    unfair price in 2015.18 Jackie further asserts that Mitch had been using revenues
    from Transomas to pay his own hotel staff.19
    Jackie also discovered a “unique type of ledger”20 in use at the Airport
    Companies. Plaintiffs explain that while Jack was in charge of the business, the Gill
    family extensively used “lines of credit,” through which “money [was] taken out of
    the airport” by a family member “for non-airport purposes”; that expense was
    recorded and “attributed to that person’s line of credit”; the line of credit “would
    then be a loan outstanding and a receivable for the airport”; and “[f]rom time to time
    . . . when [Jack] saw fit, he would then agree to write those lines of credit off . . . and
    those would be recorded in tax returns . . . .”21 Plaintiffs claim that this “line of credit
    system” was “scrupulously tracked” and approved by their father, and that it
    compensated Jag for the nominal salary he was paid, rewarded family members
    (including Plaintiffs) for good performance, and was consistent with their father’s
    18
    M. Gill at 191.
    19
    Def.’s Answering Pre-Trial Br. [hereinafter, “AB”] at 5, Dkt. 69.
    20
    Pls.’ Op. Pre-Trial Br. [hereinafter, “OB”] at 9, Dkt. 68.
    21
    M. Gill at 219-20.
    10
    intentions that “‘[o]ne day, Sons, this will all be yours.’”22 Jackie believes that
    through the “line of credit” system, Jag misappropriated over $9 million from the
    Company in the 10 years before his father’s death, and absconded with another
    $800,000 in the first eleven months after Jack’s death.23 Jackie also maintains that
    Jag misappropriated $2.25 million in “developer commissions” and “management
    fees,” and challenges additional fees paid for trusts and estate planning that solely
    benefitted Plaintiffs.24
    E.       Amarjit Makes Changes at the Company and its Subsidiaries.
    In the months following Jack’s death, Amarjit decided to remove Plaintiffs
    from positions of authority at Regency and asked Jackie to step in and manage the
    Company and its subsidiaries in their place.
    In June and July 2020, Amarjit appointed Jackie as a director of Glissen
    Properties Ltd., Transomas Investments Ltd., West Properties, and Transomas Ltd.25
    22
    OB at 10 (citing M. Gill at 222). See also M. Gill at 221 (“[H]ad my dad not passed
    away unexpectedly, Regency was going to be a hundred percent owned by myself and Jag.
    . . . So, yeah, on occasion, monies were written off, but it was done . . . in the family
    business, and it was pattern and practice for many years.”).
    23
    AB at 2 (“Jag’s ‘system’ was to use airport funds to pay every personal expense he ever
    had, whether it be for his mortgage, his property taxes, his income taxes, his children’s
    private school tuitions, or jewelry, in addition to his personal credit card charges that
    commonly ran to $30,000 per month.”).
    24
    Id. at 2-3.
    25
    Pre-Trial Stip. and Order [hereinafter, “PTO”] ¶ 15, Dkt. 76.
    11
    On December 16, 2020, Amarjit executed an “Action by Personal
    Representative of Jagmail Singh Gill,” purporting to “exercise [Jack]’s rights under
    the Operating Agreement to remove [Mitch] as a director of the Company and to
    replace him as a director of the Company with [Jackie],” and to “elect [her]self as a
    director of the Company as the successor director to [Jack].”26 Recitals in the Action
    by Personal Representative explain that Jack’s will “le[ft] his entire U.S. Estate to”
    Amarjit and appointed her as executor, and further state that “Section 18-705 of the
    Delaware Limited Liability Company Act provides that if a member who is an
    individual dies the member’s personal representative may exercise all of the
    member’s rights for the purpose of settling the member’s estate or administering the
    member’s property.”27
    Plaintiffs dispute the validity of the Action by Personal Representative,
    arguing that it is unsettled law whether the personal representative of an estate has
    authority to remove directors under 6 Del. C. § 18-705.28 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs
    acknowledge Amarjit’s wishes that Mitch be removed as a director, and explain that
    Mitch “worked to ensure a smooth transition” by providing Jackie with the
    26
    JX 41 at Recital D.
    27
    Id. at Recitals A, C.
    28
    OB at 19 n.14.
    12
    Company’s records.29 Mitch also resigned as a director of Glissen Properties Ltd.,
    Transomas Investments Ltd., West Properties, and Transomas Ltd. by February 19,
    2021.30
    In May 2021, Amarjit gifted her 51% interest in Gill Aviation Inc. to Jackie.31
    Jackie then removed Jag as director of Gill Aviation Inc., elected herself sole director
    effective June 25, 2021, “seized the . . . buildings and its records,” and reduced Jag’s
    visibility into the Airport Companies’ operations.32
    F.       The Parties File Lawsuits in the U.K. Business Court.
    In the summer of 2021, Jackie demanded that Plaintiffs repay amounts that
    she contends were misappropriated from the Company.33 A barrage of lawsuits
    followed. First, Mitch’s company, Kheri Trading Limited (“KTL”), sued Regency’s
    Transomas subsidiaries in the High Court of Justice, Business and Property Courts
    of England and Wales (“U.K. Business Court”), seeking to compel Transomas to
    release a lien on the Westbourne Hyde Park hotel.34 A few months later, the
    Transomas subsidiaries sued KTL and Mitch in the U.K. Business Court, seeking to
    29
    Id. at 18.
    30
    PTO ¶ 16.
    31
    J. Gill at 196.
    32
    Id. at 197.
    33
    OB at 20; JX 45-48.
    34
    PTO ¶ 20.
    13
    rescind the sale of the hotel and to recover £4.5 million that Mitch allegedly used for
    the benefit of his own companies.35
    In September 2022, Mitch, KTL, and Gill London I Limited (a company
    owned by Jag) sued Jackie, the Transomas subsidiaries, and Whitechurch Lane
    Limited (another company owned by Amarjit) in the U.K. Business Court, asserting
    claims for debts allegedly owed by Jack’s estate, Amarjit’s company, and the
    Transomas subsidiaries under certain oral loans.36 In October 2022, the Transomas
    subsidiaries sued Lime Green Investments Limited and Kheri Properties Limited
    (companies owned by Mitch) in the U.K. Business Court for over £600,000 in unpaid
    interest on debts owed under promissory notes.37
    G.      Plaintiffs Discover “Suspicious” Transfers at the Airport
    Companies.
    Plaintiffs claim that about one year after Amarjit transferred management
    control of Regency to Jackie, they began to suspect that Jackie was engaged in
    wrongdoing at the Company. They deny that their suspicions were prompted by
    Jackie’s investigation into their own alleged wrongdoing.
    35
    Id. ¶ 21; JX 55.
    36
    PTO ¶ 22; JX 62.
    37
    PTO ¶ 23; JX 64.
    14
    Instead, Plaintiffs contend that beginning in 2022, “decisions that at first
    might be chalked up to a difference in management style appeared to escalate to
    mismanagement and even potential misappropriation.”38 Mitch testified that “the
    number of staff members [Jackie] was employing” was “not the way [his] father
    would have managed things” because “[h]e would have been a bit more careful with
    the money.”39 He also claims that Jackie was “very aggressive and belligerent” with
    the Bank of Singapore when she “failed to comply with their on-boarding,” and
    Mitch was concerned that the £10 million loan could be foreclosed upon if Jackie
    did not comply.40
    Additionally, before his access to Northwest Airport’s bank accounts was
    suspended, Jag observed that transfers totaling approximately $2.4 million had been
    made from Northwest Airport to West Properties. According to Plaintiffs, the
    Airport Companies had never transferred funds to any Regency company, and West
    Properties had no apparent need for cash since it does not have operations, payroll,
    or expenses.41 Mitch testified that months later, in November 2022, a former
    Company employee told him that Jackie was “running the bank accounts dry” and
    38
    OB at 21.
    39
    M. Gill at 211.
    40
    Id. at 211-13.
    41
    Id. at 187-88.
