State v. Riley ( 2017 )


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  • Superior Court
    of the
    Stote of De|owore
    Jon R. Jurden New Cost|e County Cour'thouse
    President Judge 500 North King Street, Suite 10400
    Wi|mington, De|owore 19801-3733
    Te|ephone (302) 255-0665
    August 17, 2017
    Rebecca Song, Esq. Joseph W. Benson, Esq.
    Department of Justice 1701 North Market Street
    Carvel State Offlce Building P.O. Box 248
    820 North French Street Wilmington, DE 19899
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    RE: State v. Charles Rilev, Case No. 1703005932
    Dear Counsel:
    The Court is in receipt of State’s Motion in Limine and Defendant’s Response.1 In its
    Motion, the State requests that the Court permit the State to introduce evidence of Defendant’s
    probationary status pursuant to Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 404(b) “for the limited
    purpose of establishing proof of identity and intent or state of mind.”2 In Support of this request,
    the State proffers that Defendant, while on Level II probation for Drug Dealing,3 was outside his
    residence when Probation received a tip that Defendant was selling drugs from that residence.4
    When Probation Offlcer Collins, accompanied by Detective Rosaio, responded to Defendant’s
    residence based on the tip, Collins knocked and announced himself as “Probation” and observed
    Defendant within his house through a window.5 Defendant did not come to the front door and
    appeared to be hiding from the officers, only revealing himself once the officers entered the
    house.6 An administrative search of the house revealed drugs, ammunition, and a firearm.7 As a
    result of the foregoing, Defendant is charged by indictment with the following:
    Drug Dealing Tier 4 Quantity of Cocaine;
    Aggravated Possession Tier 5 Quantity of Cocaine;
    Drug Dealing Tier 2 Quantity of Heroin;
    Aggravated Possession Tier 2 Quantity of Heroin;
    Drug Dealing Marijuana;
    Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony;
    1 D.I. 14, 20.
    2 D.I. 14 at l.
    3 CaSe NO. 1506009651.
    4 D.I. l4 at 2_3.
    5 Ia'. at 3.
    6 
    Id. 7 Id.
    Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (4 counts);
    Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited;
    Receiving a Stolen Firearm;
    Resisting Arrest; and
    Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.8
    The State argues that Defendant’s probationary status is relevant to show: how Detective Rosaio
    and Officer Collins were able to identify Defendant; Defendant’s intent to resist arrest; and
    Defendant’s “intent to conceal drugs and a . . . [handgun] to avoid new charges and a violation of
    probation.”9
    D.R.E. 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts “to prove the
    character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Such evidence may be
    admissible “for other purposes, Such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
    knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.”10 In Getz v. Sl‘az‘e,ll the Delaware
    Supreme Court laid out six factors for the Court to consider for Rule 404(b) evidence.
    Admissible Rule 404(b) evidence must be:
    (1) material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute;
    (2) introduced for a purpose either explicitly sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or for a
    purpose consistent with Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on the use of evidence of bad
    acts to show bad character or action in conformity therewith;
    (3) proved by evidence which is plain, clear and conclusive;
    (4) not too remote in time;
    (5) balanced against any unfair prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403; and
    (6) if admitted, admitted subject to a D.R.E. 105 limiting instruction.12
    In this case, Defendant’s status as a probationer is material to at least two issues or
    ultimate facts in dispute--Defendant’s identity and intent on the charge of Resisting Arrest.
    Pursuant to ll Del. C. § 1257(b), “[a] person is guilty of resisting arrest when the person
    intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an arrest or detention
    of the person or another person or intentionally flees from a peace officer who is effecting an
    arrest or detention of the person” As a condition of probation, Defendant was required to permit
    probation officers to enter his home.13 Thus, Defendant’s apparent attempt to hide from
    Probation, as outlined in the State’s proffer, reflects much differently on Defendant’s actions
    8 D.I. 14 a11_2;D.1.3.
    9 D.I. 14 at 6.
    111 D.R.E. 404(b).
    11 
    538 A.2d 726
    (Del. 1988).
    12 ld. at 734 (qu<>cing Renzi v. sza¢e, 
    320 A.2d 711
    , 712 (Del. 1974)).
    13 D.I. 19 11 2.
    than if he were a person not under State supervision who avoided coming to the door to talk to
    Probation or police officers.
    In light of the foregoing, the Court must consider whether D.R.E. 403 requires the
    exclusion of Defendant’s status as a probationer because the probative value is substantially
    outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In Deshields v. State, the Delaware Supreme
    Court discussed a nine-factor analysis for D.R.E. 403 balancing in the context of D.R.E. 404(b)
    evidence:
    (1) the extent to which the point to be proved is disputed;
    (2) the adequacy of proof of the prior conduct;
    (3) the probative force of the evidence;
    (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence;
    (5) the availability of less prejudicial proof;
    (6) the inflammatory or prejudicial effect of the evidence;
    (7) the similarity of the prior wrong to the charged offense;
    (8) the effectiveness of limiting instructions; and
    (9) the extent to which prior act evidence would prolong the proceedings.14
    As previously stated, Defendant’s probationary status casts the actions he allegedly took to avoid
    and hide from Probation in a much different light than if he were a non-probationer, and this
    context is necessary for the jury to fairly determine whether the State has met its burden of proof
    on the elements of Resisting Arrest. Due to the nature of the evidence-the fact of Defendant’s
    status_there is no less prejudicial proof available. However, the inflammatory or prejudicial
    effect of the evidence can and must be mitigated in this case. Therefore, evidence of
    Defendant’s status as a probationer_in addition to being subject to a D.R.E. 105 limiting
    instruction_shall not include any indication of the offense for which Defendant was on
    probation. What probative value, if any, the fact that Defendant was previously convicted of
    Drug Dealing has is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Subject to the
    foregoing limitations, the Court finds evidence of Defendant’s status as a probationer admissible
    under D.R.E. 404(b) to show Defendant’s identity and intent on the charge of Resisting Arrest.
    Although the State argues that Defendant’s status as a probationer is also admissible to
    show his identity and intent with regard to the Drug Dealing and Aggravated Possession charges,
    the Court finds this evidence excludable under D.R.E. 403.
    14 
    706 A.2d 502
    , 506-07 (Del. 1998).
    For the foregoing reasons, the State’s Motion in Limine is GRANTED in part and
    DENIED in part.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    an R. J urderl
    President Judge
    JRJ:mls
    cc: Prothonotary
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1703005932

Judges: Jurden P.J.

Filed Date: 8/17/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/21/2017