State v. Joshua Scruggs ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 1503016361
)
JOSHUA SCRUGGS, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION
Date Submitted: January 15, 2016
Date Decided: January 22, 2016
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Custodial Statement: DENIED.
Periann Doko, Deputy Attorney General, Julie Finocchiaro, Deputy Attorney
General, Delaware Department of Justice, 820 North French Street, Wilmington,
DE 19801, Attorneys for the State.
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Colleen E. Durkin, Esquire, Collins & Associates, 716
North Tatnall Street, Suite 300, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendant.
JURDEN, P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant Joshua Scruggs’s Motion to Suppress
Custodial Statement. The Court held a suppression hearing on January 15, 2016,
and has reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties and the videotaped interview
at issue. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
Custodial Statement is DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
On March 22, 2015, officers from the New Castle County Police Department
(“NCCPD”) were called to a shooting at Rogers Manor Park in New Castle,
Delaware. On arrival, officers found Miguel Escobar and Jose Padilla-Gonzales in
a GMC Sierra suffering from gunshot wounds. Escobar and Padilla were
immediately transported to the hospital. A third occupant of the vehicle, Axel
Cruz, was transported to the NCCPD headquarters.
The initial police investigation revealed that Brandon Kasinath was meeting
Escobar to consummate a marijuana sale. Kasinath and another male allegedly got
into the Sierra and pulled out a handgun. At the same time, two other men
allegedly stood outside of the Sierra with shotguns. Someone then fired shots into
the Sierra, injuring Escobar and Padilla.
As the investigation progressed, the police learned that Kasinath and several
other individuals met earlier that day at 136 Stamm Boulevard, the home of Carlos
2
Hernandez, where they allegedly passed around two shotguns and a handgun, and
planned to rob Escobar.
On March 25, 2015, three days after the shooting, Detective John Ziemba,
the Chief Investigating Officer, asked Detective Sendek and Detective DiSabatino
of the NCCPD to locate Defendant Joshua Scruggs (“Scruggs”) and ask Scruggs if
he would be willing to come to the NCCPD police headquarters for a formal
interview with Detective Ziemba. Although Scruggs was not considered a suspect
at the time, Detective Ziemba had information that Scruggs was at 136 Stamm
Boulevard on the day of the shooting, and he wanted to talk to Scruggs about who
else was there and what Scruggs heard or observed.
The officers went to Scruggs’s house and made the request. The officers
also told Scruggs that if he wished he could drive himself, but Scruggs elected to
accompany the officers in an unmarked police car. Detective Sendek testified that
if Scruggs had indicated that he did not want to go to police headquarters, the
officers would have left.
Detective Sendek testified that he was not certain if Scruggs was patted
down for weapons, but it is his standard practice to conduct a safety pat down for
weapons before anyone is transported in his police car. Detective Sendek’s police
car did not have a shield or barrier between the driver and passenger
compartments.
3
Upon arriving at the NCCPD headquarters around 9:20 a.m., Scruggs
followed Detective DiSabatino through the main lobby entrance. According to
Detective Sendek, individuals who are suspects or in custody are escorted through
an entrance in the back of the building, which leads directly to the processing and
cell block area. Scruggs was not handcuffed and remained in possession of all of
his belongings.
Scruggs followed Detective DiSabatino to an interview room where he was
left alone for about fifteen minutes until Detective Ziemba commenced the
interview at approximately 9:39 a.m.. After obtaining Scruggs’s background
information, Detective Ziemba began to question Scruggs about his whereabouts
on March 22, 2015, and the various people he was with that day.
Approximately one hour into the interview, Detective Ziemba administered
Miranda warnings, and Scruggs signed a Miranda waiver form. The interview
continued for approximately three more hours, during which time Scruggs
admitted that guns were present at Carlos’ house. Scruggs also told Detective
Ziemba who had the guns, how the robbery was planned, and who was present
during the shooting.
Scruggs was arrested later that day, along with co-defendants Hernandez,
Kasinath, Kaleef Smyre, and Jorge Reza-Ayala. Scruggs was charged with
Attempted Murder First Degree, Robbery First Degree, Assault Second Degree,
4
Conspiracy First Degree, Conspiracy Second Degree, twelve counts of Possession
of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Criminal Mischief.
III. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Scruggs moves to suppress his entire March 25, 2015 statement, arguing that
it was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Scruggs argues that he was interrogated for over an hour and
provided incriminating information before being advised of his Miranda rights.