    15
    “spending all the money” “on the lawyers.”42 Separately, Jag testified that Jackie
    told him she “do[es]n’t care how much money [she] spend[s] because it’s not [her]
    money.”43
    Jag also observed that on May 13, 2022, the Company made a $600,000
    payment to the I.R.S. to pay a tax penalty owed by Jack’s estate,44 and on May 17,
    2022, a $170,838.71 payment was made to Jackie’s personal account.45
    H.     Plaintiffs Serve the Demand.
    On May 24, 2022, Plaintiffs, through counsel, sent a demand to the Company
    pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 18-305 (the “Initial Demand”), seeking to inspect six
    categories of books and records of the Company and certain of its subsidiaries,46
    explaining that, “[b]y virtue of Messrs Gill’s positions as Members in Regency they
    are entitled to receive information relating to the running of the Regency Companies
    under both Delaware law and the relevant operating agreements.”47
    The six categories of documents sought in the Initial Demand included:
    42
    M. Gill at 133, 213-14.
    43
    J. Gill at 157.
    44
    Id. at 200; JX 74 at 0001.
    45
    JX 74 at 0002.
    46
    Plaintiffs no longer seek books and records of Gill Aviation Inc. or Northwest Airport
    Management, L.P. PTO ¶ 35.
    47
    JX 57 at 0001. The Company contends that the Initial Demand was not properly served
    in accordance with the statute.
    16
    1. All financial statements, profit and loss statements, and general
    ledgers;
    2. All loan accounts (including at least directors’ or shareholder’s
    loans);
    3. Copies of all bank and account statements;
    4. Copies of all payroll records;
    5. Copies of any tax returns.
    6. Copies of all correspondence with [the Company’s accountants,]
    Perry Patel and/or Silver Levene[.]48
    The Initial Demand also sought “confirmation” of the following information:
    1. Whether any loans have been advanced to Jackie Kaur or Amarjit
    Kaur, or related parties;
    2. Details of any payments, distributions, or dividends paid to or made
    on behalf of or to Jackie Kaur, Amarjit Kaur or related parties; or
    3. All payments made to any of the following and the details thereof:
    a. accountants;
    b. legal advisors; and/or
    c. any further professional advisors, including but not limited to
    any payments made to Perry Patel and/or Silver Levene;
    4. The Regency Companies’ current assets and liabilities; and
    5. Confirmation of any related-party transactions undertaken.49
    48
    Id. at 0002.
    49
    Id. at 0002.
    17
    On June 7, 2022, Plaintiffs, through counsel, sent the Company a second
    demand letter that was nearly identical to the Initial Demand.50
    On September 28, 2022, Plaintiffs, through new counsel, served a “renewed
    demand” on the Company pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 18-305 (the “Demand”), seeking
    to inspect the same categories of books and records of the Company sought in the
    Initial Demand, for the following stated purposes:
    (1) evaluating the status of the business and financial condition of the
    Regency Companies; (2) investigating improprieties in the corporate
    governance, regulatory compliance, reporting, and controls of the
    Regency Companies, including but not limited to the purported removal
    of Mitch Gill as Director and manager; (3) investigating
    mismanagement of the Regency Companies; (4) understanding the
    current cash financial position of the Regency Companies; (5)
    evaluating their substantial membership interests in the Regency
    Companies; and (6) evaluating the propriety of any transfers of funds
    from the Regency Companies to accountants, legal advisors, and/or any
    other professional advisors.51
    Like the Initial Demand, the Demand states that, “[b]y virtue of Messrs. Gill’s
    positions as Members in Regency, they are entitled to receive information relating
    to the running of the Regency Companies under both Delaware law and the relevant
    operating agreements.” 52 Unlike the Initial Demand, the Demand further asserts
    50
    JX 58.
    51
    Id. at 4. The Demand also seeks to confirm “[w]hether any transactions have taken place
    with Regency Holding I, LLC, and the details thereof.” Id.
    52
    Id. at 2.
    18
    that, “by virtue of his position as Director and manager of Regency, Mitch Gill is
    afforded ‘the right to examine all of the information described in [6 Del. C. § 18-
    305(a)] for a purpose reasonably related to the position of manager.’”53
    I.    Procedural History
    On March 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Verified Complaint to Compel
    Inspection of Books and Records (the “Complaint”).
    Ten days after the Complaint was filed, on March 31, 2023, Amarjit sued
    Plaintiffs in Probate Court No. 3 of Harris County, Texas, seeking a declaration that
    Plaintiffs do not own valid membership interests in Regency or Northwest Airport
    (the “Texas Probate Action”). The complaint in the Texas Probate Action alleges
    that prior to Jack’s death, Jack and Amarjit entrusted Mitch and Jag to consult with
    their attorneys and financial advisors concerning the structuring of their personal
    estates to minimize their exposure to estate and inheritance taxes.54 In 2017, when
    the U.S. government increased the amount of the gift and estate tax “Applicable
    Exclusion Amount,” Mitch and Jag “used this as an excuse” to claim that Jack and
    Amarjit’s consultants and attorneys had advised them to gift membership interests
    in Regency to Plaintiffs, which led to Jack executing the Assignment Agreements.55
    53
    Id.
    54
    JX 75 ¶¶ 18-19.
    55
    Id. ¶ 27.
    19
    The complaint asserts that “[s]ince Mitch and Jag placed themselves in a position in
    which their self-interest would conflict with their obligations as a fiduciary, the
    resulting transactions were presumptively unfair and void.”56
    This action was reassigned to me on April 4, 2023.57 At that time, in a letter
    to counsel, the Chancellor directed the parties to “confer on a schedule designed to
    resolve this action before the Master within sixty days and submit a proposed
    schedule within one week,” stayed exceptions to interlocutory reports, and advised
    “that pleading-stage motions are generally disfavored by this court in summary
    proceedings” and “[t]he assigned Master is likely to deny a proposed schedule that
    contemplates case-dispositive motions unless the parties demonstrate that there is a
    compelling need or extraordinary circumstances.” Dkt. 7.
    On April 11, 2023, the parties filed letters attaching competing scheduling
    orders. Plaintiffs’ proposed schedule contemplated a one-day trial in June. The
    Company proposed a briefing schedule on a motion to dismiss or stay, arguing “that
    this action is nothing but an impermissible attempt to interfere with the jurisdiction
    56
    Id. ¶ 40.
    57
    On April 4, 2023, Jag, purporting to act derivatively on behalf of Northwest Airport,
    sued Jackie and Gill Aviation, Inc. in the District Court of Harris County, Texas. JX 76.
    The next day, on April 5, 2023, Northwest Airport sued Jag, Mitch, and related parties for
    debts allegedly owed under their lines of credit in the District Court of Harris County,
    Texas. JX 77.
    20
    and discovery rules of the courts [in the U.K. and Texas] already hearing [these]
    disputes.”58 On April 12, 2023, I held a scheduling conference during which I
    largely granted Plaintiffs’ proposed trial schedule, while leaving open the possibility
    for parallel briefing on the Company’s motion to stay, explaining:
    As the Chancellor, I think, made pretty clear in her letter when she was
    reassigning this case to me, case dispositive motions in summary
    proceedings are generally disfavored. And the arguments previewed in
    defendant’s letter submitted last night are defenses commonly raised in
    books and records cases that are most appropriately presented in pretrial
    briefing rather than in a preliminary motion. So I am not going to
    permit case dispositive motions in this case, including a motion to
    dismiss. Nothing will preclude the defendants from raising all of their
    arguments in support of dismissal in their pretrial briefs. That includes
    arguments about standing, the defendant’s position that the plaintiffs
    are impermissibly seeking records of subsidiaries, that the filing of
    other lawsuits established a lack of a proper purpose, or whatever other
    arguments the defendants come up with.
    The defendant’s letter last night also previewed argument for a stay of
    this litigation in favor of other litigation filed in other courts. I’m not
    going to preclude the defendant from filing a motion to stay. . . . A
    deadline for the motion and a response can be built into the [trial]
    schedule, but that should not delay any other dates in the schedule that
    have to proceed in parallel with all other deadlines. . . . I did review
    the letters last night. And based on those letters, I’ll be candid, I didn’t
    really see a basis to stay what is designated by statute as a summary
    proceeding in favor of a later-filed litigation in another forum. But I’m
    open. And the parties are free to allocate their clients’ resources to
    briefing a motion to stay if they think that that makes sense.59
    58
    Dkt. 11 at 2.
    59
    Gill v. Regency Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 2023-0349-BWD, at 7-9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12,
    2023) (TRANSCRIPT).
