Elizabeth Sullivan v. Jaraad Watson ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
ELIZABETH SULLIVAN )
Plaintiff,
V. C.A. No: CPU4-21-004463
JARAAD WATSON
Defendants.
Submitted: August 13, 2024
Decided: September 23, 2024
Elizabeth Sullivan, Jaraad Watson
500 Delaware Ave. Ste. 1 1307 Radford Road
P.O. Box 1403 Wilmington, DE 19803
Wilmington, DE 19899 Self-represented Defendant
Self-represented Plaintiff
DECISION AFTER TRIAL
Danberg, C.J.
Plaintiff Elizabeth Sullivan brings this action against her former landlord,
Defendant Jaraad Watson, to recover for intentional torts allegedly committed by
Mr. Watson and his agent/property manager, Darrell Stroy,' at the end of her tenancy
and thereafter.
On August 13, 2024, the case proceeded to trial on Ms. Sullivan’s claims for
(1) slander, (2) malicious prosecution, and (3) abuse of process.” At trial, the Court
heard testimony from one witness, Ms. Sullivan, and multiple documents were
admitted into evidence.’ At the conclusion of trial, the Court reserved decision. This
is the Court’s Final Decision After Trial.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
This is not the first legal dispute between Ms. Sullivan and Mr. Watson. Far
from it; the parties share a long and tortuous history of litigation, much of which is
' Mr. Stroy was named as a defendant in this case, but the claims against him were adjudicated prior to
trial. See Order granting default judgment as to Darrell Stroy, Sullivan v. Watson, 2023 WL 3487773,
Ca. No. CPU4-21-004463, Surles, J. (June 23, 2022)(ORDER).
Ms. Sullivan also brought a claim for harassment. However, on the day of trial, prior to the presentation
of evidence, the Court dismissed Ms. Sullivan’s harassment claim, as Delaware does not recognize a
private civil cause of action for harassment. Washington v. Talley, 2017 WL 1201125, at *3 (Del. Com.
Pl. Feb. 15, 2017); McCambridge v. Bishop, 2009 WL 3068915, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2009).
3 Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-71, 13-17, 19-20, 22-27, and 29-32 were admitted into evidence. Plaintiff's
Exhibit 23 was the audio recording from the April 8, 2021, hearing in the Justice of the Peace Court.
Ms. Sullivan did not take steps necessary to obtain and enter the transcript from that hearing into
evidence. However, exercising its discretion to afford leeway to pro se litigants, and considering that
(i) Mr. Watson did not object to the evidence, and (ii) the audio recording was in the possession of the
Court, the Court accepted the audio recoding into evidence as if it were presented to the Court.
2
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intrinsic to the case at bar. For concision, only the facts and procedural history
relevant to the issues raised at trial will be discussed herein.*
a. The Landlord-Tenant Relationship and Initial Legal Proceedings
Ms. Sullivan rented a home from Mr. Watson (the “Property”) from 2017
through June 2020, which was largely paid for through a Wilmington Housing
Authority (“WHA”) housing assistance program. The rental dealings between Ms.
Sullivan and Mr. Watson were not aboveboard; although the parties were
contractually precluded from charging or paying beyond the WHA-established rental
rate, Mr. Watson charged—and Ms. Sullivan paid—an additional rental fee each
month. This underhanded arrangement continued for more than two years, until the
COVID-19 pandemic rendered Ms. Sullivan financially unable to pay the surplus
rental fee.
The cessation of supplemental rental payments caused considerable tension
between the parties. At some point, Ms. Sullivan learned that Mr. Watson told third-
party acquaintances that he was going to “put that bitch [Ms. Sullivan] and her son
out of my [Property]” (the “Eviction Comment”). Indeed, Mr. Watson seemed intent
on doing just that. On December 22, 2020, Mr. Stroy, acting in his capacity as agent
4 The Court incorporates the facts and procedural history from its Order on Damages as to Defendant
Stroy, Sullivan v. Watson, 2023 WL 3487773, Ca. No. CPU4-21-004463, Surles, J. (May 16,
2023)(ORDER), and Watson vy. Sullivan, Ca. No. CPU4-21-004447, Danberg, C.J. (Sept. 23,
2024)(ORDER).
