Dewey Beach Enterprises, Inc. v. Drass Insurance Agency, Inc. ( 2021 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    DEWEY BEACH ENTERPRISES,INC. and     )
    RUDDERTOWNE HOTEL, LLC,              )
    )
    Plaintiffs,            )
    )
    v.                         ) C.A. No. N20C-08-018 CEB
    )
    DRASS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.;        )
    MARKEL AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.:       )
    WILMINGTON INSURANCE CO.;            )
    CATALYTIC MANAGERS AND INSURANCE )
    AGENCY, LLC; UNDERWRITERS AT         )
    LLOYD’S, LONDON; SAFETYSPECIALTY     )
    INSURANCE CO.; and GUIDEONE NATIONAL )
    INSURANCE CO.,                       )
    )
    Defendants.            )
    Submitted: February 5, 2021
    Decided: May 13, 2021
    On Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
    Motion to Stay Litigation.
    DENIED.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Neil R. Lapinski, Esquire, Phillip A. Giordano, Esquire, GORDON, FOURNARIS
    & MAMMARELLA, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dewey
    Beach Enterprises, Inc. and Ruddertowne Hotel, LLC.
    Susan List Hauske, Esquire, TYBOUT, REDFEARN & PELL, Wilmington,
    Delaware; Kimberly M. Jones, Esquire, Christian M. Gunneson, Esquire, WOOD,
    SMITH HENNING & BERMAN, LLP, Tampa, Florida. Attorneys for Defendants
    Catalytic Risk Managers and Insurance Agency, LLC, Underwriters at Lloyd’s
    London, Safety Specialty Insurance Company and Guideone National Insurance
    Company.
    BUTLER, R.J.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In 2012, Plaintiffs began construction and renovation on a mixed-use property
    containing the Ruddertowne Hotel, the adjacent lighthouse, condominiums, and
    commercial event space (collectively, the “Project”). Plaintiffs retained Defendants
    to provide insurance coverage for the Project.1 The coverage was current through
    April 2020. On April 23, 2020, a fire — deemed arson by the Fire Marshall —
    consumed the lighthouse, the restaurant and damaged the adjacent decking, railings,
    piers, condominiums and commercial space. Plaintiffs have brought this action
    against the insurers claiming breach of contract, negligence and requesting
    declaratory judgment.      Three of the Defendants have moved to dismiss the
    Complaint because, they say, they are still “adjusting” the claim. In the alternative,
    they seek a stay of the litigation pending the completion of their own investigation.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the
    Court accepts all factual allegations as true in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.2
    1
    The instant motion is brought by Defendants Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
    Safety Specialty Insurance Company, and Guideone National Insurance Company.
    It appears these defendants were underwriters of policies obtained by Defendant
    Drass Insurance Agency.
    2
    Williams v. Newark Country Club, 
    2016 WL 6781221
    , at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 2,
    2016); see Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs., LLC, 
    27 A.3d 531
    , 535 (Del. 2011).
    1
    If it is possible for the plaintiff to recover under any reasonable set of circumstances
    presented from the complaint, the motion must be denied.3
    ANALYSIS
    Defendants argue that because the Plaintiffs’ insurance claims are still being
    adjusted, any litigation is premature and is not ripe for adjudication.
    A ripeness determination requires an assessment of whether the interests of
    the party seeking immediate relief – in this case the Plaintiffs – outweigh the
    concerns of a party “in postponing review until the question arises in some more
    concrete and final form.”4 The balancing test to determine ripeness for adjudication
    includes:
    (1) a practical evaluation of the plaintiff’s legitimate interest in prompt
    resolution of the question presented, (2) the hardship that further delay
    may threaten, (3) the possibility of future factual development that
    might affect the determination made, (4) the need to conserve scarce
    judicial resources, and (5) a due respect for identifiable policies of the
    law touching upon the subject matter dispute.5
    Here, these so-called Schick factors weigh in favor of denying the motion to
    dismiss. First, Plaintiffs have a legitimate interest in prompt resolution, as they are
    paying the repair and rebuilding costs themselves, defeating the very reasons they
    3
    Spence v. Funk, 
    396 A.2d 967
    , 968 (Del. 1978).
    4
    Stroud v. Milliken Enter., Inc., 
    552 A.2d 476
    , 480 (Del. 1989) (quoting Cont'l Air
    Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 
    522 F.2d 107
    , 124–25 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
    5
    Schick v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textiles Workers Union, 
    533 A.2d 1235
    , 1239
    (Del. Ch. 1987).
    2
    purchased insurance. Plaintiffs have suffered hardships including loss of income
    and lengthened construction schedules that further delay will exacerbate.
    When considering the possibility of future factual development that might
    affect the determination and a due respect for identifiable policies of the law
    touching on the dispute, Defendants rely upon XL Specialty v. WMI Liquidating
    Trust.6 In XL Specialty, an excess insurance policy was only triggered when the
    plaintiff incurred liability reaching the excess carrier’s attachment level. The Court
    dismissed the action because without a determination regarding liability, there was
    no reasonable likelihood that the policy would be triggered and a judicial
    determination would necessarily be based on speculation and hypothetical facts.
    That is not this case. While there may be multiple insurance policies involved,
    the Defendants have not identified themselves as excess carriers. Absent such a
    claim, XL Specialty is inapposite. There is no risk that the Court will render an
    advisory opinion, as the condition for coverage has been triggered and litigation is
    unavoidable.7 Since litigation is unavoidable, there is no judicial economy served
    by piecemeal litigation.8
    6
    XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. WMI Liquidating Trust, 
    93 A.3d 1208
     (Del. 2014).
    7
    See 
    id. at 1217
     (“Generally, a dispute will be deemed ripe if ‘litigation sooner or
    later appears to be unavoidable and where the material facts are static.’” (quoting
    Julian v. Julian, 
    2009 WL 2937121
    , at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2009))).
    8
    See generally Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. v. Twin City Fire Insur. Co., 
    2020 WL 5758027
    , at *7 (Del. Super. Sept. 28, 2020) (finding judicial economy is not
    3
    The Court cannot sanction further delay when the precipitating factor appears
    to be that Defendant insurers are still investigating the claim. Such logic would give
    Defendant insurers carte blanche to take forever resolving their own coverage
    obligations while the Plaintiff loses the benefits of his bargained-for insurance
    coverage.
    The Court is currently issuing trial availability dates in 2022 at the earliest.
    There is no illusion that these Defendants, or any other party, is being rushed into
    the Courthouse.     Should Defendants require a protective order from onerous
    discovery they are not yet prepared to answer, they may apply to the Court for relief.
    A blanket Order that dismisses the litigation or stays it indefinitely while the insurers
    investigate their options is not appropriate.
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay
    litigation is DENIED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Charles E. Butler, Resident Judge
    preserved when dismissing an action without prejudice would result in a new
    complaint renaming moving insurers).
    4