    21
    On April 14, 2023, I entered a scheduling order setting a one-day trial for June
    21, 2023.60 The Company did not move to stay. The case proceeded to discovery.
    It did not go smoothly.
    On April 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Protective Order, seeking to
    limit extraordinarily broad discovery requests served by the Company, including
    requests to support the Company’s standing defense that Jack’s gifts of membership
    interests to Plaintiffs under the Assignment Agreements were invalid due to breaches
    of fiduciary duty, fraud, or undue influence.61 On May 2, 2023, following oral
    argument, I granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Protective Order,
    explaining that the Court would not decide the validity of the transactions through
    which Plaintiffs acquired their membership interests:
    [A]s articulated in Pogue [v. Hybrid Energy, Inc., 
    2016 WL 4154253
    (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2016)], in a typical case, the stock ledger controls
    record stockholder status, and a stockholder may point to the stock
    ledger to show prima facie that she is, in fact, a holder of record.
    The [P]laintiffs here have made a prima facie case of standing. Exhibits
    B and C attached to the complaint evidence the membership interests
    held in the LLC. The defendant argues it’s not fair to rely on documents
    that were created when the plaintiff was a director, but defendant
    doesn’t challenge the accuracy of the membership interests in those
    documents other than to challenge the validity of an underlying
    transaction through which the membership interests were transferred on
    60
    Dkt. 16.
    61
    Dkt. 28.
    22
    grounds of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, undue influence, or similar
    theories.
    Under that theory, the fiduciary duties that allegedly were breached
    were owed to Jack and Amarjit, not to the [C]ompany. So it’s not even
    apparent to me that the [C]ompany has standing here to raise that as a
    defense. But what is clear to me is that it’s not appropriate to have a
    mini trial-within-a-trial in seven weeks to adjudge the validity of a
    transfer of membership interests that occurred in 2018 on a limited
    record in order to assess the [P]laintiffs’ standing to obtain books and
    records. A summary books and records proceeding is not the right
    vehicle to raise those arguments.62
    On May 9, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel, and on May 16, 2023,
    the Company filed a Motion to Compel and Motion for Protective Order. On May
    16, 2023, following oral argument, I denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel and
    granted the Company’s Motion to Compel and Motion for Protective Order.63
    On May 19, 2023, a Friday afternoon, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion
    for a Protective Order and for Clarification, in advance of depositions scheduled to
    begin Monday morning. That day, I denied the motion and provided additional
    guidance via two minute orders filed on the docket.64
    A one-day trial on a paper record was held on June 21, 2023.
    62
    Gill v. Regency Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 2023-0349-BWD, at 36-38 (Del. Ch. May 2,
    2023) (TRANSCRIPT).
    63
    See Dkts. 54, 66.
    64
    Dkts. 56-57.
    23
    II.    ANALYSIS
    Section 18-305(a) of the Limited Liability Company Act affords members of
    a Delaware limited liability company the right to obtain books and records of the
    company “from time to time upon reasonable demand for any purpose reasonably
    related to the member’s interest as a member of the limited liability company.” 6
    Del. C. § 18-305(a). Section 18-305(b) further provides that “[e]ach manager shall
    have the right to examine all of the information described in subsection (a) of this
    section for a purpose reasonably related to the position of manager.” 6 Del. C. § 18-
    305(b). Section 18-305(e) requires that a demand for books and records “shall be in
    writing and shall state the purpose of the demand.” 6 Del. C. § 18-305(e).
    Inspection rights under Section 18-305 may be expanded or limited by the
    governing limited liability company agreement. The Operating Agreement provides
    that “[t]he Member and its duly authorized representatives may, for any reason
    reasonably related to its interest as a member of the [Company], examine the
    [Company]’s books of account and make copies and extracts therefrom at its own
    expense.” JX 3, Operating Agreement § 13(e). The parties’ arguments assume that
    this language is co-extensive with Section 18-305.65
    65
    OB at 32; Pls.’ Reply Br. [hereinafter, “RB”] at 1, Dkt. 72 (“Regency does not dispute
    . . . that Plaintiffs’ rights are coterminous with the Act . . . .”). Although “[t]he phrase
    24
    The Company does not contest that the Demand complies with the form and
    manner requirements of Section 18-305. The Company does, however, contest that
    (i) Plaintiffs have standing as members or managers of the Company to obtain books
    and records; (ii) Plaintiffs have demonstrated a proper purpose reasonably related to
    their interests as members or managers of the Company; and (iii) Plaintiffs’ stated
    purposes in making the Demand are their actual, primary purposes for seeking books
    and records. The Company further asserts that (iv) inspection may be denied
    because its manager believes in good faith that providing any books and records to
    Plaintiffs in response to the Demand would be adverse to the interests of the
    Company.
    A.     Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated Standing to Obtain Books and
    Records as Members, But Not Managers, of the Company.
    Entitlement to books and records under Section 18-305 is “status related”—
    under the statute, only a member or a manager may access the company’s books and
    records. To demonstrate standing, Plaintiffs must establish their status as members
    or managers of the Company.
    ‘books of account’ is a less expansive term than ‘books and records,’” the parties have not
    distinguished between entitlement to “books of account” under the Operating Agreement
    and “books and records” under the statute. RED Cap. Inv. L.P. v. RED Parent LLC, 
    2016 WL 612772
    , at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2016) (citing Madison Real Estate Immobilien-
    Anlagegesellschaft Beschrankt Haftende Kg v. Kanam USA XIX Ltd., 
    2008 WL 1913237
    ,
    at *12 n.91 (Del. Ch. May 1, 2008), and Arbor Place, L.P. v. Encore Opportunity Fund,
    L.L.C., 
    2002 WL 205681
     (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2002)).
    25
    1. Plaintiffs’ Standing as Members of Regency
    The Company contends that Plaintiffs are not valid members because the
    Assignment Agreements through which they acquired their membership interests are
    invalid due to breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, or undue influence. Earlier in this
    litigation, the Company sought (but was denied) discovery to support its defense that
    Plaintiffs lack standing on that basis. The Company still seeks dismissal or a stay of
    this action in favor of the Texas Probate Action where Amarjit is currently
    challenging the validity of the Assignment Agreements.
    I recommend denying the Company’s request for dismissal or a stay for two
    reasons. First, as I explained in ruling on the Motion for Protective Order, this Court
    is not the appropriate forum “to challenge the validity of an underlying transaction
    through which the membership interests were transferred on grounds of breach of
    fiduciary duty, fraud, undue influence, or similar theories.”         Gill v. Regency
    Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 2023-0349-BWD, at 36-38 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2023)
    (TRANSCRIPT). “Caselaw determining who is a stockholder or a holder of record
    under Section 220”—the corporate analog of Section 18-30566—“generally relies on
    the corporation’s existing stock ledger.” Knott Partners L.P. v. Telepathy Labs, Inc.,
    66
    “‘Delaware courts have interpreted Section 18-305 by looking to cases interpreting
    similar Delaware statutes concerning corporations and partnerships,’ such as Section 220
    of the Delaware General Corporation Law.” Riker v. Teucrium Trading, LLC, 
    2020 WL 2393340
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2020), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2020).
    26
    
    2021 WL 5493092
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2021). “In a typical case, the stock
    ledger controls record-stockholder status, and a stockholder may point to the stock
    ledger to show, prima facie, that she is in fact a holder of record.” Pogue, 
    2016 WL 4154253
    , at *3. As a practical matter, this rule is essential, because “requiring an
    analysis of why and under what circumstances a [books and records] plaintiff came
    to hold [her interest in the company] could significantly complicate the nature of this
    summary and often expedited proceeding.” Deephaven Risk Arb Trading Ltd. v.
    UnitedGlobalCom, Inc., 
    2005 WL 1713067
    , at *6 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2005).
    Although the ledger is prima facie evidence of standing in a books and records
    proceeding, the Court may, in limited circumstances, look beyond the ledger where
    the prima facie case is rebutted by other evidence. See Pogue, 
    2016 WL 4154253
    ,
    at *3 (“[I]nclusion on a stock ledger is prima facie evidence of stock ownership, but
    . . . the corporate defendant may rebut that presumption by clear and convincing
    evidence.”). But the few cases in which the Court has considered evidence beyond
    the ledger to assess a standing defense have done so on narrow grounds, where the
    defense could be resolved based on factual admissions or contract interpretation.67
    For example, in Pogue v. Hybrid Energy, Inc., the Court declined to rely on a ledger
    67
    See Knott Partners L.P., 
    2021 WL 5493092
    , at *4 (noting that “the Court seldom uses
    this authority [to look beyond the stock ledger], occasionally acknowledging its existence
    but typically declining to inquire beyond the ledger itself”).