for Mr. Watson,” filed a summary possession action in the Justice of the Peace Court
to evict Ms. Sullivan and to recover unpaid rent (the “Summary Possession
Action”). Notably, the claim for unpaid rent was for the WHA-prohibited
surcharge, not the contractually agreed-upon monthly rental rate, which was not in
arrears. The case proceeded to trial on April 5, 2021, and Mr. Watson testified as
owner of the Property; however, the evidence adduced fell markedly short of the
applicable burden of proof and, upon motion of Ms. Sullivan, the case was dismissed
with prejudice.’ Shortly thereafter, Ms. Sullivan notified Mr. Watson of her intent
to vacate the Property by June 30, 2021.
b. Litigation in the Court of Common Pleas
The disposition of the Summary Possession Action and Ms. Sullivan’s
vacating the Property did not mark the end of the parties’ litigious engagement. Ms.
Sullivan filed suit against Mr. Watson in the Justice of the Peace Court, asserting
claims related to breach of the rental agreement; however, on December 27, 2021,
following a trial and entry of judgment in favor of Ms. Sullivan, Mr. Watson
appealed to this Court for a trial de novo (the “CCP Appeal”). A few days later, on
5 In its April 15, 2020, Notice of Dismissal, the Magistrate explained that the issue of Mr. Stroy’s
standing to bring the suit was raised prior to commencement of trial, but the court reserved decision
and proceed to trial “as it was aware the Owner [Mr. Watson] was present to testify.” Pl. Ex. 5
6 Pl. Ex.3, Pl. Ex.5.
7 Pl. Ex. 5.
December 30, 2021, Ms. Sullivan filed the present cause of action against Mr.
Watson and Mr. Stroy, asserting various intentional tort claims (the “Torts Case”).
Both the CCP Appeal and the Torts Case were scheduled for trial on May 14,
2024. Noting the factual overlap between the matters, the parties elected to present
their cases consecutively. The CCP Appeal was to proceed first and, for efficiency,
the evidence presented would be incorporated in the Torts Case. While the intention
was for both cases to be heard on the same day, time did not permit,® and the Torts
Case was continued to August 13, 2024.
Court convened on August 13, 2024, for trial in the Torts Case. Prior to the
commencement of trial, the Court reminded the parties that the evidence adduced in
the CCP Appeal was incorporated into the Torts Case, thus the parties need not
rehash facts already established.’ Ms. Sullivan, the sole witness to testify at trial,
recounted the housing-related challenges she faced in the years since she vacated the
Property—challenges which she attributes to Mr. Watson. In fact, Ms. Sullivan has
not be able to secure permanent housing since she vacated the Property in June 2020.
To that end, she described one instance where her housing application was denied
8 As in the Torts Case, the parties were both self-represented in the CCP Appeal, and their presentation
of evidence took much longer than anticipated.
° Given the pro se parties’ difficulty to present their claims and defenses in a clear and concise manner,
the Court undertook to ensure that both parties understood their respective evidentiary burdens. As to
Ms. Sullivan, the Court cautioned her prove each element of her claims, and confirmed that she
understood each element. For example, on no less than five occasions, the Court reiterated to Ms.
Sullivan the elements of malicious prosecution.
because Mr. Watson refused to respond to the prospective landlord when they
reached out to him for a reference. In support of this claim, Ms. Sullivan introduced
a letter from Woodlawn Trustees, the potential landlord (the “Letter”).'° Indeed, the
Letter indicates a rental application could not be accepted “due to the unavailability
to provide landlord reference history.” Notably, the Letter is not addressed to Ms.
Sullivan; rather, it is addressed to her son and her son’s girlfriend. Ms. Sullivan
explained that she, her son, and her son’s girlfriend had all applied to rent a place
together; however, she did not explain why her name was omitted from the Letter,
and she did not produce any other documentation or testimony to support her
contention that the non-responsive landlord referenced therein was her landlord, Mr.
Watson.
