Connelly Gallagher, LLP v. Fred Earl Reynolds, III ( 2023 )


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  • IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
    CONOLLY GALLAGHER, LLP                 )
    )
    Plaintiff,                       )
    )
    v.                        )
    )         CPU4-20-003274
    FRED EARL REYNOLDS, III                )
    )
    Defendant.                       )
    Submitted: May 19, 2023
    Decided: August 7, 2023
    Josiah R. Wolcott, Esq.                        Fred Earl Reynolds, III
    1201 North Market Street, Suite 2000           5034 Overlook Road NW
    Wilmington, DE, 19801                          Washington, D.C. 20016
    Attorney for Plaintiff                         Self-represented Defendant
    ORDER AWARDING DAMAGES
    Surles, J.
    This case stems from an agreement between the parties (the “Fee
    Agreement”), whereby Plaintiff Connolly Gallagher, LLP (“Connolly Gallagher”)
    agreed to represent Defendant Fred Early Reynolds, III (“Mr. Reynolds”) in
    litigation against Mr. Reynolds’ former employer in the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware (the “Employment Case”). In exchange, Mr. Reynolds
    agreed to render payments to Connolly Gallagher for its legal representation,
    charged at the rates set forth in the Fee Agreement.
    On November 11, 2020, Connolly Gallagher initiated this breach of contract
    action against Mr. Reynolds to recover unpaid legal fees incurred under the Fee
    Agreement, totaling $30,426.08. On July 20, 2021, this Court granted Connolly
    Gallagher’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability alone, as there
    existed genuine issues of material fact as to damages. The parties engaged in
    mediation on the issue of damages, but without success; so, the matter was scheduled
    for an inquisition hearing for the Court to determine damages.1
    The inquisition hearing was held on May 19, 2023, during which the Court
    heard testimony from four witnesses, and received exhibits into evidence.2 At the
    1
    See CCP Civ. R. 56(d).
    2
    Mr. Reynolds testified on his own behalf. The Court also heard testimony from three witnesses on
    behalf of Connolly Gallagher, all of whom were employees of Connolly Gallagher: Christina Phillips,
    Timothy Holly, Esq., and Lauren DeLuca, Esq. Connolly Gallagher submitted nine exhibits into
    evidence.
    2
    conclusion of the hearing, the Court reserved decision. This is the Court’s Final
    Decision and Order on the issue of damages.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Based on the testimony and evidence adduced at the inquisition hearing, the
    Court finds the following relevant facts:
    On June 20, 2019, Mr. Reynolds executed the Fee Agreement, pursuant to
    which Connolly Gallagher agreed to represent him in the Employment Case, for
    which they would charge a specified hourly rate.3 Prior to the execution of the Fee
    Agreement, Connolly Gallagher had represented Mr. Reynolds in a pre-litigation
    capacity and, as of the date of the Fee Agreement, Mr. Reynolds had an existing
    balance due and owing.4
    Mr. Reynolds’ legal claim in the Employment Case was far from unassailable.
    From the outset, the parties acknowledged a statute of limitations issue, but Connolly
    Gallagher developed a legal strategy to potentially overcome that hurdle. As part of
    the legal strategy, Connolly Gallagher amended the complaint to focus on a different
    cause of action. However, before doing so, Connolly Gallagher advised that
    opposing counsel would likely challenge the effort, and it explicitly cautioned that
    3
    Pl. Ex. 9.
    4
    Id.; Pl. Ex. 2.
    3
    success was not guaranteed.5 Nevertheless, Mr. Reynolds elected to proceed with
    litigation.
    During the litigation, Connolly Gallagher diligently communicated with Mr.
    Reynolds regarding the litigation expenses.6 Connolly Gallagher consulted with Mr.
    Reynolds before taking certain actions, affording consideration to costs,7 and
    invoices reflecting fees incurred were submitted to Mr. Reynolds each month for
    payment.8 As time progressed, so did the communications from Connolly Gallagher
    regarding the mounting balance of unpaid legal fees.9
    Despite the apparent transparency regarding litigation expenses, Mr.
    Reynolds failed to remit payment in full. Finally, after numerous communications
    relating to his ongoing non-payment,10 Connolly Gallagher moved to withdraw as
    counsel. While the motion to withdraw was pending, Connolly Gallagher—which
    had continued to discuss the case with Mr. Reynolds regardless of his non-