    27
    where the plaintiff conceded that the stock issuance through which he obtained his
    stock was void because it was not authorized under the corporation’s certificate of
    incorporation.68 
    2016 WL 4154253
    , at *1. In Prokupek v. Consumer Capital
    Partners LLC, the Court dismissed a books and records action under Section 18-305
    where it could determine as a “matter[] of contract interpretation” that the plaintiff
    “was no longer a member of [the company] when he demanded inspection.” 
    2014 WL 7452205
    , at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2014).
    By contrast, this Court has declined to look beyond the ledger where doing so
    would effectively convert a summary books and records proceeding into a plenary
    action. In Holtzman v. Gruen Holding Corp., then-Vice Chancellor Chandler denied
    a similar motion to stay where the company argued that the plaintiff was not a
    “proper” stockholder entitled to inspection because he had breached contractual
    obligations under a stockholders agreement to tender his stock to the company. 
    1994 WL 444756
    , at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1994). An action in Pennsylvania was filed to
    68
    In Knott Partners L.P. v. Telepathy Labs, Inc., the Court held that where a corporation
    failed to update its stock ledger but conceded in documentation circulated outside the
    corporation that the same entity was in fact a stockholder as of that date, the corporation
    could not rely on the deficient ledger it controlled to deprive the stockholder of its
    inspection rights. 
    2021 WL 5493092
    , at *5-6. Given that Plaintiffs appear on the ledger
    here, that case is inapposite.
    More recently, in Handler v. Centerview Partners Holdings L.P., the Court permitted
    targeted discovery into partnership status in a books and records action where, unlike here,
    there was no partnership ledger to which the parties could refer. 
    2023 WL 1955151
    , at *3
    (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, (Del. Ch. 2023).
    28
    determine whether the plaintiff was “obligated to tender all of his stock in the
    company” under that agreement; according to the company, “[i]f that determination
    [wa]s ultimately made by the Pennsylvania court, [the plaintiff] would not be a
    stockholder entitled to demand inspection of books and records under 8 Del. C.
    § 220.” Id. The Court denied the motion, explaining that “when a stock ledger exists
    and no other reason appears to question its authenticity or accuracy, our law has
    always accorded prima facie stockholder status to one whose name appears on such
    a ledger.” Id.69
    Here, Plaintiffs have produced two Assignment Agreements through which
    Jack assigned membership interests in the Company to Mitch and Jag, and a
    Resolution by Consent of the Directors of Regency Holdings, LLC, dated December
    15, 2018, attaching a ledger and membership certificates reflecting Mitch and Jag’s
    membership interests in the Company.70 That evidence presents a prima facie case
    69
    See also, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Kerkorian, 
    254 A.2d 240
    , 242 (Del. 1969)
    (affirming the Court of Chancery’s holding that, where a plaintiff “proved that he was a
    stockholder of record” of the company, evidence that the plaintiffs acquired his shares in
    violation of federal law was “irrelevant” and could not defeat his inspection rights);
    Odyssey Partners v. Trans World Corp., 
    1983 WL 20288
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1983)
    (denying request to continue trial where the company argued it could not “be ready for trial
    on such short notice” because “its primary defense” was that the plaintiff had violated
    federal securities laws “in its effort to wage its proxy battle,” holding that the Court would
    not “entertain any evidence at the hearing” about those alleged violations given the
    summary nature of a books and records action).
    70
    JX 11.
    29
    of Plaintiffs’ status as members of the Company. Aside from its theories that the
    gifts of membership interests under the Assignment Agreements are invalid, the
    Company has offered no evidence to rebut Plaintiffs’ standing.71
    Second, the Company’s request to stay this action in favor of the Texas
    Probate Action “proceeds on a false premise.” Holtzman, 
    1994 WL 444756
    , at *3.
    In that action, Amarjit seeks to invalidate the Assignment Agreements due to breach
    of fiduciary duty, fraud, and undue influence. “Even if one assumes” that the Texas
    Probate Action will ultimately invalidate the Assignment Agreements under those
    theories, “it remains undeniable that as of now” Plaintiffs are members of the
    Company, and their right to inspection “exists even though the possibility exists that
    [they] may later be divested of [their] [membership interests] in some other
    proceeding or be declared in some future proceeding to be holding [their] [interests]
    contrary to law or private agreement.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    71
    Although a summary books and records action is not the appropriate forum to litigate
    breach of fiduciary duty theories, the Company is not foreclosed from raising any
    arguments to challenge Plaintiffs’ prima facie standing as members. Plaintiffs anticipated
    one such argument in briefing—they acknowledge “potential blemishes” in the wording of
    the Assignment Agreements, which “assign,” rather than “transfer,” membership interests
    to Plaintiffs. Despite the inconsistent wording, Plaintiffs point out that the recitals in the
    Assignment Agreements reflect Jack’s intention to transfer the interests such that Plaintiffs
    would be “admitted to the Company . . . as a member,” JX 3 § 17, and that the Company’s
    ledger was updated to reflect Plaintiffs’ membership interests. JX 11. The Company has
    not pursued this argument, and it is therefore waived. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 
    726 A.2d 1215
    , 1224 (Del. 1999) (“Issues not briefed are deemed waived.”).
    30
    The Company argues otherwise, essentially claiming that the transfer of
    membership interests under the Assignment Agreements never occurred because
    Plaintiffs stood on both sides of the transaction, rendering the agreements
    “presumptively void.”72 Assuming the Company even has standing to challenge the
    validity of agreements to which it is not a party on grounds of breach of fiduciary
    duties owed to someone else, a gift to a fiduciary is not automatically “void.” Rather,
    a gift to a fiduciary will “be presumed to be voidable . . . and [the recipient] has the
    burden of proving the fairness of the transaction.” In re Est. of Surian, 
    1990 WL 100794
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. July 12, 1990) (emphasis added).73 In other words, the
    “presumption” addresses who bears the burden of proving fairness; the transaction
    is nevertheless effective unless and until declared otherwise. For purposes of this
    action, “[a]ll that matters presently is that [Plaintiffs] [are] current record [members]
    and that [they] ha[ve] stated a proper purpose” for inspection. Holtzman, 
    1994 WL 444756
    , at *3 (emphasis in original).
    72
    AB at 38.
    73
    See also Coleman v. Newborn, 
    948 A.2d 422
    , 429 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Upon the finding of
    a fiduciary relationship, the party seeking to sustain the transfer can overcome the
    presumption of fraud by showing the fairness of the transaction.”).
    31
    Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden to demonstrate by a
    preponderance of the evidence that they are members of the Company with standing
    to inspect its books and records.
    2. Mitch’s Standing as a Manager of Regency
    Plaintiffs separately contend that Mitch is entitled to inspect books and
    records as a manager of the Company.74
    On December 16, 2020, Amarjit executed an “Action by Personal
    Representative of Jagmail Singh Gill,” purporting to “exercise [Jack]’s rights under
    the [Operating Agreement] to remove [Mitch] as a director of the Company and to
    replace him as a director of the Company with [Jackie].”75 According to Plaintiffs,
    that action may have been invalid because it is an open question whether the personal
    representative of an estate has authority to remove directors under 6 Del. C. § 18-
    705.76 Plaintiffs concede, however, that after Jack’s death, Amarjit became the
    Company’s majority member, and in that capacity, had the power to remove and
    74
    Under the Operating Agreement, the managers of the Company are its directors. JX 3,
    Operating Agreement § 1(b) (“The Member has requested that all references to managers
    shall mean directors and therefore shall be changed to be called directors instead.”).
    75
    JX 41 at Recital D.
    76
    OB at 35-36.
