Perry v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. ( 2015 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
    CLARENCE PERRY,                           )
    Plaintiff,                        )
    )
    v.                                  )        C.A. No. N13C-10-224 ALR
    )
    HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS                     )
    INSURANCE COMPANY,                        )
    Defendant.                        )
    Upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED
    Submitted: May 4, 2015
    Decided: June 3, 2015
    This matter involves a dispute over insurance coverage between Plaintiff,
    Clarence Perry, and Defendant, Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company
    (“Hartford”). Upon consideration of Hartford’s motion for summary judgment and
    Perry’s opposition thereto, the Court makes the following findings:
    1. In March 2007, Perry was insured under a personal homeowners insurance
    policy issued by Hartford. The policy identified 1017 East 13th Street,
    Wilmington, Delaware as Perry’s residence.
    2. Perry owned and operated a business, Perry Trucking, LLC, from his
    residence. Perry did not have a commercial insurance policy with Hartford
    or any other insurance company to insure the business activities of Perry
    Trucking or losses associated with the business.
    3. Perry employed Robert White as a truck driver. If assigned a job, White
    used the Perry Trucking dump truck. Although White had a key for the
    truck, he did not have permission to use the truck for other purposes.
    4. Around 6 o’clock in the morning on March 17, 2007, Perry noticed the Perry
    Trucking dump truck was not parked in front of his residence. Perry had not
    assigned White a job for March 17. When Perry confronted White about the
    missing truck, White admitted that White was using the Perry Trucking
    dump truck to complete a job unaffiliated with Perry Trucking. When White
    returned the Perry Trucking dump truck to Perry’s residence on March 17,
    Perry fired White and attempted to give White his final paycheck. At this
    point, Perry and White had a verbal and physical altercation.
    5. Perry faced criminal charges for assaulting White. On May 2, 2007, Perry
    pled guilty to Assault Third Degree, admitting that he “intentionally or
    recklessly cause[d] physical injury to another person.”1
    6. Anticipating a civil lawsuit, on September 17, 2008, Perry submitted a claim
    with Hartford under Perry’s homeowner’s policy. Perry recited the facts of
    the March 17 altercation and provided Hartford with a copy of the criminal
    complaint against Perry alleging assault and battery against White. On
    September 25, 2008, Hartford denied Perry’s claim for coverage on several
    1
    11 Del. C. § 611.
    2
    grounds, including an exclusion for business activity. Specifically, Hartford
    claimed that the personal injury suffered by White arose out of dispute
    related to Perry’s trucking business and was therefore not covered by Perry’s
    homeowner’s policy.
    7. On October 29, 2008, White filed a civil action against Perry and Perry
    Trucking alleging intentional and negligent conduct. 2 After a two-day trial,
    a jury found in favor of White and entered a verdict against Perry and Perry
    Trucking for $64,100.00. The jury rejected Perry’s self-defense claim.
    8. On October 18, 2013, Perry filed this insurance coverage dispute, claiming
    Hartford failed to defend and indemnify Perry in connection with the 2008
    civil claim by White. On February 18, 2014, Hartford filed a motion for
    judgment on the pleadings, which the Court denied on March 12, 2014.
    9. On March 30, 2015, after discovery was completed, Hartford filed the
    pending motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the policy
    excludes coverage for White’s claim against Perry. According to Hartford,
    the policy does not provide coverage for Perry’s conduct in the March 17
    altercation for several reasons, including an exclusion that applies because
    Perry’s liability arose from operating a business. 3
    2
    White v. Perry, C.A. No. 08C-10-272 CHT (Del. Super. Oct. 29, 2008).
    3
    Because the Court finds that the business exclusion applies, the Court does not
    address Hartford’s other bases for declining coverage.
    3
    10. In opposition, Perry maintains that there are genuine issues of material fact
    which defeat summary judgment. Perry contends that the trier of fact must
    consider the nature of the personal relationship between the parties and the
    circumstances that gave rise to the March 17 altercation. Specifically, Perry
    contends that he and White had been friends before they were business
    associates.
    11. The Court may grant summary judgment only where the moving party can
    “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 4 The moving
    party bears the initial burden of proof and, if satisfied, the burden shifts to
    the non-moving party to show that material issues of fact exist. 5 The Court
    must view the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 6
    12. The Court’s interpretation of the policy is a question of law. 7 Where the
    language is clear and unambiguous, “parties will be bound by the plain and
    common meaning of the policy language.” 8 Here, the parties agree the
    language of the policy is clear and unambiguous.
    4
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56.
    5
    Moore v. Sizemore, 
    405 A.2d 679
    , 680–81 (Del. 1979).
    6
    Brzoska v. Olson, 
    668 A.2d 1355
    , 1364 (Del. 1995).
    7
    O’Brien v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co, 
    785 A.2d 281
    , 286 (Del. 2001).
    8
    Engerbretsen v. Engerbretsen, 
    675 A.2d 13
    , 17 (Del. Super. 1995).
    4
    13.The policy excludes personal liability coverage for loss from “‘[b]odily
    injury’ . . . arising out of or in connection with a ‘business’ conducted from
    an ‘insured location.’” 9 The policy defines business as a “trade, profession
    or occupation engaged in on a full-time, part-time or occasional basis; or
    [a]ny other activity engaged in for money.” 10
    14. Delaware decisional law defines a business pursuit as a “continuous or
    regular activity, done for the purpose of earning profit, including part-time
    or supplemental income activities.” 11 The record is clear, even viewing the
    facts in the light most favorable to Perry, that the reason White was at
    Perry’s residence on March 17 was to return the Perry Trucking dump truck
    and to collect his paycheck.
    15.The Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
    and Hartford is entitled to summary judgment. Perry owned and operated a
    trucking business on his residence and employed White to drive his dump
    truck. The policy at issue excludes coverage for the loss arising out of or in
    connection with a business–Perry Trucking–conducted from an insured
    location–Perry’s residence. The increased risk associated with operating a
    business is exactly what Hartford sought to exclude and, indeed, did exclude
    9
    Def.s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A, Policy at II.E.2., 32 of 41.
    10
    
    Id.
     at B.3.a-b, 1 of 41.
    11
    Delaware Ins. Guard. Ass’n v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 
    1992 WL 147998
    , at *5
    (Del. Super. June 9, 1992).
    5
    from coverage under the homeowner’s policy Hartford issued to Perry.
    Accordingly, Hartford is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
    NOW, THEREFORE, on this 3rd day of June 2015, Defendant’s Motion
    for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. Judgment is hereby entered in
    favor of Defendant Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company and against
    Plaintiff Clarence Perry.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Andrea L. Rocanelli
    ____________________________________
    The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13C-10-224

Judges: Rocanelli

Filed Date: 6/3/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/4/2015