Scruggs contends that under Missouri v. Seibert 1 and State v. Mattison, 2 the mid-
interrogation Miranda warning is unconstitutional and cannot cure the statement he
gave pre-Miranda. In response, the State argues that Scruggs was never subject to
a custodial interrogation and that Siebert and Mattison are not applicable because
Detective Ziemba did not use the two-tiered interrogation scheme at issue in those
cases.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court extended the right against
self-incrimination to any person suspected of a crime who is subjected to custodial
1
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
2
State v. Mattison, 2005 WL 406342 (Del. Super. 2005).
5
interrogation. 3
A law enforcement officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings
attaches only in the context of a “custodial interrogation.” 4 A custodial
interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.” 5 The Court must review the totality of the circumstances, and the
“initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating
officers or the person being questioned.” 6
The fact that the questioning occurs in a police station does not
automatically make it custodial. 7 “[T]he legal standard used to determine
‘custody’ for Miranda purposes is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4
Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1191–92 (Del. 1992).
5
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
6
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994).
7
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 492–95 (1977) (“[A] noncustodial situation is not
converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that,
even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning
took place in a ‘coercive environment.’ Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police
officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part
of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.
But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they
question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning
takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ It was that sort of coercive environment to
which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited.”); Chao v. State, 604
A.2d 1351, 1355–56 (Del. 1992) overruled on other grounds by Williams v. State,
818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002).
6
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 8 “In the
absence of a formal arrest, the determination that there has been a restraint on
freedom of movement to a degree that would trigger Miranda turns on whether a
reasonable person, in the suspect’s position, would believe himself or herself to be
in custody or deprived of his or her freedom in a significant way.” 9
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Scruggs was not
in custody prior to the time when Detective Ziemba administered Miranda
warnings. Scruggs voluntarily came to the police headquarters and knew he was
going there for an interview with Detective Ziemba. Although Scruggs was
transported in an unmarked police car, Scruggs was told that if he wished he could
drive himself. Scruggs voluntarily elected to accompany the officers in the police
car. 10
8
Schellinger v. State, 2000 WL 1587950, at *1 (Del. 2000) (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 1528–
29); Marine, 607 A.2d at 1192.
9
State v. Wright, 2009 WL 3068914, at *4 (Del. Super. 2009); Chao, 604 A.2d at 1355 (“[I]n the
absence of an actual arrest the critical variable in defining ‘custody’ is the extent to which a
particular detention resembles an actual arrest.”).
10
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (holding Miranda warnings were not required
where the defendant, although a suspect, was not placed under arrest, voluntarily came to police
station, and was allowed to leave unhindered after brief interview); Chao, 604 A.2d at 1356–57
(holding that the defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation even though the defendant
was escorted from her home to the police station); State v. Davis, 2002 WL 1463105, at *2 (Del.
Super. 2002) (holding that the defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation when he
accompanied the police officers to the police station, was not told he was under arrest, was not
handcuffed, was given breaks when requested, and was allowed to return home when he
wanted); Wright, 2009 WL 3068914, at *4–5 (holding that the defendant was not in custody
when the defendant voluntarily accompanied officers back to the police station, was patted down
for weapons, was never handcuffed, remained in possession of his cell phone, and the interview
door was not locked); State v. Sumner, 2003 WL 21963008, at *11 (Del. Super. 2003) (holding
7
Upon arriving at the NCCPD headquarters, Scruggs followed Detective
DiSabatino through the main lobby entrance and was left alone in the interview
room until Detective Ziemba commenced the interview. Scruggs was not
handcuffed, deprived of his belongings, or processed in any way that would lead a
reasonable person in that situation to believe that he or she was in custody or
otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way. The
interview door was not locked, Scruggs was not restrained, and Scruggs did not ask
to leave or indicate that he wanted to leave. Detective Ziemba was the only officer
present for the entire interview, the tone of the interview was conversational, and
the pre-Miranda portion of the interview was only an hour long with two breaks,
during which Scruggs was left alone in the interview room.
Several times during the interview Detective Ziemba told Scruggs that he
knew he was lying and advised Scruggs about the importance of being truthful.
For example, Detective Ziemba told Scruggs, “if you keep lying you will be in
worse trouble,” “help yourself out, it’s every man for himself,” and “you could get
arrested for lying to me.” Scruggs argues that no reasonable person subject to this
aggressive line of questioning would feel free to leave.
that the defendant was not in custody when the defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany
officers to the police station, was patted down for weapons, was never handcuffed, did not ask to
leave, and the interview door was not locked).