    32
    replace directors.77 Moreover, Mitch’s purported removal as a director of Regency
    occurred two and a half years ago, in December 2020.78 Despite “question[ing]” the
    validity of his removal,79 Mitch never took legal action to challenge it. Instead,
    Mitch complied with the “handover” of Company records to Jackie “because [his]
    mother asked [him] to do so”80; resigned as a director of Glissen Properties Ltd.,
    Transomas Investments Ltd., West Properties, and Transomas Ltd.; and has not
    fulfilled the roles of a manager since.
    For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Mitch is a manager of the Company.
    77
    See M. Gill at 203 (“After my father passed away, that ownership interest in Regency
    would have passed on to my mother.”); Compl. ¶ 12 (“Several months after his death,
    Jack’s membership interests transferred to Amarjit.”); id. ¶ 13 (“Several months after
    Jack’s death, Amarjit became a member and 53.9% owner of Regency.”). See also JX 3,
    Operating Agreement ¶ 6(d) (“Any incumbent Director may be removed and replaced at
    any time, with or without cause, by the Member.”).
    78
    Cf. Simple Glob., Inc. v. Banasik, 
    2021 WL 2587894
    , at *14 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2021),
    judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2021) (explaining in the “Section 225 context, even a delay of
    a month and a half has been held sufficient to bar a claim under the doctrine of laches”);
    Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., 
    2013 WL 5739680
    , at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2013)
    (holding plaintiff’s seven-month delay in challenging his removal as a director was barred
    by laches).
    79
    OB at 36.
    80
    M. Gill at 205-6 (stating that Mitch agreed to cede control of the Company to Jackie
    “because [his] mother asked” and “out of respect and love for [his] mum, [he] . . . listened”).
    33
    B.     Plaintiffs Have Established Proper Purposes for Inspection.
    “To inspect books and records, a member of a Delaware LLC, like a
    stockholder of a Delaware corporation, must first establish by a preponderance of
    the evidence the existence of a proper purpose for inspection.” Sanders v. Ohmite
    Hldgs., LLC, 
    17 A.3d 1186
    , 1193 (Del. Ch. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). A
    proper purpose is any purpose “reasonably related to the member’s interest as a
    member.” 6 Del. C. § 18-305(f)(2).
    As explained below, Plaintiffs have established proper purposes for inspection
    of the Company’s books and records.
    1. Plaintiffs Have Stated Proper Purposes to Value their
    Membership Interests and Evaluate the Status of the Business.
    Plaintiffs seek books and records for the purpose of “evaluating their
    substantial membership interests in the Regency Companies.”81 The Demand also
    “reformulates” the valuation purpose “in terms employed in the LLC Act”82 by
    seeking to “evaluat[e] the status of the business and financial condition of the
    Regency Companies” and “understand[] the current cash financial position of the
    Regency Companies.”83
    81
    JX 61, Demand at 4.
    82
    Sanders, 
    17 A.3d at 1193
    .
    83
    JX 61, Demand at 4.
    34
    Under Delaware law, a member’s desire to value her interests in the
    company—particularly where the company is privately held—“has long been held
    as a proper purpose” to inspect books and records. Woods Tr. of Avery L. Woods Tr.
    v. Sahara Enterprises, Inc., 
    238 A.3d 879
    , 890 (Del. Ch.), judgment entered sub
    nom. In re Woods v. Sahara Enters., Inc. (Del. Ch. 2020) (citing cases). The Demand
    therefore states a proper purpose.
    2. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Proper Purpose to Investigate
    Interested-Party Payments.
    Plaintiffs also seek to “investigat[e] improprieties in the corporate
    governance, regulatory compliance, reporting, and controls of the Regency
    Companies,” “investigat[e] mismanagement of the Regency Companies,” and
    “evaluat[e] the propriety of any transfers of funds from the Regency Companies to
    accountants, legal advisors, and/or any other professional advisors.”84
    Under Delaware law, the desire to investigate mismanagement is a proper
    purpose. However, “[a] mere statement of a purpose to investigate possible general
    mismanagement, without more, will not entitle” a member to broad inspection relief.
    Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 
    909 A.2d 117
    , 122 (Del. 2006). To establish a
    proper investigation purpose, a member “must present some evidence to suggest a
    credible basis from which a court can infer that . . . wrongdoing may have occurred.”
    84
    JX 61, Demand at 4.
    35
    Pettry v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 
    2020 WL 6870461
    , at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2020),
    judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2020).
    The credible basis standard imposes “the lowest possible burden of proof.”
    Seinfeld, 
    909 A.2d at 123
    . It does not require a member to prove that the wrongdoing
    “actually occurred.” Marmon v. Arbinet-Thexchange, Inc., 
    2004 WL 936512
    , at *4
    (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2004). It does not require a member “to show by a preponderance
    of the evidence that wrongdoing is probable.” Lebanon Cnty. Employees’ Ret. Fund
    v. Amerisourcebergen Corp., 
    2020 WL 132752
    , at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020), aff’d,
    
    243 A.3d 417
     (Del. 2020).        It requires only that a member “establish by a
    preponderance of the evidence that there is a credible basis to suspect a possibility
    of wrongdoing.” Pettry, 
    2020 WL 6870461
    , at *11 (emphasis in original). That
    burden may be “‘satisfied by a credible showing, through documents, logic,
    testimony or otherwise, that there are legitimate issues of wrongdoing.’” 
    Id.
    To demonstrate a credible basis to investigate mismanagement, Plaintiffs
    attempt to create an inference that Jackie has “run[] the bank accounts dry”85 by
    secretly siphoning Company assets and forming new entities in which to hide them.
    To support that theory, Plaintiffs identify (i) two instances in which it appears Jackie
    85
    M. Gill at 214.
    36
    used Company funds to pay personal expenses;86 (ii) account statements showing
    approximately $2.4 million in transfers made from Northwest Airport to West
    Properties;87 and (iii) two new “Regency” entities that were formed in November
    2022.88
    First, Plaintiffs cite account statements showing a $600,000 transfer to the
    I.R.S. to pay Jack’s personal tax liabilities and another $170,838.71 transfer made
    directly to Jackie’s personal account. The Company suggests that those payments
    do not evidence wrongdoing because “the airport had regularly paid Jack’s tax
    liabilities before Jackie came along,” and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the
    payment to Jackie “would represent an unreasonable salary for her two years as
    CEO, President, Secretary, and sole director” of Northwest Airport. 89 Whether
    characterized as the investigation of possible wrongdoing or as an independent
    proper purpose, “how directors and senior officers are compensated and whether
    they are the beneficiaries of any related-party transactions are basic facts that
    stockholders are entitled to know.” Woods, 238 A.3d at 900. Plaintiffs have stated
    86
    JX 74.
    87
    M. Gill at 70; id. at 188; JX 73.
    88
    JX 71.
    89
    AB at 32.
    37
    a proper purpose to investigate payments made to or on behalf of the Company’s
    managers, family members, or other interested parties.
    Next, Plaintiffs contend that transfers from Northwest Airport to West
    Properties amounting to $2.4 million give rise to an inference of possible
    wrongdoing at the Company’s subsidiaries90 because West Properties had no
    legitimate need for the funds, never previously received funds from Northwest
    Airport, and did not have a line of credit with Northwest Airport.91 The implication
    is that Jackie has engaged in a secret scheme to funnel millions of dollars out of the
    Company for illicit reasons, and Plaintiffs need “to understand what happened to the
    $2.4 million (and likely more) that Jackie took.”92 The suspicion Plaintiffs try to
    create around these transfers, however, is dispelled by their own repeated admissions
    90
    The Company argues that seeking to investigate wrongdoing based on these transfers is
    improper because they are the subject of a lawsuit that Jag filed derivatively on behalf of
    Northwest Airport in Texas court days after this action was initiated. AB at 26. This
    argument mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ reasons for describing the transfers. Plaintiffs
    stipulate that they do not seek documents from Northwest Airport in this litigation. Instead,
    they assert that a pattern of mismanagement at Northwest Airport gives rise to a credible
    inference of wrongdoing at Regency’s other subsidiaries, given that those subsidiaries are
    all managed by the same person.
    91
    RB at 16; see also OB at 24. Plaintiffs also assert that if the transfers were “above-board
    ‘distributions’” to West Properties, then Jag, as a partner of Northwest Airport, would have
    received a pro rata distribution, but he did not. The Company counters that Jag owes
    Northwest Airport an “eight-figure debt” and “it would be a long time before he would be
    entitled to cash, as opposed to credits against his debt.” AB at 33.