Ms. Sullivan also described three instances at the core of her defamation
claim. According to Ms. Sullivan, she and Mr. Watson attended the same gym, and
certain individuals at the gym alerted her to Mr. Watson having made the Eviction
Comment. Ms. Sullivan elaborated that she was “pretty sure” Mr. Watson made other
slanderous statements, but the Eviction Comment was the only one she recalled at
trial.
The two remaining defamatory statements identified by Ms. Sullivan occurred
during the proceedings in this Court. Specifically, Ms. Sullivan took issue with Mr.
10 PL. Ex. 26.
Watson’s Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend which was filed in this case on
June 25, 2024 (the “June 25" Filing”). In the June 25" Filing, Mr. Watson implied
that Mr. Stroy and Ms. Sullivan had been in a relationship, which ended when Mr.
Stroy returned to his wife.'’ Ms. Sullivan also pointed to comments made by Mr.
Watson during his testimony at the May 14, 2024, trial in the CCP Appeal.
Specifically, Ms. Sullivan claimed that Mr. Watson insinuated that she had been
romantically involved with Mr. Stroy (the “May 14"" Testimony”).
DISCUSSION
Both parties in this matter appeared pro se, which presents challenges as the
Court balances the need to afford leniency so that the case is considered on its merits,
with the obligation to maintain neutrality.'? Indeed, both parties were hindered by
their lack of understanding of certain rules and legal principals. However, mindful
of the protracted history of litigation and the need for full and fair resolution of the
Although the term “affair” was notably missing from Mr. Watson’s statements, Ms. Sullivan was
insistant that Mr. Watson had claimed that she and Mr. Stroy engaged in an affair.
'2 See Durham vy. Grapetree, LLC, 2014 WL 1980335, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 16, 2014)(affording leeway
to the pro se plaintiff “to allow the matter to be determined on its merits”)(quoting Jackson v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1986 WL 11546, at *2 (Del.Super.Sept. 24, 1986)); Lanciotti v. Shore
Properties Maintenance, 1995 WL 1582030, at *2 (Del. Com. PI. Nov. 28, 1995)(noting that the court
cannot be a resource to help pro se litigants who find court rules to be difficult to understand because
the court must maintain neutrality); Dickens v. Costello, 2004 WL 396377, at *1 (Del.Super.Feb.23,
2004) (“Because the Plaintiff is acting pro se, the Court will attempt to unearth the merits of his most
recent motion”); Zhai v. Stein, 2012 WL 1409358, at * (Del. Super. Jan. 6, 2012)(“This Court will
accommodate [a pro se litigant] only to the extent that the substantive rights of the opposing party are
not affected”).
issues raised, the Court endeavored to unearth the factual and legal bases of each of
Ms. Sullivan’s claims without impinging the substantive rights of Mr. Watson."
I. Malicious Prosecution
To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, it is incumbent on the plaintiff
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the institution of civil proceedings;
(2) brought by or at the behest of the defendant; (3) without probable cause; (4) with
malice; (5) the proceedings terminated in favor of the plaintiff, and (6) damages
inflicted by seizure of property or other special injury.'* Notably, malicious
prosecution claims are disfavored by Delaware courts, and are thus “assessed with
careful scrutiny.”!°
At the core of Ms. Sullivan’s malicious prosecution claim is the Summary
Possession Action. The Court is satisfied that Ms. Sullivan demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Summary Possession action was instituted
at the instance Mr. Watson, that it lacked probable cause, and that the proceedings
terminated in favor of Ms. Sullivan. However, the viability of Ms. Sullivan’s
malicious prosecution claim begins to waver at the element of malice.
3 See supra n. 9.
14 Smith v. Delaware State Police, 2014 WL 3360173, at *4 (Del. Super. July 8, 2014); Winshall v. Viacom
International, Inc., 2019 WL 960213, at *15 (Del. Super. Feb. 25, 2019).
'S Ferguson v. Wesley College, Inc., 2000 WL 706833, at *2 (Del. Super. March 23, 2000);.McMahon v.
McMahon, 2024 WL 1905462, at *2 (Del. Super. April 29, 2024).
