State of Delaware v. Ryan J. Flanigan ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE )
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v. ) Cr.A. N0.: 1406011386
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RYAN J. F LANIGAN, )
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Defendant. )
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Submitted: May 21, 2015
Decided: June 10, 2015
Christopher Marques, Esquire Richard B. Ferrara, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General Ferrara & Haley
820 N. French Street, 7”E Floor 1716 Wawaset Street
Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19806
Aflomeyfl)?‘ the State of Delaware Attorneyfor Defendant
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant Ryan J. Fianigan (“Flanigan”) was charged with Failing to Remain Within A
Single Lane, in Violation of 21 Del. C. § 4122(1), and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in
Violation of 21. Del. C. § 4177. Flanigan filed a Motion to Suppress, challenging the legality of
the traffic stop. On May 5, 2015, the Court held a bifurcated suppression hearing. At the end of
the hearing, the Court issued a briefing schedule and instructed counsel to address two issues
relating to whether there was reasonable articuable suspicion for the traffic stop. This is the
Court’s Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
1. Facts
At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the State presented the testimony of Officer
Andrew J. Davis (“Officer Davis”) of the Elsmere Police Department. Officer Davis testified
that he was patrolling Eismere on June 14, 2014, and observed Flanigan driving a white
Chevrolet Equinox SUV traveling westbound on Kirkwood Highway. Officer Davis testified
that he saw Fianigan making moving violations. Officer Davis testified that first he saw
Flanigan move from the right lane to the left lane without signaling. He and Flanigan then came
to a traffic light. Officer Davis further testified that when the iight turned green, Flanigan
accelerated, came close to Officer Davis (who was still in the left lane), and “briefly” used his
turn signal as he merged into the right lane. At that point in time, Officer Davis got behind
Flanigan, and activated his emergency equipment and dash—camera.l
On cross examination, Officer Davis testified that the dash camera did not capture the
first lane change. However, Officer Davis again testified that Fianigan made a iane change in
front ofOfficer Davis’ vehicle without using his turn signal.
After activating his emergency equipment, Flanigan used his turn signal and pulled over.
Officer Davis testified that before coming to a complete stop, Flanigan struck the curb. Officer
Davis then approached the driver’s side of Flanigan’s vehicle, and spoke with him.
II. Standard of Review
In a Motion to Suppress, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
alleged search and seizure did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.2
' Flanigan testified that his patrol vehicle was equipped with a Mobile Video Recording (MVR). The
State admitted the MVR into evidence as its Exhibit 1, and Officer Davis testified as to what was
happening in the video while it played for the Court.
2 Hunter v. Stale, 783 A.2d 550, 561 (Del. 2001).
Ill. The Law
Case Law on Motion to Suppress
On a Motion to Suppress challenging the legaiity of a traffic stop, the State bears the
burden of establishing that the challenged stop was reasonable under the circumstances.3 The
officer conducting the traffic stop must have reasonable articuiable suspicion that a crime has
4 in order for the traffic stop to be legal, “‘the
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.
quantum of evidence required for reasonable articulable suspicion is less than that of probable
cause?”5 The Court evaluates the evidence “‘in the context of the totality of circumstances[,] as
viewed from the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances,
combining objective facts with an officer’s subjective interpretation of those facts.”6 It is well
settled that changing lanes without using a turn signal is a violation of 21 Del. C. § 4155.7
IV. Opinion
Notwithstanding counsel’s response to the Court’s briefing schedule, after reviewing the
record, the Court finds that Officer Davis had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop F1ani gran
after observing the first lane change. Officer Davis’ sworn testimony at the suppression hearing
was that he observed Flanigan change lanes without signaling. 0n direct examination, Officer
Davis testified as follows:
Q: Can you recount the moving violations as you mentioned them before?
A: Sure. Initiaily when 1 saw the vehicle, it started to move into my lane of
travel. 1 was in the left lane, westbound on Kirkwood Highway. He was in,
3 Slate v. Lcmouette, 2012 WL 4857820, at *7 (Del. Com. P1. Aug. 27, 2012) (citing Whren v. United
States, 517 us. 806, 809 (1996)).
4 Delaware 1!. Prouse, 440 US. 648, 663 (1979).
5 State v. Vizcm‘r‘ondqfargas, 201 1 WL 6946978, at *3 (Del. Com. Pl. Dec. 14, 201%) (quoting Dawns v.
State, 570 A.2d I142, 1145 (Del. 1990)).
"Id. (citfnngmes v. State, 744 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999)).
7 1d; see also State v. Walker, 1991 WL 53385, at *2 (Del. Super. 1991).
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the vehicle was in the right lane, came into my lane, then went back into
the right lane, and then merged into the left lane without signaling.
Q: When he came into the right lane the first time, did he signal then?
A: He did not.
After reviewing Officer Davis’ testimony, the Court finds that under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable articulable suspicion existed for Officer Davis to stop Flanigan.
There is no iegal case law, statute, or evidentiary rule that the officer must capture the facts
constituting reasonable articulable suspicion on his camera. Officer Davis’ sworn testimony is
sufficient.
IV. Order
Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The matter will now be
set for triai. This Judicial Officer retains jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day ofJune, 2015.
a& (wt ‘—
John K. Welch, Judge
cc: Ms. Diane Healy
Criminal Case Manager