    payment—sent Mr. Reynolds an e-mail, apprising him of the legal landscape and
    upcoming deadlines, as he would have to proceed pro se or with alternate counsel.11
    5
    See Pl. Ex. 2; Pl. Ex. 7. As anticipated, opposing counsel challenged the cause of action set forth in the
    amended complaint by filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
    6
    See Pl. Ex. 1-8.
    7
    For example, Connolly Gallagher suggested Mr. Reynolds work one of the firm’s highly recommended
    associates in the early phases of the litigation as it would “help keep costs under control,” and noted
    financial impact of discovery strategies. Pl. Ex. 2 at p. 3; Pl. Ex. 8 at p. 5.
    8
    Pl. Ex. 1.
    9
    See Pl. Ex. 3-6.
    10
    See Pl. Exs. 2-6.
    11
    Pl. Ex. 6.
    4
    In response, Mr. Reynolds asked Connolly Gallagher for a referral and thanked the
    attorneys for “actively producing ways to increase the chances for success for [the]
    case.”12 Mr. Reynolds also noted that he would “continue to make payments to
    satisfy the balance.”13 However, that did not occur. Consequently, Connolly
    Gallagher filed the present suit to recover the unpaid legal fees.
    PARTIES’ POSITIONS
    Connolly Gallagher argues that the fees charged to Mr. Reynolds were
    reasonable based on its experience, the complexity of the case, and relative to the
    rates of other law firms in the community. Consistent with the invoices admitted
    into evidence at the damages hearing, Connolly Gallagher requests damages for the
    legal work it performed under the Fee Agreement, totaling $30,426.08.14
    Mr. Reynolds’ argument is less delineated; the precise basis and extent to
    which he challenges the legal fees was not clearly presented. He did not claim that
    the hours charged were artificially inflated or disproportionate to the work
    performed. He did not introduce evidence to contest the reasonableness of the rate
    agreed upon,15 nor did he impute bad faith or wrongdoing in Connolly Gallagher’s
    12
    Id.
    13
    Id.
    14
    Pl. Ex. 2.
    15
    Mr. Reynolds insinuated that, in advance of the damages hearing, he consulted with other legal
    professionals regarding the strength of the Employment Action and the decision to move forward.
    However, he failed to call any witnesses to testify to those communications and, on objection from
    counsel for Connolly Gallagher, such testimony was excluded as hearsay.
    5
    general legal strategy. Rather, he seemed to suggest that he should not be required
    to pay fees incurred from work performed in the Employment Action beyond the
    filing of the amended complaint given the “statute of limitations issue.”
    DISCUSSION
    The sole focus of an inquisition hearing is “the amount of damages owed to
    the plaintiff, which is determined by the ... judge.”16 The Court’s finding on damages
    must be based on a preponderance of the evidence, meaning “the side on which the
    greater weight of the evidence is found.17
    The only issue before the Court is the amount of damages owed to Connolly
    Gallagher for Mr. Reynolds breach of the Fee Agreement. Yet the argument asserted
    by Mr. Reynolds at the inquisition hearing—that he should be relieved of any
    obligation to pay fees incurred after the filing of the amended complaint—goes to
    liability, not the calculation of damages. The Court previously found Mr. Reynolds
    liable for breach of contract and entered judgment in favor of Connolly Gallagher;
    thus, Mr. Reynolds’ argument is moot.
    In contrast, Connolly Gallagher presented cogent evidence as to the damages
    it incurred as a result of Mr. Reynolds’ breach of the Fee Agreement. It offered
    unrefuted testimony regarding the fees accrued in its representation of Mr. Reynolds.
    16
    Jagger v. Schiavello, 
    93 A.3d 656
    , 659 (Del. Super. Ct. 2014).
    17
    
    Id.
    6
    That testimony was supported by documentary evidence, including invoices
    depicting the hours worked on Mr. Reynolds' case. 18 The Court finds that Connolly
    Gallagher has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it suffered damages
    in the amount of $30,426.08.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds damages in the amount of
    $30,426.80 owed to Connolly Gallagher by Mr. Reynolds, plus pre and post­
    judgment interest at a rate of 10.5% until satisfied. 19
    obert H. Surles,
    Judge
    18
    Pl. Ex. 1.
    19
    6 Del. C. § 2301.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CPU4-20-003274

Judges: Surles J.

Filed Date: 8/7/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/11/2023