8
At trial, Ms. Sullivan was adamant in her belief that “the filing of the lawsuit
in the first place was the malice.” The Court finds that argument to be untenable,
for if the act of instituting a proceeding was, in and of itself, demonstrative of malice,
then malice would not be a discrete element of the claim. Further, Delaware law is
clear that a showing of malice requires more than bare allegations of hostile intent;'°
rather, it calls for “evidence that the action was taken by the defendant with a
wrongful or improper motive or with wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights.”!”
“Actual spite, ill will or a grudge do not necessarily establish malice.”!8
Ms. Sullivan failed to point to any specific facts to demonstrate malice.'? At
best, the facts demonstrate that Mr. Watson was greedy in that he wanted to continue
collecting the supplemental rental payments despite the WHA’s prohibition.
However, the parties’ years-long practice of imposing/paying the rental surplus
allays the inference that Mr. Watson’s efforts to continue the practice was an act of
malice. Moreover, even if malice could be inferred, Ms. Sullivan’s malicious
16 Spence v. Spence, 2012 WL 1495324, at *2 (Del. Super. April 20, 2012)(“a bare allegation that the
defendant instituted “proceedings solely to intimidate and harass is insufficient” to plead malice” and
“the addition of the incidental fact that the defendant felt indignation or resentment toward the plaintiff
does not make the defendant liable”).
7 Scott v. Moffit, 2019 WL 3976068, at *6 (Del. Super. Aug. 20, 2019).
18 Sekscinski v. Harris, 2006 WL 509541, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 18, 2006).
19 At best, the facts demonstrate that Mr. Watson was greedy in that he sought to continue to collect the
rental surplus despite the WHA’s prohibition. However, the parties’ years-long practice of
imposing/paying the rental surplus allays the inference that Mr. Watson’s efforts to continue the
practice was inherently malicious.
prosecution claim must fail because she did not adduce any evidence as to the
element of damages.
Although difficult to pinpoint, it appears that the damages Ms. Sullivan claims
to have suffered as a result of the Summary Possession Action relate to expenses she
incurred when she vacated the Property and could not secure new housing, including
the cost of placing her personal property in storage. However, the Summary
Possession Action did not render Ms. Sullivan unhoused, for it did not result in her
eviction. Rather, Ms. Sullivan continued to live at the Property well after the case
was terminated in her favor, and she ultimately moved out on her own volition. To
the extent that Ms. Sullivan believes that her inability to secure new housing after
she chose to leave the Property is attributable to the Summary Possession Action,
such causal nexus was not established at trial. In fact, Ms. Sullivan actually seems
to be claiming the root of her problems finding housing are attributable to Mr.
Watson’s actions separate and apart from the Summary Possession Action, in that
she claims he would not respond to requests for a landlord reference.
In all, Ms. Sullivan failed to prove any damage consequent to the Summary
Possession Action, much less damages amounting to seizure of property or special
10
injury as required to recover for malicious prosecution.”° Accordingly, Ms. Sullivan
cannot prevail on her malicious prosecution claim.
II. Abuse of Process
“Unlike malicious prosecution claims, which focus on a party's initiation of
the legal process, abuse of process concerns perversions of the legal process after it
has been issued.””! To recover for abuse of process, the plaintiff must prove two
elements: (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the legal process
that is not proper in the regular conduct of proceedings.” To sustain an abuse of
process claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “some definite act or threat not
authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the
process.””3 “Some form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly
involved in the proceeding itself, must be shown; in other words, a form of extortion
is required.”4
Ms. Sullivan’s position at trial was that Mr. Watson “weaponized the courts”
against her by initiating the Summary Possession Action. However, the initiation of
the Summary Possession Action cannot satisfy her burden; she must allege and prove
20 Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407, 411 (Del. Super. July 21, 1983). To the extent that Ms. Sullivan intended
her generalized claims of reputational harm to be construed as the damages she suffered, such harm
does not satisfy the damages element. Batchelor v. Alexis Properties, LLC, 2018 WL 1611662, at *2
(Del. Super. April 3, 2018).