    92
    RB at 16; see also M. Gill at 214 (testifying that Plaintiffs need books and records “to
    get to the bottom of this to find out what’s going on”).
    38
    that the transfers apparently were used to fund the ongoing litigations. Indeed, Mitch
    testified that a former Company employee told him that Jackie was “running the
    bank accounts dry” and “spending all the money” “on the lawyers,”93 and Plaintiffs
    sought injunctive relief in Texas premised on similar representations.94 Given those
    concessions, the transfers Plaintiffs identify do not support a credible basis to suspect
    that Jackie has been secretly siphoning Company funds.
    Finally, Plaintiffs point to evidence that two new entities bearing the
    “Regency” name—Regency Holdings I, LLC and Regency Holdings DE Inc.—were
    formed in November 2022.95 Plaintiffs now agree that one of those entities, which
    was formed by an individual in Australia, “may in fact have been a coincidence,”
    93
    M. Gill at 133, 211-14. Jag also testified that Jackie told him she “do[es]n’t care how
    much money [she] spend[s] because it’s not [her] money,” but I am not convinced that this
    self-serving account of their conversation is credible. J. Gill at 155, 156.
    94
    JX 92 ¶ 1 (“Jackie has withdrawn millions of dollars from NWAM’s bank accounts to
    directly pay expenses and liabilities that have no legitimate business purpose for NWAM,
    as well as to fund her personal vendetta against Mitch and Jag”); id. ¶ 32 (“Jag and Mitch
    are concerned that Jackie is using her control of NWAM to divert its funds in order to cover
    the very considerable costs involved in the English Proceedings.”); id. ¶ 38 (“A former
    employee working for Jackie recently told Mitch that Jackie had emptied Regency
    Holdings’ bank accounts and ‘spent all the money’ in pursuing these claims driven by
    personal animosity. He indicated that Regency Holdings’ bills—whether for company
    work or otherwise—could only be met by extracting funds from Regency Holdings’
    subsidiaries and transferring them to the UK. This is exactly what is happening with the
    unauthorized distributions from NWAM to West Properties.”).
    95
    JX 71.
    39
    but claim it is “still unclear” who formed the other.96 Even assuming it was Jackie,
    the formation of a single entity, alone or in combination with the other arguments
    Plaintiffs have raised, does not give rise to a credible inference of possible
    wrongdoing.97
    Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated a proper purpose to investigate payments
    made to or on behalf of the Company’s managers, family members, or other
    interested parties, but have not demonstrated a credible basis to investigate
    mismanagement more broadly.
    3. Plaintiffs’ Stated Purposes Are Their Actual, Primary Purposes.
    The Company asserts that even if the purposes identified in the Demand are
    facially proper, they are not Plaintiffs’ actual or primary purposes for seeking books
    and records of the Company.
    “[O]nce a [member] has identified a proper purpose . . . the burden shifts to
    the corporation to prove that the [member]’s avowed purpose is not her actual
    purpose and that her actual purpose for conducting the inspection is improper.”
    96
    RB at 17.
    97
    Plaintiffs also assert that they are entitled to books and records “to probe Jackie’s
    continued engagement of a person [Mr. Patel] she says defrauded the Companies.” RB at
    24. Plaintiffs do not assert that they believe Mr. Patel defrauded the Company. Jag testified
    that “Perry Patel was an integral part of [the] family business,” and Mitch testified that
    correspondence with Mr. Patel could provide “an objective opinion of what is going on.”
    J. Gill at 221; M. Gill at 233-34. Instead, it appears Plaintiffs seek this information for
    impeachment purposes. This does not provide a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing.
    
    40 Woods, 238
     A.3d at 891. “[O]ur courts have given credence to such defenses only
    where it is evident from the facts on the record that the plaintiff’s actual,
    predominating, purpose is something unrelated to the plaintiff’s purpose as a
    stockholder.” Sutherland v. Dardanelle Timber Co., 
    2006 WL 1451531
    , at *9 (Del.
    Ch. May 16, 2006). “The issue of whether a concept so elusive as purpose or motive
    is ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’, involves a judgment that necessarily is qualitative, not
    mathematical.” Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 
    525 A.2d 160
    , 166-67 (Del. Ch. 1987). If a member’s primary purpose is proper, “any
    secondary purpose or ulterior motive of the [member] becomes irrelevant.’” Riker,
    
    2020 WL 2393340
    , at *4.
    Based on the evidence presented at trial, I find that Plaintiffs’ stated purposes
    are, in fact, the primary purposes motivating the Demand. Mitch and Jag devoted
    their entire careers to running Regency and its subsidiaries alongside their father.
    They assert they are the owners of 46% of the Company. They do not trust their
    sister. It is eminently believable that after losing visibility into the operations of the
    companies they ran for three decades, Plaintiffs want to understand the status of the
    business, the value of their interests, and whether self-dealing has occurred.
    Those purposes were borne out in each of Mitch and Jag’s testimony. For
    example, Mitch testified that:
    [A]s an owner, a member, a director of Regency, I just want
    transparency, something that Jackie hasn’t been giving me. So whether
    41
    it’s about the prosecution, whatever she’s not able to share with me
    under privilege or whatever it may be, I’m not asking for that. I’m
    actually asking for, what are the funds being used for? What’s going
    on with the companies? And it’s got nothing to do with these cases.
    All I want to know is, together with my brother as a 46 percent
    shareholder member and owner of Regency, we want to know what is
    going on with the company. Is that too much to ask?98
    He further testified:
    My books and records request is to understand what is going on in the
    company, how is it performing, how is [Jackie’s] management going,
    is she a competent operator, is she kind of squandering money? I need
    to know all those questions. It’s not specifically what you’re talking
    about. You’re narrowing it down, and I’m trying to say to you I just
    want generally to know how exactly is the company performing now
    that Jackie is operating it?
    Prior, it was me in the UK and my brother in the U.S. And for many
    years, we knew exactly what was going on, and whatever was going on,
    Jackie has those documents and information. I’ve been shut out since
    2020, and I want to be understanding how things are going. As an
    owner, I think I have that right.99
    And again, Mitch explained:
    [S]orry to state the obvious, but as an owner, a member, a director of
    Regency and for all the concerns I have in the payments that I see and
    the various other . . . explanations I’ve given, as a stakeholder in
    Regency, most notably an active member, owner, I want to know
    what’s going on. And I want to know, is Jackie dissipating the value of
    what myself and my brother and even my mother [own].100
    98
    M. Gill 100.
    99
    Id. at 102-3.
    100
    Id. at 237.
    42
    Jag similarly testified:
    I want to know the financial position of this entity, Regency, and its UK
    subsidiaries. We’ve talked about these cash flows between the U.S. and
    the UK subsidiaries, so I certainly want to know about the cash position
    in the UK and its subsidiaries, I want to know how do I evaluate my
    membership interest in Regency and is that appreciating or
    deteriorating? . . . I have no visibility to any of that, and so, I’m
    generally concerned about that . . . .101
    The Company nevertheless raises several arguments in support of its position
    that Plaintiffs’ stated purposes are not their actual or primary purposes for making
    the Demand. None carry the day.
    First, the Company argues that Plaintiffs’ valuation purpose is not genuine
    because Plaintiffs have failed to “identify a credible potential end use of a
    valuation.”102 “If a stockholder cannot identify a credible potential end use, then the
    court may infer that the stockholder’s stated purpose is not its actual purpose.”
    Woods, 238 A.3d at 893 (citing Marathon P’rs, L.P. v. M & F Worldwide Corp.,
    
    2004 WL 1728604
    , at *8 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004)). But that is not dispositive. Based
    on the evidence, the Court instead “may credit the stockholder’s valuation purpose.”
    
    Id.
     Plaintiffs’ testimony persuades me that they do, in fact, seek to understand the
    status of the business and value of their interests, even if they have not identified a
    101
    J. Gill at 222-23.
    102
    AB at 23.
