Paula H. Smith v. Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) ( 2024 )

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
LOREN MITCHELL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734
January 12, 2024
Paula H. Smith Melanie J. Thompson, Esquire
10 Ironwood Drive CoraAnn M. Foley, Esquire
Newark, DE 19711 Orlans PC
4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 140
Wilmington, DE 19805
Re: Paula H Smith v. Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), C.A. No. 2023-0653-LM
Dear Counsel & Parties:
Pending before me is a motion to dismiss an action seeking to quiet title due
to adverse possession. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim
for adverse possession due to her inability to meet the statute’s twenty-year
occupancy requirement. I agree and recommend that the motion be granted, and this
action dismissed, for this reason. This is my final report.
I. BACKGROUND1
Petitioner Paula H. Smith (“Smith”) seeks title to a parcel of land located at
10 Ironwood Drive, Newark, Delaware 19711 (the “Property”). 2 Smith avers she
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are taken from the Complaint. Docket
Item (“D.I.”) 1.
2
D.I. 1 at 1.
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January 12, 2024
Page 2
had been “maintaining the property, doing repairs,…replace[d] broken well pump,
replace[d] piping in septic tank, replace[d] nonwork[ing] HVAC system, paying
property tax and HOA fees including back HOA fees[,] and bi-weekly
landscaping.” 3 But she has never been the record owner.
The property was originally owned by Brenda and Charles Ferris. 4 Petitioner
asserts that the property was subject to Sheriff Sale on November 9, 2016.5 It was
subsequently deeded to Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) as
a buyback on or around January 27, 2017. 6 The Petitioner asserts she has attempted
to purchase the property since April of 2018.7 She alleges she obtained the property
by adverse possession on February 4, 2020. 8
Smith filed this Petition for Quiet Title by adverse possession on June 26,
2023. 9 On July 17, 2023, Fannie Mae timely responded to the Complaint, moving
to dismiss it in full, for failure to state a claim (the “Motion”).10
3
D.I. 1, Page 3.
4
D.I. 4, Page 3.
5
Id.
6
D.I. 4, Ex. A.
7
Id.
8
D.I. 1, Page 3.
9
D.I. 1.
10
D.I. 10.
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January 12, 2024
Page 3
In her response to the Motion, Smith represents that she has attempted to
purchase the house and applied for a mortgage.11 She adds that she has made efforts
to work with Fannie Mae and details her communications with Fannie Mae regarding
the purchase since April 2018. Nonetheless, she maintains in her response to the
Motion that she obtained the property by adverse possession on February 4, 2020.
II. ANALYSIS
Fannie Mae moves under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the
property cannot be obtained via an adverse possession claim as Smith failed to plead
a reasonably conceivable claim of adverse possession. The standards governing a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are settled:
(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even
vague allegations are “well-pleaded” if they give the opposing party
notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party; and ([iv]) dismissal is inappropriate
unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof. 12
Although “[t]he Court will view pleadings filed by pro se litigants with
forgiving eyes… proceeding pro se will not relieve Plaintiffs of their obligation to
11
D.I. 11 ¶ 5.
12
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del. 2002) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
2023-0653-LM
January 12, 2024
Page 4
‘allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief’ or ‘to present and support
cogent arguments warranting the relief sought.’”13
Based on her Petition, Smith is unable to prove she is reasonably entitled to
recover under a claim for adverse possession. The elements of adverse possession
require the Petitioner to show that she “openly, exclusively, notoriously,
continuously and adversely” possessed the property in dispute for 20 years.14 If any
element is unsupported, the claim should be dismissed.
Smith avers that she has been “maintaining the property, doing
repairs,…replace[d] broken well pump, replace[d] piping in septic tank, replace[d]
nonwork[ing] HVAC system, paying property tax and HOA fees including back
HOA fees[,] and bi-weekly landscaping.”15 Even with forgiving eyes and viewing
the Petition in a light most favorable to Smith, Smith has failed to adequately plead
actual possession of the Property for more than twenty (20) years. This alone is
sufficient to grant the Motion without an analysis of the remaining elements.
13
Hall v. Coupe, 2016 WL 3094406, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2016) (internal citations
omitted).
14
Acierno v. Goldstein, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82, at *23 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2004); Tumulty
v. Schreppler, 132 A.3d 4, 24 (Del. Ch. 2015).
15
D.I. 1, page 3.
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January 12, 2024
Page 5
Even if I were to consider the additional documentation 16 Smith submitted
with her Response to the Motion to Dismiss and the follow up letter and attachments,
Smith consistently maintains that she has only occupied the property since February
4, 2020.17 As she is unable to establish that she has occupied the property for more
than 20 years, Smith has failed to plead a reasonably conceivable claim of adverse
possession and, therefore, her claim should be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, I find the Motion should be granted. Based on the
allegations in the Petition, Smith would not be able to plead a reasonably conceivable
claim of adverse possession. Thus, the Petition should be dismissed. This is my
final report, and exceptions may be filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Loren Mitchell
Magistrate in Chancery
16
I decline to include the additional documentation filed by the Petitioner as they are not
integral to the claim. See Fortis Advisors LLC v. Allergan W.C. Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL
5588876, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2019) (“On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider
documents that are integral to the complaint, but documents outside the pleadings may be
considered only in particular instances and for carefully limited purposes. Whether a
document is integral to a claim and incorporated into a complaint is largely a facts-and-
circumstances inquiry. Generally, a document is integral to the claim if it is the source for
the . . . facts as pled in the complaint.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
17
D.I. 11 and D.I. 12