21 Dayton v. Collision, 2020 WL 3412701, at *14 (Del. Super. June 22, 2020).
22 Td.
23 Adams vy. Aidoo, 2012 WL 1408878, at *9 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2012).
4 Dayton, at *14.
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some additional action beyond the filing of the suit—some action taken during the
proceedings—to satisfy her burden. Ms. Sullivan failed to articulate any such
improper action. As such, Ms. Sullivan failed to satisfy her burden of proof with
regards to her abuse of process claim.
Ill. Defamation
Ms. Sullivan identified three communications made by Mr. Watson that serve
as the bases of her defamation claim: (i) the Eviction Comment; (ii) the June 25"
Filing, and; (iii) the May 14" Testimony. However, the June 25" Filing and the May
14" Testimony occurred years after the complaint in this matter was filed; as such,
those statements cannot serve as the basis of Ms. Sullivan’s defamation claim. Thus,
the Court will consider only the Eviction Comment as the basis of Ms. Sullivan’s
defamation claim.
To recover for defamation under Delaware law, the plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) a defamatory statement; (2) the statement refers
to the plaintiff (3) the statement was published; (4) a third party would understand
the statement to be defamatory; and (5) injury.?? Generally, oral defamation (i.e.,
26
slander) is not actionable without special damages.*° “Special damages” means
“loss of something having economic or pecuniary value.”?’
25 Read y. Carpenter, 1995 WL 945544, at *2 (Del.Super. June 8, 1995).
6 Id.27 Preston Hollow Capital LLC v. Nuveen LLC, 2022 WL 2276599, at *3 (Del. Super. June 14, 2022).
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First, the Court must consider whether the Eviction Statement was defamatory
in nature. Whether a statement is defamatory is a question of law; it requires the
Court to consider whether the statement constitutes “expressions of fact or protected
expressions of opinion,” and whether the statement is “capable of a defamatory
meaning.””® Additionally, Delaware law does not impose liability for a statement
that is substantially true.2? The Court finds that the Eviction Statement was not
defamatory in nature. It was a statement of Mr. Watson’s intent to remove Ms.
Sullivan from the Property—an intent which he actively pursued, thereby actualizing
the statement’s truth.*° Therefore, as a matter of law, Mr. Watson cannot be held
liable for the Eviction Statement.
Furthermore, Ms. Sullivan failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating injury
consequent to any alleged defamatory statement. Like her malicious prosecution
claim, Ms. Sullivan seemingly points to her inability to secure new housing, and
expenses she incurred due to her lack of housing, as the injury she sustained from
the alleged defamation. However, Ms. Sullivan never identified a single statement
that Mr. Watson made to any prospective landlord that defamed her character. To
8 Id.29 Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248, 253 (Del. Supr. 1987); Giove v. Holden, 2014 WL 975135, at *5 (D.
Del. 2014)
30 To the extent that Ms. Sullivan takes issue with Mr. Watson’s referring to her as a “bitch,” it is clear
from the evidence that such statement, although crude, was an expression of pure opinion, and thus
cannot serve as a basis to impose liability upon Mr. Watson. Grimaldi v. New Castle County, 2016 WL
4411329, at *8 (Del. Super. Aug. 18, 2016)(“Pure expressions of opinion are protected under the First
Amendment and are not defamatory”).
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the contrary, the only allegation regarding Mr. Watson’s communications with
prospective landlords was that he refused to communicate at all.°' Accordingly, Ms.
Sullivan failed to satisfy her burden of proof with regards to her defamation claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Ms. Sullivan failed to
satisfy her burden of proof with regards to her malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, and defamation claims. Therefore, judgment is entered in favor of Mr.
Watson. Each party shall bear its own costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
31 To the extent that Ms. Sullivan seeks to construe Mr. Watson’s alleged refusal to provide a reference
as defamation, this Court is not aware of any Delaware case to support the proposition that a landlord’s
refusal to provide any reference constitutes defamation. Moreover, for the reasons explained supra,
the Court declines to find that Ms. Sullivan demonstrated that Mr. Watson did, in fact, refuse to
communicate with her prospective landlord.
14