    43
    specific end use for that information. As Plaintiffs explain, “Jag and Mitch are 46%
    members of a company that holds a significant portion of their net worth . . . . Their
    reasons for wanting to value their interests are self-evident.”103
    Second, the Company contends that Plaintiffs do not actually seek to
    investigate wrongdoing. According to the Company, prior to Jack’s death, Plaintiffs
    regularly used Company assets to pay personal expenses, including personal tax
    liabilities. The Company says that if Plaintiffs did not believe their own personal
    expenditures were wrongful, they cannot honestly believe that Jackie’s payment of
    personal expenses is wrongful. Plaintiffs disagree, claiming the “line of credit” used
    at the Airport Companies was different because it was “scrupulously tracked,” and
    turn the Company’s argument back on it, suggesting that if Jackie believes their prior
    draws were wrongful, then she must concede her own are as well. To my mind,
    these arguments simply confirm the parties’ mutual distrust, and I remain convinced
    that Plaintiffs sincerely seek to investigate the legitimacy of any personal payments
    Jackie has authorized.
    Third, the Company argues that the Demand itself demonstrates that
    Plaintiffs’ true purpose is not to investigate wrongdoing or to value their interests in
    the Company, but to investigate Regency’s ability to continue financing the
    103
    RB at 12.
    44
    litigations in the U.K. and Texas, and to improperly obtain discovery to advance
    those other lawsuits. The Company asserts that the Demand seeks records and
    details of payments to the Company’s legal advisors; the Demand requests
    communications with the Company’s accountant, Perry Patel, that Plaintiffs were
    denied during discovery in the U.K. litigations; and, despite arguing here that the
    transfers from Northwest Airport to West Properties “made no sense,” Jag
    represented in the Texas litigation that the transfers were used to pay litigation
    expenses.         On that last point, the Company says that “inconsistency” proves
    Plaintiffs “are attempting to conceal here that their true purpose in bringing this
    action is to acquire highly confidential information about Regency’s current and
    continuing willingness and ability to fund its litigation with Mitch and Jag, and the
    course of Regency’s confidential investigations in support of its claims and
    defenses.”104
    Plaintiffs deny that the Demand was prompted by any desire to obtain an
    advantage in the other litigations.       The timing of the Demand supports that
    conclusion. Plaintiffs sent their initial demand to the Company on May 24, 2022,
    days after Jag discovered the $600,000 and $170,838.71 personal payments, and a
    few weeks after he began to see transfers from Northwest Airport to West Properties.
    104
    AB at 19.
    45
    As Plaintiffs explain, “[t]his was well after the parties filed their now-consolidated
    hotel claims in 2021 . . . and well before they filed their second set of UK claims in
    September and October 2022.”105
    And, again, Plaintiffs’ testimony about their purposes was credible. Mitch
    testified that “whether it’s about the prosecution, whatever [Jackie]’s not able to
    share with me under privilege or whatever it may be, I’m not asking for that.”106 He
    said:
    I’m not sure what I’m asking for regarding the litigation. What I am
    asking you for is all the documents, all the paperwork, so that I can see
    how the companies are performing. I’m not necessarily trying to
    understand what her case is against me. I’m asking, how is the
    company performing? As an owner, I have that right.107
    Weighing the evidence, I find it implausible that Plaintiffs, who believe they
    collectively own 46% of the Company yet no longer have any insight into its
    operations, are primarily motivated by gaining a litigation advantage as opposed to
    actually understanding the status of the business, the value of their interests, and
    whether Jackie is self-dealing.108
    105
    RB at 21 (citing JX 50, JX 55, JX 62, and JX 64).
    106
    M. Gill at 100.
    107
    Id. at 101-2.
    108
    The Company relies on Berkowitz v. Legal Sea Foods, Inc., 
    1997 WL 153815
     (Del. Ch.
    Mar. 24, 1997), in which the Court found that a stockholder of a private, family-run
    46
    For these reasons, I find that the Company has not met its burden to prove by
    a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs’ actual, primary purposes for seeking
    books and records are other than those stated in the Demand.
    C.     The Company Has Not Established a Good Faith Belief That
    Disclosing the Information Sought in the Demand Will Harm the
    Company.
    Section 18-305(c) empowers the manager of a limited liability company to
    withhold books and records from the members where the manager believes in good
    faith that disclosure of information would not be in the best interests of the company
    or could damage the company or its business:
    The manager of a limited liability company shall have the right to
    keep confidential from the members, for such period of time as the
    manager deems reasonable, any information which the manager
    reasonably believes to be in the nature of trade secrets or other
    information the disclosure of which the manager in good faith
    believes is not in the best interest of the limited liability company or
    could damage the limited liability company or its business or which
    the limited liability company is required by law or by agreement with a
    third party to keep confidential.
    company sought books and records for the primary purpose of “facilitat[ing] the
    prosecution” of claims in a Massachusetts lawsuit. But in that case, unlike here, “the
    plaintiff . . . made no real effort to advocate his position in any credible way,” and instead
    “filed an eight page posttrial brief that advanced essentially conclusory assertions, and
    made no effort to address the factual or legal problems inherent in his case.” Id. at *3. Of
    course, the Court’s factual findings in that case do not control here.
    47
    6 Del. C. § 18-305(c) (emphasis added).109
    Relying on this section, the Company asserts that even if the purposes stated
    in the Demand are Plaintiffs’ actual, primary purposes, the Company may refuse to
    permit inspection because Jackie, as a manager of the Company, believes in good
    faith that “allowing any part of the requested inspection would have both the purpose
    and effect of providing Mitch and Jag with a strategic and tactical advantage in their
    multiple lawsuits against Regency.”110 According to the Company, Plaintiffs “are
    using funds they took from the Regency companies to fund a barrage of litigation in
    the hope that the companies, drained of cash, will be unable to fund a defense,” and
    “[t]he financial records they seek here would reveal just how well their strategy is
    working and how much longer they will need to sustain it.”111 The Company asserts
    that “even the most basic financial records would indicate the legal spend,” and
    “information about the companies’ free cash flow, savings, and credit lines would
    give Mitch and Jag unprecedented insight into Regency’s ability to resist their siege
    of lawsuits.”112
    109
    At trial, Plaintiffs argued for the first time that the Operating Agreement supersedes
    Section 18-305(c). That argument was not briefed and is therefore waived. See Emerald
    Partners, 
    726 A.2d at 1224
    .
    110
    AB at 14.
    111
    Id. at 15.
    112
    Id. at 15-16.
    48
    The Company bears the burden to prove Jackie’s good faith belief that
    disclosing any information sought in the Demand would not be in the best interest
    of the Company. Bond Purchase, L.L.C. v. Patriot Tax Credit Properties, L.P., 
    746 A.2d 842
    , 846 (Del. Ch. 1999). The Company has not met that burden.
    When asked what harm the inspection would cause, Jackie testified that
    expedited litigation is “burdensome” and Plaintiffs face “conflicts of interest” due
    to the pending litigations.113 She also explained that inspection should be denied
    because only the person “who’s running the business” should be the one “looking
    at” the Company’s finances—she testified that “I don’t think as an owner, everyone
    needs to be doing that.”114 In response to leading questions on direct examination,
    Jackie did confirm her agreement that the Company’s subsidiaries would not
    “benefit” from Plaintiffs learning how much has been spent on the litigation and how
    much cash remains available to fund it.115 But that testimony did not convince me
    113
    J. Kaur at 262-63.
    114
    Id. at 161.
    115
    Id. at 263 (“Q. [I]f Mitch and Jag knew how much Transomas was spending on the
    litigation, would that be a benefit to Transomas? A. I don’t think so.”); id. at 264 (“Q. Do
    you want Mitch and Jag to know how much you’re spending or Transomas is spending on
    its attorneys in the UK litigation? A. No, I don’t think that’s appropriate in litigation. I’m
    not aware of any situation where that’s allowed in litigation. So I think claiming an interest
    that would give you something that’s an unfair advantage in litigation that you’re choosing
    to pursue or defending, wouldn’t be appropriate.”); id. at 266 (“Q. [C]an you . . . think of
    anything that would become good for Transomas Investments by Mitch knowing how
    49
    that Jackie sincerely believes providing Plaintiffs with access to books and records
    would not be in the best interests of the Company for the reasons that counsel asserts.
    This conclusion is supported by the Company’s failure to even attempt to
    identify, with any precision, the information that, if disclosed, would harm the
    Company. Jackie testified that she was “not sure which specific books are being
    sought here.”116 And counsel conceded at trial that some information sought in the
    Demand—such as information reflecting interested-party transactions—would not
    reveal the Company’s legal spend or ability to fund the litigations going forward.
