State of Delaware v. Howard. ( 2015 )

G «a».
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 3;
STATE OF DELAWARE )
“9 753'
; E3 w:
v. ) ID No. 1503012316
)
CHARLES HOWARD, ;
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER
On this 16th day of November, 2015, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
John S. Taylor, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Beth D. Savitz, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Public Defender’s
Office, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the Defendant.
Scott, J.
ngroductiglfl
Before the Court is Defendant Charles Howard’s (“Defendant”)
Motion to Suppress, brought by counsel. Defendant argues that he was
searched and seized in Violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, pursuant
to an illegal traffic stop. The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions
and held a suppression hearing. For the following reasons, the Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
On March 19, 2015, Corporal William Draper of the Wilmington
Police Department (“WPD”) was monitoring the Downtown Visions
cameras. While monitoring the video feed of the 900 block of North Pine
Street, Cpl. Draper observed a grey Ford Explorer with tag number
XC743894. He also observed a black male, wearing red sneakers, a grey
sweatshirt, and blue jeans, repeatedly go in and out of the grey vehicle.
Finally, Cpl. Draper observed the individual engage in conduct, which was
in his training and experience, consistent with hand to hand drug
transactions.
Cpl. Draper advised Officers Patrick Malloy and Kevin Lubeck of
WPD what he observed. The officers drove to the Explorer’s location. As
they arrived, the vehicle was pulling away. The officers followed, calling in
to the Data Center for a registration inquiry on the vehicle’s temporary tag.
The Data Center ran the tag through DELJIS and informed the officers that
there was no record for the listed registration.
The officers activated their lights and pulled over the vehicle. Upon
approaching the vehicle, one officer requested the occupants’ pedigree
information. The driver was identified as Desdani Leatherburry. It was later
discovered that the vehicle’s temporary registration was valid and the
vehicle was registered to Ms. Leatherburry’s father.
Officer Malloy approached the front passenger, Defendant Charles
Howard, who Officer Malloy observed was wearing the same clothing as
described to him by Cpl. Draper. Defendant initially gave his name as
Derrick Johnson, with a date of birth of August 6, 1992. When that named
returned invalid in DELJIS, Defendant was asked to step out of the vehicle
and Officer Malloy asked Defendant for his name again. This time
Defendant gave his correct name and date of birth. Defendant was arrested
for the criminal charge of Criminal Impersonation and then patted down by
Officer Malloy.
Contraband was found on Defendant’s person during the search
incident to his arrest. Officer Malloy testified that the vehicle was then
towed to WPD based on Cpl. Draper’s observations of apparent contraband
in the vehicle, which was indicative of a large quantity of drugs. Both Ms.
Leatherburry and Defendant were detained and taken back to the police
station. At the police station, the officers found additional contraband in the
vehicle pursuant to a search consented to by Ms. Leatherburry.
_l_’arties.’___Cog_tentions.
Defendant argues that the officers lacked probable cause to stop the
vehicle because the vehicle’s temporary registration was valid, and that but
for that illegal stop of the vehicle, the officers would not have gotten to the
point of asking for Defendant’s name or discovering the capiases pending
for Defendant’s arrest. As such, Defendant argues that any evidence or
information after the stop was unlawfiilly obtained.
Defendant also argues that the officers extended the stop longer than
was necessary to determine if there had been a violation of the motor vehicle
code. Defendant asserts that questioning and detaining him was not part of
finding out whether or not the vehicle was properly registered.
Defendant argues further that the vehicle search at the traffic stop was
illegal because Defendant was already removed from the vehicle and in
custody. Thus, Defendant asserts that the search subsequent to that unlawful
search is also unlawful.
Finally, Defendant argues that his detention was illegal from its
inception, and that the subsequent searches were tainted by illegality of the
detention. Defendant argues that, for these reasons, any evidence seized
from him should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
The State argues first that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
the vehicle. The State also argues that the stop was valid, despite the later
discovery that the vehicle’s registration was valid. The State further argues
that the officers were allowed to request all passengers’ pedigree
information. Finally, the State argues that Defendant had no expectation of
privacy in the vehicle.
Discussion:
An individual's right to be free from unreasonable governmental
searches and seizures is secured by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.1 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures...”2
“Under the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop is reasonable if it is
supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic
1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 8 (1968); Quarles v. State, 696 A.2d 1334, 1336 (Del.
1997).