8
“When there is no formal arrest, another aspect of the inquiry is whether the
police resorted to psychological pressure or deception sufficient to transform an
interview into a custodial interrogation.” 11 However, “police tactics which can be
described as ‘coercive’ do not of themselves change the nature of an interview.” 12
“Miranda warnings are only required when a person’s freedom has been
sufficiently restricted so as to amount to custody.” 13
Under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview, after
reviewing the testimony provided at the suppression hearing, and the videotaped
interview, the Court does not find that Detective Ziemba’s line of questioning,
wherein he accused Scruggs of lying, transformed the interview into a custodial
interrogation such that a reasonable person, in Scruggs’s position, would believe he
was in custody or deprived of his freedom in a significant way. Although Scruggs
was not overly forthcoming, he remained calm, did not appear frustrated, did not
indicate that he wanted the questioning to end, or that he wanted to leave. Both
Detective Ziemba and Scruggs’s tone and demeanor remained conversational,
Detective Ziemba remained seated, Scruggs was not restrained in any way, and
Scruggs was left alone in the interview room during two breaks. 14
11
State v. Aiken, 1992 WL 301739, at *2 (Del. Super. 1992); State v. Alexander, 1994 WL
150862, at *4–6 (Del. Super. 1994).
12
Id. (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
13
Chao, 604 A.2d at 1356 (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
14
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495–96 (“The officer’s false statement about having discovered [the
defendant’s] fingerprints at the scene . . . has nothing to do with whether [the defendant] was in
9
Scruggs relies on Seibert and Mattison to argue that the mid-interrogation
Miranda warning cannot cure the statement he gave pre-Miranda. However, both
Seibert and Mattison are distinguishable from the present case. In Seibert, the
interrogating officer intentionally withheld Miranda warnings as an interrogation
technique until the defendant gave a confession. 15 The interrogating officer then
elicited a subsequent confession following the Miranda warnings.16 The United
States Supreme Court held that this two-tiered interrogation scheme was
unconstitutional and provided the following factors in considering whether mid-
stream interrogation Miranda warnings would be effective: “the completeness and
detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the
overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and
the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the
interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” 17
Similarly, in Mattison, the issue before the Court was whether a mid-
interrogation Miranda warning could cure a prior confession given without proper
Miranda warnings. In Mattison, the defendant was taken into custody following a
custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.”); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)
(“Instead of pressuring Alvarado with the threat of arrest and prosecution, she appealed to his
interest in telling the truth and being helpful to a police officer.”); United States v. LeBrun, 363
F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he coercive aspects of a police interview are largely irrelevant
to the custody determination except where a reasonable person would perceive the coercion as
restricting his or her freedom to depart.”).
15
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605–06.
16
Id.17
Id. at 615–16.
10
traffic stop and was questioned in an interrogation room about his alcohol and drug
consumption prior to that traffic stop. 18 Mattison responded that he had been
drinking, had consumed three bags of heroin, and “that he committed crimes to get
the drugs.” 19 The interrogating officer then issued Miranda warnings and
questioned Mattison regarding these newly discovered crimes. 20 Applying the
Seibert factors, the Court concluded that the mid-interrogation Miranda warnings
could not cure Mattison’s first statement, and reasoned that, “the post-Miranda
warnings [could not] function effectively because the second confession was not
separate and distinct from the first line of questioning.” 21
In the present case, Scruggs was not subject to a custodial interrogation prior
to being advised of his Miranda rights, and Detective Ziemba did not use a two-
tiered interrogation approach to elicit an incriminating response before Scruggs
was advised of his Miranda rights. Detective Ziemba had reason to believe that
Scruggs was at Carlos’ house the day of the shooting and Detective Ziemba’s pre-
Miranda questions focused on what happened at Carlos’ house and the people who
were there. Detective Ziemba administered Miranda warnings once Scruggs
positively identified Brandon Kasinath, an individual suspected to be involved in
the shooting. After Scruggs signed a Miranda waiver form, Detective Ziemba
18
Mattison, 2005 WL 406342, at * 1.
19
Id.20
Id.21
Id. at *3.
11
began asking questions about firearms at Carlos’ house, the robbery, and the
shooting.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Scruggs was not in custody prior
to being advised of his Miranda rights and, therefore, the interrogating officer was
not required to administer Miranda warnings. Scruggs was not formally arrested
and there was no restraint on Scruggs’s freedom of movement to a degree that
would lead a reasonable person, in Scruggs’s position, to believe he was in custody
or deprived of his freedom in any significant way. For the foregoing reasons,
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Custodial Statement is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Jan R. Jurden, President Judge
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