    Yet in an effort to wholly resist the Demand, the Company argues that “allowing any
    part of the requested inspection” would cause harm and refuses to produce, in its
    own words, “even the most basic financial records.”117 I find this position was not
    asserted in good faith.
    much it’s spending on the litigation in London? . . . A. No, I think it’s contrary to the
    interests of Transomas Investments, Limited. I can’t think of how that would be helpful to
    the interests of the company.”); id. at 267 (“Q. Do you think there’s any benefit that you
    can think of to Transomas, Limited of Mitch and Jag knowing how much cash flow is
    available to fund litigation against Mitch and Jag and their companies in all the litigation
    they brought and has been brought against them? . . . A. No, I don’t think it would be of
    any benefit to the company. I think it would be contrary to the best interest of the
    company.”).
    116
    Id. at 185.
    117
    AB at 14, 16 (emphasis added).
    50
    Beyond that, the purported harm the Company claims to face is overblown.118
    It is no secret that the Company has incurred substantial legal expenses.119 By
    making the argument, the Company seems to concede that its litigation spend is
    unsustainable. While I do not entirely discount the advantage Plaintiffs could gain
    by understanding the Company’s financial position, any incremental leverage does
    not outweigh Plaintiffs’ right to obtain books and records for the proper purposes
    stated in the Demand.120
    Accordingly, the Company has not met its burden to support its defense under
    Section 18-305(c) and cannot withhold documents on that basis.
    118
    See AB at 16 (“If litigation were war, such disclosure to the enemy of one’s resources
    available for the fight would be considered treason.”) (citing CONVENTIONAL
    AMMUNITION IN SURPLUS 9 (James Bevan, ed., 2008), for the proposition that
    “ammunition stockpiles are regarded as national secrets”).
    119
    M. Gill at 79 (“Q. So you are, of course, well aware that the Regency subsidiaries have
    substantial legal expenses in the . . . UK, right?”); AB at 15 (arguing that “[t]he financial
    records [Plaintiffs] seek here would reveal” whether “the companies, drained of cash, will
    be unable to fund a defense”); id. at 15-16 (“[T]he size of the legal fees relative to the
    normal expenses of the Transomas companies are such that even the most basic financial
    records would indicate the legal spend”); id. at 18-19 (“Mitch and Jag admit that it is pretty
    obvious why Regency would need substantial sums transferred from the airport to its UK
    subsidiaries: to fund the expenses of the ‘English Proceedings’”).
    120
    See Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 
    769 A.2d 113
    , 124 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that
    when stockholders seeking inspection own a large percentage of a privately held company,
    “there often is no identifiable corporate interest separate and apart from the interests of the
    . . . stockholders or if there is, the interest of the corporation in protecting itself from
    unwarranted intrusion is considerably diminished”).
    51
    D.     Scope of Production
    Because Plaintiffs have established a right to inspection, I address the scope
    of the Demand.
    Section 18-305(g) provides that “[i]f a member is entitled to obtain
    information under this chapter or a limited liability company agreement for a
    purpose reasonably related to the member’s interest as a member or other stated
    purpose, the member’s right shall be to obtain such information as is necessary and
    essential to achieving that purpose.” 6 Del. C. § 18-305(g). The Company has not
    argued that any specific categories of information sought in the Demand are not
    necessary and essential to Plaintiffs’ stated purposes,121 and it does not contest that,
    if inspection is ordered, Plaintiffs are entitled to books and records held by
    Regency’s subsidiaries in the U.K.
    The Demand seeks six categories of books and records and five additional
    categories of information from the Company. Those specific requests can be
    grouped into three broader categories: requests for financial documents (Document
    Requests 1-5 and Information Requests 3 and 4); requests concerning interested-
    121
    As a result, the Company has waived any objection to the scope of the relief
    recommended herein on the basis that any particular documents are not necessary and
    essential to the purposes stated in the Demand. See Emerald Partners, 
    726 A.2d at 1224
    .
    52
    party payments and transactions (Information Requests 1-2 and 5); and requests for
    correspondence with the Company’s accountants (Document Request 6).
    1. Financial Documents
    Document Requests 1 and 5 and Information Request 4 seek financial
    statements, profit and loss statements, and general ledgers; copies of tax returns; and
    documents reflecting the Company’s current assets and liabilities. These documents
    are necessary and essential to Plaintiffs’ valuation purpose.
    Document Requests 2, 3, and 4 seek all loan accounts; copies of all bank and
    account statements; and copies of all payroll records. Plaintiffs have not satisfied
    their burden to demonstrate that this granular information is essential to their
    valuation purpose.122
    Information Request 3 seeks documents reflecting all payments made to the
    Company’s accountants, legal advisors, and other professional advisors.                This
    request is overbroad. “A request for all documents concerning any payment made
    to any advisor is more akin to discovery in plenary litigation than a [books and
    122
    See J. Gill at 219 (requesting bank account statements for “more detail”). See also
    Bizzari v. Suburban Waste Servs., Inc., 
    2016 WL 4540292
    , at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2016)
    (finding plaintiff failed to prove that requests for “monthly cash flow statements, all sales
    and expenses, credit, security, and pledge agreements, schedules of accounts payable and
    accounts receivable, check registers, and bank statements would aid in valuing his interests
    beyond the aggregate information contained in [the company’s] financial statements”).
    53
    records] request.” Woods, 238 A.3d at 902. Plaintiffs are entitled to documents
    showing the total amount of payments made annually to each advisor.
    2. Documents Concerning             Interested-Party      Payments      and
    Transactions
    Information Requests 1, 2, and 5 seek documents showing whether any loans
    have been advanced to Jackie, Amarjit, or other related parties; payments,
    distributions, or dividends paid to or made on behalf of or to Jackie, Amarjit, or
    related parties; and any related-party transactions undertaken by the Company. As
    noted above, whether stated as a valuation purpose, investigation purpose, or its own
    independent purpose, Plaintiffs are entitled to information reflecting “basic
    information about how [the Company’s managers] are compensated” and “how their
    fiduciaries are taking money out of the corporation.” Woods, 238 A.3d at 900-01.
    These requests are appropriately tailored to the purposes of the Demand.123
    3. Correspondence with the Company’s Accountants
    Document Request 6 seeks all correspondence with the Company’s
    accountants, Perry Patel and Silver Levene. This information may be relevant to
    Plaintiffs’ valuation purpose, and could also bear on Plaintiffs’ investigation purpose
    to the extent communications refer to interested-party transactions. However, the
    123
    To the extent payments to Jackie are reflected on payroll records (see Document Request
    4), those must be produced as well.
    54
    documents discussed above are sufficient for those purposes, and Plaintiffs have not
    demonstrated a need for informal communications. I therefore recommend that this
    request be denied.
    E.      Plaintiffs’ Request to Amend the Pleadings Should be Denied.
    Plaintiffs seek to amend their pleadings to the evidence, pursuant to Court of
    Chancery Rule 15(b), to add a request for “the Regency Companies’ governing
    documents, including any limited liability company agreements, resolutions, transfer
    agreements, ownership ledgers, or other foundational documents that have been
    created or amended since April 2020.”124 As of trial, Plaintiffs had not served a
    written demand seeking those documents. Because a demand for books and records
    must strictly comply with the form and manner requirements of Section 18-305, I
    recommend that Plaintiffs’ request be denied, but nothing herein precludes Plaintiffs
    from serving another demand on the Company.
    Relatedly, Plaintiffs “conditionally” move for fees in the event that Regency’s
    document productions reveal that it has engaged in “self-help” by amending its
    governing documents.125 At trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed that Plaintiffs are
    124
    OB at 49.
    125
    Id. at 55-56.
    55
    not asking the Court to rule on that request at this time. It may be renewed when
    and if appropriate.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    I recommend that judgment be entered for Plaintiffs as described above. The
    parties should meet and confer regarding a form of order memorializing the scope
    of the production. This is a final report and exceptions may be taken pursuant to
    Court of Chancery Rule 144(d)(2). The stay of exceptions entered under the
    Chancellor’s April 4, 2023 letter is hereby lifted.
    56