2 US. Const. Amend. IV.
violation has occurred.”3 Even if it is later determined that there was in fact
no violation, an officer’s mistake as to an objective fact at the time of the
stop may still be properly considered in determining whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion.4
Moreover, the scope and duration of the detention must be reasonably
related to the initial justification for the traffic stop.5 During a routine traffic
6
stop, all passengers are subject to some scrutiny. The Delaware Supreme
Court has held that during a routine traffic stop, the police may question a
passenger about his or her identity, and that those questions are not beyond
the scope of a reasonable investigation.7
person only has standing to challenge evidence seized as a result of
a Violation of one's own constitutional rights.8 The petitioner must
demonstrate his own “legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place” before he may challenge the validity of a search or seizure.9 For
purposes of protection under the Fourth Amendment, automobiles are
3 State v. Rickard“ 23°73“ 1“47. 151 (Del. Super. 2010), affid 30 A.3d 782 (Del. 2011)
.. '“ 1’" 5° “*5” '- “WL 453210 (Del. Feb. 22, 2006).
-,: - I_‘. " ' ' 3,. 2001).
" 37 ._ I, __ ' {$007) (“[E]ven when the wrongdoing is only
bad driving, [a] passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny....”).
7 Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Del. 2010) (quoting Mills v. State, 900 A.2d 101(Table), 2006 WL 1027202, at *2 (Del. 2006) (“[Q]uestions concerning a suspect’s
identity are a routine and accepted part [of an investigatory stop].”).
3 Mills, 2006 WL 1027202.
9 Wilson v. State, 812 A.2d 225 (Del. 2002) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US. 128
(1978)).
J!— ___ —._ —.—l _
treated differently than houses.10 A passenger who does not own or exercise
control over a vehicle does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy
1 Therefore, a mere passenger in a
in the- vehicle in which he is traveling.1
vehicle does not have standing to challenge a search.12 The only standing
that the passenger has is in the narrow context of objecting to the seizure of
his person.13
In Mills v. State, the defendant argued that he was illegally detained at
the time of the motor vehicle stop and that the fruits of that detention should
have been suppressed.14 The court in Mills held that the defendant lacked
standing to seek suppression of the fruits discovered as a result of the
driver’s arrest because the defendant did not own or exercise control over
the vehicle, and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vehicle’s trunk where the evidence was found.15 Furthermore, the court in
Mills specifically acknowledged that, while the defendant had “no standing
with respect to the stop and search of the vehicle, he [had] standing to object
to the circumstances under which his person was seized.”16
'0 Rakas, 439 us. 128.
3 See Mills, 2006 WL 1027202; see Rakas, 439 US. 128,,
1d.
‘3 Jarvis v. State, 600 A.2d 38, n.1 (Del. 1991).
'4 Mills, 2006 WL 1027202, at *1.
15
Id.
’6 Id. at *2.
In this case, the Court first addresses the issue of standing. Defendant
does not have standing to challenge the traffic stop or the search of the
vehicle because he did not own or control the vehicle. The Court finds the
facts in this case are substantially similar to those in Mills. Here, Defendant
has standing to object to the circumstances under which his person was
seized, but he has no standing with respect to the stop of the vehicle and
evidence found as a result of the vehicle search.17 The vehicle was driven by
Ms. Leatherburry and registered to her father. There is no evidence that
Defendant owned the vehicle or exercised control over it. Moreover, Ms.
Leatherburry later consented to a search of the vehicle at the police station.
Thus, as a passenger in the vehicle, Defendant had no reasonable expectation
of privacy inside the vehicle. Accordingly, Defendant has no standing to
suppress evidence obtained from the vehicle pursuant to the traffic stop and
its consensual search.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the stop was valid because the
officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion for the stop. Although it was
later discovered that the vehicle’s temporary registration was in fact valid,
the officers believed there to be no valid registration for the vehicle at the
time of the stop. This mistaken belief may still be properly considered in
r7 Mills, i006 =WL"1027202, Qt * 1; Jarvis, 600 A.2d 38 at n.1.
evaluating whether there was reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop
because the information was an “objective fact” obtained from the DELJIS
Data Center.18 The evidence submitted by the State shows that the vehicle
tag was correctly relayed from the officers and received by the Data Center
operator.” Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the Data Center is
untrustworthy.20 It follows then, that the officers reasonably believed at the
time of the stop that the vehicle’s temporary registration was invalid. As
such, it does not matter whether the registration information was, in fact,
correct.21 The information from the Data Center was sufficient to form
reasonable articulable suspicion that Ms. Leatherburry was committing a
motor vehicle offense, at the time of the stop.22
Defendant does, however, have standing to challenge the
circumstances under which his person was searched and seized.23 On this
issue, the Court finds that the traffic stop did not exceed its reasonable
duration or scope because the police may question a passenger about his
4
identity during a routine traffic stop.2 Furthermore, the officers had
reasonable suspicion for further investigation into Defendant’s true identity
24 See Loper, 8 A.3d at 1173.
upon discovering that Defendant had provide the officers with a fake name
and date of birth.
Moreover, the Court finds that the officers had probable cause to
arrest Defendant for Criminal Impersonation after Defendant admitted to
initially giving Officer Malloy a false name and date of birth. As such,
Defendant was validly searched incident to that arrest. Accordingly, the
evidence found on Defendant’s person as a result thereof should not be
suppressed.
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, is
hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10